Brexit Is Not a “Taking Out” Under UCC Article 154: High Court sets RGR clock from pre‑Brexit movement and reinforces strict proof and representation duties

Introduction

This commentary analyses the High Court of Ireland’s decision in Bell Transport Ltd v The Revenue Commissioners [2025] IEHC 544, a case-stated appeal from the Tax Appeals Commission (TAC) that confronts the customs consequences of Brexit for second-hand motor vehicles imported into Ireland from Great Britain (GB) in early 2021.

The dispute centered on whether vehicles that were in GB immediately before 23:00 (Irish time) on 31 December 2020—the end of the transition period and the moment of the UK’s departure (“MoD”)—lost their EU customs status “within the meaning of Article 154” of the Union Customs Code (UCC), such that Returned Goods Relief (RGR) under Article 203 could apply to post‑Brexit re‑imports. The case also addressed the evidential burdens when claiming GB Preferential Origin (GBPO) under the EU‑UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), the consequences of failing to declare and prove customs representation under Articles 18–19 UCC, and collateral issues including CN heading 9705 classification for three “classic” cars, the legal effect of administrative time limits for entry in accounts (Article 105 UCC), and equity remission (Article 120 UCC).

Bell Transport, a long‑established customs representative, had lodged import declarations for 279 second‑hand vehicles in January–February 2021. It initially claimed GBPO (generally 0% duty), later conceding most vehicles did not qualify and pivoting to claim RGR for all vehicles and CN 9705 classification for three. Revenue challenged the claims, demanded supporting documentation, and—given the absence of representative disclosure on AIS and failure to produce empowerment documents—treated Bell as the importer, raising a customs debt of approximately €402,963. The TAC largely upheld Revenue, with a modest reduction where empowerment documents were produced for eight vehicles. The High Court affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

• The High Court held that goods in GB at the MoD lost Union status by operation of law (Article 50(3) TEU and the Withdrawal Agreement), not because they were “taken out of the customs territory” within Article 154 UCC. Therefore, Article 203(4) UCC (RGR following loss of Union status “pursuant to Article 154”) does not apply.
• Article 203(1) RGR requires a prior “export” from the Union. Pre‑Brexit movements into GB were intra‑EU movements, not exports, so Article 203(1) cannot directly apply to such goods. However, the Commission’s Guidance Note (23 December 2020) provided a facilitation: operators may claim RGR if they prove that goods moved to GB before the MoD and return unaltered within three years of that pre‑Brexit movement (not three years from the MoD).
• Revenue’s requests for proof of movement dates and unaltered condition were reasonable. VIN and UK registration documents alone are insufficient. The Appellant failed to discharge its evidential burden under Articles 15 and 163 UCC and Article 253 of the Implementing Regulation.
• Because Bell failed to declare its status as direct representative on AIS and did not produce empowerment documents when required (Articles 18–19 UCC), Revenue lawfully treated it as importer and debtor for any customs duties due.
• GBPO claims were correctly refused: having selected code U116 (statement on origin), the Appellant had to hold and produce the statement on origin under Article 54(3) TCA. It did not.
• CN 9705 classification for three vehicles failed: the “original/unaltered state” criterion requires proof; assumptions do not suffice.
• Revenue’s delay in entering the debt into accounts (Article 105 UCC) does not extinguish the customs debt. Equity remission under Article 120 UCC was not available on the facts.
• Answers to case-stated questions: the TAC was correct that goods did not lose customs status within Article 154 at the MoD; the TAC was correct to refuse RGR under Articles 203(1) and/or (4); and its proof assessments were not irrational.

