Clarifying the Interaction between Section 28(6), Safe Country Designations and State Protection: Commentary on G.G. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2025] IEHC 625

Clarifying the Interaction between Section 28(6), Safe Country Designations and State Protection: Commentary on G.G. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2025] IEHC 625

1. Introduction

This judgment of O’Donnell J in G.G. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2025] IEHC 625 sits at a critical juncture in Irish international protection law. It is one of the first High Court applications to be decided after the Court of Appeal’s significant ruling in Z.M. v IPAT and Minister for Justice [2025] IECA 208 (“Z.M.”), which clarified how the “safe country of origin” regime under the International Protection Act 2015 (“the 2015 Act”) must be understood in light of EU law.

The case presents a familiar but legally complex scenario: an applicant from a designated “safe country” who has clearly suffered religiously motivated violence, but whose claim ultimately fails because the Tribunal concludes that effective state protection is available to him in his home state.

The core legal questions raised were:

  • How must the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT” or “the Tribunal”) apply the rebuttable presumption in s. 28(6) of the 2015 Act, where past persecution has been accepted?
  • What is the proper approach to assessing the availability of state protection, particularly where the country is designated safe and where country of origin information (COI) appears to change over time?
  • Does s. 33 of the 2015 Act (safe country of origin) require an explicit, separate “serious grounds” finding before state protection is assessed under ss. 28 and 31?

The judgment does not radically recast the law. Rather, it confirms and consolidates a number of principles, especially in light of Z.M., while rejecting an attempt to impose rigid formal requirements on Tribunal decisions. It clarifies:

  • That the s. 28(6) presumption can be properly applied even without repeated or formulaic reference, so long as the reasoning shows that the evidential benefit was given.
  • That the assessment of risk of persecution and the assessment of adequacy of state protection are separate inquiries.
  • That the designation of a state as a safe country of origin is a factor to be taken into account within the s. 28 analysis, and does not require a discrete, anterior s. 33 “stage” or a ritualistic set of questions.
  • That reliance on updated COI (including nuanced changes between annual reports) is permissible, provided the Tribunal engages with the material as a whole and does not act irrationally or selectively.

In short, G.G. is important for how it operationalises the Court of Appeal’s guidance in Z.M. and earlier High Court case law on s. 28(6), safe-country designations and state protection.

2. Case Overview: Facts and Procedural Background

2.1 The Applicant and His Claim

The applicant, G.G., is a national of Georgia, a country designated as a safe country of origin under s. 72 of the 2015 Act. He converted to Jehovah’s Witnesses in October 2021 and tried to keep his religious beliefs private. Despite this, three significant incidents formed the factual basis of his protection claim:

  1. May 2022 assault: A neighbour confronted him over his religious beliefs, accused him of betraying his country and religion, and physically assaulted him, causing injuries that required hospitalisation. A police report was filed.
  2. April 2023 assault: An attack outside a church, again resulting in hospitalisation; a further police report was filed.
  3. Threat from his father: His father allegedly threatened him with a knife in relation to his religious conversion.

These incidents were accepted by both the International Protection Office (IPO) and IPAT as having occurred, and as religion-based persecutory acts.

2.2 Procedural History

  • G.G. arrived in Ireland on 20 May 2023 and applied for international protection on 22 May 2023.
  • He completed an IPO questionnaire and underwent a s. 35 interview. The IPO issued its first-instance decision on 14 August 2023, refusing refugee status and subsidiary protection.
  • He appealed to IPAT on 22 August 2023. After seeking further submissions and updated COI from his legal representatives, IPAT determined the appeal “on the papers” and issued its decision on 23 January 2024.
  • By order of 13 May 2024, leave for judicial review was granted; an amended statement of grounds followed.

