C.D. v E.F.: Proper Provision for Qualified Cohabitants under Section 194 Without a Prior “Moral Obligation” or Financial Dependency

1. Introduction

The High Court (Circuit Appeal) decision in C.D. v E.F. [2025] IEHC 737 is a significant addition to Irish jurisprudence on the rights of surviving cohabitants under Part 15 of the Civil Partnership and Certain Rights and Obligations of Cohabitants Act 2010 (“the 2010 Act”).

The case concerns a surviving same-sex partner (C.D.) of the deceased (A.B.), who died intestate in 2014. A.B.’s father, E.F., as personal representative, opposed C.D.’s application for provision from the estate under s. 194 of the 2010 Act. The central legal question was how to interpret the requirement in s. 194(3) that “proper provision in the circumstances was not made for the applicant during the lifetime of the deceased.”

Ms Justice Nuala Jackson dismisses the appeal and affirms the Circuit Family Court’s orders in favour of C.D., while delivering an important clarification of:

• what “proper provision in the circumstances” under s. 194(3) means;
• the relationship between “proper provision” and any alleged “moral obligation” of the deceased towards the applicant; and
• the role of financial dependency, the statutory factors in s. 173(3), and the interests of intestate beneficiaries (here, the deceased’s parents).

The judgment builds on and refines earlier decisions such as D.C. v D.R. [2015] IEHC 309 and G.R. v Regan [2020] IEHC 89, and draws analogically on s. 117 Succession Act jurisprudence, while firmly distinguishing the s. 194 test from that applied to adult children under s. 117.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 The Relationship Between C.D. and A.B.

C.D., originally from outside Ireland but now an Irish national, met A.B. in or about 2008. Within about two months of meeting, they began to live together, and remained in an intimate and committed relationship until A.B.’s untimely death in 2014. It was accepted by A.B.’s father (E.F.) that:

• C.D. and A.B. were in an intimate and committed relationship at the time of A.B.’s death; and
• C.D. was a “qualified cohabitant” within the meaning of s. 172 of the 2010 Act.

The couple lived together in a series of rented properties and eventually moved into an apartment purchased in A.B.’s sole name in or about October 2010. The purchase was a joint undertaking in practical terms: the couple selected the property together and shared day‑to‑day financial responsibility through a joint account, from which the mortgage, utilities and management charges were paid. A.B., earning more, contributed more; C.D. contributed less, but consistently, in line with his means.

Same-sex marriage was not yet available in Ireland during A.B.’s lifetime. Nonetheless, evidence was given (and accepted) that:

• the couple intended to marry;
• they considered marrying abroad (e.g. Spain or Italy); and
• A.B. even prepared a draft wedding guest list and discussed these plans with others.

This strongly supported the court’s finding of a serious, long‑term commitment akin to that of a married couple.

2.2 The Estate of A.B.

A.B. died intestate, unmarried and without children. Under Irish intestacy rules, in such circumstances, his estate would pass to his surviving parents in equal shares, subject to any successful claim under s. 194 of the 2010 Act.

The estate comprised roughly:

• The apartment (value €440,000–€460,000);
• Life assurance proceeds of about €195,000;
• Pension gratuity of about €45,000;
• Savings of about €6,500.

There was a mortgage of approximately €195,000 on the apartment. Although the life policy was not formally assigned to the lender, E.F., as personal representative, used the life assurance proceeds and some of A.B.’s savings to discharge the mortgage. As a result, the apartment – still forming part of A.B.’s estate – was left unencumbered.

Letters of administration issued to E.F. on 12 January 2016. C.D., who continued to live in the apartment, then sought provision out of the estate under s. 194.

2.3 C.D.’s Circumstances

C.D. was working in retail, had been with the same employer for many years and had acquired relevant qualifications. More recently, he had moved to part‑time work and returned to education. His income was modest, and he had:

• no pension;
• reduced savings (depleted further by legal fees);
• a progressive disability, diagnosed during the relationship, with associated costs; and
• no family support in Ireland, though he sent small monthly remittances to family abroad.