Analysis

1) Precedents and materials cited and how they were used

• Article 50(3) TEU and the Withdrawal Agreement: The Court treated these as the primary instruments by which GB ceased to be within the EU legal order at the MoD, with the consequence that goods in GB lost Union customs status “by operation of law,” not through a customs event envisaged by UCC Article 154.
• Commission Guidance Note (23 December 2020), para 5.4: Recognised as a pan‑EU facilitation allowing RGR for goods moved to GB before the MoD if returned unaltered within three years of that movement, notwithstanding that intra‑EU movements are not “exports.” The Court endorsed Revenue’s application of this facilitation and rejected the Appellant’s attempt to reset the three‑year clock to the MoD.
• Menolly Homes Ltd v Appeal Commissioners [2010] IEHC 49: Cited for the proposition that the onus of proof in tax appeals lies on the appellant. The Court emphasised Bell’s sustained failure to meet its evidential burdens.
• CJEU in Silver and Others v Council (Joined Cases C‑499/21 P, C‑501/21 P, C‑502/21 P, 15 June 2023): Used analogically to support the proposition that legal consequences flowed automatically from the UK’s sovereign decision to withdraw, rather than from the terms of the UCC—a helpful analogy for the “operation of law” analysis.
• CJEU in Kiwall (C‑252/87) and Damseaux (C‑128/08): Invoked by the Appellant to argue against double taxation. The Court found the point did not assist the Appellant since RGR was, in principle, available under the Guidance if the required proofs were furnished; the Appellant’s failure was evidential, not structural.

2) The Court’s legal reasoning

a) Article 154 UCC (“taken out of the customs territory”) does not capture Brexit

The Court’s central holding is interpretive and precedential: Article 154 addresses loss of Union status when goods are “taken out of the customs territory of the Union.” The High Court considered the ordinary meaning of “taken out” (and its predecessor wording “moved”) and held it connotes physical movement of goods out of the territory, not a legal re‑definition of the territory’s boundary by operation of treaty. At the MoD, the territory changed; the goods did not move. Therefore, Article 154 did not trigger on Brexit night, and Article 203(4) (which presupposes loss of Union status “pursuant to Article 154”) cannot be engaged by mere operation of law.

The Court rejected the notion of a “deemed mass export” at the MoD. If such an extraordinary effect had been intended, the Withdrawal Agreement or the UCC would have said so expressly. They did not.

b) Article 203(1) UCC RGR requires an export—hence the need for the Commission’s facilitation

Article 203(1) grants RGR for “non‑Union goods which, having originally been exported as Union goods from the customs territory of the Union, are returned…” Pre‑Brexit movements to GB were intra‑Union transactions, not exports. Absent the Commission’s facilitation, Article 203(1) would not apply at all to such vehicles.

The Guidance Note bridged that gap by allowing Member States to treat pre‑Brexit movements to GB as functionally equivalent to exports for RGR purposes, provided all normal RGR conditions are proven. Crucially, the three‑year period runs from the date of that pre‑Brexit movement to GB, not from the MoD. The High Court endorsed Revenue’s insistence on this timeline and rejected any attempt to recalibrate the three‑year period to start on 31 December 2020.

c) Uniform application and reasonableness of proof demands

To avoid discrimination and ensure EU‑wide consistency, Ireland could not grant a more generous facilitation than that described in the Guidance (e.g., extending the three‑year period from the MoD). The High Court accepted that Revenue’s requests for evidence (shipping/transport documents, manufacturer certificates, INF3 or documentary substitutes contemplated by Article 253 of the Implementing Regulation) were orthodox, necessary, and proportionate. VIN and UK registration certificates may show model year or domestic registration date, but they generally do not prove:

• the date goods moved from the EU to GB (which is the start date for the three‑year RGR clock under the facilitation), and
• the place/date of manufacture or the unaltered condition of the vehicle on return.

Since Bell did not provide the required evidence despite extended opportunities, its RGR claims failed for want of proof.

d) Representation: failure to declare and prove direct representation meant Bell was the importer

Articles 18–19 UCC require a customs representative to:

• state that it acts as representative and whether representation is direct or indirect (Article 19(1)), and
• produce evidence of empowerment on request (Article 19(2)–(3)).