2.3 The Tribunal’s Core Findings

The Tribunal:

  • Accepted G.G.’s nationality, religious conversion and the occurrence of persecutory incidents.
  • Accepted that these incidents amounted to past persecution on a Convention ground (religion).
  • Recognised that this triggered the rebuttable presumption in s. 28(6) of the 2015 Act (that past persecution is a serious indication of a well-founded fear of future persecution, absent good reasons to think it will not recur).
  • Nonetheless concluded that effective, non-temporary state protection was available in Georgia for someone in G.G.’s position, especially in light of updated COI (including changes between the 2022 and 2023 Freedom House reports).

On that basis, the Tribunal refused both refugee status and subsidiary protection.

2.4 The Judicial Review Grounds

Three principal issues were advanced in the High Court:

  1. Section 28(6) presumption: G.G. argued that, although the Tribunal mentioned the presumption, it then applied the “normal” forward-looking test for risk without actually giving him the benefit of that presumption. He claimed this was a misapplication of s. 28(6).
  2. Use of COI and Freedom House reports: He argued it was irrational for the Tribunal to shift its conclusion on state protection largely because a sentence stating that religious minorities are “insufficiently protected by the State” appeared in the 2022 Freedom House report but was absent from the 2023 report. He contended that the Tribunal misread the COI and failed to properly assess the effectiveness of Georgian legal protections.
  3. Safe country of origin and s. 33: Relying on Barrett J’s judgment in B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763, G.G. claimed that s. 33 required the Tribunal to conduct a specific analysis—answering four particular questions—and to make an explicit finding that he had not submitted “serious grounds” for finding Georgia unsafe for him. He argued that failure to do so was an error of law.

The respondents accepted the factual background but maintained that the Tribunal’s decision correctly applied the law and was rationally based on the evidence and COI.

3. Summary of the High Court’s Decision

O’Donnell J dismissed the application and refused to quash IPAT’s decision. In essence, the Court held:

  1. Section 28(6) had been properly applied. Although the Tribunal did not repeatedly invoke the presumption, it:
    • Expressly recognised that the applicant had suffered persecution; and
    • Expressly stated that he was entitled to the benefit of s. 28(6), and then proceeded on the basis that he had a well-founded fear of persecution, focusing thereafter on state protection.
    This was sufficient; no legal error arose.
  2. The Tribunal’s treatment of COI was rational. It:
    • Engaged extensively and openly with the COI, including US State Department, European Commission and Freedom House reports;
    • Was entitled to give significant weight to updated information (the 2023 report) and to adjust conclusions accordingly; and
    • Did not rest its decision solely on the omission of one sentence from the 2023 report.
    The conclusion that effective, non-temporary state protection existed in Georgia was within the range of reasonable outcomes.
  3. No legal error in the s. 33 / safe country analysis. In light of Z.M., the Court held that:
    • Section 33 does not require a separate, discrete step or formalistic set of questions before proceeding to s. 28/31 analysis.
    • The safe-country designation is a relevant factor within the s. 28 assessment itself.
    • What matters is that the Tribunal considered whether the applicant had advanced “serious grounds” for saying the country was unsafe for him and then assessed state protection accordingly.
    On the decision’s substance, it was clear that IPAT did conclude that G.G. had not shown serious grounds that Georgia was unsafe in his personal circumstances.

Having found no error of law, irrationality or failure to conduct the required “thorough review” (within the judicial review standard), the Court refused relief. It provisionally awarded costs to the respondents, subject to further submissions.

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1 The Legal Framework

The judgment operates at the intersection of several key provisions of the 2015 Act and their EU law sources:

  • Section 28: sets out the “assessment of facts and circumstances” for international protection applications, including the assessment of:
    • whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution (refugee status), or faces a real risk of serious harm (subsidiary protection); and
    • whether protection is available from the state in their country of origin.
  • Section 28(6): creates an evidential presumption—often called a “rebuttable presumption”—where past persecution has been established:
    …this in turn establishes a serious indication that the applicant’s subjective fear of suffering serious harm, if returned, is well founded unless there were good reasons to consider that such serious harm would not be repeated. (N.U. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 87, para 20)
  • Section 31: defines “actors of protection” and the nature of state protection, in line with Article 7 of the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU). Protection must be effective but not absolute; the state must take “reasonable steps” and operate an effective legal system (criminal justice, etc.) against persecutory acts.
  • Section 33: deals with safe countries of origin. A country designated safe may be treated as such only if the applicant has not submitted “serious grounds” for considering it unsafe for him “in his particular circumstances and in terms of his eligibility for international protection.”
  • Section 72: allows for the designation of a country as a “safe country of origin.” Georgia has been so designated.

