Base Offence Must Be Identified for Unlawful Act Manslaughter; Minimum Terms for Immature Adult Murderers May Fall Below the 30‑Year “Double Murder” Starting Point

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) decision in R v Bukhari & Ors [2025] EWCA Crim 1353 (Warby LJ), arising from the notorious A46 car chase that ended in the deaths of Saqib Hussain and Mohammed Hashim Ijazuddin. The case involves two distinct appellate strands: (1) sentencing for murder and unlawful act manslaughter; and (2) the safety of manslaughter convictions predicated on secondary liability and the proper structure of jury directions.

At trial (Leicester Crown Court, HHJ Spencer KC), four defendants were convicted of murder and three of manslaughter; one was acquitted. On appeal, the Court quashed and reduced the minimum term for Mahek Bukhari’s life sentence and substantially reduced the manslaughter sentences. Crucially, the Court also granted leave to appeal on a point of law of general importance: in unlawful act manslaughter, a “base offence” must be identified and proved; the Court flagged that the same logic may apply where liability is secondary, thereby potentially sharpening the law post-Jogee on joint enterprise and unlawful act manslaughter.

Parties with live applications on this appeal included Mahek Bukhari (sentence for murder) and three manslaughter appellants (Ameer Jamal, Sanaf Gulammustafa, and Natasha Akhtar) challenging both conviction and sentence. The Court refused two conviction grounds (no case to answer and alleged perversity due to inconsistent verdicts) but granted leave on the base-offence/directions point for a full appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

• Murder (Mahek Bukhari): Minimum term reduced — The Court quashed the minimum term fixed by the trial judge and substituted 28 years (then deducting 4 months’ curfew credit and 332 days’ remand), resulting in a term of 26 years and 285 days. Key to the reduction:
  • Youth and immaturity (she was 22 at the offence date) were given “far too little weight.”
  • The judge placed excessive weight on “planning” and wrongly treated her social media “influencer” status as aggravating.
  • Mitigating factors exerted sufficient downward force to take the case below the 30‑year Schedule 21 starting point for double murder.
• Manslaughter (conviction appeals) — Leave granted on one ground only:
  • Ground 1 (arguable): The jury route to verdict allowed conviction for manslaughter without identifying and proving a base offence, and conflated routes (common plan to “expose to risk” vs intention to assist/encourage the principal’s crime) contrary to Jogee and subsequent guidance. The Court highlighted post-trial authority (R v Grey (Auriol) [2024] EWCA Crim 487) and the 2025 Crown Court Compendium stating it is “vital” to identify and prove a base crime; failure renders a conviction unsafe.
  • Grounds 2 and 3 refused: the no-case submission was properly rejected; and the acquittal of a co-accused (Patel) did not render these verdicts perverse.
• Manslaughter (sentence appeals) — Sentences reduced as manifestly excessive given minor roles and mitigation, notwithstanding Category B culpability and two deaths:
  • Ameer Jamal: 13 years, less 4 months’ curfew credit (12 years 8 months).
  • Sanaf Gulammustafa: 13 years, less 3 months’ curfew credit (12 years 9 months).
  • Natasha Akhtar: 10 years, less 4 months’ curfew credit (9 years 8 months).
• Procedural directions: Representation orders for Leading Counsel were made; timetabling for skeleton arguments and authorities was directed for the full appeal on the unlawful act manslaughter issue, including argument on candidate base offences (e.g., assault, battery, criminal damage, dangerous driving) and whether an actual impact is an essential ingredient.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• R v Jogee [2017] AC 387 (UKSC): The leading authority on secondary liability. Jogee requires proof that a secondary party intentionally assisted or encouraged the principal’s commission of the crime; mere foresight that the principal might commit the crime is evidence but not itself the test for guilt. The Court here emphasised that, for secondary liability to manslaughter, it is not enough to agree to dangerous conduct in the abstract—there must be intentional assistance/encouragement of a crime.
• R v Grey (Auriol) [2024] EWCA Crim 487: Post-dating the trial, Grey is now reflected in the 2025 Crown Court Compendium. It states unequivocally that in unlawful act manslaughter, a base crime must be identified and proved; failure to do so renders the conviction unsafe. The Court relied on Grey to find an arguable error where the jury were not anchored to a specific base offence.
• Andrews v DPP [1937] AC 576: A foundational case distinguishing unlawful act manslaughter from gross negligence manslaughter. Andrews is often taken to mean that manslaughter cannot be built on an act that is merely negligent (e.g., dangerous driving may be a lawful act done negligently, not an unlawful act per se), hence the Court’s invitation for focused argument on whether dangerous driving could serve as the base offence here and why criminal damage (due to collision) or an assault/battery might be preferable.
• Sentencing Act 2020, Sch 21: Provides the starting points for life minimum terms. The Court reaffirmed that, although the double-murder starting point of 30 years normally applies (para 3(2)(f)), sentencing must still reflect individual culpability and mitigation, including youth/immaturity.
• Sentencing Council Guideline: Unlawful Act Manslaughter: The Court accepted Category B culpability (factor 2: “high risk of death or GBH which was or ought to have been obvious to the offender”) but emphasised the non-mechanistic application of factors and the significant downward impact of a minor role (Category D factor), even where there are two deaths and some aggravating features.

