Introduction

The case of Ofori‐Addo v London Borough of Haringey ([2025] EWCA Civ 277) addresses significant questions under the Housing Act 1996, particularly relating to the scope of Sections 202 and 204. At its core, the dispute emerged when the appellant, a single mother with two disabled children, rejected a final accommodation offer provided by the respondent local authority. The central legal issue concerns whether the respondent’s review decision—found solely on the suitability of the offered property—adequately considered or needed to consider the broader question of whether any residual duty under Part VII of the Act should continue after the ending of the initial relief duty.

The appellant challenged the local authority’s approach by arguing that the review failed to accommodate her submission that other duties (specifically under section 190(2)) might still be owed even after the refusal of a final accommodation offer. The case thereby explores the delicate balance between a narrowly defined review of suitability (invoked under Section 202(1)(h)) and the statutory obligations of authorities once a decision to terminate the relief duty has been made.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeal confirmed that the review undertaken by the respondent was limited to assessing the suitability of the offered accommodation pursuant to Section 202(1)(h). The appellant’s broader contention—that the authority should have undertaken a comprehensive review including a determination of whether any further duty under Part VII was owed—was rejected.

The judgment affirmed that, once the consequences of refusing a final accommodation offer (as set out in the offer letter) are accepted, the corresponding statutory mechanism brings an end to the relief duty and precludes the main housing duty. Furthermore, it held that the statutory provisions impose a narrowly defined right to review: namely, one reviewing only the specific decision on suitability rather than a wholesale reappraisal of the authority’s entire duty or eligibility assessment.

Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed with unanimous agreement among the judges, reinforcing that the review duty was confined to the question of suitability and that any additional issues, if they were considered to be unresolved, should be pursued via judicial review – not within the statutory review procedure provided by Sections 202 and 204.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment noted key decisions such as Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2010] EWCA Civ 755 and Temur v Hackney LBC [2014] EWCA Civ 877. In Ravichandran, the Court of Appeal clarified that it is both possible and desirable for an applicant to request concurrent reviews for related decisions under multiple subsections of Section 202. This decision underpinned the discussion regarding the boundaries of a request for review – distinguishing between a review of suitability (Section 202(1)(h)) and a review of the scope of duty (Section 202(1)(b)).

In Temur, the Court acknowledged that an applicant’s request for a review could be broadly framed, but it emphasized that the statutory wording limits the review to the specific decision being challenged. The appellant’s attempt to expand the scope was therefore treated as an overreach, and the judgment stressed that requests under Section 202 should not be used to force an examination of issues not explicitly identified by the applicant. The reliance on these precedents was instrumental in explaining that the review officer’s remit was confined to the decision about suitability rather than a comprehensive reconsideration of all statutory duties.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning centered on the textual interpretation of the Housing Act 1996. It was held that:

• The applicant’s request was expressly limited to the suitability of the accommodation under Section 202(1)(h), and thus the review officer’s analysis was not obligated to extend beyond that issue.
• The statutory framework – notably Article 3 of the Homelessness (Suitability of Accommodation) Order 2012 and Sections 188, 189B, 193, and 193A of the Act – clearly delineates the responsibility of the authority once a final accommodation offer is refused.
• The judgment emphasizes that if an authority wishes to revisit the overall scope of its duty to assist (including, for example, whether any duty remains under Section 190(2) for intentionally homeless applicants), then that must be sought through the appropriate judicial review process, not through a Section 202 review.

In effect, the Court concluded that the respondent had correctly upheld its earlier decision, making the link between the acceptance of the consequences of refusing an offer (i.e. the termination of both the relief and main housing duties) and the narrow subject matter of the review request.

Impact on Future Cases and the Relevant Area of Law

This decision has important implications for both applicants and local authorities dealing with homelessness applications. First, it reinforces the limits of a statutory review request under Section 202 of the Housing Act 1996. Authorities can now more confidently restrict their review to the issues explicitly raised by the applicant – primarily the suitability of the offered property – without being compelled to reexamine the full spectrum of their housing duties.

For future cases, the ruling clarifies that any broader challenges regarding the adequacy of the authority’s decision-making process, including whether further duties should be considered, require a separate judicial review. This demarcation is likely to result in more focused review decisions and minimize resource-intensive “umbrella reviews” where applicants attempt to force the reconsideration of additional statutory obligations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

One of the central complex concepts is the idea that a “review” under Section 202 is not a catch-all reconsideration of the local authority’s actions. Instead:

• Final Accommodation Offer: When a local authority makes a final accommodation offer under Section 193A, it communicates that refusing the offer leads to an immediate cessation of its statutory duties.
• Suitability Review: The appellant in this case was only contesting whether the offered property was suitable. The legislation does not require the authority to reconsider whether it owes any residual duty to the applicant beyond that suitability analysis.
• Differentiated Review Rights: The Act expressly distinguishes between a review of the duty owed (Section 202(1)(b)) and a review of the accommodation’s suitability (Section 202(1)(h)). This case reaffirms that each review must be requested and considered separately.

In essence, local authorities need only address that which is specifically challenged by the applicant rather than engaging in an expansive review that might include issues not raised by the appellant.

Conclusion

The ruling in Ofori‐Addo v London Borough of Haringey serves to underscore an important legal principle within the context of the Housing Act 1996. The Court of Appeal has clarified that when an applicant requests a review of the suitability of a final accommodation offer, the review should be limited exclusively to that specific issue. The termination of the relief duty and the consequent non-application of the main housing duty, as outlined under Section 193A, remains unchallenged unless the applicant specifically seeks judicial review on other grounds.

This decision draws a clear line between the statutory right to a narrowly confined suitability review and the need for a judicial review for any broader challenge concerning the scope of the authority’s duty. As such, local housing authorities are now afforded greater certainty in managing their statutory responsibilities, while applicants are reminded to frame their challenges precisely in accordance with the statutory provisions.

In summary, the key takeaway is that the statutory structure set out by the Housing Act 1996 demands precision in the review process. The appellant’s failure to request a comprehensive review of the authority’s entire duty meant that her appeal was limited to, and ultimately dismissed on, the basis of suitability alone.