These provisions must be read consistently with the Qualification and Procedures Directives, and especially the safe country framework and the requirement, under Article 39 of the (former) Procedures Directive, that an effective remedy involve a “thorough review”.

4.2 Section 28(6) and the Rebuttable Presumption of Future Risk

4.2.1 The Applicant’s Argument

G.G. argued that, although IPAT stated he was entitled to the benefit of s. 28(6), it then defaulted to a standard “forward-looking” analysis without actually relying on the presumption. He invoked:

  • M.Y. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 345 – where certiorari was granted in part because the Tribunal failed to engage with the s. 28(6) presumption at all.
  • N.U. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 87 – where Phelan J described s. 28(6) as a serious evidential indicator that must be factored into future risk assessment.

He suggested that the Tribunal could not simply “start from a presumption of state protection” (as para 5.17 of the impugned decision stated) without first giving real operative effect to the presumption of future risk arising from his past persecution.

4.2.2 The Court’s Approach: Substance over Form

O’Donnell J approached this argument in a nuanced way, placing emphasis on the substantive reasoning rather than mere phrasing:

  • He endorsed Phelan J’s explanation in N.U. that s. 28(6) amounts to a rebuttable presumption of well-founded fear where past persecution is established.
  • He also relied on E.S. v IPAT & Anor [2022] IEHC 613, where Phelan J stressed that it is not strictly necessary to mention s. 28(6) expressly; what matters is that the decision:
    is couched in terms which reflect that the decision maker is aware of the significant evidential benefit which supports a finding of future fear or risk of persecution or harm unless good reasons are identified… (para 42)

On the facts of G.G., the Tribunal had done more than the bare minimum:

  1. It expressly noted that G.G. had suffered persecution and that s. 28(6) was engaged.
  2. That reference was placed in a section of the decision headed “Analysis of Well Founded Fear”, indicating it formed part of the future-oriented risk assessment.
  3. There was no finding that he lacked a future risk of persecution; indeed, the structure of the decision—moving straight from recognition of past persecution and s. 28(6) to an extensive discussion of state protection—made sense only on the assumption that future risk was accepted.

On that basis, O’Donnell J held that:

  • It was “a necessary inference” that the Tribunal accepted a well-founded fear of persecution;
  • Accordingly, it had in substance afforded G.G. the benefit of the s. 28(6) presumption; and
  • There was therefore no basis for arguing that he was deprived of that evidential advantage.

4.2.3 Separation of Risk of Persecution and State Protection

A key point reinforced by the Court (drawing directly on Z.M.) is that:

The question whether an applicant has a well-founded fear of persecution (or real risk of serious harm) is distinct from the question whether adequate state protection is available.

Thus, even if s. 28(6) leads a decision-maker to accept that there is a serious risk of persecution:

  • It does not follow that state protection is unavailable; and
  • Acceptance of risk does not preclude a separate finding that the state can adequately protect against that risk.

This is conceptually important. The applicant’s argument tended to collapse these two stages: he suggested that once the Tribunal accepted his fear as well founded (via s. 28(6)), it could not then properly rely on a presumption of state protection. O’Donnell J, consistent with Z.M., rejected that conflation.

4.3 Assessment of State Protection and the Use of COI

4.3.1 The Freedom House Reports and the Alleged Irrationality

A central plank of the challenge concerned the Tribunal’s use of two successive Freedom House reports:

  • In 2022, the report had stated that religious minorities, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, were “insufficiently protected by the State”.
  • In 2023, that stark sentence was omitted.

The Tribunal observed that, in an earlier case, the 2022 wording had tipped the balance in favour of finding a lack of effective state protection for Jehovah’s Witnesses. The question was whether, with the 2023 report now omitting that phrase, the current COI still justified that conclusion.

