Bhblasted v Meta: Strong Case Threshold, Contractual Primacy and Limits on Interim Relief Against Online Platforms

1. Introduction

The High Court of Ireland’s decision in Bhblasted S.R.L. Societa' Benefit & Ors v Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 699 is a significant addition to Irish jurisprudence on interlocutory injunctions in the digital platform context. It addresses, in a highly commercial and cross-border setting, the circumstances in which a court will compel a large online platform to reinstate disabled advertising accounts.

The plaintiffs are three Italian companies (Bhblasted S.R.L., BHBroke S.R.L., Bhnailed S.R.L.) that act as intermediaries between their own clients and Meta’s advertising products. They placed very large volumes of advertisements for those clients on Meta’s social media platforms and made substantial prepayments to Meta to fund those campaigns.

On 20 December 2024, Meta summarily disabled the plaintiffs’ advertising accounts, removed approximately 11,560 active advertisements, prevented the plaintiffs from placing new ads or accessing their billing and invoicing records, and retained prepaid balances said to total about €5 million. No contemporaneous explanation was given.

The plaintiffs sought interlocutory relief requiring Meta to:

• Restore their advertising accounts (a mandatory injunction); and
• Alternatively or in addition, provide access to billing data and/or return retained prepayments.

They framed their case in contract, estoppel, competition law (s.5 of the Competition Act 2002) and alleged breaches of the Digital Services Act 2024 (“DSA 2024”), and argued that only an injunction could prevent irreparable harm to their business.

Bolger J refused the application. The judgment is notable for:

• Confirming that reinstatement of suspended platform accounts is mandatory relief attracting a “strong case” standard;
• Giving clear primacy to written online terms and conditions (with “entire agreement” clauses) over alleged informal assurances and “organic” WhatsApp dealings;
• Clarifying the contractual responsibility of advertising intermediaries for the content of clients’ ads;
• Limiting the immediate utility of the Digital Services Act 2024 and abuse of dominance arguments at the interlocutory stage; and
• Reinforcing orthodox principles on delay, status quo and adequacy of damages in commercial injunctions.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Outcome

The High Court refused:

• The mandatory injunction to compel Meta to restore the advertising accounts; and
• Any alternative interlocutory relief, including orders for:
  • Return of the allegedly retained prepayments; or
  • Access to billing and invoicing data.

The Court also gave an indicative view that the costs of the interlocutory application should be reserved to the trial judge, notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ lack of success at this stage.

2.2 Key Reasons

Bolger J’s central conclusions can be summarised as follows:

1. Mandatory injunction – “strong case” standard: The relief sought was plainly mandatory (it would require Meta to undo what it had done), so the plaintiffs had to show a strong case that they would succeed at trial. They failed to do so.
2. Contractual terms prevail: The written terms and conditions governing the advertising relationship:
   • Permitted Meta to disable accounts, including without notice in certain circumstances; and
   • Allowed Meta to retain prepaid funds.
   The plaintiffs did not establish any clear post-contract representations capable of generating an estoppel that would displace these terms.
3. Responsibility for ad content: Contractually, the plaintiffs had accepted responsibility for ensuring that their clients’ ads complied with Meta’s rules. Their affidavit disavowals of responsibility conflicted with the written terms and their counsel’s concession. This weighed heavily against any strong case that Meta’s account suspensions were unlawful.
4. Scam ads and evidence: Meta produced screenshots of alleged “scam ads”. The plaintiffs insisted that the evidence was too sparse (no metadata, logs, or detailed linkage to their accounts) to allow them to investigate. The Court rejected the suggestion that they were wholly unable to investigate, noting that the screenshots contained account information and that the plaintiffs, given the responsibility they had assumed, should be able to check their own clients’ ads.
5. Digital Services Act 2024: The DSA 2024 was not pleaded as a cause of action, and in any event, according to the Court:
   • The Act provided defences that might apply to Meta; and
   • Any remedy under the Act was limited to damages, not injunctive relief.
6. Competition law / abuse of dominance: While the plaintiffs relied on a 2024 EU Commission decision finding Meta dominant (and abusive) in certain markets, the Court held that:
   • The plaintiffs were not competitors but rather customers of Meta; and
   • On the material before it, the plaintiffs had not shown a strong case that section 5 of the Competition Act 2002 was engaged by Meta’s suspension of their accounts.
7. Delay and status quo: There was a delay of some eight months between the disabling of the accounts (20 December 2024) and the filing of the interlocutory application (11 July 2025). Applying Ryanair DAC v Skyscanner, the relevant status quo was the state of affairs immediately before the proceedings, i.e. with the accounts disabled. The plaintiffs had not shown the “reasonable expedition” required for urgent interim relief.
8. Adequacy of damages / balance of justice: Guided by the Supreme Court’s observations in Merck Sharp & Dohme, the Court was sceptical of claims that damages would be inadequate in this commercial dispute. The plaintiffs had failed to corroborate their alleged catastrophic business harm with documentary evidence and were found to have continued hiring staff during the relevant period. Their losses could be quantified at trial. By contrast, forcing Meta to reactivate allegedly non-compliant accounts posed an unquantifiable risk to its users and systems. The least risk of injustice lay in refusing the injunction.
9. Alternative relief refused: The Court declined to use its inherent jurisdiction to craft alternative orders for:
   • Return of prepayments; or
   • Provision of billing data.
   Such matters could be addressed through discovery, case management or final relief, but not via an interlocutory mandatory order.
10. Costs reserved: Applying Yoplait Ireland Ltd v Nutricia Ireland Ltd, the Court indicated that the costs of the interlocutory application should be reserved to the trial judge, who would be better placed to decide them in light of the full evidence. The defendant’s complete failure to give any explanation until its replying affidavit in August 2025 was a relevant factor.

3. Analysis of the Judgment

3.1 The Contractual Framework and Factual Matrix

The judgment starts from a close examination of the written contractual framework governing the parties’ relationship. These include:

• Terms of service;
• Self-serve ad terms;
• Online invoicing terms;
• Commercial terms;
• Advertising standards and community standards; and
• Community payment terms.

These terms applied afresh to each advertisement placed by the plaintiffs on Meta’s platforms and required compliance with Meta’s standards. Importantly:

“you agree that you will ensure that any third party on whose behalf you access or use any Meta Product for any business or commercial purpose will abide by the applicable terms of use… and you represent and warrant that you have the authority to bind that third party to such terms.” (para. 11)

The Court emphasises two consequences:

1. Contractual responsibility for third-party content: As a matter of contract, the plaintiffs had accepted the role of gatekeepers, assuming responsibility to ensure that their clients complied with Meta’s rules.
2. No direct contract between Meta and the plaintiffs’ clients: The contractual relationships lay solely between the plaintiffs and Meta, not Meta and the end advertisers. This meant any breaches in the ads’ content were, as a matter of contract, attributable to the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs’ affidavits, however, claimed that:

• They were merely intermediaries; and
• The clients were “themselves responsible” for content and compliance; the plaintiffs had “no direct control or responsibility” for ad content (paras. 12–13).

Counsel for the plaintiffs ultimately accepted that “as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff is responsible for ensuring that the ads comply with the applicable rules” (para. 12). This concession effectively undercut the plaintiffs’ pleaded narrative and reinforced the contractual framework as Meta had described it.

Given this foundation, any argument that Meta’s suspension of the accounts was prima facie unlawful had to grapple with clear contractual obligations that the plaintiffs had assumed.

3.2 The Nature of the Relief Sought – Mandatory Injunction and the “Strong Case” Standard

The plaintiffs sought an order directing Meta to restore their accounts. The Court characterised this as a mandatory interlocutory injunction: it would compel Meta to do something (reactivate accounts and infrastructure) rather than merely refrain from some new action.

