Delaney v An Coimisiún Pleanála [2025] IEHC 621: Failure to Prosecute, Defective Pleadings and the Strict Leave Threshold in Planning Judicial Review

1. Introduction

Delaney v An Coimisiún Pleanála & Buirios Ltd [2025] IEHC 621 is a High Court (Planning & Environment List) decision of Humphreys J delivered on 13 November 2025. The case arises from a challenge by a lay litigant homeowner to a permission for a nine-turbine wind farm and access road near Templemore, Co. Tipperary. Substantively, the applicant was concerned about the proximity of the construction access road to her dwelling and past hedgerow removal on neighbouring lands.

However, the judgment is not primarily about the environmental or planning merits of the project. It is a decision at leave stage in judicial review, and it is significant for three tightly linked procedural themes:

• The stringent “substantial grounds” test for leave in planning judicial review and the requirement that such grounds be properly pleaded and evidenced.
• The enforcement of procedural discipline, particularly:
  • adherence to the eight-week time limit in s. 50 of the Planning and Development Act 2000,
  • compliance with the Rules of the Superior Courts and Practice Direction HC126, and
  • the insistence that applications (e.g. for adjournments) be made by formal motion and affidavit, not by a stream of informal emails.
• The articulation of failure to prosecuteindependent discretionary basis for refusing leave, even where the proceedings have technically been commenced within time but are then allowed to languish.

The case also displays a candid judicial engagement with the difficulties of managing litigation involving a self-represented, medically unwell litigant, and the tension between accommodating personal difficulties and ensuring that planning litigation — which is subject to statutory expedition — is not indefinitely stalled to the prejudice of developers and decision-makers.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The proposed development

The impugned decision was An Coimisiún Pleanála’s decision under reference ABP-318704-23 to grant permission for:

• a ten-year wind farm development of nine turbines, and
• associated infrastructure, including an access road,

at Borrisbeg and adjacent townlands near Templemore, Co. Tipperary. Documentation for the application was available on a dedicated website (borrisbegplanning.com) and remained accessible at the time of judgment.

Tipperary County Council’s Chief Executive’s report (14 February 2024) considered the development broadly acceptable subject to conditions. An inspector reported on 26 June 2024 recommending a grant with conditions. The Board granted permission on 12 September 2024 and notified the applicant on 16 September 2024.

2.2 The applicant’s involvement at planning stage

The applicant, a wheelchair user residing near the proposed access road, objected to the development. Her key concerns included:

• the proximity of the main access road to her property (about 60 metres from the gable of her house), particularly noise, vibration and potential structural damage during construction;
• previous hedgerow removal on neighbouring lands (in 2019) which she linked to the wind farm project; and
• wider distress about the impact of construction on her remaining quality of life.

She had attempted to object to An Bord Pleanála (as it then was) by a letter dated 13 December 2024, which was rejected as being out of time. She later made further submissions, including on 31 January and 3 April 2024.

Importantly, the inspector’s report did expressly address her concerns. The judge quotes paragraph 10.17.18 at length, where the inspector:

• identifies the location of the access in proximity to her dwelling,
• recognises potential construction noise and vibration impacts, and
• records additional mitigation measures proposed by the developer (temporary acoustic screening; pre- and post-construction structural surveys) and recommends that these be secured by condition in any permission.

This would later be central to the judge’s conclusion that her alleged failure-to-consider complaint was, in substance, a merits disagreement, not a legal ground.

2.3 Commencement of judicial review and time-limit issues

The Board’s decision was made on 12 September 2024, so under s. 50(6) and (7) of the 2000 Act the eight-week limitation period for commencing judicial review expired on 6 November 2024. The applicant:

• emailed the Non-Jury Judicial Review List on 6 November 2024 at 14:32 seeking a pre-emptive extension of time to lodge an “urgent Judicial Review”; and
• filed her statement of grounds and grounding affidavit on 11 November 2024 — five days late.

The 6 November email, addressed to a registrar, was not answered. The judge describes this approach as:

“not the correct procedure to seek an extension of time and unsurprisingly there appears to have been no response.”