The applicant contended that:

  • The Tribunal’s shift in position was effectively based on a single missing sentence in the 2023 report.
  • This was an unsafe and irrational basis on which to conclude that effective state protection was now available.
  • Other COI still indicated that protection for religious minorities was deficient.

4.3.2 The High Court’s Application of the Rationality Standard

O’Donnell J emphasised that the Court’s task was not to decide whether it agreed with the Tribunal’s assessment, but whether the Tribunal’s use of COI was rational:

The issue here is whether the treatment of the COI by the Tribunal was rational, and not whether it was open to the Tribunal to take a different view or, still less, whether the court would have reached a different conclusion. (para 46)

He also cited Phelan J in E.S. for the well-established principle:

…the Tribunal is not entitled to use COI selectively or to ignore relevant COI in the Applicant's favour without comment. The Tribunal is required to weigh up the different and conflicting information and explain why it considered that notwithstanding that the information goes in contrary directions, a particular conclusion or finding is being reached or one part of the information preferred over another. (para 79)

On the facts of G.G., the Court found:

  • The Tribunal engaged extensively with a range of COI:
    • U.S. Department of State 2022 religious freedom report;
    • European Commission working document on Georgia’s EU application;
    • Amnesty International and other NGO materials (noting that some were out of date); and
    • Freedom House 2022 and 2023 reports.
  • It actively sought updated COI and submissions from the applicant’s representatives, rather than unilaterally relying on its own sources.
  • It recognised that the COI was closely balanced and that its conclusion in earlier cases was heavily influenced by the 2022 Freedom House phrase.
  • With the 2023 report no longer containing the stark “insufficiently protected” sentence, the overall balance of COI could reasonably tip the other way.

Crucially, the Court held that:

  • The change in the Freedom House report was a legitimate and important factor—not the only factor—in the Tribunal’s re-evaluation.
  • The Tribunal’s conclusion that there was now generally effective state protection for religious minorities, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, was within the range of reasonable decisions.
  • There was no irrationality or selective use of COI; the Tribunal’s analysis was open-minded and documented.

The Court expressly rejected the characterisation that the decision “turned” on “one missing sentence”. Instead, it saw the 2023 omission as altering the weight of one major piece of COI in a context where the broader picture was already finely balanced.

4.3.3 The Standard of State Protection

The Court also endorsed, via Z.M., a crucial principle on the standard of state protection required under EU and Irish law:

State protection must be effective but it is not required to be absolute. The obligation on a state under Article 7 is to take "reasonable steps". … Absolute protection, especially where the threat emanates from criminal elements, would in any event be impossible to attain. (Z.M., para 134, cited at para 60)

Thus, evidence of:

  • occasional failings in investigations,
  • some ineffective hate crime prosecutions, or
  • general corruption concerns

does not automatically equate to a lack of “effective” state protection for Convention purposes. The Tribunal is entitled to find sufficient protection where:

  • a functional legal system exists, and
  • there is a reasonably operating criminal justice system capable of detecting, investigating and punishing persecutory acts.

The Tribunal’s conclusion that the Georgian system met this threshold, even if inferior to the Irish system, was therefore not legally flawed.

4.4 Safe Country Designations, Section 33 and the Impact of Z.M.

4.4.1 The Applicant’s Reliance on N.U. and B.C.

On the safe country issue, G.G. argued—drawing on N.U. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 87 and B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763—that:

  • Section 33 allows a state to be treated as a safe country of origin “only where” the applicant has not submitted serious grounds for considering it unsafe in his particular circumstances.
  • Therefore, the Tribunal had to:
    • conduct an explicit analysis under s. 33,
    • answer the four questions identified by Barrett J in B.C., and
    • make a clear finding that no “serious grounds” had been submitted, before relying on the safe-country designation or proceeding to a s. 31 state protection analysis.

In his view, the Tribunal’s reference at para 5.17 to “starting from the point of view that there is a presumption of State Protection” and noting Georgia’s safe-country status, without an express s. 33 finding, was contrary to law.

