Clarifying the Legal Standard for Directed Acquittals under Section 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010

1. Introduction

Director of Public Prosecutions v. J.B.; Director of Public Prosecutions v. S.M. ([2024] IESC 57) is a landmark Supreme Court of Ireland decision delivered on 18 December 2024 that addresses the prosecutor’s right to appeal a trial judge’s directed acquittal under s. 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. The appeals originate from two related trials in the Central Criminal Court (CCDP0101/2021) where J.B. and S.M. faced charges including attempted murder, possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life (Firearms Act 1925, as amended), and criminal damage. After the trial judge directed a not‐guilty verdict—finding the prosecution’s circumstantial case too tenuous—the DPP successfully appealed “with prejudice” to the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court was asked to decide whether (a) the Court of Appeal correctly characterized the judge’s withdrawal as an error of law, and (b) whether the judge had indeed erred in directing an acquittal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court unanimously held:

A judge’s decision to withdraw a criminal charge from the jury—applying the Galbraith test—is a question of law, not of fact. It involves determining whether the evidence, if accepted, is legally capable of sustaining a conviction.
Section 23 of the 2010 Act limits a prosecutor’s appeal against an acquittal to errors of law. The appellate court must be satisfied both that the direction was wrong in law and that there was evidence on which a jury might reasonably convict beyond reasonable doubt.
In applying s. 18 and s. 19 of the Criminal Justice Act 1984, the trial judge omitted any consideration of inferences properly drawn from the accused’s refusal to account for possession of firearm‐residue gloves (J.B.) and their presence in a vehicle shortly after the shooting (both appellants). Those provisions permit the drawing of corroborative inferences that must be factored into the “case to answer” analysis.
The cumulative circumstantial evidence, together with potential inference‐based corroboration, was sufficient to go to the jury. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in law by directing acquittals, and a retrial was ordered.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

R v. Galbraith [1981] 2 All ER 1060 – established the two‐pronged test for directed acquittals: (1) no evidence at all or (2) evidence so weak that no reasonable jury properly directed could convict.
The State (Turley) v. O’Floinn [1968] IR 245 – Ó Dálaigh C.J. confirmed that “whether there is sufficient evidence in law to support a conviction” is a legal, not factual, question.
Fitzgerald v. DPP [2003] 3 IR 247 – distinguished between legal issues of evidentiary sufficiency and factual issues of credibility or inferences of fact.
The People (DPP) v. Pires, Corrigan and Gannon [2018] IESC 51 – reaffirmed the difference between reviewing evidence for legal sufficiency versus making factual findings.
The People (DPP) v. O’Shea (No 2) [1983] ILRM 592 – Finlay P. explained that a judge must decide if “there is evidence which if accepted by a jury could as a matter of law lead to a conviction,” including cases where the chain of proof is tenuous.
Charleton J. in The People (DPP) v. McHugh [2024] IECA 176 – emphasized that judging whether the evidence is so tenuous as to preclude a jury finding is still a legal inquiry.
Rock v. Ireland [1997] 3 IR 484 – clarified that inferences under s. 18/19 of the 1984 Act may amount to corroboration but cannot be the sole or main basis for conviction.
The People (Attorney General) v. Williams [1940] IR 195 – defined “corroboration” as independent evidence implicating the accused.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in two main strands:

Nature of a Directed‐Acquittal Decision: Drawing on Turley, Pires and Galbraith, the Court held that determining whether the prosecution’s evidence meets the legal threshold to go before a jury is a matter of law. It is an inquiry into whether, matched against the statutory elements of the offence, the evidence is legally capable of sustaining a conviction. Weighing credibility or drawing factual inferences to decide what actually happened is a factual exercise; by contrast, assessing sufficiency is purely legal.
Role of Statutory Inference Provisions (ss. 18 & 19, Criminal Justice Act 1984): Those sections allow the court—and ultimately the jury—to draw inferences from an accused’s failure to account for objects (e.g., firearm‐residue gloves) or presence at a scene, provided statutory safeguards (warning, solicitor access) are met. Such inferences can amount to corroboration of other evidence. The trial judge’s grant of a direction failed to factor in those potential inferences, an oversight that rendered her decision legally defective.

3.3. Impact

This decision clarifies and strengthens prosecutorial appeal rights under s. 23 of the 2010 Act, ensuring that:

Courts uniformly treat sufficiency‐to‐convict decisions as legal matters, preserving the prosecutor’s ability to challenge directed acquittals “with prejudice.”
Trial judges must expressly consider and rule on inference provisions when deciding whether to withdraw a case from the jury. Omission of that analysis will constitute an error of law.
Future appeals will frequently revisit the line between legal sufficiency and factual credibility, but this judgment affirms that the threshold inquiry remains legal.
Defence practitioners will need to address statutory safeguards and the weight of inference evidence at trial and on applications to withdraw, ensuring compliance with warnings and solicitor consultations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Directed Acquittal (Galbraith Test): A trial judge may remove a case from the jury if there is no evidence at all or if the evidence is so weak that no reasonable jury could convict.
Error of Law vs. Error of Fact: Determining whether evidence meets the legal standard for conviction is a question of law. Deciding which facts to believe and drawing factual inferences is a question of fact.
Inference Provisions (ss. 18 & 19, CJA 1984): When an accused refuses to explain possession of objects or presence at a scene, the court/jury may draw inferences that can corroborate other evidence—but cannot rely solely on those inferences for conviction.
“With Prejudice” Appeal: Under s. 23, the DPP may appeal an acquittal that involves an error of law, with the potential outcome of a retrial rather than an unconditional dismissal.

5. Conclusion

DPP v. J.B.; DPP v. S.M. decisively affirms that the sufficiency‐to‐convict inquiry is a matter of law, preserving the legislature’s design for prosecutorial “with prejudice” appeals under s. 23 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2010. It underlines the critical importance of addressing statutory inference provisions in directed‐acquittal applications and confirms that omission of such analysis constitutes a legal error. This judgment will guide trial judges, appellate courts, and practitioners in delineating legal sufficiency from factual credibility and in properly applying inference statutes, thereby shaping the conduct of future criminal trials and appeals in Ireland.