Relying on Farina v X Internet Unlimited Company [2025] IEHC 514, Bolger J held that where a plaintiff seeks reinstatement of suspended online accounts, the relief is indeed mandatory and so attracts the higher “strong case” threshold (para. 10). This is consistent with longstanding Irish and common-law authority that:

• Ordinary (prohibitory) interlocutory injunctions only require a “fair question to be tried”; but
• Mandatory injunctions, especially those altering the status quo, require a strong case that the plaintiff will succeed at trial.

This is a crucial point of principle for future platform litigation: any litigant seeking reactivation of suspended or terminated accounts should expect to face the “strong case” test, rather than the lesser “fair issue” threshold.

3.3 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.3.1 Farina v X Internet Unlimited Company [2025] IEHC 514

This case is cited for the proposition that the reinstatement of suspended accounts constitutes mandatory relief (para. 10). While the present judgment does not reproduce the reasoning in Farina, it adopts its classification of such orders as mandatory, thereby standardising the strong case requirement in Irish law where users seek reinstatement on online platforms.

3.3.2 Ryanair DAC v Skyscanner Holdings Ltd [2022] IECA 64

Meta relied on Ryanair v Skyscanner to argue that:

• The relevant status quo for the injunction analysis is the position as it stood immediately before the commencement of proceedings; and
• Because the accounts had already been disabled for months by that point, the plaintiffs in effect sought to alter the status quo.

The Court accepted this approach (para. 9), reinforcing a key principle: where the impugned state of affairs has persisted for an extended period prior to proceedings, restoring the prior situation is more likely to be treated as a mandatory, status-quo-altering measure.

3.3.3 Nolan Transport (Oaklands) v Halligan (1994) WJSC HC 1550

Nolan Transport is invoked to emphasise that applicants for interim relief must proceed with “reasonable expedition” (para. 28). Bolger J concluded that an eight-month delay between suspension and interlocutory application – with large gaps in correspondence – fell well short of this standard.

Delay here:

• Weighs heavily in the balance of justice against granting relief; and
• Reinforces the characterisation of the relief sought as an attempt to disturb a settled status quo.

3.3.4 Wallace v Kershaw [2019] IEHC 382

The plaintiffs sought to rely on Wallace v Kershaw to argue that delay need not be fatal where the defendant has no answer to the plaintiff’s claim. In that case, the High Court granted relief despite delay because the defendant’s liability was effectively incontrovertible.

Bolger J distinguished Wallace on the facts (para. 28). Here, Meta had clear contractual and factual arguments, and the Court found that the plaintiffs had not made out a strong case on the merits. Thus, Wallace did not assist the plaintiffs in overcoming the consequences of their delay.

3.3.5 Merck Sharp & Dohme (Supreme Court)

While the judgment does not give a precise citation, it references the Supreme Court’s observations in Merck Sharp & Dohme on the adequacy of damages in commercial cases (para. 30). In that case (widely known in Ireland as part of the pharmaceutical patent injunction jurisprudence), the Supreme Court cautioned that commercial actors frequently claim that damages are not an adequate remedy, but courts should approach such assertions with scepticism and require proof.

Bolger J applied that sceptical approach:

• Scrutinising whether the plaintiffs had actually evidenced irreparable or unquantifiable harm; and
• Assessing whether Meta’s losses, if wrongly compelled to reinstate, were in fact less amenable to quantification.

3.3.6 Yoplait Ireland Ltd v Nutricia Ireland Ltd [2025] IECA 163

This Court of Appeal decision is relevant to costs on interlocutory applications. The CA confirmed that:

• Under Order 99 rule 4 RSC, costs should normally be determined even at the interlocutory stage; but
• Where justice so requires, a court may properly reserve costs to the trial, especially given the different standards of proof and incomplete evidential record at the interim stage.

In Yoplait, the High Court partly granted interlocutory relief and reserved costs, with a cap of 80% for the partially successful party; the Court of Appeal upheld this approach (paras. 41–42).