4.4.2 Clarification from E.S. and Z.M.

The High Court rejected this argument, drawing heavily on:

  • E.S. v IPAT & Anor [2022] IEHC 613 – where Phelan J clarified that her earlier remarks in N.U. were made in the context of a problematic decision that had conflated ss. 31 and 33, and did not mean that a stand-alone, expressly labelled s. 33 analysis was always required.
  • Z.M. v IPAT [2025] IECA 208 – where the Court of Appeal provided a comprehensive exposition of how s. 33 fits into the EU safe-country scheme.

In particular, O’Donnell J cited and relied on the following key points from Z.M.:

  • Overall scheme (para 106): A country may be designated safe after an assessment of its general situation and protection systems. However:
    …the designation of a country as safe is always subject to the requirement that each application for protection be individually examined and to the entitlement of an applicant for protection to show that the country is not safe in their particular circumstances.
  • Purpose of s. 33 (para 116):
    Section 33 does not in its terms require a separate and discrete analysis to be conducted and a decision made as to the existence of "serious grounds" as a precursor to the carrying out of the assessment of facts and circumstances required under section 28.
  • No “two-stage” structure (para 118):
    There is no separate section 31 protection analysis which must be preceded by a section 33 analysis… There is an assessment of facts and circumstances pertaining to the application under section 28… The fact that a country has been designated safe will also be relevant to overall analysis… subject to the entitlement of the applicant to submit grounds showing that it is not safe for them in their particular circumstances.
  • Relevance of safe-country designation (paras 119–120): The wording of s. 33 and its EU context “positively requires decision makers to have regard to the designation of a country as safe” rather than precluding reliance on it absent an anterior “serious grounds” finding.

O’Donnell J also noted Ferriter J’s observation in XS and JT v IPAT & Minister [2022] IEHC 100 that, in a safe-country context, the onus rests on the applicant to rebut the presumption of state protection by showing serious grounds that the country is not safe in their individual circumstances.

4.4.3 Application to the Tribunal’s Reasoning in G.G.

O’Donnell J’s review of the Tribunal’s core finding (paras 5.17–5.18 of the decision) is central:

[5.17] The Tribunal must start its consideration from the point of view that there is a presumption of State Protection. Further, Georgia is a designated Safe Country of Origin which does not preclude an analysis of the adequacy of State Protection but requires that there are substantial grounds for considering that the country is not safe for the particular Appellant.
[5.18] …The test is whether the State in question takes reasonable steps for the detection, investigation, prosecution and punishment of offenders and that such a system is available to the Appellant and that it is effective and non-temporary. The Tribunal is satisfied that there is State Protection generally available in Georgia… it is effective and available for the particular Appellant. …

From this, the High Court concluded that:

  • The Tribunal correctly understood that:
    • There is a rebuttable presumption of state protection in international protection law; and
    • Georgia’s status as a safe country is a relevant factor, but does not shut down a substantive analysis of adequacy of protection.
  • The Tribunal in fact considered whether there were “substantial grounds” (or serious grounds) indicating Georgia was unsafe for G.G.—its extended COI discussion was precisely about that question.
  • Although the Tribunal did not expressly say “the applicant has not submitted serious grounds”, this was implicit and clear from its reasoning and conclusion that effective state protection existed.

Accordingly:

  • There was no legal requirement for the Tribunal to set out the four questions articulated by Barrett J in B.C. or to structure its decision under explicit s. 33 “headings”.
  • As with statutory references generally, the real test is whether it is substantively clear that the correct legal tests have been understood and applied.
  • In this case, that standard was met.

4.5 The Standard and Intensity of Judicial Review in Asylum Cases

Finally, the Court reiterated the impact of EU law on the scope of judicial review in international protection matters, citing R.A. v Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2017] IECA 297 (Hogan J):

…the requirement of Article 39 of the Procedures Directive means that the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review proceedings must nonetheless ensure that "the reasons which led the competent authority to reject the application for asylum as unfounded … may be the subject of a thorough review by the national court." (para 63, emphasis added)

This “thorough review” requirement:

  • Demands a careful, reasons-focused scrutiny of the Tribunal’s decision; but
  • Does not convert judicial review into a full merits appeal.