Crucially, he had no housing costs while occupying the apartment, but his evidence – which the court accepted – was that without the apartment he would face severe housing difficulty, likely homelessness and possibly the need to emigrate.

2.4 The Dispute on Appeal

The Circuit Family Court had granted relief to C.D. under s. 194. E.F. appealed. The factual pillars of the relationship and C.D.’s status as a qualified cohabitant were no longer in dispute. Instead, E.F.’s arguments were narrowly focused on the legal interpretation of s. 194(3) and (4), essentially contending:

1. That “proper provision” required demonstration of a moral or similar obligation on A.B. to provide for C.D. during his lifetime, which, it was argued, did not exist because C.D. was young, able-bodied and (said E.F.) self-sufficient; and
2. Alternatively, that A.B. had already made proper provision by:
   • purchasing and sharing the apartment with C.D., and
   • paying the bulk of the living and housing costs during his lifetime,
   so that no further provision on death was warranted.

The High Court had therefore to decide whether, in light of the statutory language and case law, these propositions were correct.

3. Summary of the Judgment

Ms Justice Jackson dismisses the appeal and fully affirms the Circuit Court’s orders, thereby confirming that provision should be made for C.D. from A.B.’s estate under s. 194.

Her key findings are:

• No pre-condition of “moral obligation”: Section 194(3) does not require that the deceased was under a moral or other obligation to make provision for the surviving cohabitant in order for relief to be granted.
• No requirement of financial dependency for ongoing relationships: Echoing Baker J. in D.C. v D.R., the court affirms that financial dependency is not a statutory requirement where the relationship subsisted at death.
• “Proper provision in the circumstances” is an objective, contextual test: The court must examine the actual provision made inter vivos and compare it with what would be appropriate in the circumstances of the surviving cohabitant after death, taking into account the factors in s. 173(3) and the interests of beneficiaries.
• Generous provision during life does not immunise the estate on death: To hold that substantial support during the relationship bars any provision on death would “entirely defeat the purpose of section 194.”
• Beneficiaries’ interests are weighed but do not dominate where they have no particular financial need: The financial comfort of A.B.’s parents and independence of his siblings reduce the weight of their claim relative to C.D.’s housing and financial vulnerability.
• Disability and housing security are significant factors: C.D.’s modest means, progressive disability and acute housing vulnerability are key considerations under s. 173(3).

On that basis, the High Court concludes that “proper provision in the circumstances was not made” for C.D. during A.B.’s lifetime, and that the Circuit Court’s order making provision out of the estate is both just and equitable and consistent with the statutory scheme.

4. Detailed Analysis

4.1 Statutory Framework: Section 194 and Section 173

4.1.1 Section 194 of the 2010 Act

Section 194 allows a qualified cohabitant to seek provision out of the “net estate” of a deceased cohabitant. The key features relevant here are:

• Time limit: Application must be brought within six months of the grant of representation (s. 194(1)).
• Threshold condition: The court may only make an order if it is “satisfied that proper provision in the circumstances was not made for the applicant during the lifetime of the deceased” (s. 194(3)).
• Balancing interests: The court must have regard to “the rights of any other person having an interest in the matter” (s. 194(3)) and, specifically, the interests of the beneficiaries and the factors in s. 173(3) (s. 194(4)).
• No automatic share: The applicant is not treated as a spouse; the court exercises a broad discretion.
• Upper limit: The total value of provision under s. 194 cannot exceed what the applicant would receive if the couple had been spouses or civil partners (s. 194(7)).

4.1.2 Section 173(3): Factors to Be Considered

Section 173(3) sets out the factors the court must have regard to in deciding whether it is “just and equitable” to make an order in cohabitation cases. Although s. 173 is framed primarily for inter vivos applications (e.g. maintenance or property adjustment orders during life), s. 194(4)(d) explicitly imports these factors into the death context, so far as appropriate.

