Clarifying “Person” in the Courts (No.3) Act: Authorising Unincorporated Solicitor Firms to Apply for District Court Summonses

Introduction

This commentary examines the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Donegal County Council v Quinn & anor [2025] IESC 19, delivered on 13 May 2025 by Charleton J, with O’Donnell CJ, Murray J, Collins J and Donnelly J concurring. The core issue in the appeal was whether an unincorporated firm of solicitors (“V.P. McMullin”) may, on behalf of a statutory prosecutor, apply to a District Court clerk for the issuance of a criminal summons under section 1 of the Courts (No 3) Act 1986 (as amended by the Civil Liability and Courts Act 2004). This question arose when Judge Sandra Murphy struck a case for the High Court’s opinion, and Bradley J answered “no” ([2024] IEHC 160), threatening to invalidate dozens of routine planning-enforcement prosecutions by local authorities. The Supreme Court’s reversal reaffirms traditional agency practice, statutory interpretation principles under the Interpretation Act 2005, and the administrative character of modern summons procedure.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court allowed Donegal County Council’s appeal and answered the stated question in the affirmative. It held that:

The definition of “person” in the Interpretation Act 2005, s 18(c) (encompassing individuals, bodies corporate and unincorporated bodies) applies to the Courts (No 3) Act 1986 unless a contrary intention appears.
No provision in the 1986 Act or its 2004 amendment displaces that general definition; the requirement that a summons specify the name of the person who applied can be met by naming a firm of solicitors acting on behalf of the authorised prosecutor.
Issuing a summons is an administrative, not judicial, act (per Clarke v Roche [1986] IR 619), and may be performed by an agent of the prosecutor, whether a natural or legal person.
Ordinary agency principles apply: a disclosed principal (the prosecutor) may act by agent; the face of the summons identifies the principal, and the firm’s identity suffices to meet the “specify the name” requirement.

As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the long‐standing practice of solicitor firms initiating criminal proceedings on behalf of bodies authorised to prosecute.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v Legal Aid Board [2023] IECA 19
Established the methodology for displacing general definitions in the Interpretation Act by context and legislative purpose. Murray J held that the term “person” in legal aid statutes could be restricted to natural persons where context so demands.
Pharmaceutical Society v London & Provincial Supply Association (1880) 5 AC 857
Lord Blackburn’s principle that “person” may have a “less extended sense” (i.e. a human being) depending on statutory context.
Gillespie v City of Glasgow Bank (1879) 4 App Cas 632
Interpreted “for behoof of” / “on behalf of” to indicate agency and disclosed principal relationships in Scots‐law pleas.
Kelly v Hamill [1997] IEHC 7
McCracken J confirmed that “by or on behalf of” in section 1(4) of the 1986 Act permits delegation of administrative tasks to persons not themselves the prosecutor, so long as acting for the prosecutor.
The State (Clarke) v Roche [1986] IR 619
Held that under the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851 the issue of a summons was a judicial act; led directly to the 1986 Act’s re-cast of summons‐issuance as administrative.

2. Legal Reasoning

Starting‐Point: Interpretation Act 2005
Section 18(c) defines “person” broadly. Section 4(1) confirms this presumption applies to all enactments “except in so far as the contrary intention appears.”
High Court’s Contrary‐Intention Analysis
Bradley J found a contrary intention from repeated references in s 1(6) of the 1986 Act to “the name of the person,” plus pronouns “he or she,” concluding the legislature must have meant “natural person” in each instance. He also said the requirement to “specify” a name implied human identity.
Supreme Court’s Rebuttal
The Supreme Court rejected the uniform‐meaning‐throughout approach. It stressed:
- No text in the 1986 Act expressly or by necessary implication disapplies the broad definition of “person.”
- The administrative nature of summons‐issuance (s 1(1) expressly) freed it from traditional judicial‐act constraints, and no mischief suggested insulating it from professional agents.
- Agency law principles (disclosed principal, authority, delegation) demonstrate that an agent—here a solicitor’s firm—may be named as applicant while the real party in interest (the prosecutor) appears on the summons.
- Historical continuity—from the 1851 Act’s intention to permit “persons” (including corporations and agents) to institute proceedings—reinforced legislative expectation that firms would act in that capacity.
Key Doctrines Applied
- Statutory interpretation: literal reading read contextually and purposively (Bennion).
- Delegation of administrative acts: Kelly v Hamill confirmed “by or on behalf of” is broad enough to reach non‐prosecutorial agents.
- Agency and privity: a disclosed agency relationship means the principal (prosecutor) is bound and the agent need not be a natural person.

3. Impact on Future Cases and the Law

The Supreme Court’s decision preserves established practice and avoids the mass cancellation or re‐issue of summonses across Ireland’s local authorities, state bodies and other prosecutors. It confirms that:

Solicitor firms—whether partnerships, LLPs or sole practitioners—remain valid applicants for District Court summonses in criminal and regulatory enforcement proceedings.
Sections 1(3) and (6) of the 1986 Act, as amended, pose no obstacle to electronic or paper applications by unincorporated bodies acting on behalf of statutory prosecutors.
Future challenges based on the literal natural‐person interpretation of “person” in administrative statutes will have to surmount the Supreme Court’s robust endorsement of the Interpretation Act’s general definitions.

More broadly, the judgment underlines the importance of agency law in criminal procedure, the adaptability of administrative court processes in the digital age, and a purposive approach to statutory language.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Unincorporated Body: A partnership (e.g. a firm of solicitors) that is not a separate legal entity but whose members share liability and authority.
Corporation Sole: A type of legal entity, usually a public office (e.g. the Attorney General) where one person at a time occupies the corporate office.
“By or on behalf of”: Language indicating that either the principal (e.g. the prosecutor) or someone empowered by the principal (e.g. a solicitor’s firm) may carry out a statutory act.
Administrative vs Judicial Act: An administrative act (e.g. issuing a summons under the 1986 Act) follows a fixed procedure and may be delegated; a judicial act requires individual judicial consideration and cannot be delegated.
Interpretation Act 2005: Provides default rules for interpreting legislation, including that “person” includes natural persons, bodies corporate and unincorporated bodies unless a contrary intention appears.

Conclusion

Donegal County Council v Quinn & anor [2025] IESC 19 establishes that section 1 of the Courts (No 3) Act 1986, as amended, authorises unincorporated solicitor firms to apply for District Court summonses on behalf of statutory prosecutors. By affirming the Interpretation Act’s broad definition of “person,” reinforcing the administrative character of summons‐issuance, and anchoring the decision in agency principles and legislative history, the Supreme Court safeguards efficient, modern criminal procedure. This judgment will guide prosecutors, solicitors and courts, ensuring that technical objections based on the nature of the applicant do not derail the administration of justice.