Clarifying Discretion for KOLL Exemptions under the British Nationality Act 1981: Distinguishing Test Failure from Underlying Medical Conditions

Clarifying Discretion for KOLL Exemptions under the British Nationality Act 1981: Distinguishing Test Failure from Underlying Medical Conditions

Introduction

In Petition of Shorshi Mohammadi for Judicial Review ([2025] CSOH 40), the Outer House of the Scottish Court of Session considered whether the Home Secretary lawfully refused to waive the Knowledge of Language and Life (KOLL) requirements for a naturalisation applicant. The petitioner, Mr Mohammadi, holds indefinite leave to remain and sought exemption from the English‐language and Life in the UK test requirements on grounds of physical and mental disability. The Secretary of State refused his exemption application, relying on Home Office policy under Schedule 1 of the British Nationality Act 1981 and the petitioner’s ten‐year residence in the UK. Mr Mohammadi challenged the refusal on two bases: (1) failure to apply Home Office policy correctly, and (2) failure to take relevant matters into account or to give reasons for discounting them. Lord Lake delivered the opinion on 1 May 2025.

Summary of the Judgment

The court upheld the respondent’s decision. It confirmed that:

  • The statutory scheme under section 6 and Schedule 1 of the British Nationality Act 1981 requires applicants to satisfy both language (paragraph 1(c)) and life‐in‐the‐UK (paragraph 1(ca)) criteria, subject to a discretionary waiver (paragraph 2(e)).
  • A waiver cannot rest solely on an applicant’s inability to pass the tests; it must be “unreasonable” to expect performance because of age or physical or mental condition.
  • The petitioner’s general practitioner report lacked key diagnostic details, treatment history, prognosis and formal identification of a qualifying “mental condition.” The Home Office policy entitled the decision‐maker to request further medical evidence, which the petitioner did not supply.
  • On the facts, and given the petitioner’s long residence in the UK, it was reasonable to expect him to meet KOLL requirements; the decision to refuse was neither irrational nor procedurally unfair.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • R. (on the application of Bibi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 68, [46]–[48]: Upheld language testing as a legitimate means to promote integration and belonging, underscoring that KOLL requirements pursue a valid public policy objective.
  • MS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 941, [61]: Confirmed that the weight to be given to a medical report rests with the decision‐maker under the relevant policy; a government department is not bound to accept the expert’s conclusions.
  • R (Jones) v North Warwickshire Borough Council [2001] EWCA Civ 315: Emphasized the importance of purposive interpretation of public‐law schemes—here, ensuring naturalisation promotes integration by verifying language and cultural knowledge.

Legal Reasoning

The court began by setting out the statutory framework. Section 6(1) of the 1981 Act requires satisfaction of Schedule 1 conditions before naturalisation. Paragraph 2(e) allows waiver “if because of the applicant’s age or physical or mental condition it would be unreasonable to expect him to fulfil” the language and life requirements. Home Office policy explains how discretion must be exercised and when medical evidence should be requested.

Lord Lake stressed the distinction between (a) an applicant’s factual inability to pass the tests and (b) a qualifying condition rendering it unreasonable to impose them. This prevents waiver on purely factual grounds, preserving the integrity and purpose of KOLL requirements.

The petitioner’s GP form reported amputation, chronic pain, depression, low mood, poor concentration, memory issues and migraines, but failed to: identify when conditions were diagnosed, describe treatments or their effectiveness, or clearly define a “mental condition” causing unreasonableness. Policy requires original, current medical evidence in a specific form; the respondent properly sought further detail. The petitioner’s non‐production of enhanced evidence justified refusal.

Impact

This decision clarifies and fortifies the evidentiary threshold for KOLL waivers:

  • Applicants must present detailed medical evidence pinpointing diagnosis, treatment history, prognosis and explicit linkage to functional incapacity.
  • Authorities are entitled—and indeed required—to request further evidence where initial material is generic or undetailed.
  • Future judicial reviews will likely reinforce the separation between inability to pass and legally relevant “unreasonableness,” ensuring consistency in waiver decisions.
  • Naturalisation applicants with disabilities must ensure their medical evidence addresses all policy questions; administrative refusals on evidential gaps will survive judicial challenge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Schedule 1 Requirements: Criteria in the British Nationality Act 1981 for naturalisation, including language and life‐in‐the‐UK tests.
  • Waiver Discretion (Paragraph 2(e)): Statutory power allowing exemption where it would be “unreasonable”—due to age or a qualifying physical or mental condition—to impose KOLL tests.
  • Unreasonableness Standard: Not simply the inability to pass a test, but an assessment of whether, given the medical condition, it is fair and proportionate to require performance.
  • Material Matters: Relevant facts or evidence the decision‐maker must consider before arriving at a lawful administrative decision.

Conclusion

The Mohammadi judgment confirms that, under the British Nationality Act 1981 and Home Office policy, a waiver of the KOLL requirements demands detailed medical evidence showing that a qualifying condition makes it unreasonable to impose language or life‐in‐the‐UK tests. An applicant’s mere failure to pass these tests is insufficient. The decision underscores the administrative duty to request missing evidence and the judiciary’s readiness to uphold refusals where the evidential threshold is not met. In the broader context, this ruling reinforces the balance between individual disability considerations and the public policy aim of integration through naturalisation.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Scottish Court of Session

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