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Jones & Anor, R (on the application of) v. North Warwickshire Borough Council
Factual and Procedural Background
The case concerns two appeals arising from a judgment given by His Honour Judge Rich QC on 19th September 2000. The judge granted an order of certiorari quashing a planning permission granted by the local council but refused to order the council to pay the claimants' costs. The claimants are two children who regularly played on a site known as The Green, Kingsbury, an open area owned by the council and not designated for any specific development under the local development plan. The council selected this site for the construction of eight two-bedroom bungalows intended as affordable housing for elderly persons, to be built by a housing association.
The housing association initially considered a different site (a car park at Coventry Road, Kingsbury) for the development but abandoned that due to objections from local residents. The council notified local residents of the planning application and invited representations. One claimant's mother submitted written objections favoring the original Coventry Road site, which was also mentioned during the council committee meeting but was said to be improperly introduced into the meeting. The council granted planning permission on 22nd December 1999, which was challenged via judicial review. Permission to seek judicial review was granted on 22nd May 2000.
Legal Issues Presented
- Whether the availability of an alternative site (Coventry Road) was a material consideration that the council was obliged to take into account in granting planning permission for The Green site.
- Whether the council erred in law by proceeding on the basis that it was not entitled to consider the alternative site at all.
Arguments of the Parties
Claimants' Arguments
- The alternative site at Coventry Road was a material consideration that the council should have taken into account when deciding the planning application.
- Alternatively, even if not conclusively material, the council should have at least considered whether to take the alternative site into account, and it was a legal error to disregard it entirely.
Council's Arguments
- The council committee proceeded on the basis that they were not entitled to consider the alternative site, a position accepted before the court for the purposes of the appeal.
Table of Precedents Cited
| Precedent | Rule or Principle Cited For | Application by the Court |
|---|---|---|
| CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 | Decision-maker's discretion in considering relevant factors subject to Wednesbury reasonableness. | Applied to assess whether the council's failure to consider the alternative site was unreasonable. |
| In re Findlay [1985] AC 319 HL | Endorsed the Wednesbury principle in judicial review of public authority decisions. | Supported the standard of review applied to the council's decision. |
| Trusthouse Forte Hotels Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment (1986) 53 P&CR 293 | Clarified when alternative sites are material considerations in planning decisions. | Guided the court's analysis that alternative sites are usually relevant only in exceptional circumstances involving significant adverse effects. |
| Greater London Council v Secretary of State for the Environment and London Docklands Development Corporation and Cablecross Projects Ltd | Identified factors for considering comparability of alternative sites in planning. | Used to frame the criteria under which alternative sites may be relevant. |
| Rhodes v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 1 WLR 208 | Whether alternative sites are material depends on nature of application; material when alternatives are comparable and significant. | Supported the view that alternative sites are not material for minor developments but may be for major or impactful ones. |
| Vale of Glamorgan BC v Secretary of State for Wales and Sir Brandon Rhys-Williams [1986] JPL 198 | Landowners entitled to develop land unless site is of questionable appropriateness; alternative land ownership does not preclude permission. | Reinforced that availability of alternative land owned by others does not automatically affect planning permission. |
Court's Reasoning and Analysis
The court began by reviewing the statutory framework under the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, emphasizing that the planning authority must consider the development plan and any other material considerations. The judge below found that the council erred by proceeding on the assumption it was not entitled to consider the alternative Coventry Road site at all.
The court examined established legal principles regarding material considerations and the discretion of public authorities. It recognized that while the council should consider relevant factors, the relevance of alternative sites depends on the nature of the development and the presence of significant objections or adverse effects.
Drawing on precedent, including Trusthouse Forte Hotels Ltd and the Greater London Council case, the court noted that alternative sites are generally material only in exceptional circumstances where the proposed development has conspicuous adverse effects and the alternative site lacks such drawbacks.
Applying these principles, the court found that the present case did not involve clear or substantial planning objections to the chosen site. Although objections existed, they were not of the magnitude that would make the alternative site a material consideration. The council’s failure to consider the alternative site was therefore not a legal error that justified quashing the planning permission.
Ultimately, the court concluded that no reasonable planning authority could have regarded the alternative site as relevant. Even if the council had considered it, it would have been rightly rejected as a basis to refuse permission.
Holding and Implications
The appeal was allowed.
The court overturned the earlier decision quashing the planning permission, holding that the council did not err in law by disregarding the alternative site as a material consideration. The direct effect is that the planning permission granted for the development at The Green stands. No new precedent was established beyond reaffirming existing principles concerning the materiality of alternative sites in planning law.
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