Crucially:

• No extension of time was sought in the statement of grounds or by notice of motion.
• No affidavit was sworn explaining the delay in the terms required by s. 50(8) and the “outside the control” test.

The judge ultimately treats the application as out of time and explains why an extension would not be granted, but he describes this analysis as obiter because he bases the refusal of leave principally on other grounds (lack of substantial grounds, defective pleadings, and failure to prosecute).

2.4 Delay and failure to prosecute after filing

After filing the papers on 11 November 2024:

• The applicant did nothing to seek a listing date for five months. Under the practice in the Non-Jury Judicial Review List, it is the applicant’s obligation to contact the List Registrar to obtain a listing.
• On 1 May 2025 she finally contacted the wrong registrar, and the matter was then passed to the Planning & Environment List.
• Over the following months, multiple listing dates were set and repeatedly vacated at her request, largely on asserted health grounds, often quite vaguely particularised.
• The case was administratively adjourned “generally” for a time, following persistent requests for adjournments.
• The developer, Buirios Limited, eventually sought to have the matter listed; when it came before the court on 29 September 2025, the applicant did not attend.

On that date the court:

• Joined the developer as a notice party,
• directed that leave be moved on notice, and
• made an unless order striking out the application unless the applicant attended on the adjourned date of 13 October 2025.

Notice of this order was sent to the applicant by the developer and the court; she attended on 13 October 2025 and the leave application was heard on notice.

2.5 The October 2025 leave hearing and post‑hearing submissions

At the leave hearing:

• The applicant, acting in person, made submissions without any time limit.
• The respondent and the notice party opposed leave, raising:
  • out-of-time commencement,
  • defective pleadings,
  • lack of substantial grounds, and
  • failure to prosecute.
• The applicant sought a further adjournment but made no formal motion and provided no sworn evidence of acute incapacity.

The judge reserved judgment but, “to ensure that the applicant felt that she had a full opportunity to make her points”, he offered an exceptional concession:

• the opportunity to file a post-hearing written submission, and
• a further opportunity to file a replying submission after seeing the respondents’ submissions.

A detailed timetable was then set by the court (email of 20 October 2025), giving:

• two weeks for the applicant’s submission (until 29 October 2025),
• one week for the respondents’ submissions (until 5 November 2025), and
• a further week for the applicant to reply (until 12 November 2025).

The applicant did file an initial submission but:

• she repeatedly sought further extensions of time by email,
• she invoked serious health difficulties and produced some certificates, but without sworn evidence, and
• she did not in fact lodge a further replying submission by 12 November 2025.

Against this backdrop, Humphreys J ultimately refused leave and dismissed the application, with no order as to costs.

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Core holdings

The High Court refused leave to apply for judicial review and dismissed the proceedings. The main holdings can be summarised as follows:

1. No substantial grounds pleaded or established:
   • The statement of grounds was unfocused, unclear, argumentative and inadequately verified.
   • No pleaded fact, if proved, could support a substantial legal challenge to the Board’s decision.
   • The applicant’s complaints essentially amounted to disagreement with the merits of the planning decision, not legal error.
   • Her concerns about the access road and potential impacts on her house were expressly addressed by the inspector, undermining any allegation that her submissions were ignored.
   • Her complaints about hedgerow removal in 2019 by a neighbouring farmer were legally irrelevant to the validity of the 2024 permission.
2. Defective pleadings in breach of Rules of Court:
   • The applicant failed to join the developer as a notice party within the eight-week period; it had to be joined by court order.
   • The statement of grounds failed to meet the particularity requirements of Order 84 RSC and Practice Direction HC126.
   • This lack of particularisation was “clearly disqualifying” and an independent reason to refuse leave.
3. Discretionary refusal for failure to prosecute:
   • Judicial review is a discretionary remedy; that discretion can be exercised even at leave stage.
   • The applicant had:
     • failed to progress her proceedings for approximately 11 months after issuing,
     • failed to notify the court or the opposing parties for over five months, and
     • engaged in a pattern of vigorous correspondence combined with persistent, inadequately supported requests for adjournments.
   • This constituted a failure to prosecute the application, justifying dismissal on discretionary grounds.
4. Time limit and extension (obiter):
   • The application was commenced five days out of time.
   • No extension was sought in the proper form, and no satisfactory explanation was sworn on affidavit.
   • Even if the issue had been live, the judge states obiter that he would have refused an extension: generic health issues and lay litigant status do not meet the “outside the control” standard in s. 50(8).
5. Adequate opportunity to be heard:
   • Despite the applicant’s age and ill‑health, the court concluded that she had been given a reasonable and fair opportunity to present her case, citing:
     • her statement of grounds and affidavit,
     • unlimited oral submissions in opening and reply,
     • the opportunity to file post-hearing submissions, and
     • extensive email correspondence and uploads to ShareFile.
   • The court also took steps to accommodate her difficulties, e.g. by supplying extracts of the Digital Audio Recording (DAR) of oral submissions.
6. Final orders:
   • Leave was refused and the application was dismissed.
   • No order was made as to costs.
   • An Coimisiún Pleanála was formally substituted as respondent in place of An Bord Pleanála.
   • A timetable was set for any application for a certificate to appeal to the Court of Appeal under s. 50A(7) of the 2000 Act, or for a direct application for leave to the Supreme Court.
   • The order was to be perfected immediately.

4. Legal Framework for Leave in Planning Judicial Review

4.1 The G. v DPP test and its statutory modification

The court re‑states the main requirements for leave to apply for judicial review, drawing on G. v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 I.R. 374 (Finlay C.J.) as adjusted for planning cases by s. 50A of the Planning and Development Act 2000 and amendments to Order 84 RSC.

The judge refers to his own prior summarising decisions:

• Reid v An Bord Pleanála (No. 5) [2022] IEHC 687,
• Duffy v Clare County Council [2023] IEHC 430, and
• Morehart v Monaghan County Council [2024] IEHC 100.

Drawing these together, he lists eight core criteria (para. 23), of which the most important in this case were:

1. Standing – a “sufficient interest” (Order 84 r. 20(5); s. 50A(3)(b)(i)), satisfied here because the applicant had made submissions in the planning process.
2. Substantial grounds – factual and legal aspects:
   • Facts averred in the affidavit must, if proved, support a “substantial ground” for the relief sought (G v DPP as modified by s. 50A(3)(a)).
   • On those facts, a substantial case in law must be capable of being made that the applicant is entitled to relief.
3. Time limits:
   • Normally eight weeks in planning matters (s. 50(6), (7)).
   • Any extension must be expressly sought (also now reflected in Order 103 r. 10(1) RSC).
4. Exhaustion of remedies – now explicitly in s. 50A(3)(c) (inserted by the Planning and Development, Maritime and Valuation (Amendment) Act 2022), though not problematic here.
5. Compliance with procedural requirements – particularly Order 103 RSC and Practice Direction HC126, affecting:
   • the form and content of pleadings,
   • joinder of essential parties (such as developers), and
   • communications with the List Registrar and other parties.
6. Discretionary factors – including triviality, lack of good faith, or other circumstances justifying refusal of leave, following North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Ltd v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2016] IEHC 300.

This framework emphasises that “substantial grounds” is not merely a loose threshold: it has both an evidential and a legal component and is overlaid with strict procedural and temporal requirements.

5. Detailed Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

5.1 Substantial grounds and the nature of the applicant’s complaints

The central substantive reason for refusal was the absence of any “substantial grounds”:

• The statement of grounds was “unfocused, unclear and argumentative”.
• It was verified only by a one-line generic averment, which the judge describes as inappropriate, especially in a specialised commercial context such as planning law.
• Even taking the pleaded facts at their highest, they did not disclose an arguable legal error by An Coimisiún Pleanála.

Two strands of complaint were examined:

(a) Alleged failure to consider her submissions / impact on her dwelling

The applicant asserted that her concerns about the access road’s proximity, construction noise, vibration and potential structural damage were not properly taken into account.