Bolger J followed this logic to indicate that, despite the plaintiffs’ lack of success at the interlocutory stage, costs should be reserved (para. 43), in view of:

• The different standard of proof at trial; and
• Meta’s own conduct in failing to give any explanation until late in the day (para. 40).

3.4 Legal Reasoning in Detail

3.4.1 Contract, Course of Dealings and Estoppel

The plaintiffs accepted that they were bound by Meta’s written terms and conditions but sought to characterise those terms as “nominal”, arguing instead that:

• A long-standing course of dealings via WhatsApp had generated explicit and implicit representations that:
• So long as they met certain spending targets and complied with policies, they would:
  • Have ongoing access to the platform; and
  • Not be terminated without notice or an opportunity to engage.

They contended that these representations:

• Qualified Meta’s reliance on the written terms; and
• Gave rise to an estoppel, preventing Meta from invoking those terms strictly (para. 6).

However:

• The plaintiffs could identify no specific communication in the voluminous WhatsApp exchanges that actually promised notice, engagement or indefinite access conditional only on payment (paras. 6–7, 17–18);
• Counsel candidly accepted that there was no express representation to that effect, attributing the plaintiffs’ understanding to the “organic” nature of communications over time (para. 6); and
• The plaintiffs did not challenge the validity of the written terms or seek to avoid them; rather, they argued for a form of informal modification through conduct and representation.

Bolger J’s key findings:

1. No clear representation: The WhatsApp messages evidenced a pattern of “collaboration” (particularly around payment issues) and showed that the plaintiffs knew they could be locked out if Meta “had issues” with them (para. 17). But this:
   • Did not amount to a clear promise of notice or engagement prior to suspension;
   • Did not amount to a guarantee of continued access once money was paid; and
   • Did not contradict the Ts&Cs that allowed summary suspension and retention of funds (paras. 17–20).
2. No estoppel against entire agreement clauses: In the absence of clear, post‑contractual representations on which the plaintiffs demonstrably relied to their detriment, they could not invoke estoppel to defeat the entire agreement clauses in the Ts&Cs (para. 19). Put simply:
   • The contract said what it said; and
   • The plaintiffs had not established any foundation to disapply those terms at the interlocutory stage.

This reflects a robust affirmation of contractual primacy in platform-user relationships: courts will be slow to infer modifications or overrides from nebulous “course of dealings”, particularly where the contract contains clear integration (entire agreement) clauses and is repeatedly accepted when placing each new ad.

3.4.2 Responsibility for Scam Ads and Adequacy of Meta’s Evidence

Meta exhibited screenshots of what it called “scam ads”. The plaintiffs responded that:

• The evidence was insufficiently particularised (no underlying logs, metadata or correspondence);
• The screenshots had “no obvious link” to the plaintiffs (paras. 14–15, 21); and
• They were therefore unable to “respond meaningfully” or investigate.

The Court considered several factors:

1. Contractual responsibility to monitor: Given the plaintiffs’ contractual undertaking to “ensure” third-party compliance, the Court reasoned that this presupposed some form of monitoring or oversight of clients’ advertising content (para. 15).
2. Affidavit disavowals inconsistent with contract: The plaintiffs’ sworn assertions that they had no responsibility for content “sat uncomfortably” with the contract and with their counsel’s concessions (para. 15).
3. Ability to investigate from screenshots: The Court did not accept that the plaintiffs were entirely unable to investigate. The screenshots contained account names, which should assist in tracing the ads within the plaintiffs’ own systems (paras. 14–16, 21).
4. No positive case of compliance: Notably, the plaintiffs’ affidavits did not assert that their clients had in fact complied with Meta’s policies; they merely complained about lack of specification of the breaches (para. 13).

On this basis, the Court concluded that:

“their inability to [investigate] cannot assist them in seeking restoration of their accounts that were disabled for the advertisements’ asserted breach of the defendant’s standards, given the responsibility the plaintiffs agreed to take on…” (para. 16)

This reasoning cuts both to the merits (whether a strong case is made out that Meta unlawfully suspended the accounts) and to the balance of justice (risk to Meta and its users if accounts are reinstated in the face of suspected scam activity).