The factors include:

• financial circumstances, needs and obligations of each cohabitant (s. 173(3)(a));
• the duration, nature and commitment of the relationship (s. 173(3)(e));
• each party’s contribution (financial and non‑financial) to the welfare of the couple and home (s. 173(3)(f), (g));
• the impact of the relationship on each party’s earning capacity (s. 173(3)(h));
• any physical or mental disability of the qualified cohabitant (s. 173(3)(i));
• such conduct of the parties that it would be unjust to disregard (s. 173(3)(j)).

Jackson J acknowledges that these factors “sit unhappily” in some respects in the post‑death context, but stresses they must be adapted and applied.

4.2 The Core Legal Issues on Appeal

The appellate dispute distilled into three main legal issues:

1. Must there be a moral or similar obligation on the deceased to provide for the applicant during life?
   E.F. argued that unless such an obligation existed and was unmet, the threshold in s. 194(3) (“proper provision … not made”) could not be satisfied.
2. Was “proper provision” already made by the deceased during life?
   It was contended that A.B. had already done enough by purchasing and sharing an apartment with C.D. and bearing most bills, particularly given that C.D. was allegedly self-sufficient.
3. How should the court balance the applicant’s needs against those of the beneficiaries?
   Under s. 194(4)(c), the court must have regard to “the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate” – here, A.B.’s parents and, indirectly, his siblings.

4.3 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.3.1 D.C. v D.R. [2015] IEHC 309 (Baker J)

D.C. v D.R. was one of the earliest substantial High Court decisions on cohabitation claims under the 2010 Act. Several passages are central to Jackson J’s reasoning.

First, at para. 111, Baker J emphasised that:

“Section 194(3) gives the court power to make such provision as it considers appropriate … The court is at large as to what provision it may make save that it may make what is described as ‘proper provision’ if it is satisfied that provision was not made for the plaintiff in the lifetime of the deceased, and it must in the light of the statutory factors make provision only if it is just and equitable to do so.”

This underscores the breadth of the court’s discretion, bounded by:

• the requirement of “proper provision” not being made during life; and
• the overarching standard of justice and equity, informed by statutory factors.

Second, at para. 124, Baker J explained that:

“…the motivation of a deceased in not making provision in his or her lifetime for a cohabitant is not of itself determinative of the question, and the court must look to the provision actually made inter vivos and test that against a provision that the court would consider to be appropriate in the circumstances of a surviving cohabitant.”

Jackson J adopts this approach: the inquiry is an objective comparison between what was in fact provided during the deceased’s life and what would be appropriate now in light of the surviving cohabitant’s present and future needs.

Third, Baker J’s discussion of s. 117 Succession Act jurisprudence is important. At para. 125, she recognises parallels but also differences between s. 194 and s. 117, and she notes the “relatively high onus” imposed on adult children under s. 117. At para. 129, she makes a point that Jackson J finds particularly helpful:

“I am of the view however that there is no ‘relatively high onus’ on a claimant under s. 194, as has been identified in the jurisprudence under s. 117, where an adult child is concerned, and of course as the Act of 2010 can confer benefits and obligations on adults only it can be expected that in many cases these adults can have a degree of separate financial resources.”

This underlines that:

• a cohabitant’s claim is not conceptually equivalent to an adult child’s s. 117 claim; and
• an adult surviving cohabitant may have some independent means without being disqualified or facing the very high threshold applicable under s. 117.

Finally, Baker J’s observation (quoted by Jackson J at para. 24) that there is no statutory requirement of financial dependency for s. 194 is decisive against E.F.’s line of argument:

“It is noteworthy that there is no requirement in the legislation that an applicant seeking relief under the section show that he or she was financially dependent on the deceased.”

4.3.2 X.C. v R.T. [2003] 2 IR 250 & Re IAC [1990] 2 IR 143 (s. 117 Succession Act cases)

These cases concern s. 117 of the Succession Act 1965, under which children (often adult) can claim that a deceased parent failed in their “moral duty” to make proper provision. In X.C. v R.T., Kearns J stressed that an adult child with sufficient means faces a “relatively high onus” in such applications. Re IAC similarly illustrates the strictness of this threshold and the elaborate guidelines developed by the courts.