The court rejected this on the basis of the inspector’s report, para. 10.17.18, which:

• explicitly identifies her dwelling as the nearest residence to the proposed access road;
• acknowledges the potential for greater intensity of construction effects on her property; and
• records further mitigation measures volunteered by the developer (acoustic screening, structural condition surveys) and recommends that these be secured by condition in any grant.

On this basis, the judge concludes that:

• Any claim that the Board failed to consider her concerns is factually untenable.
• What remains is simply her dissatisfaction with the outcome – a classic merits complaint which cannot ground judicial review.

(b) Hedgerow removal and alleged lack of information

The applicant also complained about hedgerow removal on neighbouring lands and suggested that she was “drip fed” information or kept in the dark about aspects of the project.

On the hedgerow issue, the court points out that:

• The complaint relates to actions by a third party farmer in 2019.
• The notice party developer was “a stranger” to this removal; nothing suggested it occurred at the developer’s behest.
• As such, this has “nothing to do with the validity of the grant of planning permission”.

As regards documentation, the judgment notes that:

• The planning documentation was made available on a dedicated website from an early stage and was still available at the time of judgment.
• This undercut any assertion that necessary information had not been made available to her.

The net effect is that, even if taken as true, these complaints cannot legally impugn the validity of the Board’s 2024 decision.

5.2 Defective pleadings and breach of procedural rules

Independent of the lack of substance, the judge holds that the pleadings themselves are so deficient that leave must be refused:

• The statement of grounds fails to comply with Order 84 RSC requirements for clarity and particularity.
• The applicant did not join the developer as a notice party, as is standard in planning JR; this had to be rectified by court order well outside the eight-week period, without explanation.
• The vague and unparticularised complaints do not permit identification of any distinct legal error or standard of review to be applied.

The court therefore upholds the Commission’s objection that the pleas “are not properly particularised, contrary to the Rules of Court”.

This line of reasoning reinforces a consistent message in recent planning JR jurisprudence: leave will be refused where the statement of grounds is vague, discursive, or argumentative, even before reaching the merits. Particularisation is part of the leave threshold, not a formality postponed to later.

5.3 Time limit and extension (obiter)

While not dispositive in this case, the judgment contains a clear obiter analysis of the time limit issue:

• The proceedings were commenced five days out of time.
• No explicit application for extension was included in the statement of grounds or brought by motion.
• No affidavit explaining why the delay was “due to circumstances outside [her] control” was sworn, as required by s. 50(8).
• Pre‑emptive emailing of the judicial review registrar on the last day of the limitation period does not constitute a proper application for extension.

Humphreys J emphasises that:

• Ignorance of the time limit is not a valid basis for extension, and in any event the applicant appears to have known of the eight-week period (since she emailed on the very last day).
• Lack of legal representation, in itself, is not a ground for extending time.
• Shortness of delay does not obviate the statutory requirement that the reasons be outside the applicant’s control.
• Lay litigant status does not modify the statutory test.
• The applicant’s copious and near‑daily correspondence with court offices undermines any suggestion that she was unable to deal with procedural steps in the relevant period.

He states that, had it been necessary to decide, he would have found the application out of time and refused an extension. This reinforces the strictness of the eight-week limit in planning cases and may influence future courts facing similar circumstances.

5.4 Failure to prosecute and discretionary refusal

A key doctrinal contribution of this judgment is the explicit statement that a planning JR application can be dismissed at leave stage on discretionary grounds for failure to prosecute, even if the technical pre-condition of filing within time is met.

The facts underpinning this conclusion include:

• a five‑month period of total inaction after filing, during which the applicant did not contact any registrar or notify opposing parties;
• subsequent 11 months of effective non‑prosecution, with dates repeatedly vacated on the basis of generalised health concerns;
• a pattern whereby the applicant:
  • actively generated copious correspondence with registrars, court officials, and even external actors (e.g. Chief Justice, Minister),
  • yet claimed an incapacity to take the procedural steps expressly required to progress her own case.

The court concludes:

“Dismissal of a leave application on a discretionary basis due to failure to prosecute is the only real remedy in a situation where an applicant does enough to stop the clock (by filing papers) but not enough to actually progress the matter.”