3.4.3 Failure to Use Internal Review and Complaints Procedures

Meta’s terms gave users:

• A right of review of decisions; and
• Access to a complaints procedure.

The plaintiffs did not avail of either. They argued that they lacked sufficient information from Meta to do so until the replying affidavit of 22 August 2025.

The Court was critical of Meta’s failure to respond to communications and legal correspondence from late 2024 into mid‑2025 (para. 22), but nonetheless held that:

• The plaintiffs knew since December 2024 that their accounts had been suspended;
• They “knew or ought to have known” from the written terms that they had these procedural rights; and
• Their failure to invoke them was not justified by Meta’s silence (para. 22).

Any prejudice claimed by the plaintiffs from the lack of information “may have been exacerbated by their own failure” to use the available procedures (para. 22). This further weakened their case for interlocutory relief.

3.4.4 Digital Services Act 2024 – No Injunctive Relief at this Stage

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of the Digital Services Act 2024 but:

• Did not plead any DSA-based cause of action in the plenary summons (para. 5, 23); and
• Sought, in substance, to use the Act as a platform for injunctive relief.

Bolger J held that:

1. The DSA claim “does not give rise to injunctive relief” in the circumstances; and
2. Even if there were a breach, the Act:
   • Provides defences that Meta said could apply; and
   • Limits the remedy to damages, not injunctions (para. 23).

This is an important signal that:

• Claimants cannot simply invoke “Digital Services Act” as a basis for interim structural relief against platforms without a properly pleaded claim; and
• The legislative scheme itself, as understood by the Court, does not confer a standalone right to interlocutory injunctive relief for alleged breaches, at least in this type of commercial dispute.

3.4.5 Abuse of Dominant Position (Section 5 Competition Act 2002)

The plaintiffs claimed that Meta had abused a dominant position contrary to section 5 of the Competition Act 2002. They relied on a November 2024 decision of the European Commission finding Meta dominant in markets for:

• Personal social networks;
• Online display advertising; and
• Social media.

The Commission had found abuse where Meta imposed unfair trading conditions on certain online classified ad service providers. The plaintiffs argued that Meta here:

• Dictated the “nature, size and structure” of their business;
• Forced them to depend on Meta’s infrastructure;
• Required them to spend millions to generate clients for Meta; and then
• Shut down their accounts and retained their monies (para. 24).

Bolger J held that the plaintiffs had not established a strong case that section 5 was engaged:

• The plaintiffs do not compete with Meta in any relevant market; they are customers purchasing advertising services (para. 24);
• The Commission’s decision on other markets and other parties could not, on its own, establish that Meta’s December 2024 actions towards these customers were an abuse of dominance; and
• Whether section 5 is engaged at all is ultimately “a matter to be addressed at the trial” (para. 24).

The Court’s approach illustrates the difficulty of:

• Leveraging competition law as a backdoor route to urgent reinstatement of services in a bilateral contractual dispute; and
• Transforming a commercial suspension into an abuse case without clearly articulating harm to competition (rather than merely harm to the individual customer).

3.4.6 Access to Billing Records and Inherent Jurisdiction

As an alternative, the plaintiffs sought interim orders compelling Meta to provide access to:

• Billing and invoicing data held on its systems, which they said they needed for regulatory and tax compliance purposes.

The Court rejected this for several reasons:

• The plaintiffs’ affidavits acknowledged the existence of management accounts (but did not exhibit them);
• They accepted that Meta had sent invoices and billing documentation by email, albeit in large volume (“tens of thousands” of emails) (para. 25);
• Despite complaining of compliance risks, they had managed to make partial tax returns to the Italian authorities (para. 25); and
• Any remaining need for documentation could be met through discovery and case management, not by a crafted interlocutory order (para. 25).

