Clarifying the O’Domhnaill Jurisdiction Post-Beatty:
Multi-Source Impairment and Fair-Trial Assessment in Historic Sexual-Abuse Claims – Commentary on D v D [2025] IEHC 434

Introduction

The High Court decision in D v D ([2025] IEHC 434) revisits the delicate balance between a plaintiff’s right to have civil allegations of historic sexual abuse tried on their merits and a defendant’s constitutional entitlement to a fair trial. Mr Justice Barr was asked to strike out proceedings on the basis of a 44–46-year lapse between the alleged abuse and the commencement of civil proceedings. The defence relied on II v JJ and alleged fatal prejudice caused by faded memories, deceased witnesses and lost documentation. The plaintiff countered with medical evidence of psychological “impairment” and invoked the Court of Appeal’s breakthrough ruling in Beatty v Beatty [2025] IECA 64, arguing that delay attributable to the wrongdoing of a defendant cannot be invoked against the victim.

The judgment supplies two critical clarifications: (1) how Beatty intersects with cases involving multiple alleged abusers, and (2) the evidential constituents necessary to demonstrate that a trial would be irremediably unfair under the O’Domhnaill v Merrick line of authority.

Summary of the Judgment

• Application: Defendant sought to strike out the civil action—based solely on pre-commencement delay—arguing that a fair trial was impossible.
• Main Findings:
  • The Court is bound by the recent Court of Appeal decision in Beatty, but the “wrongdoer-caused delay” principle only protects a plaintiff where the impairment derives from the defendant’s own wrongdoing alone.
  • In multi-abuser scenarios, responsibility for delay cannot be placed wholly on any single defendant without clear medical linkage.
  • Applying the refined O’Domhnaill/Fingleton principles, the defendant failed to cross the high threshold of showing an unfair (as opposed to imperfect) trial.
• Decision: Motion to strike out refused; costs awarded to the plaintiff (execution stayed pending determination).

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. O’Domhnaill v Merrick [1984] IR 151 – Origin of the inherent jurisdiction to dismiss claims where lapse of time makes a fair trial impossible. Sets a constitutional presumption in favour of a trial on the merits.
2. II v JJ [2012] IEHC 327 – Hogan J struck out a sibling-abuse claim 32–36 years after the events because it reduced to “one word against another”. The defendant in D v D relied heavily on this case.
3. Manning v Benson & Hedges [2004] 3 IR 556 – Finlay Geoghegan J set non-exhaustive factors for assessing fairness (nature of evidence, documents, witnesses etc.). Adopted by Barr J.
4. IBRC v Fingleton [2024] IESC 59 – Supreme Court restated and systematised the O’Domhnaill criteria; emphasised distinction between litigious disadvantage and unfair trial.
5. Beatty v Beatty [2025] IECA 64 – New and pivotal. Holds that delay caused by psychological impairment resulting from a defendant’s wrongdoing cannot be used by that defendant to bar proceedings. Provides important dicta that a court must take the plaintiff’s case “at its height” when assessing impairment.

Justice Barr recognised Beatty as “a radical addition” yet distinguished it on factual grounds—particularly the presence of multiple abusers potentially responsible for the plaintiff’s impairment. Thus the protective shield of Beatty was not automatically engaged.

2. Legal Reasoning Employed

• High Threshold for Dismissal: The Court began from the constitutional presumption favouring trial and reiterated that dismissal is “exceptional”.
• Impairment Analysis: Accepting medical evidence that the plaintiff suffered trauma-induced impairment, Barr J nonetheless required causal attribution. Because three perpetrators were involved, the Court could not attribute impairment exclusively to the defendant. Accordingly neither party was “at fault” for the delay.
• Evidence Assessment:
  • Potential availability of the sister as a witness contradicted the assertion that the case would rest solely on contesting narratives.
  • Possible Army leave records and discoverable psychiatric files constituted further objective material.
  • Lost hotel rosters, parents’ death and incidental documents were deemed either unsurprising given normal retention periods or not specifically prejudicial.
• Application of Fingleton Factors: On each Manning/Fingleton criterion—nature of evidence, role of documents, availability of witnesses—the defendant’s prejudice was viewed as no more than ordinary litigation disadvantage.
• Ultimate Balancing: Viewing the totality, the Court saw no “real likelihood of injustice” if the matter proceeded. Thus, the presumption in favour of trial prevailed.

3. Likely Impact of the Decision

D v D establishes nuanced clarifications that will reverberate through historic-abuse litigation:

• Scope of Beatty: Courts must examine whether plaintiff impairment is solely attributable to the defendant before disallowing reckoning of pre-complaint delay. In multi-defendant or multi-abuser contexts, that causal link may not be presumed.
• Evidence Emphasis: The decision underscores that even minimal objective or third-party evidence (e.g., siblings, institutional records) can defeat a strike-out attempt by tipping the balance toward a potentially fair trial.
• Discovery Strategy: Defence practitioners are reminded to pursue discovery (medical, employment, military records) rather than rely on presumed evidential voids.
• Hotel-Roster Logic: Barr J’s commonsense approach to retention practices signals that defendants cannot rely on the theoretical existence of decades-old ephemeral documents.
• Constitutional Imperative Restated: The judgment fortifies the notion that “justice diminished” (an imperfect trial) is not synonymous with “justice denied” (an unfair trial).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Impairment: A psychiatric or psychological condition arising from trauma that prevents a person from initiating legal action or reporting abuse.
• Plenary Summons: The initiating High Court document in Ireland for proceedings where substantial facts are in dispute and oral evidence will be required.
• Discovery: Formal court-ordered exchange of documents relevant to the issues in dispute, enabling each side to inspect the other’s evidence.
• Lapse-of-Time / O’Domhnaill Jurisdiction: The court’s inherent power to dismiss a civil claim where the passage of time renders a fair trial impossible, regardless of fault.
• Nolle Prosequi: A decision by the Director of Public Prosecutions to discontinue a criminal case.
• Stay on Execution: A suspension of the enforcement of a costs order pending the final resolution of the underlying dispute.

Conclusion

D v D is significant not because it forges an entirely new doctrinal path, but because it carefully refines the ambit of the recently minted Beatty principle and re-affirms the disciplined application of Fingleton. The decision teaches that:

1. Delay rendered explicable by psychological impairment bars a strike-out only where the impairment is the defendant’s own doing.
2. The existence of any credible third-party or documentary evidence, however limited, militates against the conclusion that a trial would be unfair.
3. Courts remain vigilant to substantive justice; mere evidential disadvantage or the discomfort of litigating ancient events will rarely justify pre-trial dismissal.

Future litigants—plaintiffs and defendants alike—must therefore prepare to substantiate their assertions of impairment or prejudice with concrete, case-specific evidence. As Irish jurisprudence continues to process historic abuse allegations, D v D serves as a measured blueprint for balancing victims’ rights to be heard with defendants’ rights to due process in the shadow of time.