In D.C. v D.R., Baker J used this jurisprudence as a comparative tool, but ultimately concluded that the s. 194 regime is different and should not import the same high threshold. Jackson J follows this analysis: she accepts that s. 117 case law provides “some assistance” in illustrating how “proper provision” has been approached in family succession contexts, but she refuses to let it control the interpretation of s. 194 or to import a “relatively high onus” into cohabitation claims.

4.3.3 G.R. v Regan [2020] IEHC 89 (Allen J)

In G.R. v Regan, Allen J further reflected on the relationship between s. 194 and s. 117, noting (at para. 58) that the benefit of comparison is often in highlighting the differences rather than the similarities. At para. 59, he stated:

“While both ss. 117 and 194 use the same language of ‘proper provision’, the right to make a claim under s. 194 is not founded on the mere fact of the relationship. In the case of a qualified cohabitant the court is required to consider the nature and duration of the relationship and the mutual contribution to welfare made in the relationship.”

This reinforces the idea that:

• being a “qualified cohabitant” is the statutory gateway, but
• the grant of relief and its quantum depend on a qualitative evaluation of the relationship’s characteristics and mutual contributions.

Jackson J uses this to emphasise that s. 194 is relationship‑centred and fact‑sensitive: it does not grant an automatic share to every qualified cohabitant, but it recognises that, where certain relationship features and contributions exist, proper provision may require substantial protection of the survivor’s position.

4.4 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

4.4.1 Rejecting the “Moral Obligation” Precondition

E.F. argued that before the court could conclude that “proper provision … was not made” during A.B.’s lifetime, it had to find that A.B. was under some moral or similar obligation to make provision for C.D. – and that C.D.’s youth, ability to work and lack of dependants meant no such obligation arose.

Jackson J firmly rejects this:

• The statutory language of s. 194(3) contains no requirement of a “moral obligation”, nor any other threshold of pre‑existing duty beyond the fact of qualified cohabitation.
• While moral or ethical considerations may influence a judge’s sense of what is “proper” or “just and equitable”, they are not explicit preconditions to jurisdiction.
• To read such a requirement into the section would be to “import into the statute pre‑conditions which are not to be found in it.”

She notes that “the existence of a moral or other obligation may be relevant to the issue of proper provision but the legislation does not provide that the latter is confined by the former.” This is a clear doctrinal statement: “proper provision” is the statutory test; “moral obligation” is at most one lens through which that test may be viewed, not a gateway requirement.

4.4.2 No Requirement of Financial Dependency (for Ongoing Relationships)

Reinforcing Baker J’s approach, Jackson J recalls that there is “no requirement in the legislation that an applicant seeking relief under the section show that he or she was financially dependent on the deceased.” Financial dependency appears only in s. 194(5), and then only where the relationship had ended before death. Here, the relationship continued until A.B.’s death; thus, s. 194(5) does not apply.

C.D.’s partial self-sufficiency – he worked, studied and managed without direct cash transfers from A.B. after death – does not preclude relief. What matters is the overall balance of:

• his modest income and lack of assets;
• his heavy reliance on the shared home for accommodation security;
• his disability and resulting expenses; and
• the way the couple organised their lives (joint account, shared outgoings, long-term planning).

4.4.3 Interpreting “Proper Provision in the Circumstances”

Jackson J interprets “proper provision in the circumstances” in a way that is both contextual and forward‑looking.

She reasons that:

• The phrase “in the circumstances” must include the circumstances during the relationship and those following the death.
• Following Baker J, the court must:
  1. look at what provision was actually made inter vivos; and
  2. “test that against a provision that the court would consider to be appropriate in the circumstances of a surviving cohabitant.”
• “Proper provision” may be lacking either because:
  • no provision at all was made, or
  • the provision made was inadequate having regard to the present and foreseeable needs of the surviving cohabitant.

On the facts, she finds that:

• A.B. “assumed a substantial role in the provision of accommodation and the discharge of the expenses of the couple.”
• C.D. made lesser contributions, but proportionate to his means.
• This pattern of support was “actually made inter vivos and forms the backdrop of what is appropriate in terms of provision in death.”