Bell failed to use the AIS “tick box” to declare representation and did not supply empowerment documents when requested (save at hearing for eight vehicles). Under Article 19(1), persons who fail to state they act as representative are “deemed to be acting in their own name and on their own behalf.” The Court agreed with the TAC that Bell was properly treated as the importer and, therefore, was the debtor for customs purposes.

e) GB Preferential Origin (GBPO) under the TCA: U116 selection carries document‑holding duties

The TCA requires a claim to preferential origin to be based on either:

• a statement on origin made out by the exporter (Article 54(2)(a)), or
• the importer’s knowledge (Article 54(2)(b)).

Having selected code U116 on AIS, Bell’s claims were founded on a statement on origin. Article 54(3) TCA requires the importer to keep the statement and provide it on request. Bell did not. Its fallback reliance on “importer’s knowledge” could not assist because the declarations did not claim that basis, and in any event, “knowledge” must be demonstrable with records. The Court upheld the refusal of GBPO.

f) CN Heading 9705 (collectors’ vehicles): proof of “original state” is indispensable

Chapter 97 of the CN covers “Works of art, collectors’ pieces and antiques.” For motor vehicles under heading 9705, three elements generally matter:

• age (typically exceeding 30 years),
• cessation of production, and
• original condition (no substantial alterations).

Bell offered assumptions (“not too much of a stretch”) rather than evidence on original condition. The Court agreed with the TAC: classification demands proof; assumptions are insufficient.

g) Administrative timing (Articles 104–105 UCC) and equity (Article 120 UCC)

Revenue’s delay in entering the debt into accounts did not extinguish the customs debt. The UCC contains no such consequence. As to equity remission, Bell did not show exceptional circumstances vis‑à‑vis similarly situated operators; Article 120 relief was rightly refused.

3) Impact and significance

a) New legal clarity on Brexit and UCC Article 154

This is the first Irish High Court pronouncement squarely holding that the loss of Union status at the MoD was not a “taking out” within Article 154 UCC. That conclusion has two major consequences:

• Article 203(4) cannot be used to bootstrap RGR by characterising the MoD as a qualifying loss of Union status “pursuant to Article 154.”
• Any RGR for goods that were in GB at the MoD rests on the Commission’s facilitation, not on Article 203(1) itself, and the three‑year clock runs from the actual pre‑Brexit movement to GB.

b) Uniform application across Member States

The judgment reinforces that Revenue cannot unilaterally re‑write or extend EU reliefs (e.g., by starting the RGR clock on the MoD). This ensures parity of treatment for GB‑sourced returns vis‑à‑vis all other third countries and maintains EU‑wide uniformity.

c) Evidential rigor for origin, RGR, and classification claims

The decision is a strong reminder that:

• Statements made in customs declarations are legally significant. Selecting U116 asserts that the statement on origin exists and is held; failure to produce it is fatal.
• VIN and registration certificates rarely prove what matters for either GBPO or RGR.
• RGR demands proof of the date of movement to GB and the goods’ unaltered state on return, in addition to proof of original Union status.
• For CN 9705 classification, proof of “original/unaltered” condition is critical.

d) Compliance culture for customs representatives

The Court’s treatment of Articles 18–19 UCC underscores that representation is not a formality: failing to declare representation status and to hold empowerment documents may expose the agent to primary liability as importer. Established agents should review systems to ensure the AIS representation fields are correctly populated and empowerment documents are maintained and produced on demand.

