Introduction

This ex tempore judgment concerns the allocation of costs following the respondents’ consent to an order of certiorari quashing an inadmissibility decision in an international protection appeal. The applicant, a Somali national granted refugee status in Greece as an unaccompanied minor in October 2021, later sought international protection in Ireland. The International Protection Appeals Tribunal (IPAT) determined on 11 December 2023 that his application was inadmissible pursuant to section 21(9)(a) of the International Protection Act 2015, and a subsequent determination and direction issued on 8 January 2024 by the second respondent.

The applicant commenced judicial review in January 2024. During the proceedings, the respondents consented to certiorari on a narrow, fair‑procedures basis due to a breakdown in email communications: IPAT had emailed a set of written questions on 27 November 2023 to the applicant’s solicitors, but those questions (while logged as received at the inbound mail gateway and queued for delivery) did not reach the solicitor’s inbox. The unanswered questions were treated by IPAT as a non‑response and formed part of the reasoning for deeming the application inadmissible.

The sole issue for the High Court was costs. The case sits within a tranche of so‑called “Greek Transfer” cases; some had been conceded (with costs) in 2024, while two were decided adversely to applicants in December 2024 and upheld on appeal on 16 October 2025. Against this unusual factual backdrop, the Court considered whether, under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, the “costs follow the event” principle should apply where the decision‑maker acted responsibly and without fault yet consented to certiorari once the fair‑procedures problem emerged.

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court (Gillane J) awarded the applicant his costs. While finding no fault on the part of the respondents in sending the email, the Court accepted that the applicant’s solicitors did not receive it; consequently, the applicant was unaware of the request for further information. The decision to deem the application inadmissible proceeded on the bona fide but mistaken premise that the applicant had failed to answer duly served questions.

Given that IPAT was functus officio once it had made its decision, the only way to undo the decision’s infirmity was by certiorari. The respondents commendably consented to quash on a fair‑procedures basis. The Court held that the principal relief sought in the proceedings—certiorari—had been achieved and that, notwithstanding the respondents’ responsible conduct and absence of wrongdoing, the ordinary rule should apply: costs follow the event. The presence of wider grounds and declaratory reliefs did not justify a departure from this default in circumstances where the proceedings effectively ended with the concession of the core relief.

Analysis

1) Precedents and Authorities Referenced

• Section 169, Legal Services Regulation Act 2015: The statutory basis for costs discretion, which embeds the general rule that costs follow the event, subject to the Court’s discretion to depart from that rule based on success, partial success, conduct, offers, and other relevant factors. The respondents relied on section 169 to argue that the applicant had not been “entirely successful” given the breadth of grounds and reliefs pleaded.
• Mootness authorities (general): Although mootness case law was cited in written submissions, both parties accepted that the issue was not truly moot. Because IPAT is functus officio once it has decided, only the High Court could set aside the decision via certiorari; the decision could not be withdrawn or informally cured by IPAT. The Court therefore treated mootness as having limited relevance—particularly regarding the unadjudicated ancillary grounds.
• Functus officio principle: Once IPAT made its decision, it had exhausted its jurisdiction; any infirmity could be remedied only by the Court. This feature materially influenced costs because the applicant had to litigate to obtain the quashing order, even though the respondents later consented.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in carefully delineated steps.

• Unusual but clear factual matrix: The email containing IPAT’s questions was sent to two addresses associated with the applicant’s solicitors and, on the respondents’ system, reached the inbound mail gateway and was queued for delivery. No “bounce back” occurred. Yet, for “whatever technical reason,” the email never arrived in the solicitor’s inbox, leaving the applicant unaware of the queries. The applicant’s solicitor engaged an IT professional but, unsurprisingly, could not “prove a negative.”
• No fault by the respondents; no challenge to the solicitor’s affidavit: The Court found that the respondents did all that could be expected to send the email, and that they were not at fault. Importantly, the Court was not invited to go behind the solicitor’s sworn account of non‑receipt, and it declined to do so by inference.
• Fair procedures were implicated: Because the applicant never saw the questions, he had no opportunity to respond. The adverse inference of non‑response—central to the admissibility decision—was therefore factually unfounded from the applicant’s perspective. On being apprised of the true position post‑leave, the respondents responsibly consented to certiorari on a fair‑procedures basis.
• Functus officio and the necessity of certiorari: The Court emphasized that once IPAT had decided, it could not undo or adjust its decision; a judicial order was the sole mechanism to correct the defect. This distinguishes the case from contexts (e.g., certain Ministerial proposals) where representations can lead to a different administrative outcome without the need for quashing.
• Applying section 169 LSRA 2015—“costs follow the event”: - The principal event was the quashing of the decision; this relief defined success in the proceedings. - The fact that other broad grounds were pleaded but not adjudicated did not erode the applicant’s success because the concession of certiorari effectively disposed of the case. - Both parties acted responsibly: the applicant promptly sought leave when confronted with a decision premised on an asserted non‑response he knew to be untrue, and the respondents conceded once the communication failure was established. Nonetheless, responsible conduct does not, by itself, displace the default rule where the applicant has obtained the primary relief.
• Administrative practice not prescribed by the Court: While an argument was made about IPAT’s lack of “read receipt” protocols (in contrast with expectations on solicitors under IPAT’s Administrative Practice Note), the Court declined to prescribe administrative arrangements for IPAT in this costs ruling, noting the agency’s volume‑driven operational context and the unusual nature of the breakdown here.