The central conceptual move is her rejection of the idea that generous provision during life automatically means that “proper provision” was made for the purposes of s. 194(3). She states:

“To determine that a sufficiency, indeed, a generosity of provision during the lifetime of the deceased while the relationship was ongoing, which provision ceased upon the death of the deceased, obviated any consideration of the position pertaining post-death would be to entirely defeat the purpose of section 194…”

In other words, the raison d’être of s. 194 is precisely to address the cliff‑edge loss of support on death. If pre‑death support inevitably barred post‑death relief, most cohabitants who were genuinely “looked after” in life would paradoxically be the ones left most vulnerable at death. The statute is designed to avoid that unfairness.

4.4.4 Application of the Section 173(3) Factors

Jackson J then systematically applies s. 173(3), adapted to the death context.

• Financial circumstances (s. 173(3)(a)):
  C.D. has modest income, no pension, limited savings and a progressive disability with associated costs. His housing is entirely dependent on continued occupation of the apartment. Without it, he faces severe difficulty in the current housing market. The court rejects the characterisation of him as comfortably self-sufficient.
• Spouses, civil partners, children (s. 173(3)(b)–(d)):
  Not applicable: A.B. had no spouse, civil partner or children.
• Duration and commitment of the relationship (s. 173(3)(e)):
  The relationship lasted from around 2008 until A.B.’s death (the judgment refers to 2008‑2013, though elsewhere A.B.’s death in 2014 is noted; the court nonetheless treats the relationship as ongoing at death). While the duration is only slightly above the statutory minimum in some respects, the court stresses that:
  • the couple were free to marry and actively considered doing so (but for the absence of same‑sex marriage domestically at the relevant time); and
  • they established a joint home together.
  The commitment level is thus accorded significant weight.
• Contributions to welfare and property (s. 173(3)(f), (g)):
  The couple had a joint account from which the mortgage and household expenses were paid, with both contributing according to their means. They clearly agreed a shared financial life. These joint contributions – particularly to the home – are key in assessing what is now “proper”.
• Effect on earning capacity (s. 173(3)(h)):
  Not found to be particularly relevant here; there is no suggestion that either party significantly gave up career prospects to care for the other.
• Disability (s. 173(3)(i)):
  C.D.’s permanent and progressive disability is an important factor. Even if not yet severely impairing, it generates costs and is likely to become more burdensome over time. C.D. gave evidence of delaying necessary assistive equipment because of cost. This increases his vulnerability and heightens the need for security of housing and income.
• Conduct (s. 173(3)(j)):
  The court finds no conduct, either during the relationship or afterwards, which would be unjust to disregard. E.F. argued that C.D.’s ongoing occupation of the apartment and receipt of occasional rental income from lodgers was relevant conduct. Jackson J agrees it is relevant as a circumstance but not as culpable conduct to be used against him.

4.4.5 Weighing the Interests of Beneficiaries under Section 194(4)(c)

Section 194(4)(c) requires the court to “have regard to the interests of the beneficiaries of the estate.” In D.C. v D.R., Baker J observed that the primary focus is on the financial needs and demands of the beneficiaries, not purely on their expectation of inheriting.

Jackson J applies that reasoning here:

• A.B.’s parents are financially comfortable, owning their home and having rental and pension income.
• A.B.’s siblings are all independent adults living in Ireland or abroad.
• There is no evidence of financial hardship among any of them.

Accordingly, the court must “weigh the financial demands or needs of the plaintiff against those of the other persons who would benefit in the estate.” On this comparison:

• C.D. has acute housing and financial vulnerability; whereas
• The parents and siblings have no demonstrable financial need.

This does not mean the beneficiaries’ legal entitlements are irrelevant – they remain the default heirs under intestacy. But their interests are more easily displaced or reduced where:

1. they are comfortably off; and
2. the applicant faces serious hardship without provision.