He explicitly finds it “more likely than not” that:

“the applicant applying her creativity to generating a mutating series of process issues as opposed to addressing the substance of the case is a tactical move rather than reflective of a genuine inability to deal with the case.”

Whether one labels this a question of discretion or otherwise, the court treats it as an “unacceptable approach” warranting dismissal. This aspect of the judgment has clear precedential weight: in planning cases governed by statutory expedition, applicants cannot park proceedings indefinitely while maintaining a minimal procedural presence.

5.5 Treatment of health difficulties and requests for adjournments

Much of the judgment is devoted to a detailed narrative of the applicant’s medical issues, her correspondence, and her repeated requests for adjournments. The tone is sometimes sharp, but several legal principles can be distilled:

• Sympathy does not equate to indefinite indulgence:
  • The judge recognises and expressly sympathises with the applicant’s health problems and age.
  • The court and Courts Service made practical accommodations (e.g. providing DAR extracts, adjusting arrangements, facilitating ShareFile uploads, offering remote attendance options).
  • However, health problems cannot justify open-ended adjournments in litigation designed to be expedited by statute.
• Evidence matters:
  • Medical certs produced were characterised as “general in nature” and referring to chronic conditions that pre‑dated the proceedings and would likely persist indefinitely.
  • They were not backed by affidavits by the doctor or oral evidence; their probative value was therefore limited.
  • The court contrasts these documents with the applicant’s extensive and energetic correspondence, undermining claims of total incapacity.
• Obligation to progress one’s own litigation:
  • As the notice party observed (and the court endorsed), these are the applicant’s proceedings; she bears an objective obligation to prosecute them.
  • If a litigant’s health genuinely renders them incapable of progressing an action, the court may have to consider solutions such as appointing a guardian ad litem — but it cannot allow the case simply to “be driven off the road and parked indefinitely”.
• Procedural formality for further applications:
  • After multiple informal requests, the court directed that any further applications (e.g. for adjournments or extensions) must be made by notice of motion grounded on affidavit.
  • This was communicated in clear terms to the applicant.
  • No such motion was ever brought.

The judgment therefore sends a clear signal: while courts will try to accommodate health issues and disabilities, they will also insist on formal, evidence‑based applications and will not permit proceedings to be paralysed by unstructured email advocacy.

5.6 Procedural fairness and case management

A recurring theme in Humphreys J’s jurisprudence is strong judicial case‑management in public law litigation. Here, he invokes O’Donnell J’s warning in O’Sullivan v Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75 that it is a “serious error, to which lawyers are prone” to assume that only procedures approximating a criminal trial are fair; departures from such formality can also be fair.

In this case, he points out that:

• There was no word limit on the statement of grounds or affidavit.
• The applicant had unlimited oral submissions in opening and reply at the leave hearing.
• She was afforded a non-standard post-hearing written submission and a further opportunity to reply to the respondents’ written submissions.
• She engaged in 59 emails with the court, many containing substantive commentary.

He concludes that the applicant had a “reasonable and fair opportunity to make her point”, and that any alleged procedural shortcomings (such as insisting on formal motions) were, in context, harmless — indeed, considering the respondents’ written submissions actually led him to narrow the grounds of refusal slightly.

The decision also refers to Eco Advocacy v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 15, where relevant authorities on courts’ powers to give procedural directions and timelines were previously reviewed. Those case-management powers are now “codified to some degree” in Order 103 rr. 22, 30(1), 32 RSC. Delaney fits within this broader movement towards disciplined, actively managed planning litigation.

6. Precedents and Authorities Cited

6.1 G. v Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] 1 I.R. 374

G v DPP is the foundational Irish authority on the leave threshold for judicial review. Finlay C.J. held that an applicant must establish that:

• he or she has an arguable case in law,
• on the basis of facts which, if proved, would entitle him or her to relief,
• and that judicial review is the appropriate remedy.