The Court was unwilling to expand its inherent jurisdiction to create bespoke interim disclosure orders where ordinary procedural tools are available.

3.4.7 Delay, Status Quo and Reasonable Expedition

The chronology was critical:

• 20 Dec 2024 – accounts disabled;
• 21–23 Dec 2024, 13 & 17 Jan 2025 – WhatsApp messages from plaintiffs requesting restoration;
• 25 Mar 2025 – Italian lawyers’ warning letter (with deadline of 3 Apr 2025);
• 10 Jun 2025 – Meta letter stating certain personal accounts would be reactivated;
• 17 Jun 2025 – Irish solicitors’ warning letter;
• 26 Jun 2025 – plenary proceedings issued;
• 11 Jul 2025 – interlocutory application filed; return date 28 Jul 2025 (para. 27).

Thus, approximately 204 days passed between disablement and the filing of the injunction motion. The Court held:

• This did not meet the standard of “reasonable expedition” required for interlocutory relief (para. 28); and
• The delay weighed against disturbing the status quo as identified in Ryanair v Skyscanner – namely, the state of affairs with the accounts disabled (paras. 9, 27–29).

The plaintiffs cited Wallace v Kershaw, but as noted, the Court found that case distinguishable given that Meta had substantive defences and the plaintiffs had not made out a strong case on the merits here (para. 28).

3.4.8 Adequacy of Damages and Balance of Justice

Even if the plaintiffs had met the strong case standard, the Court would have refused relief on the balance of justice (para. 26).

(a) Plaintiffs’ alleged harm

The plaintiffs claimed:

• Loss of clients, goodwill and market position;
• Jeopardy to tax and regulatory compliance due to loss of invoicing data;
• Threats to the viability of the businesses and employment (paras. 5, 8, 31); and
• Impairment of their “operational visibility” and investor/client relationships (para. 8).

However:

• No management accounts or other financial documents were exhibited, despite being relied upon (paras. 8, 31);
• No documentary evidence of lost clients or staff at risk was produced (para. 31); and
• Meta exhibited a social media post showing that the plaintiffs were hiring new employees in May 2025, undermining their narrative of existential threat (para. 32).

In light of Merck Sharp & Dohme, the Court was sceptical of unsubstantiated claims that damages were inadequate. It concluded that:

• The plaintiffs’ alleged business losses were quasi‑quantifiable (lost profits, lost margin, etc.);
• Any wrongful retention of prepaid funds could be remedied by orders at trial (para. 36); and
• The plaintiffs had already been able to make partial tax returns, and there was no evidence of regulatory concern (para. 34).

(b) Meta’s alleged harm

Meta argued that if forced to reinstate:

• It would be prevented from protecting its users from fraudulent or “scam” advertisements;
• It would have to do business “on a worldwide basis” with entities alleged to have breached its standards; and
• Such harm, including potential exposure to fraud and reputational damage, could not easily be quantified or compensated (para. 33).

The plaintiffs responded that, if reinstated, they would still be subject to Meta’s standards and Meta could require removal of non-compliant ads. The Court saw this as an attempt to shift responsibility for ad compliance back onto Meta, contrary to the express terms placing that responsibility on the plaintiffs (para. 33).

The Court held that Meta’s potential harm was:

• Less amenable to monetary quantification than the plaintiffs’ business losses; and
• Not adequately addressable by the plaintiffs’ undertaking as to damages (paras. 33–34).

Therefore, on a standard “least risk of injustice” analysis, the balance of justice favoured refusal of the injunction (para. 37).

3.5 Costs: Application of Yoplait and Order 99

Under Order 99 rule 4 RSC, the Court must determine costs unless that cannot be done justly at the interlocutory stage. In Yoplait v Nutricia, the Court of Appeal endorsed reserving costs to trial in circumstances where:

• The interim decision applied a “special standard” that does not equate to success or failure at trial; and
• The full evidential record would only emerge later.