4.5 Novel or Clarified Principles Emerging from C.D. v E.F.

While building on earlier case law, the judgment crystallises several points of principle that are likely to guide future s. 194 applications:

1. No implied “moral obligation” threshold:
   The court expressly refuses to read into s. 194(3) a requirement that the deceased must have been under some moral or quasi‑moral obligation to provide. “Proper provision” remains the statutory test and is not confined by that concept.
2. Past generous support does not defeat a s. 194 claim:
   Even where the deceased provided generous accommodation and financial support during life (as A.B. did by bearing the mortgage and household bills), this does not automatically mean “proper provision” was made for the purposes of s. 194(3). What matters is whether, viewed from the perspective of the surviving cohabitant’s post‑death situation, the inter vivos provision was adequate.
3. Financial dependency is not a general requirement:
   Confirming D.C. v D.R., the court reiterates that financial dependency is not a requirement under s. 194 save in the limited circumstance specified in s. 194(5) (where the relationship had ended before death).
4. Section 173(3) must be applied flexibly in the death context:
   The inter vivos factors must be “adapted” to a post‑death situation, with particular emphasis on:
   • relationship duration and commitment;
   • contributions to the shared home;
   • the applicant’s disability and vulnerability; and
   • the comparative financial needs of beneficiaries.
5. Greater weight to housing security:
   The judgment places substantial emphasis on the applicant’s dependence on the shared home. In the current housing context, this signals strong judicial recognition that retention or security of occupation of a cohabitation home can constitute “proper provision”.
6. Beneficiaries’ financial comfort can justify significant displacement of their expectations:
   Where beneficiaries (even parents) are financially secure and the applicant faces serious hardship, the court is more willing to make robust provision for the cohabitant, even at the expense of materially reducing the beneficiaries’ entitlement on intestacy.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Qualified Cohabitant

A “qualified cohabitant” (s. 172 of the 2010 Act) is, broadly, someone who:

• was living with another person as a couple (in an intimate and committed relationship); and
• did so for a minimum period (typically five years, or two years where they have a child together), subject to some qualifications;
• and where neither is married or in certain other legal relationships that would exclude cohabitant relief.

Being a qualified cohabitant is the gateway condition to applying for relief under ss. 173–194 of the 2010 Act.

5.2 Net Estate

“Net estate” in s. 194(11) means the estate after paying:

• all debts and liabilities which rank ahead of succession rights;
• any legal right share of a surviving spouse; and
• any rights of a surviving civil partner.

The surviving cohabitant’s claim therefore comes after the protection of any spouse or civil partner but before ordinary heirs under intestacy (such as parents or siblings).

5.3 Intestacy and Letters of Administration

A person dies “intestate” if they die without a valid will. In A.B.’s case:

• he was unmarried, with no children;
• so under the Succession Act 1965, his estate would normally pass equally to his surviving parents.

“Letters of administration” is the grant issued by the Probate Office to allow someone (here, E.F.) to administer the estate of a person who died intestate. The six‑month clock for a s. 194 application typically runs from the date of this grant.

5.4 Proper Provision

“Proper provision” is not defined in precise monetary terms. It is a value judgment by the court, informed by:

• the applicant’s needs (financial, housing, health‑related);
• the standard of living enjoyed during the relationship;
• the duration and nature of the relationship;
• the contributions each party made; and
• the competing claims of other beneficiaries.

In cohabitation cases, “proper provision” is not an automatic share of the estate. It may range from:

• a lump sum or regular payments;
• a right to occupy or a share in a property; or
• more limited provision where the applicant is well‑off or beneficiaries have pressing needs.

5.5 Moral Obligation (in Succession Law)

In s. 117 claims by children against a deceased parent’s estate, Irish courts speak of the parent’s “moral duty” or “moral obligation” to make proper provision. In that context, the child must show that the deceased parent failed in that moral duty, and for adult, financially independent children the bar is very high.

In contrast, under s. 194 of the 2010 Act:

• there is no statutory reference to moral obligation;
• the test is whether “proper provision in the circumstances” was made during the deceased’s lifetime; and
• a “relatively high onus” of the s. 117 type should not be imposed on adult cohabitants.