Legal Reasoning

1) Murder: reducing the minimum term below the 30‑year starting point

The trial judge approached Mahek Bukhari’s minimum term by starting at 30 years (double murders), adding aggravation to 36 years (planning, group attack with a leading role, masks/weapons/pursuit, threats during pursuit, failure to summon assistance, deletion of phone contents), and then applying mitigation (no intent to kill, youth/immaturity, previous good character) to reach 32 years, then deducting curfew/remand.

The Court of Appeal held the balance was wrong for three main reasons:

• Influencer status irrelevant: Treating social media “influencer” status as aggravating added nothing to culpability and risked moral coloration.
• Planning overstated: There was planning to “jump” the victim but the fatal plan to ram the Skoda emerged shortly before the deaths; attributing weeks-long planning to the lethal conduct overstated culpability.
• Youth and immaturity undervalued: For adults under 25, youth and immaturity are “highly material” and should exert “substantial downward pressure” on minimum terms. This mitigatory force was not properly recognised.

The Court was not persuaded that the blackmail/provocation materially mitigated Mahek’s culpability. She was not the blackmail target; her earlier retributive plan pre‑dated the threats; and the connection between the blackmail and the fatal ramming was weak. Overall, proper application of aggravation/mitigation warranted a term below the statutory starting point.

2) Manslaughter: conviction directions — the “base offence” problem

The Court identified an arguable misdirection flowing from the jury route to verdict. Specifically:

• Question 8 framed liability around a “joint or common plan to cause some injury or expose to obvious risk of harm” or intentionally assisting/encouraging such a plan.
• Question 10 offered three alternative routes to conviction, including the “obvious risk” limb, without ensuring that the jury identified and found proved a specific base crime committed by the principal (or intentionally assisted/encouraged by the secondary).

In light of Grey and the updated Compendium, the Court underscored that it is vital to identify and prove a base offence in unlawful act manslaughter. For secondary liability post‑Jogee, the arguable position is that the accessory must intentionally assist or encourage the commission of that crime, not merely join in a plan for dangerous conduct. The Court invited full argument on what the base offence(s) should be here (e.g., assault, battery, criminal damage, possibly dangerous driving), and whether an actual impact was essential, or whether causing the Skoda to leave the road without impact could suffice.

The Court also queried how the directions addressed evidence of “withdrawal,” noting the trial judge intended Question 9 (overwhelming supervening act) to address this. That formulation pertains more naturally to a principal’s fundamental departure (a supervening act not in contemplation), rather than the discrete doctrine of timely withdrawal by a secondary. Although the Court did not decide this point, it implicitly flagged the need for careful doctrinal separation in directions.

3) Manslaughter: refusal of no-case and perversity grounds

The Court agreed there was a case to answer against each manslaughter appellant, given the evidence of coordinated pursuit, communications between vehicles, admissions (e.g., Akhtar’s prison call), and the inference of voluntary and supportive presence. As to inconsistent verdicts, differences between these appellants and Patel were matters for the jury; divergent verdicts were not irrational per se.

4) Manslaughter: re‑sentencing

While accepting Category B culpability (high risk of death/GBH obvious to each offender), the Court emphasised the non‑mechanistic application of the guideline and the strong downward pull of the appellants’ minor roles (a Category D factor). Mitigation (youth, good character, and other personal factors) also carried “real weight.” Although two deaths required a substantial uplift on totality, the original sentences (15 years for Jamal and Gulammustafa; 12 years for Akhtar) were manifestly excessive. Substituted terms were materially lower, as set out above.