Here, Bolger J reasoned that:

• The plaintiffs had not established a strong case for interim relief, but that did not mean they would fail at trial (para. 39);
• Meta’s failure to provide any explanation until August 2025 was a relevant feature (para. 40); and
• Justice would best be served by reserving costs to the trial judge, who would have a complete overview of the evidence and issues (para. 43).

The Court therefore indicated it would reserve costs, subject to hearing the parties further (paras. 39–44).

4. Impact and Significance

4.1 For Online Platforms and Business Users

This decision cements several key propositions in the Irish context:

• Reinstatement of accounts = mandatory injunction: Businesses seeking to compel platforms to reverse suspensions should expect to face a “strong case” hurdle.
• Contractual terms are decisive at the interim stage: Where clear Ts&Cs expressly allow suspension without notice and retention of prepayments, a plaintiff must produce powerful, specific evidence to persuade a court to override or disapply them even temporarily.
• Internal complaints and review mechanisms matter: Failure to use platform‑provided procedures (especially where mandated by Ts&Cs or legislation like the DSA) may weigh against the grant of urgent relief.

4.2 For Advertising Intermediaries

The judgment has particular resonance for agencies and intermediaries who:

• Run large ad portfolios on behalf of many clients; and
• Contract directly with platforms, while their clients have no direct contractual link.

Key takeaways:

• Intermediaries are likely to be treated as primary contractual bearers of responsibility for content compliance with platform rules;
• Attempts to argue that “we are just intermediaries” will be scrutinised against the wording of platform Ts&Cs; and
• Robust internal compliance and monitoring systems will be crucial – both substantively and evidentially – for any future litigation.

4.3 For Digital Services Act Litigation

Although the Court did not finally interpret the Digital Services Act 2024, the decision signals that:

• DSA‑based complaints must be properly pleaded as causes of action, not merely invoked in passing;
• The Act’s remedial regime is understood, at least prima facie, as being damages‑oriented, with no obvious freestanding right to interim injunctive relief in private litigation of this kind; and
• Defences under the Act (e.g. safe harbours or procedural compliance) may be relevant but will typically require fuller examination at trial.

Future litigants may need to consider carefully:

• Whether DSA obligations are better enforced via regulatory channels (e.g. designated Digital Services Coordinators); and
• How to align private law claims (contract, tort, competition) with DSA‑related arguments about fairness and transparency.

4.4 For Competition Law Strategies

The decision also illustrates the challenges of deploying abuse of dominance arguments in bilateral contractual disputes. While a dominant platform can in principle abuse its position by unfairly excluding or penalising trading partners, this case suggests that:

• Courts will scrutinise whether the claimant is a competitor or merely a customer in the market allegedly affected;
• Reliance on EU Commission decisions in other factual and market contexts will rarely suffice, on their own, to show a strong case of abuse; and
• For interim relief, a claimant must articulate a concrete competition theory of harm that goes beyond “harm to me as a customer”.

4.5 For Injunction Practice Generally

The judgment reinforces several broader points about interlocutory practice:

• Delay erodes entitlement: even where business disruption is serious, months of inaction or slow reaction undermine claims of urgency and the desire to restore the pre‑suspension status quo.
• Evidence matters: claims of destroyed goodwill, lost clients, regulatory peril or existential risk must be backed by documents – management accounts, client correspondence, regulatory notices, etc.
• Adequacy of damages is a real hurdle in commercial disputes, especially after Merck Sharp & Dohme. Courts will expect sophisticated corporate plaintiffs to quantify and prove alleged losses rather than merely assert that they are unquantifiable.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

5.1 Mandatory vs Prohibitory Injunctions and the “Strong Case” Test

• A prohibitory injunction orders a party not to do something (e.g. “do not publish this information”, “do not trespass”). The usual interim test is:
  • Is there a fair issue to be tried?
  • Are damages an adequate remedy?
  • Where does the balance of convenience/justice lie?
• A mandatory injunction orders a party to take positive action (e.g. “restore an account”, “take down a structure”). Courts are much more cautious and require a “strong case” that the plaintiff will succeed at trial before granting such relief at the interlocutory stage.