5.6 Financial Dependency

“Financial dependency” in this context means that the applicant relied on the deceased for financial support (e.g. maintenance) and could not reasonably maintain themselves without that support.

Section 194 draws an important distinction:

• If the relationship ended before death, the applicant must show financial dependency (s. 194(5)(a)).
• If the relationship was still ongoing at death, there is no such requirement; dependency may strengthen a case, but its absence does not defeat it.

6. Likely Impact and Future Significance

6.1 For Surviving Cohabitants

This decision will likely be cited to:

• counter arguments that a surviving cohabitant must prove a specific “moral obligation” or near‑dependency to succeed under s. 194;
• emphasise that housing security, especially where the home was established and funded jointly (albeit unevenly), is a powerful factor favouring substantial provision; and
• underline that a relatively modest but long‑term relationship, with shared life planning (e.g. intended marriage), can justify meaningful provision even where the survivor works and appears superficially self‑supporting.

6.2 For Personal Representatives and Beneficiaries

Personal representatives (PRs) and family members of deceased cohabitants should take careful note that:

• a cohabitant’s claim under s. 194 is not marginal or exceptional in principle; it is part of the intended statutory scheme;
• where the deceased and cohabitant built a life and home together, and the cohabitant has limited resources, courts are likely to lean towards protecting the survivor’s housing position; and
• arguments based solely on the beneficiaries’ disappointment at receiving less than a full intestate share will carry limited weight if they are comfortably off.

PRs should:

• identify early whether any surviving cohabitant is a “qualified cohabitant” within the statutory meaning;
• engage with such cohabitants before distributing the estate; and
• consider compromised or agreed provision to avoid protracted litigation.

6.3 For Same-Sex Relationships and Historical Context

The case also has symbolic and practical importance for same‑sex couples who cohabited before marriage equality:

• The court takes seriously the evidence that the couple intended to marry and had planned wedding arrangements, recognising these plans as relevant to the “degree of commitment” under s. 173(3)(e).
• The inability to marry in Ireland at the time is implicitly acknowledged as context, rather than as a reason to discount the seriousness of the relationship.

In that sense, the case underscores that the cohabitant provisions of the 2010 Act, though not limited to same‑sex couples, form part of a broader trajectory towards protecting non‑traditional families.

6.4 Doctrinal Development of Section 194

Alongside D.C. v D.R. and G.R. v Regan, this case further develops the doctrinal framework for s. 194:

• Clarifying again that s. 194 is not simply s. 117 in another guise;
• rejecting attempts to narrow s. 194 by importing s. 117’s “moral duty” and high threshold for adult children;
• emphasising the integrated role of s. 173(3) factors, adapted to the post‑death context; and
• highlighting the strong protective potential of s. 194 for a surviving cohabitant’s home and livelihood.

7. Conclusion

C.D. v E.F. [2025] IEHC 737 is a substantial clarification of cohabitant rights on death under s. 194 of the 2010 Act. The High Court confirms that:

• “Proper provision in the circumstances” is a flexible, contextual standard focused on the surviving cohabitant’s real needs and the lived reality of the relationship, not on abstract notions of moral duty or strict financial dependency.
• Generous support during life does not, by itself, preclude post‑death provision; indeed, s. 194 exists to mitigate the abrupt loss of that support.
• The statutory factors in s. 173(3) – particularly duration and commitment of the relationship, contributions to a shared home, and disability – must be carefully weighed alongside the beneficiaries’ financial position.
• Where beneficiaries (including parents) are financially secure, and the surviving cohabitant faces housing and financial vulnerability, significant provision may be just and equitable, even at the expense of the default intestate shares.

By dismissing the appeal and affirming the Circuit Family Court’s orders, the High Court reinforces a coherent and humane reading of Part 15 of the 2010 Act: one which recognises cohabitants as a legally protected family form, entitled, in appropriate cases, to meaningful support from the estate of a deceased partner with whom they built a shared life and home.