In planning matters, this test has been heightened by s. 50A(3) of the 2000 Act, which replaces “arguable case” with the need for “substantial grounds”. Humphreys J treats G v DPP as the starting point, but emphasises that statutory modification now requires:

• a higher intensity of scrutiny at leave stage, and
• compliance with procedural strictures (time, standing, exhaustion, pleadings) that are expressly laid down in statute and rules of court.

6.2 Reid v An Bord Pleanála (No. 5) [2022] IEHC 687; Duffy v Clare County Council [2023] IEHC 430; Morehart v Monaghan County Council [2024] IEHC 100

While the text of these cases is not reproduced in the judgment, they are cited as recent restatements of the modified G v DPP test in the planning context. Together, they appear to:

• harmonise the “substantial grounds” standard with earlier case law,
• emphasise that substantial grounds must be grounded in specific pleaded facts and relevant legal norms, and
• locate time limits, standing, exhaustion and procedural compliance as integral elements of the leave threshold.

Delaney builds upon these cases but pushes further on the dimension of failure to prosecute and case-management compliance as independent discretionary barriers to leave.

6.3 North East Pylon Pressure Campaign Ltd v An Bord Pleanála (No. 1) [2016] IEHC 300

In NEPPC (No. 1), the High Court (Barrett J) considered discretionary factors in judicial review, including:

• triviality of grounds,
• lack of good faith, and
• other abuses of process.

Humphreys J cites this case as authority that discretion can justify refusal of leave where the court is satisfied that, notwithstanding technical compliance, it would be inappropriate to allow the challenge to proceed. In Delaney, the main discretionary factor is failure to prosecute over a prolonged period, compounded by the applicant’s tactical deployment of adjournment requests and correspondence.

6.4 O’Sullivan v Sea Fisheries Protection Authority [2017] IESC 75

This Supreme Court decision (O’Donnell J) is invoked for a cautionary principle about fair procedures:

“[It would be] a serious error, to which lawyers are prone, to approach any such case on the tacit assumption that only procedures which approximate to a criminal trial are fair, and anything which departs from that is somehow dubious.”

Humphreys J uses this to support his view that:

• It is legitimate for a trial judge to direct efficient procedures and timelines.
• Fairness is contextual; it does not require replicating a full trial structure at leave stage.

This underpins his refusal to indulge further adjournments or open-ended submissions and his insistence that further applications be made by formal motion.

6.5 Eco Advocacy v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IEHC 15

Eco Advocacy (another decision of Humphreys J) is cited for a list of authorities recognising the court’s entitlement to prescribe directions and timelines to move litigation forward. The judge notes that such powers are now codified, at least in part, in Order 103 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (notably rr. 22, 30(1), 32).

In Delaney, this case functions as doctrinal reinforcement for:

• the issuance of unless orders (striking out unless the applicant appears),
• setting non-extendable deadlines for submissions absent “exceptional circumstances”, and
• insisting on formal motions and grounded affidavits for further applications.

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 For planning and environmental judicial review

This judgment consolidates a trend in Irish planning JR towards a disciplined, high-threshold approach at leave stage:

• Substantial grounds = substance + form: It is not enough to feel aggrieved or to point to real-world impacts. Substantial grounds require:
  • specific pleaded facts,
  • a clear legal theory (breach of statute, misinterpretation of planning guidelines, procedural unfairness, etc.), and
  • adequate evidential grounding, even at leave stage.
• Failure to prosecute as a standalone bar: Applicants in planning cases cannot rely on having once filed papers to indefinitely freeze a project. The court will consider whether proceedings are genuinely being pursued or simply kept alive as a form of strategic delay. Where the latter is suspected, leave may be refused on discretionary grounds.
• Formalism in procedural compliance: The judgment reaffirms:
  • the necessity of joining developers as notice parties within time,
  • the use of formal motions and affidavits for extensions or adjournments, and
  • the obligation to comply with Practice Direction HC126 regarding communication with registrars and service on other parties.
• Protection of developers’ and decision-makers’ interests: Repeatedly, the judgment emphasises that the developer has the benefit of a prima facie lawful public law decision and is prejudiced by protracted uncertainty. This reflects the statutory policy behind s. 50A(10) — that planning JR be disposed of “as expeditiously as is consistent with the administration of justice”.

