Automatic cessation of the main homelessness duty on acceptance of a Part VI offer; section 184 does not govern discharge decisions; challenges must run through the Part VII review/appeal scheme

Introduction

This commentary examines the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of Wandsworth v Young [2025] EWCA Civ 1336. The case addresses whether a local housing authority must, upon deciding that its main homelessness duty under section 193(2) of the Housing Act 1996 has ceased, notify the applicant of that decision with reasons and of a right to review under section 202—by reference to section 184—and whether a tenant can raise the continuing existence of the main housing duty as a public law defence in possession proceedings rather than pursuing the bespoke review and appeal route prescribed by Part VII.

The appellant, Mr Jerome Young, a single man in his mid-40s diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder with ADHD traits, had been accepted as owed the main housing duty by the London Borough of Wandsworth. Following an offer of permanent accommodation under Part VI (25 Diprose Lodge), which Mr Young accepted by signing a tenancy, the Council undertook a suitability review and concluded the duty had been discharged. When Mr Young did not vacate his temporary accommodation at 15 Ganley Court, the Council served a notice to quit and brought possession proceedings. Mr Young defended on the basis that the main duty continued, arguing (a) the Council had to notify him, with reasons and information about review rights, that the duty had ceased (invoking sections 184 and 202), and (b) in any event he had not validly accepted the offer due to capacity issues. The District Judge and a Circuit Judge dismissed those arguments. The Court of Appeal (Newey, Elisabeth Laing and Cobb LJJ) dismissed Mr Young’s further appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

No section 184 duty to notify cessation: Section 184’s notification regime applies to initial inquiries where an authority has reason to believe an applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness. It does not apply to later decisions that the main housing duty has ceased. Parliament has laid down specific notification requirements in section 193 for cessation scenarios; section 184 does not add to them.
Automatic cessation on acceptance of a Part VI offer: Acceptance by an applicant of accommodation allocated under Part VI engages section 193(6)(c), which ends the main duty without any additional notification requirement about review rights beyond the statute’s express terms.
Review rights are not contingent on being told of them (outside the statute’s express requirements): While an applicant may request a section 202 review of a decision that the duty has ceased, the legislation does not generally require authorities to notify applicants of a right to review that discharge decision (save where the statute expressly requires notice, such as section 193(5), (7) and (7AA)/(7AB)).
Possession proceedings are not a backdoor for Part VII challenges: Save in exceptional circumstances, challenges to Part VII decisions must be brought via the section 202 review and section 204 appeal route. It was not open to Mr Young to resist possession by advancing a public law defence to re-argue cessation; he had ample opportunity to use the statutory procedures and did not do so.
Outcome: The appeal was dismissed. The main duty had ceased when Mr Young accepted the Part VI tenancy, and the Council was entitled to possession of the temporary accommodation.

Detailed Analysis

Statutory context and legislative evolution

Part VII of the 1996 Act governs homelessness. Section 188 imposes an interim duty to accommodate pending inquiries. Section 184 governs those inquiries—triggered when the authority has reason to believe the applicant may be homeless or threatened with homelessness—and requires the authority, on completing inquiries, to notify the applicant of the decision and, where adverse, the reasons and the right to request a review (section 184(3), (5)).

Section 193 codifies the main housing duty and the circumstances in which it ceases. The text and legislative history matter. Originally, section 193(5) and (7) contained fuller post-offer notification requirements. Amendments in the Homelessness Act 2002 and Localism Act 2011 reshaped those duties, adding express requirements to notify an applicant of a right to review the suitability of an offer, but notably removing the prior “within 21 days” post-refusal notification in section 193(7). The current statute:

Section 193(6)(c): main duty ceases if the applicant accepts an offer of accommodation under Part VI (no express notification requirement of any review right on discharge).
Sections 193(5), (7), (7AA), (7AB): prescribe specific information that must be given at the offer/refusal stage, including rights to a suitability review, and in section 193(5)(c) a post-refusal notification that the authority regards itself as ceasing to owe the duty.

Sections 202 to 204 create a bespoke, time-limited review and appeal scheme designed to internalise and then place in the County Court the supervisory function otherwise carried by judicial review. Section 202(3) sets a 21-day period for seeking a review from notification of the decision (with scope for extension by the authority).

Issue 1: Was the main housing duty still owed to Mr Young?

Mr Young’s case rested on two connected propositions: that section 184’s notification duties apply when an authority decides the main duty has ceased; and that he was not informed that he could request a review of that discharge conclusion contained in the July 2020 review letter, so the duty persisted.