Thus, the High Court:

  • Checked whether the Tribunal:
    • identified the correct legal tests (ss. 28, 31, 33, s. 28(6) presumption, safe-country framework);
    • properly understood the standard of state protection; and
    • used COI rationally and non-selectively.
  • Did not substitute its own assessment of:
    • whether COI should have been weighed more heavily one way or another; or
    • whether Georgia is in fact safe for Jehovah’s Witnesses at a merits level.

Within those constraints, the Court found no basis for intervention.

5. Precedents and Their Influence

5.1 R.A. v RAT [2017] IECA 297 – “Thorough Review” under EU Law

Hogan J’s judgment in R.A. laid down the principle that, because asylum law is “fundamentally governed by EU law”, the High Court’s judicial review jurisdiction must accommodate the requirement of an effective remedy under the Procedures Directive. This means:

  • Review must be intensive enough to scrutinise the reasons for refusal in depth; but
  • Still respects the boundaries of judicial review (legality and rationality, not fresh fact-finding).

In G.G., this standard manifested in:

  • Careful examination of the Tribunal’s reasoning on s. 28(6), state protection and safe-country designation; and
  • A conscious refusal to re-weigh evidence or second-guess reasonable evaluations of COI.

5.2 N.U., E.S., IL, M.Y. – The Section 28(6) Presumption

  • IL v IPAT [2021] IEHC 106 first described s. 28(6) as creating a “rebuttable presumption” that past persecution is a serious indicator of well-founded fear.
  • N.U. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 87 elaborated on how this presumption should inform future-risk assessments and highlighted the need for clarity in s. 33 safe-country reasoning.
  • E.S. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 613 clarified that:
    • Express reference to s. 28(6) is helpful but not essential if the decision in substance gives the applicant the evidential benefit;
    • There is no rigid requirement for a separately labelled s. 33 analysis, provided the reasoning shows whether “serious grounds” have been submitted.
  • M.Y. v IPAT [2022] IEHC 345 stands as a counterpoint: it is an example of a decision being quashed where no engagement at all with s. 28(6) was evident, despite established past persecution.

G.G. is consistent with this line: it confirms that substantive engagement with the presumption is enough, and that courts will not insist on formulaic language where the analysis clearly assumes future risk and then turns to state protection.

5.3 Z.M. v IPAT & Minister [2025] IECA 208 – Safe Countries and State Protection

Z.M. is the most influential authority in G.G.. The Court of Appeal:

  • Explained the EU-law framework for safe country designations;
  • Clarified that:
    • s. 33 does not require a standalone, preliminary “serious grounds” decision;
    • the safe-country designation is always relevant but always rebuttable by individual circumstances;
    • the assessment of state protection occurs as part of the s. 28 “assessment of facts and circumstances”, incorporating the yardstick in s. 31 and Article 7 of the Qualification Directive.
  • Reaffirmed that state protection must be effective but not perfect, echoing EU jurisprudence.

In G.G., O’Donnell J applies these principles directly:

  • He rejects the applicant’s argument for a rigid two-stage, s. 33-then-s. 31 analysis.
  • He accepts that the Tribunal could:
    • note Georgia’s safe-country designation,
    • recognise a presumption of state protection, and
    • then ask whether COI and the applicant’s circumstances rebut that presumption.

5.4 B.C. v IPAT and XS & JT – Formal Structure vs Substantive Test

Barrett J’s decision in B.C. v IPAT [2019] IEHC 763 identified a set of four questions that, in his view, a decision-maker should address when dealing with safe-country issues. In practice, this has sometimes been invoked by litigants as implying a near-mandatory checklist.

O’Donnell J explicitly distances himself from any such formalism:

  • He does not criticise B.C. as such, but
  • He affirms that there is no legal requirement that a Tribunal decision must mirror those four questions in structure or wording.