7.2 For lay and disabled litigants

The judgment has a particular resonance for lay and disabled litigants:

• It recognises the courts’ duty to make reasonable accommodations (e.g. access arrangements, DAR extracts, remote options) and expresses sympathy for the applicant’s position.
• It nonetheless affirms that lay status and disability do not alter statutory tests:
  • time limits still apply,
  • pleading standards still apply,
  • formal evidential requirements still apply.
• The judge hints at solutions (e.g. guardian ad litem) where a litigant is genuinely incapable of prosecuting a case, but emphasises that the system cannot accept a situation where health difficulties are invoked to halt proceedings indefinitely.

In practice, this means that community members and vulnerable persons wishing to challenge planning decisions may need:

• early legal advice,
• support from NGOs or representative associations, or
• to consider whether others (e.g. residents’ groups with greater capacity) should act as applicants.

From an access-to-justice perspective, the case underscores the tension between:

• the need for expeditious, certain decision-making for infrastructure investment; and
• the aspiration under environmental and human rights law that access to justice in environmental matters be “not prohibitively expensive” and practically effective for ordinary citizens.

7.3 For court administration and registrars

The judgment includes extensive reproductions of correspondence between the applicant and court staff. This is unusual in its detail and serves several implicit functions:

• It transparently documents the efforts made by the Courts Service to assist a difficult litigant, countering any narrative of institutional indifference.
• It underscores to future litigants that:
  • emailing registrars does not equate to making a formal application to the court,
  • registrars are bound by practice directions to copy all parties into most communications, and
  • registrars cannot “grant” substantive relief; they implement judicial directions.
• It may also serve as guidance to registrars on when to escalate repeated correspondence to the judge, and when to insist that further steps be taken only by formal motion.

8. Clarifying Key Legal Concepts

8.1 Judicial review and “leave”

Judicial review is a procedure by which the High Court supervises the legality of decisions of public bodies (such as An Coimisiún Pleanála). The court does not re‑hear the merits; it examines whether:

• the decision-maker acted within its powers,
• applied correct legal standards,
• followed fair procedures, and
• did not act in a way that is irrational in the public law sense (Wednesbury unreasonableness).

Leave is permission from the court to commence judicial review. It is an initial filtering stage designed to prevent weak or abusive challenges from proceeding. In planning cases, the threshold is particularly high: the applicant must show substantial grounds.

8.2 “Substantial grounds”

“Substantial grounds” in s. 50A(3)(a) requires more than a merely arguable case. In essence, the applicant must demonstrate:

• a specific legal basis for challenging the decision (e.g. breach of a statutory provision, failure to consider mandatory considerations, misdirection as to law, procedural unfairness), and
• that this ground is supported by particular pleaded facts in the affidavit which, if proved, would justify quashing the decision.

Complaints that:

• the decision is harsh or unwise, or
• the decision-maker disagreed with one’s submissions, or
• one is personally severely affected by the outcome,

are not, without more, “substantial grounds”. They are merits-based disagreements, which must be pursued (if at all) at the planning appeal stage, not in judicial review.

8.3 Standing (“sufficient interest”)

Section 50A(3)(b)(i) of the 2000 Act requires that a person seeking leave in a planning JR have a “sufficient interest”. In practice, this usually means:

• objectors who made submissions at the planning/relevant consultation stages will have standing; and
• persons with a clear, proximate interest (e.g. adjoining residents) may have standing even if they did not make submissions, though that can be contentious.

Here, the applicant did have standing, as she had participated in the planning process and lived adjacent to the access road site.

8.4 Time limits and extensions

Section 50(6)–(8) of the Planning and Development Act 2000 imposes an eight-week limit from the date of the decision to commence JR proceedings. An extension may only be granted if:

• there is good and sufficient reason for doing so, and
• the circumstances leading to the failure to make the application within eight weeks were “outside the control” of the applicant.