In Bhblasted v Meta, reactivating the disabled advertising accounts was held to be mandatory relief, thus triggering the higher threshold.

5.2 Entire Agreement Clauses and Estoppel

• An entire agreement clause says that the written contract contains the whole agreement between the parties, and that they are not relying on any other representations or promises not recorded in the document.
• Estoppel is a legal doctrine that can prevent a party from insisting on its strict legal rights where:
  • It has made a clear representation about its future conduct;
  • The other party has relied on that representation; and
  • It would be unfair or unconscionable to allow the first party to go back on its word.

To use estoppel to defeat an entire agreement clause, a plaintiff must show very clear post‑contractual representations and reliance. Generalised “course of dealings” or vague assurances will rarely be enough. That was the situation in this case.

5.3 Abuse of a Dominant Position (Section 5 Competition Act 2002)

• A firm is dominant when it has substantial market power, enabling it to behave independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.
• An abuse of dominance involves using that power in ways that distort competition (e.g. unfair pricing, exclusionary practices, discriminatory trading conditions).
• Section 5 of the Competition Act 2002 (analogous to Article 102 TFEU) prohibits abuses, not dominance as such.

In Bhblasted, the plaintiffs tried to argue that Meta’s suspension of their accounts and retention of funds was an abuse. The Court held that they had failed to show a strong case that competition, as opposed to their own commercial interests, was being harmed – particularly since they were customers, not competitors, of Meta.

5.4 Status Quo and Delay in Injunction Applications

• The status quo is the factual situation that the court seeks to preserve pending trial. Usually this is the state just before the alleged wrongful act.
• However, where there is significant delay, the status quo may instead be taken as the situation just before the proceedings, even if the allegedly wrongful act occurred earlier and has been in place for months.
• Delay undermines claims of urgency and can shift the balance of justice against granting interim relief.

Here, because the plaintiffs waited some eight months before seeking an injunction, the Court treated the “status quo” as accounts already suspended and was reluctant to disturb that.

5.5 Adequacy of Damages and Balance of Justice

• Adequacy of damages means asking: if the plaintiff wins at trial, can money reasonably compensate them for the harm suffered in the meantime?
• If damages are adequate, an injunction is usually not granted.
• The balance of justice (or balance of convenience) weighs which party would suffer more if the court:
  • Grants the injunction but the plaintiff ultimately loses; versus
  • Refuses the injunction but the plaintiff ultimately wins.

In commercial disputes, Irish courts – following Merck Sharp & Dohme – are sceptical of claims that monetary damages are inadequate, especially for loss of profit, clientele or goodwill, unless supported by strong evidence.

6. Conclusion

Bhblasted S.R.L. Societa' Benefit & Ors v Meta Platforms Ireland Ltd [2025] IEHC 699 is a landmark Irish decision at the intersection of platform governance, digital regulation and traditional private law. It clarifies that:

• Orders compelling platforms to reinstate disabled accounts are mandatory interlocutory injunctions requiring a strong case on the merits;
• Written Ts&Cs, especially with entire agreement clauses, will generally prevail at the interim stage over alleged informal assurances or “course of dealings”;
• Advertising intermediaries engaging with platforms on behalf of clients are likely to be treated as bearing primary contractual responsibility for compliance with content rules;
• The Digital Services Act 2024 does not, without more, furnish a basis for interlocutory injunctive relief in private commercial litigation; and
• Courts will continue to apply orthodox principles on delay, status quo, and adequacy of damages, even in technologically complex and high‑value disputes.

While the plaintiffs may yet succeed at trial on some aspects of their case – particularly regarding the lawfulness of Meta’s retention of prepayments – the High Court has set a demanding threshold for those who seek to use interim injunctions to restructure their relationships with dominant online platforms. In doing so, the Court reaffirms that the digital economy remains, in large part, governed by conventional contractual and equitable principles, albeit applied to novel factual contexts.