Regina v Eletu & Anor

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellants were convicted of aggravated burglary on 9 February 2017 at Inner London Crown Court and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. The indictment alleged that on 2 September 2016, the appellants, together with others, entered a building as trespassers and attempted to steal cash and cigarettes, while possessing weapons of offence, specifically knives and a crowbar. The appellants admitted to the lesser offence of simple burglary, but this plea was not accepted by the Crown.

On the night in question, staff were restocking shelves at a store in The City when a group of males entered the premises via the roof and a hole in the wall. The group confronted staff, ordering them to hand over their possessions. Some intruders were described as carrying knives, a crowbar, and possibly a hammer. Police arrived following an anonymous call; some suspects fled, while the appellants were detained—one found with a balaclava and gloves, the other hiding inside the building.

The Crown's case was that the appellants were part of a group acting in concert, with at least two members carrying weapons. The appellants denied carrying weapons or knowing others did, though one admitted seeing a crowbar later during the incident. The central issue was whether the appellants were part of a joint enterprise involving weapons of offence at the time of the burglary.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the trial judge's directions to the jury on the definition and requisite intent regarding "weapons of offence" were legally correct and sufficiently clear.
2. Whether the appellants had the necessary knowledge and intention relating to the weapons carried by others during the burglary for the offence of aggravated burglary.
3. Whether the convictions were safe in light of the jury directions and the timing of the appellants’ knowledge and intention concerning the weapons.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

• The judge's directions on what constitutes a weapon of offence were unclear and confusing.
• The initial direction was legally incorrect and the subsequent clarification by the judge introduced unnecessary complexity, including an erroneous distinction between articles made or adapted for use and those intended for use as weapons.
• The directions failed to include a necessary explanation that an intention only to frighten was insufficient for conviction.
• The judge's response to the jury’s question further confused the required intent, rendering the convictions unsafe.

Crown's Arguments

• The Crown accepted the initial direction was flawed but maintained that the subsequent directions were correct and sufficiently clear.
• Emphasized that the jury’s question and the judge’s answer demonstrated the jury understood the legal position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the judge’s directions on the definition of "weapon of offence" and the intent required for aggravated burglary. The initial directions were acknowledged as flawed because they failed to properly explain the legal definition consistent with section 10(1)(b) of the Theft Act 1968, which requires that a weapon be intended for use in causing injury or incapacitation.

The judge’s subsequent clarification introduced confusion by improperly distinguishing between articles made or adapted for use as weapons and those merely intended for such use, and by focusing on specific items like hammers and crowbars in a misleading way. The directions were delivered at an inconsistent pace, further reducing clarity for the jury.

The court noted the importance of clear directions, especially given the jury’s question about the timing of knowledge and intent regarding weapons. The judge’s answer, though indicating a "continuing intention," was expressed unclearly, compounding the confusion.

The court emphasised that the jury requires precise and clear guidance on these issues, which was lacking here. The failure to provide such clarity rendered the convictions unsafe.

Regarding the appellants’ additional grounds of appeal relating to police conduct and disclosure, the court found these unarguable and would have refused leave to appeal on those grounds.

Holding and Implications

The court ALLOWED THE APPEALS and QUASHED THE CONVICTIONS of both appellants for aggravated burglary.

The court ordered a retrial on the count of aggravated burglary, with the indictment to include the alternative offence of burglary. Directions were given for a fresh indictment and re-arraignment within two months, to be tried on the South-eastern circuit by a different judge than the original trial judge.

No new precedent was established; the decision directly affects the appellants by overturning their convictions and mandating a new trial due to the unsafe nature of the jury directions in the original trial.