In doing so, he also takes account of:

  • XS and JT v IPAT & Minister [2022] IEHC 100 (Ferriter J), which stressed that the burden lies on the applicant to rebut the safe-country presumption by showing serious grounds that the country is not safe in their particular circumstances.

Thus, post-Z.M. and G.G., the safe-country analysis is:

  • Fact-intensive and individualised;
  • Integrated into the overall s. 28 assessment; and
  • Assessed on substance rather than on whether the Tribunal has recited particular formulae or checklists.

6. Simplifying Key Concepts

6.1 What Is “State Protection”?

“State protection” in asylum law has a specific meaning. It is not about whether:

  • a country is perfectly safe, or
  • the applicant has ever been harmed there.

Rather, it asks:

  • Can the state reasonably protect the applicant from future persecutory harm?

Under Article 7 of the Qualification Directive and s. 31 of the 2015 Act, a state provides protection if it:

  • takes reasonable steps to prevent persecution (e.g. by operating an effective policy and legal system), and
  • operates a functioning law enforcement and justice system to detect, investigate and punish persecutors.

Protection need not be perfect; even compliant states can have crime, inefficiency and corruption. The key question is whether, overall, the state seriously attempts and is generally able to protect its citizens.

6.2 What Is a “Safe Country of Origin”?

A “safe country of origin” is a state that, following a legal and political assessment, is designated by statute as generally safe—i.e. one where:

  • there is normally no persecution,
  • there is generally respect for human rights, and
  • effective state protection is presumptively available.

However:

  • This is a rebuttable presumption.
  • Section 33 explicitly states that a country will only be treated as safe for a given applicant if he has not submitted serious grounds for considering it unsafe for him “in his particular circumstances”.

So, even where a country is designated safe, an individual may still be recognised as a refugee if they can show that:

  • their personal situation—e.g. political activity, minority status, or specific threats—takes them outside the general norm; and
  • the state cannot or will not effectively protect them.

6.3 What Is the Section 28(6) Presumption?

Section 28(6) deals with the role of past persecution in predicting future risk. The idea is that:

  • If you have already been persecuted (for a relevant reason),
  • that is a serious indication that you may be persecuted again if returned.

This is called a rebuttable presumption: the decision-maker must start from the view that your fear of future persecution is well founded, unless there are good reasons to think the harm will not recur (e.g. a regime change, relocation, or special protection now available).

However, this presumption:

  • Concerns future risk, not state protection; and
  • Does not automatically mean that protection from the state is unavailable. It simply means the decision-maker must accept that the risk exists, then ask whether the state can reasonably protect you against it.

6.4 Judicial Review vs Appeal and “Thorough Review”

In asylum cases, the High Court does not hear a full appeal; it hears a judicial review. This has two implications:

  1. Scope: The Court does not decide afresh whether the applicant should be granted refugee status. It asks whether the Tribunal:
    • applied the correct law,
    • took account of relevant considerations,
    • gave adequate reasons, and
    • reached a decision that was rational (not perverse or arbitrary).
  2. Intensity: Because EU law requires an effective remedy, the Court’s review must be “thorough”—it cannot be superficial. It must seriously engage with the reasons for refusal and the relevant evidence, especially COI.

G.G. illustrates this balance:

  • The Court scrutinised in detail how the Tribunal treated s. 28(6), COI and s. 33; but
  • It stopped short of substituting its own view on whether Georgia is safe; it simply determined that the Tribunal’s view was legally tenable.

7. Likely Impact and Future Implications

7.1 For Applicants from Safe Countries (Especially Georgia)

For claimants from designated safe countries—Georgia in particular—G.G. signals several important points:

  • High evidential bar to rebutting state protection:
    • Even with accepted past persecution and s. 28(6) engaged, applicants must still show that the state cannot or will not protect them.
    • General reports of discrimination or imperfect investigations may not suffice if a functional justice system exists.
  • COI is dynamic: Changes between successive reports (e.g. Freedom House 2022 vs 2023) can materially affect outcomes. Applicants will need to:
    • identify and rely on the most recent evidence, and
    • explain why, despite any improvements or softened formulations, the country remains unsafe for them personally.
  • Jehovah’s Witnesses in Georgia: While this judgment does not declare Georgia safe for all Jehovah’s Witnesses as a matter of law, it does show that:
    • the current COI can sustain a finding that effective state protection exists for members of that group, and
    • a claimant will need strong, up-to-date, and individualised evidence to displace that conclusion.

