Cahill v Residential Tenancies Board (IEHC, 2025):
The High Court Re-affirms the Absolute and Non-Extendable 21-Day Limit for Section 123 Appeals

1. Introduction

In Cahill v Residential Tenancies Board ([2025] IEHC 410) President Barniville was required to decide a preliminary objection raised by the Residential Tenancies Board (“RTB”) to an appeal brought by Mr Jason Cahill under s.123(3) of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004. At the heart of the objection lay a simple but recurring question: Is the 21-day period for appealing a Tribunal determination to the High Court capable of being extended? The Court’s negative answer reinforces a clear line of authority and leaves self-represented parties, practitioners and the RTB with a definitive statement that the statutory clock cannot be stopped or rewound.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Determination Order at issue was issued on 5 March 2024 and received by Mr Cahill on 7 March 2024. His appeal was not lodged until 20 December 2024—over nine months outside the prescribed 21-day window. The RTB argued that the Court had no jurisdiction to enlarge that period; alternatively, even if jurisdiction existed, no basis for an extension could be shown.

Barniville P held that:

• The 21-day time limit in s.123(8) is absolute and non-extendable.
• Accordingly, the High Court lacks power to entertain an appeal lodged outside that period.
• Even obiter, if a power did exist, the criteria in Seniors Money and Éire Continental were not met; the appeal would still be dismissed.
• Costs would provisionally follow the event in favour of the RTB.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Keon v Gibbs [2017] IECA 195
  Hogan J (Court of Appeal) described the s.123 limit as “strict” and not open to extension. Although technically obiter, the dicta set the analytical foundation for later High Court cases.
• Noone v RTB [2017] IEHC 556
  Noonan J expressly held the court lacked jurisdiction to extend time, emphasising the contrast between s.123 (no power) and s.88 (express power afforded to the RTB itself). Barniville P adopts this reasoning verbatim.
• Dada v RTB [2018] IEHC 378 (McDonald J) – endorsed Noone, holding that the wording of the Act and the absence of any reference to Court enlargement powers are decisive.
• Halbherr [2018] IEHC 595; Abeyneh [2023] IEHC 81; Olaszewski [2025] IEHC 113
  Additional High Court support for the “absolute limit” approach, collectively forming an “unchallenged line” per Barniville P.
• Kirwan v O’Leary [2023] IESC 27
  Supreme Court majority (Murray J) held a different 21-day period under the Solicitors Acts could be extended, but importantly identified s.123(2) RTA as an example of a provision that does impose an absolute, non-extendable limit. Barniville P relies on this authoritative obiter statement as a strong endorsement of the existing line.
• Seniors Money Mortgages Ireland DAC v Gately & McGovern [2020] IESC 3 & Éire Continental Trading Co v Clonmel Foods [1955] IR 170
  Classic authorities on the criteria for extension of time if the court has jurisdiction. Applied only in the alternative to show Mr Cahill would still fail.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds in three logical stages:

1. Statutory Text – Section 123(2) stipulates that a determination order becomes binding after the “relevant period” unless an appeal is made before that expiry. Section 123(8) defines the period as 21 days. The “becomes binding” mechanism indicates an automatic vesting of legal effect—leaving no room for judicial enlargement.
2. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius – Section 88 expressly empowers the RTB (not the Court) to extend time for other procedural steps, demonstrating that the Oireachtas knew how to confer an extension power when desired. Its silence in s.123 is therefore intentional.
3. Consistency with Higher Authority – The Court aligns itself with the combined effect of the High Court cases and Murray J’s obiter endorsement in Kirwan. Once the line is “well-established”, a High Court judge is bound to follow it unless plainly wrong (per Worldport principle).

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation and the Housing Sector

• Procedural Certainty – Litigants (particularly self-represented tenants/landlords) now have unequivocal notice that an out-of-time appeal is dead on arrival. Central Office staff can rely on the judgment to refuse to issue non-compliant motions.
• Strategic Behaviour – Parties must gather legal advice early. The RTB may anticipate quicker finality to determinations, reducing the volume of speculative or delayed appeals.
• Legislative Reflection – Should the Oireachtas wish to temper the harshness for pro se appellants, an amendment akin to s.88 would be required. Absent such change, courts will continue to decline jurisdiction.
• Judicial Economy – The reaffirmation spares court resources; judges can summarily dismiss out-of-time appeals without lengthy consideration of discretionary extension factors.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Determination Order – A formal legal order issued by the RTB embodying the findings of its Tenancy Tribunal. It is the springboard for any High Court appeal.
• “Point of Law” Appeal – An appeal confined to alleged legal errors (e.g. misinterpretation of statute), not to re-arguing facts.
• Absolute / Non-Extendable Limitation – A statutory time limit that the court lacks power to enlarge, unlike ordinary “discretionary” limits imposed by rules of court.
• Balance of Justice Test – A set of equitable criteria (length of delay, bona fide intention, explanation, prejudice, arguable case) used when a court does have jurisdiction to extend time. Here, it was addressed only hypothetically.
• Costs Follow the Event – The prevailing party (RTB) is normally awarded its legal costs; the losing party can make submissions if exceptional circumstances exist.

5. Conclusion

Cahill v RTB adds a presidential seal to an already formidable body of case law establishing that the 21-day appeal window in s.123 of the Residential Tenancies Act 2004 is strict, absolute and incapable of judicial extension. By explicitly aligning with Murray J’s Supreme Court analysis in Kirwan, the High Court has likely closed any lingering debate on the matter short of legislative intervention.

The judgment stands as a cautionary tale for tenants, landlords and advisers: once the Determination Order is issued, the sand in the hourglass starts to run, and there is no procedural device— no equitable discretion, no court order—that can refill it after 21 days.