This is a demanding test. Typical examples that might qualify could include:

• serious, unforeseen events rendering the applicant physically or mentally unable to act (supported by detailed evidence),
• non-notification of a decision through fault of the decision-maker, or
• exceptional misrepresentation or concealment.

Chronic health conditions known at the time of the decision, lack of legal representation, or simple misunderstanding of the time limit usually do not satisfy this test.

8.5 “Unless order”

An unless order is a court order that a party’s case will be struck out (or some other sanction imposed) unless a specified step is taken by a particular deadline. It is a robust case management tool.

In Delaney, the court made an order that the proceedings would be struck out unless the applicant attended on 13 October 2025, after she had failed to appear on 29 September 2025. Such orders are increasingly used in managing delayed public law litigation.

8.6 “Slip rule”

The slip rule allows the court to correct minor clerical or typographical errors in its orders (e.g. a mis‑spelled name or wrong record number) without the need for a full appeal or rehearing. In this case, the applicant pointed out that the order mistakenly referred to a different name; with the consent of all parties, the court corrected this under the slip rule.

8.7 Guardian ad litem (contextual reference)

A guardian ad litem is a person appointed by a court to conduct litigation on behalf of someone who lacks capacity to do so (e.g. a minor or an adult with a decision-making disability). Humphreys J mentions this concept illustratively: if a litigant is genuinely unable to prosecute proceedings, the solution may involve substituting or adding another person to conduct the case, rather than leaving the proceedings in indefinite limbo. No such appointment was made here; the reference underscores that incapacity must be addressed by proper procedural means, not simply by tolerating non-prosecution.

9. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

Delaney v An Coimisiún Pleanála is a significant addition to Irish planning judicial review jurisprudence, especially in three respects:

1. Re-affirmation and sharpening of the “substantial grounds” test:
   • Applicants must plead clear, particularised legal grounds supported by specific facts averred on affidavit.
   • Complaints confined to dissatisfaction with the merits of a planning decision will not cross the leave threshold.
   • Pleadings that are vague, argumentative or unfocused are themselves a reason to refuse leave.
2. Strict enforcement of procedural and temporal discipline:
   • Time limits under s. 50 are to be taken seriously; extensions require explicit application and cogent evidence that the delay was outside the applicant’s control.
   • Communications with registrars do not substitute for formal motions and affidavits where relief is sought.
   • Joining developers as notice parties and complying with Practice Direction HC126 are not optional formalities but integral aspects of fair process.
3. Recognition of failure to prosecute as an independent discretionary bar to leave:
   • Where an applicant does enough to commence proceedings but then allows them to stagnate, especially in a context of statutory expedition, the court may dismiss at leave stage for failure to prosecute.
   • Health difficulties, lay status and disability, while calling for reasonable accommodations, do not absolve the applicant of the fundamental obligation to progress their own litigation or to seek appropriate procedural substitutes (such as a guardian ad litem) if they truly cannot do so.

More broadly, the decision exemplifies a judicial approach which:

• seeks to protect the integrity and efficiency of the planning system and the legitimate expectations of developers and public authorities;
• insists that access to judicial review in environmental and planning cases be exercised responsibly and within procedural constraints; and
• acknowledges but ultimately limits the weight to be given to personal hardship where it conflicts with statutory mandates for expedition and legal certainty.

For practitioners, Delaney is a cautionary tale and a practical guide:

• Ensure that any planning JR application:
  • is commenced within eight weeks,
  • explicitly seeks extension if necessary, supported by sworn evidence,
  • joins all essential parties (especially the developer), and
  • contains tightly drafted, legally coherent, and well-particularised grounds.
• Advise clients — particularly vulnerable, unrepresented or ill individuals — of the importance of early, structured engagement with legal process, rather than reactive email campaigns.
• Be alert to the possibility that prolonged non-prosecution can now, in planning cases, be fatal at leave stage, even if the proceeding was initially commenced in time.

From the perspective of the law’s development, Delaney stands for the proposition that in Irish planning judicial review, substantial grounds, properly pleaded and diligently pursued, are the gateway; health, sympathy, and informal protest cannot substitute for that gateway in the eyes of the court.