The Court rejected both propositions. Newey LJ reasoned as follows:

Section 193 is the tailored code for cessation. Parliament has expressly specified, and in some cases pared back, the information obligations in cessation scenarios. This sits ill with reading across section 184’s initial inquiry regime to cessation decisions. The structural headings reinforce this: section 184 belongs to “Application for assistance” and “Inquiry” at the gateway stage; section 193 resides within “Duties to persons found to be homeless or threatened with homelessness.”
Section 193(6)(c) is framed in unqualified terms: the duty “shall cease” if the applicant accepts a Part VI offer. There is no textual foothold for superimposing a free-standing duty to notify a review right upon the discharge event, beyond the express statutory notice content elsewhere in section 193.
Section 202(3) uses the applicant’s “notification of the authority’s decision” to set a time bar for reviews, but the subsection does not itself create an obligation to notify a right to review. Nor does it convert section 184’s regime into a general notification duty for any and all Part VII decisions beyond the initial inquiry stage.
Legislative history and the 2002 Explanatory Notes point away from a general, overarching post-offer notification requirement. Parliament consciously removed the former section 193(7)(b) notification obligation and instead situated mandatory information duties at the time of making final offers/refusals (including suitability review rights), not at the “discharge” moment.

On that basis, even if the July 2020 review letter is read as including an additional, freestanding “discharge” decision, the Council was not obliged to tell Mr Young of a right to seek a further review of that decision in order for discharge to be effective. The main duty ended when he accepted the Part VI tenancy at Diprose Lodge.

Precedents cited and their influence

Warsame v Hounslow LBC [2000] 1 WLR 696

Warsame established that section 202(1)(b) is broad enough to encompass decisions that the main duty, once owed, is no longer owed—a “decision as to what duty (if any) is owed.” Mr Young invoked the parallel language of section 184(1)(b) to argue that section 184’s notification regime should therefore also apply to discharge decisions.

The Court accepted Warsame’s reach on the scope of reviewability under section 202(1)(b) but rejected the transposition of section 184’s obligations. The link between the two provisions in Warsame served to show what may be reviewed, not to import section 184’s notification mechanics into cessation under section 193. Structural context matters: section 184 is about initial inquiries; section 193 prescribes cessation requirements.

Ravichandran v Lewisham LBC [2011] PTSR 117

Ravichandran held that an applicant is entitled to a section 202 review of suitability and, where relevant, reasonableness in relation to a final Part VI offer; it also accepted that a review can be sought of the authority’s decision that its duty has ceased (even if confirmatory). Stanley Burnton LJ said applicants “should be informed” of the right to review a discharge decision.

Newey LJ treated this “should be informed” statement as obiter and not as imposing a legal duty beyond the express text of section 193. Ravichandran supports the reviewability of discharge decisions under section 202(1)(b) but does not mean authorities must give additional review-right notifications in discharge cases where the statute does not require it.

R (Bano) v Waltham Forest LBC [2025] EWCA Civ 92

Bano (binding in the Court of Appeal) emphasised “automatic discharge” when the statutory preconditions are satisfied, and confirmed that the legislation does not require an authority to tell an applicant that its duty has terminated. Importantly, it stated that nothing in section 193, section 202, or elsewhere makes the right to seek a section 202(1)(b) review conditional on being informed of that right (while sections 193(7AA)/(7AB) do specifically require notice of a suitability review right for private rented sector offers).

Young extends and applies that logic beyond private rented sector offers to acceptance of Part VI offers under section 193(6)(c): discharge is automatic upon acceptance; no additional notification of review rights is required by section 184 or otherwise.

Other authorities underpinning the procedural route

Runa Begum v Tower Hamlets LBC [2003] 2 AC 430; James v Hertsmere BC [2020] 1 WLR 3606; Abdikadir v Ealing LBC [2022] PTSR 1455: clarify that section 204 appeals are appellate in form but mirror judicial review grounds, providing a specialist alternative to High Court JR in homelessness disputes.
Wandsworth LBC v Winder; Kay v Lambeth; Doherty v Birmingham; Manchester CC v Pinnock: acknowledge the availability of public law defences in possession claims in principle.
Tower Hamlets LBC v Rahanara Begum [2006] HLR 9; Godson v Enfield LBC [2020] HLR 1; Bano: emphasise that, given the statutory review and appeal scheme with short time limits, it is “wrong in principle,” absent exceptional circumstances, to re-litigate Part VII determinations via different procedures (including possession proceedings) after the time for review/appeal has passed.

Issue 2: Was the point open to Mr Young in possession proceedings?

Reaffirming Rahanara Begum and Godson, the Court held that possession proceedings are not a forum to reopen Part VII determinations which could and should have been pursued via sections 202/204. While public law defences are conceptually available in possession cases, their use is tightly constrained when Parliament has provided a bespoke alternative remedy with strict timelines.

Applied to Mr Young, even if the Council should have told him about a further review right (a premise the Court rejected), the circumstances were not “exceptional.” He was plainly notified that the Council considered the main duty discharged; he neither sought a review on that basis within 21 days nor requested an extension. The Council delayed issuing possession proceedings for months; by the time of the District Judge hearing, years had elapsed. This was not a case warranting departure from the statutory route.