Impact

• Directions for unlawful act manslaughter will tighten: Prosecutors must specify and prove a particular base offence, and judges must anchor directions to that offence. The hazard of presenting “obvious risk of harm” as a free‑standing pathway to conviction (especially for accessories) is now squarely on the appellate radar and, following Grey, likely fatal if left uncorrected.
• Secondary liability must be tied to a crime, not dangerousness in the abstract: Post‑Jogee, secondary parties must intentionally assist or encourage the commission of a defined crime. This case signals careful scrutiny where jury routes blur that requirement. The forthcoming full appeal may produce authoritative guidance on how to structure accessory directions in unlawful act manslaughter.
• Base offence in road‑death scenarios: The Court’s invitation for focused argument (assault, battery, criminal damage, dangerous driving) will likely shape charging decisions and directions in vehicular manslaughter cases. Andrews suggests caution with dangerous driving as a base offence for unlawful act manslaughter.
• Sentencing of immature adult murderers (18–24): This case reaffirms that youth and immaturity are “highly material” and can justify dipping below the Schedule 21 starting point even in double‑murder cases. Courts should avoid overweighting planning and morally tinged factors (e.g., online persona) and must calibrate culpability to the offender’s maturity.
• Unlawful act manslaughter sentences: Where Category B is engaged but the offender played a minor role, meaningful downward movement within (and sometimes below) the category starting point is appropriate before totality. The judgment is a reminder against mechanistic application of guideline factors.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Unlawful act manslaughter: A person commits manslaughter if they commit a criminal offence (the “base offence”) which is dangerous (i.e., all sober and reasonable people would recognise the risk of some harm), and that act causes death. The prosecution must prove the base crime and its causative role in the death.
• Base offence: The specific crime on which unlawful act manslaughter is constructed (e.g., assault, battery, criminal damage). It is not enough to say the conduct was “dangerous”; a crime must be identified and proved.
• Secondary liability (aiding/abetting, joint enterprise): Liability for intentionally assisting or encouraging another’s commission of a crime. Post‑Jogee, mere foresight of what the principal might do is not enough by itself.
• Overwhelming supervening act: A principal’s act that is so unexpected and independent that it breaks the chain between the joint plan and the crime committed, so an accessory is not liable. This is different from withdrawal, which is a secondary’s timely and unequivocal disengagement from the enterprise.
• Schedule 21 starting points: Statutory starting points for life sentence minimum terms (e.g., 30 years for murders of two or more people by adults), from which the court adjusts up/down for aggravation and mitigation.
• Totality: A sentencing principle ensuring that the overall sentence for multiple crimes or harms is just and proportionate, sometimes requiring an uplift to reflect multiple deaths.
• Curfew credit / remand credit: Time spent on qualifying curfew or in custody pre‑sentence is credited against the sentence or minimum term.

Conclusion

Bukhari & Ors delivers two significant messages. First, on unlawful act manslaughter, the Court of Appeal has firmly aligned with Grey: identifying and proving a base offence is not optional—it is vital. While the present judgment stops short of deciding how this requirement maps onto secondary liability in every case, it unmistakably signals that mere participation in “dangerous conduct” is not enough; accessories must intentionally assist or encourage the commission of a crime. A full appeal on that issue will likely refine jury directions and charging practice in complex, multi‑handed manslaughter trials—especially in vehicular contexts where the choice between assault/battery, criminal damage, or driving offences has doctrinal stakes under Andrews.

Second, on sentencing, the Court recalibrates the weight of youth and immaturity for adult offenders under 25 in the gravest context of double murder, demonstrating that these factors can justify a minimum term below the Schedule 21 starting point where overall culpability, properly assessed, commands it. The Court also underscores a careful, non‑mechanistic application of the unlawful act manslaughter guideline, requiring real moderation where defendants occupy minor roles, even where the harm is as grave as two deaths.

Key takeaways: prosecutors and judges must pin unlawful act manslaughter to a defined base crime and craft directions accordingly; defence teams should interrogate routes to verdict that rest on “obvious risk” without a base offence anchor; and sentencing courts must give genuine effect to immaturity and limited roles, resisting aggravating factors that risk moral rather than legal calibration of culpability.