4) Complex concepts simplified

• Union goods vs Non‑Union goods: Union goods are either EU‑origin goods or non‑origin goods that were lawfully released for free circulation in the EU. Non‑Union goods are all others. At the MoD, goods in GB ceased to be Union goods by operation of treaty law.
• “Taken out” under Article 154: The Court reads this as physical removal from the EU customs territory, not a legal redrawing of that territory. Brexit therefore does not count as a “taking out.”
• Returned Goods Relief (RGR) under Article 203: Relief from customs duty when goods previously exported as Union goods return within three years in an unaltered state, with supporting information. For GB, the Commission’s Guidance allows operators to treat pre‑Brexit movements to GB as if they were exports, but the three‑year period runs from the date of that movement, not the MoD.
• GB Preferential Origin (TCA): To claim 0% duty, the importer must either hold a valid exporter’s statement on origin or hold records that demonstrate importers’ knowledge that the origin rules are met. If you select the “statement on origin” route (e.g., U116), you must be able to produce the statement.
• AIS representation and empowerment: A direct representative acts in the name of and on behalf of the importer; an indirect representative acts in their own name. If you do not declare representation status and cannot produce empowerment, you can be treated as the importer.
• Evidence suitable for RGR: Examples include shipping/transport documents showing movement to GB pre‑MoD; access to prior customs/re‑export declarations; INF3; or in some cases a manufacturer’s certificate confirming EU manufacture and date, plus proof the goods are unaltered on return.
• CN 9705 classification for collectors’ vehicles: Beyond age and cessation of production, customs require credible proof that the vehicle has not undergone substantial alterations.

Practice implications and guidance

For importers and customs agents

• Representation discipline: Always declare direct/indirect representation on AIS and maintain signed empowerment documents, ready to produce on request.
• Origin claims under the TCA: If you claim via statement on origin (U116), retain the statement and provide it when asked. If claiming via importer’s knowledge, keep detailed records demonstrating compliance with origin rules; a VIN is not enough.
• RGR after Brexit: Assemble proof that the goods:
  • moved from the EU to GB before the MoD (e.g., transport documentation or contemporaneous trade records),
  • returned within three years from that movement date, and
  • remained unaltered (supporting documents, inspections, or declarations corroborated by records).
• Classic vehicles: Be prepared to substantiate “original condition” with expert reports, photographs, restoration histories, or manufacturer certifications. Assumptions will be rejected.
• Record‑keeping: Keep all supporting documents contemporaneously, in line with Articles 15 and 163 UCC and Article 59 TCA.

For litigation and appeals

• Onus of proof: The appellant bears the burden throughout. Assertions without documents are unlikely to succeed.
• Guidance as facilitation: While not primary law, Commission guidance that grants a facilitation will be applied uniformly and respected by the courts, particularly where it affords relief not otherwise available under a literal reading of the Code.
• Administrative timing: Delays by customs authorities in entering debts into accounts do not, without more, extinguish liabilities.
• Equity relief: Article 120 UCC relief is exceptional; the threshold of “special circumstances” is high, and general business difficulties are insufficient.

Conclusion

Bell Transport establishes an important interpretive rule for the Brexit era: the MoD was not a “taking out” of goods for the purposes of Article 154 UCC. Consequently, Article 203(4) RGR cannot be triggered merely because goods in GB lost Union status at that moment. Where goods had moved to GB before the MoD, RGR may still be available—but only through the Commission’s facilitation, and only if the declarant proves that the goods moved pre‑MoD, returned within three years of that movement, and remained unaltered.

The decision also underscores the strict evidential architecture of customs law. Customs declarations are legally significant instruments: selecting U116 presupposes possession of a statement on origin; claiming representation triggers duties to declare and prove empowerment; seeking classification under 9705 demands tangible proof of original condition. VINs and assumptions are not substitutes for documentation.

Key takeaways:

• Brexit was not a “taking out” under Article 154 UCC; no deemed mass export at the MoD.
• RGR for goods in GB at the MoD depends on the Commission’s facilitation; the three‑year period runs from the pre‑Brexit movement to GB.
• Revenue’s proof demands were orthodox and proportionate; failure to supply them is fatal.
• Customs representatives who fail to declare and prove representation may be treated as importers and debtors.
• Origin, RGR, and special classification claims demand contemporaneous records; assumptions and VINs are insufficient.
• Administrative delays in entering debts do not cancel liabilities; equity remission remains exceptional.

In short, the High Court has delivered clarity on the legal consequences of Brexit for returned goods and reinforced a culture of exacting compliance in customs practice. The decision will guide not only motor vehicle imports but the wider landscape of post‑Brexit EU–UK customs administration.