3) Why the Result Matters

The judgment underscores a practical but important costs principle in judicial review: where a public decision is quashed—especially in circumstances where the decision‑maker is functus officio and the quashing was the only route to relief—the successful applicant will ordinarily receive costs, even if:

• the decision‑maker acted reasonably and without fault;
• the defect arose from an external or technical failure (here, email non‑delivery beyond the sender’s control); and
• the decision‑maker promptly consented to the quashing once informed of the true position.

The judgment, therefore, promotes early and responsible concessions without penalizing applicants who must litigate to obtain a remedy that only the Court can grant. It also clarifies that the pleading of broader grounds does not, without more, mean “partial success” for costs purposes when the main remedy that disposes of the proceedings is achieved.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Certiorari: A court order quashing a decision of a public body because of legal error (e.g., breach of fair procedures). It nullifies the impugned decision and restores matters to the pre‑decision state.
• Functus officio: Once a body like IPAT makes a final decision, it has “spent” its authority regarding that matter and cannot revise or withdraw the decision itself. Any cure typically requires a court order.
• Section 21(9)(a), International Protection Act 2015: A statutory provision enabling the determination of an international protection application as inadmissible in specified circumstances (including, in general terms, where protection has been granted in another state). The merits of that statutory application were not adjudicated here because the decision was quashed on fair‑procedures grounds.
• Costs follow the event: The default rule in Irish litigation that the unsuccessful party pays the successful party’s legal costs. Courts have discretion to depart from this rule under section 169 LSRA 2015, considering factors such as partial success, conduct, and offers.
• Mootness: A case is “moot” when the issues no longer require court resolution. Here, the case was not moot because the only way to set aside the IPAT decision was by court order; a mere concession by the respondents could not, by itself, cure the decision’s effects.
• Inbound mail gateway / queued for delivery: Technical stages in an email system indicating that an email has reached the recipient’s server but may not have propagated to the recipient’s inbox. This nuance explained how the sender could have acted properly while the recipient remained unaware.
• “Greek Transfer” cases: A shorthand used in Irish litigation to describe cases involving applicants with prior protection status in Greece. The present judgment concerns costs only and does not address the substantive viability of such claims.

Practical Implications

• For applicants and solicitors: Where a decision relies on a putative failure to respond, and there is credible evidence of non‑receipt of correspondence, it may ground a fair‑procedures challenge. If the decision‑maker is functus officio, the applicant may have to bring judicial review to achieve a quashing order, and if successful (including by consent), costs will usually follow.
• For decision‑makers (e.g., IPAT): Early and narrow concessions on fair‑procedures grounds are encouraged and will not generally immunize the decision‑maker from costs where the applicant obtains the primary relief. While the Court declined to mandate specific administrative tools (such as read receipts or dual‑channel notifications), the case highlights the value of robust communication systems and redundancy when requests for critical information are issued under strict timelines.
• On pleading strategy: Pleading broader grounds and declaratory relief in judicial review does not necessarily jeopardize a costs award when the principal relief is obtained and disposes of the proceedings. However, prolix or unnecessary grounds may still influence discretionary costs decisions in other cases; practitioners should plead proportionately.
• On settlement dynamics: A “free‑standing” consent to certiorari, decoupled from costs, allows the parties to resolve the substantive controversy swiftly while leaving the costs issue to the Court. This judgment signals that, in public law cases where only the Court can unwind a decision, successful applicants will generally obtain their costs notwithstanding the absence of administrative fault.

Conclusion

Y.A.M v IPAT affirms a clear and practical rule: where a public law decision is quashed—here, by consent, on a fair‑procedures basis—and the decision‑maker is functus officio such that certiorari is the sole route to remedy, the successful applicant will ordinarily receive costs under section 169 LSRA 2015. The absence of wrongdoing by the decision‑maker, and even commendable conduct in consenting to quashing once the problem is identified, does not displace the default that costs follow the event.

The Court’s careful treatment of the unique email failure—recognizing both the respondents’ propriety in sending the email and the solicitor’s credible non‑receipt—avoids attributing fault while still vindicating fair procedures. It also declines to micromanage administrative practices, leaving operational choices (such as read receipts or redundant communications) to agencies while signaling the litigation risks if critical communications fail.

The key takeaways are:

• Fair‑procedures defects caused by communication failures can render decisions infirm even absent fault.
• When a body is functus officio, applicants must seek judicial review to obtain relief; consent to quash will generally carry an entitlement to costs.
• The presence of broader, unadjudicated grounds does not, in itself, negate success where the principal relief disposes of the case.

In the broader public law landscape, this judgment strengthens predictability around costs in consent‑to‑quash scenarios and underscores the centrality of procedural fairness in high‑volume administrative systems like international protection.