7.2 For IPO and IPAT Decision-Makers

For protection decision-makers, G.G. provides both reassurance and guidance:

  • Reassurance:
    • Decisions will not be quashed merely because they do not reproduce every statutory provision or judicial formula, provided the reasoning shows:
      • awareness of the key legal tests, and
      • a genuine engagement with the evidence.
  • Guidance:
    • They should:
      • expressly recognise s. 28(6) where past persecution is accepted and explain, at least in substance, how it informs the future-risk assessment;
      • draw a clear analytical distinction between assessment of risk and assessment of state protection;
      • avoid selective use of COI and explain where they prefer one source over another, especially if reports change over time;
      • treat safe-country designation and the presumption of state protection as starting points that can be rebutted by serious grounds, not as trump cards that preclude individualised assessment.

7.3 For Litigation Strategy in Judicial Review

From a litigation perspective, G.G. suggests that:

  • S. 28(6) challenges will only succeed where:
    • there is no sign that the decision-maker recognised the evidential presumption at all (M.Y. scenario); or
    • the reasoning clearly contradicts the presumption (e.g. treating past persecution as irrelevant to future risk without justification).
  • S. 33/safe-country arguments based on alleged failure to recite the B.C. four questions are unlikely to prosper:
    • The emphasis will be on whether the reasoning, read fairly, shows that the applicant’s serious grounds (if any) were considered and rejected.
  • COI-based irrationality claims remain viable but demanding:
    • Counsel will need to demonstrate selectivity, misreading, or arbitrary preference, not simply a difference of opinion over the weight of evidence.

8. Conclusion

G.G. v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Ors [2025] IEHC 625 is best understood as a consolidating judgment. It does not rewrite Irish asylum law, but it harmonises and clarifies several important lines of authority in the aftermath of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Z.M..

Its key contributions can be summarised as follows:

  • Section 28(6): The presumption of future risk arising from past persecution is an important evidential tool, but decision-makers need not invoke it ritualistically. If they:
    • accept past persecution,
    • proceed on the basis that there is a future risk, and
    • then focus on whether state protection is available,
    the applicant will be taken to have had the benefit of s. 28(6).
  • Risk vs protection: The judgment reinforces the conceptual separation between establishing a well-founded fear of persecution and showing that state protection is unavailable or ineffective. The former does not entail the latter.
  • Safe-country regime: Post-Z.M., s. 33 is not a rigid, stand-alone “stage”. Safe-country designation is a significant, but rebuttable, factor in the s. 28 assessment, and the onus lies on the applicant to submit serious grounds that the country is unsafe in their particular circumstances.
  • COI and rationality: Tribunals are entitled—and indeed obliged—to rely on the most up-to-date COI, and to adjust conclusions where reports evolve. Courts will intervene only where COI is used selectively, misread, or in a manifestly irrational way.
  • Judicial review intensity: The “thorough review” standard derived from EU law is affirmed, but remains bounded by the principles of judicial review: legality, reasonableness and proper reasoning, not re-hearing on the merits.

In practical terms, G.G. underscores the difficulty, for applicants from designated safe countries, of overcoming the presumptions of both state protection and general safety. Yet it also insists that those presumptions are not absolute: individualised evidence can rebut them, and decision-makers must engage with such evidence openly and transparently.

For practitioners, the judgment is a reminder that successful challenges will increasingly turn on careful, evidence-based argument about how COI is interpreted, how statutory presumptions are applied in substance, and how individual circumstances intersect with general assessments of safety, rather than on formalistic criticisms of structure or wording.

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