Legal reasoning distilled

Text and structure: Section 184’s text and placement show it regulates gateway inquiries. Section 193 is the lex specialis governing how and when the main duty ends, including targeted information duties for particular cessation paths. Reading section 184 into discharge would misalign with the carefully calibrated section 193 regime and the legislative deletions introduced in 2002/2011.
Automatic discharge doctrine: Acceptance of a Part VI offer engages section 193(6)(c) and automatically ends the main duty. Analogous automaticity has been recognised for refusals/acceptances of PRS offers under section 193(7AA), and refusals of final Part VI offers under section 193(7), assuming the statutory information prerequisites are met where imposed.
Review rights and notice: While discharge decisions are reviewable under section 202(1)(b), the right to review is not generally made conditional upon being told of it (save where the statute expressly requires notification, e.g., suitability reviews at the offer stage). Section 202(3)’s function is to trigger time limits once a decision is notified; it does not create an ancillary duty to advise on review rights for discharge.
Exclusive procedural channel: The policy choice behind Part VII’s internal review and County Court appeal scheme was to divert homelessness disputes away from general public law litigation and to resolve them quickly. That policy would be undermined if defendants could withhold or bypass reviews only to invoke public law arguments much later in possession actions.
Practical coherence: Imposing an additional section 184 notification duty at discharge would generate duplication and confusion—e.g., requiring authorities to notify both suitability review rights and separate “discharge” review rights at multiple stages—contrary to the streamlined design of section 193 and the 2002 reforms.

Impact and practical implications

For local housing authorities

Offer letters: Continue to ensure final offers under Part VI and PRS offers comply strictly with the express statutory information requirements (e.g., suitability review rights under sections 193(7), 193(7AA)/(7AB)).
Discharge communications: There is no general duty to notify applicants, with reasons and review-rights advice, that the main duty has ceased following acceptance of a Part VI offer (section 193(6)(c)). Authorities may still choose to confirm discharge as a matter of good practice, but failure to add review-rights wording to a discharge statement does not prevent cessation.
Litigation posture: Where discharge has occurred and review/appeal windows have expired without extension requests, authorities can resist attempts to relitigate in possession proceedings. Consider adjournments only if a live section 202 review or section 204 appeal is pending or in time.

For applicants and advisers

Act within 21 days: The 21-day clock for section 202 reviews runs from notification of the decision under challenge. Seek extensions in writing promptly if needed.
Different review opportunities: Suitability of a final offer is reviewable, and so is a decision that the main duty will or has ceased (under section 202(1)(b)). The latter right exists whether or not the authority expressly signposts it.
No second bite in possession claims: Do not rely on possession proceedings as a means to revisit discharge questions that could have been reviewed/appealed. The courts will expect use of the statutory pathways.
Capacity issues: If capacity is in doubt at the point of offer acceptance, raise it immediately, obtain evidence, and seek appropriate protections. In Young, the capacity point failed on the facts before the District Judge and was not pursued on further appeal.

For courts and tribunals

Adjournment vs adjudication: Where a timely section 202 review or section 204 appeal is in train, adjourn possession claims to allow the specialist process to run. Otherwise, resist re-opening Part VII merits in the possession forum absent exceptional circumstances.

Complex concepts simplified

Main housing duty (section 193(2)): If an applicant is homeless, eligible, in priority need, and not intentionally homeless, the authority must secure that accommodation is available.
Part VI allocation: The local authority offers permanent social housing through its allocation scheme. Acceptance of such an offer normally ends the main duty (section 193(6)(c)).
Private rented sector offer (PRSO): A qualifying offer of a private tenancy that, if accepted or refused after proper warnings, can end the main duty (section 193(7AA)).
Automatic discharge: The main duty ends by operation of law once the statutory trigger is met (e.g., acceptance of a Part VI offer), without the need for further steps by the authority, provided the statute’s express conditions are satisfied.
Section 184 inquiries vs section 193 cessation: Section 184 governs the initial decision as to whether any duty is owed and carries notice obligations. Section 193 governs how the main duty operates and ceases; it contains its own, more specific information requirements for particular cessation scenarios.
Section 202 review and section 204 appeal: The dedicated mechanism for challenging homelessness decisions. Requests must be made within 21 days of notification, extendable by the authority. Appeals to the County Court lie on points of law, mirroring judicial review grounds.
Public law defence in possession: A tenant may sometimes argue that a public authority’s decision to seek possession is unlawful. But where a statute provides a specific review/appeal route with timelines, courts will usually insist that route be followed instead.

Conclusion

Wandsworth v Young delivers clear guidance on three fronts. First, it confines section 184 to its proper role in initial homelessness inquiries and decisively rejects attempts to graft its notification regime onto later discharge decisions under section 193. Second, it consolidates the “automatic discharge” principle: acceptance of a Part VI offer ends the main duty under section 193(6)(c) without any additional notification of review rights unless expressly required elsewhere in the statute. Third, it reinforces the exclusivity, in practice, of the section 202/204 review and appeal route for Part VII disputes and cautions against using possession proceedings as a collateral forum, save in exceptional circumstances.

The decision aligns with Warsame on reviewability, harmonises with Ravichandran by acknowledging review rights while treating “should be informed” as non-mandatory outside the statute’s express terms, and extends Bano’s logic on automatic discharge and non-contingent review rights to Part VI acceptance cases. For authorities, the message is to keep offer-stage notifications statute-compliant; for applicants, to move quickly within the review/appeal windows. In the broader legal landscape, the judgment strengthens the coherence of the Part VII scheme, ensuring clarity, speed, and finality in homelessness decision-making.