Deduction of Remand Time in Minimum Term Orders for Discretionary Life Sentences: Trendell v Crown

Introduction

The case of Trendell, R. v Crown ([2022] EWCA Crim 267) addresses a significant issue in criminal sentencing: the treatment of time spent on remand in custody when imposing a discretionary life sentence accompanied by a minimum term order. The appellant, Mr. Trendell, along with another offender, Grainger, was convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent and false imprisonment. Both were sentenced to life imprisonment with differing minimum terms and concurrent determinate sentences. The central contention arose from the non-deduction of 203 days the appellant spent on remand prior to sentencing from his minimum term. This case was brought before the England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC).

Summary of the Judgment

The appellant appealed against the length of the minimum term imposed, specifically challenging the lack of deduction for the time spent on remand. The Court of Appeal examined the statutory provisions governing sentencing, particularly focusing on section 82A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 (now section 323 of the Sentencing Code 2020). The court clarified that while section 240ZA of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 mandates automatic crediting of remand time for determinate sentences, this does not extend to discretionary life sentences with minimum term orders. However, the court exercised its discretion to generally deduct remand time unless exceptional circumstances dictated otherwise. In Mr. Trendell's case, the absence of any compelling reason led the court to quash the original minimum term of 6 years and substitute it with a reduced term of 5 years and 162 days, accounting for the remand period.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment references several key cases that influence the court's decision:

R (Shields-McKinley) v Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor [2019] EWCA Civ 1954: This case established that for determinate sentences, time spent on remand is automatically credited without the need for court intervention.
R v Sylvester [2018] EWCA Crim 599: Highlighted that the automatic crediting of remand time does not apply to discretionary life sentences with minimum term orders, thereby necessitating judicial consideration.

These precedents were instrumental in determining that while automatic crediting is ensured for determinate sentences, discretionary life sentences require a separate judicial evaluation.

Legal Reasoning

The court delved into the statutory framework governing sentencing. Section 82A of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, now section 323 of the Sentencing Code, provides guidelines for setting minimum terms in discretionary life sentences. Importantly, while section 240ZA mandates automatic deduction of remand time for determinate sentences, it does not prescribe the same for discretionary life sentences. This distinction grants judges discretionary power to decide whether to account for remand time when setting minimum terms.

The court emphasized that this discretion should, in most cases, lead to the deduction of remand time to maintain consistency and fairness, reflective of the principles established in previous rulings. Only in exceptional circumstances, where omission of such deductions would be unjust, should a judge consider not applying them.

Impact

This judgment sets a clear precedent that while judges possess discretion in adjusting minimum terms for life sentences, there is an overarching expectation to account for remand time similarly to determinate sentences. This fosters greater consistency and transparency in sentencing, ensuring that offenders receive credit for time already served, thereby preventing undue extensions of their periods of custody.

Future cases involving discretionary life sentences will likely reference this judgment to justify the deduction of remand time unless exceptional circumstances are present, reinforcing fair sentencing practices.

Complex Concepts Simplified

To aid in understanding the legal intricacies of this case, several key concepts are clarified below:

Remand: The period an individual spends in custody awaiting trial or sentencing. This time is often considered when calculating the total sentence to ensure the offender is not unduly penalized for pre-trial detention.
Discretionary Life Sentence: A type of life imprisonment where the judge sets a minimum term that the offender must serve before becoming eligible for parole. Unlike a whole life order, it does not prohibit release entirely.
Minimum Term Order: The specified period that must be served before an offender can apply for parole. It serves as a guideline for the length of imprisonment deemed necessary for rehabilitation and public safety.
Determinate Sentence: A fixed-term sentence where the offender knows the exact length of imprisonment from the outset.

Conclusion

The Trendell v Crown judgment underscores the nuanced approach required in sentencing, particularly concerning the deduction of remand time in discretionary life sentences. By affirming that judges generally should account for remand periods unless exceptional circumstances arise, the court promotes fairness and consistency within the criminal justice system. This decision ensures that offenders are not disproportionately penalized for pre-sentencing custody, aligning discretionary sentencing practices with the principles governing determinate sentences. As a result, this case serves as a pivotal reference point for future judicial decisions in similar contexts, reinforcing the importance of equitable treatment in sentencing.