Rebutting the Presumption of Regularity and the Materiality of Unconsidered Documents in International Protection Appeals: Commentary on C. (Nigeria) (Unconsidered documents) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2025] IEHC 606

1. Introduction

This judgment of Simons J in C. (Nigeria) (Unconsidered documents) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2025] IEHC 606 is a significant addition to Irish asylum and administrative law. It addresses two crucial and recurrent issues:

The circumstances in which a court will find that a tribunal failed to consider a document, notwithstanding a general statement that all material was considered (i.e. rebutting the “presumption of regularity”).
The standard of materiality that an unconsidered document must meet before its omission will vitiate an international protection decision.

In addition, the judgment gives a structured, practical treatment of the test for extending the strict 28‑day time-limit for judicial review of immigration decisions under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, particularly in light of recent rule changes on when an application is treated as “made”.

The case arises from the refusal by the International Protection Appeals Tribunal (“IPAT”) to recognise a Nigerian applicant as a refugee or as a person eligible for subsidiary protection, where a central reason for rejecting her credibility was said to be the absence of any “vouching documentation”. Yet, on the undisputed facts, her solicitor had sent the Tribunal an apparently official Nigerian police summons linked to her bisexuality. The Tribunal’s written decision never mentioned this document and, indeed, asserted that no vouching documentation had been produced.

The High Court’s response – to set aside the IPAT decision and remit the appeal to a differently constituted panel – clarifies and reinforces the legal duties of decision-makers in international protection appeals. It underlines that:

Where a tribunal explicitly relies on the absence of documentation, it bears a heavy burden to show it did in fact consider any such documentation that was submitted.
A potentially corroborative document going to the core of an asylum claim will almost invariably be material in the judicial review sense; failure to consider it is unlawful.
When an extension of time for judicial review is heard together with the merits, the court may – and sometimes must – have regard to the substantive strength of the case in deciding whether there is “good and sufficient reason” to extend time.

2. Background and Procedural History

2.1 Parties and protection claim

The principal applicant is a Nigerian national who identifies as bisexual. She applied for international protection in Ireland on 2 June 2022 (para. 4). Her core fear is that she faces:

Prosecution in Nigeria due to her sexual orientation; and
The possible removal of her children from her care.

These fears were articulated in her International Protection Office (IPO) questionnaire (see para. 4, referring to §4.5, §4.6 and §7.2 of that questionnaire).

Her minor children were joined as co‑applicants in the judicial review proceedings, but Simons J makes clear that the sole ground of challenge relates to the assessment of the principal applicant’s own circumstances. For the purposes of the judgment (and this commentary), “the applicant” refers to the principal applicant alone (para. 3).

2.2 First-instance refusal and appeal to IPAT

On 19 May 2023, the IPO recommended refusal of both refugee status and subsidiary protection. The applicant appealed to the IPAT by notice of appeal dated 2 August 2023 (para. 5).

On 16 August 2023, her solicitor emailed the IPAT secretariat attaching a single document: an official letter from the Nigerian police, headed “invitation letter to police station”, citing a case of “conduct likely to cause breach of the public peace” described as:

“indecent sexual display on [a] female (bisexual)”

The letter identifies a complainant and a date for the alleged breach of the peace. It then instructs the applicant to attend a named police station at a specified time and date so that the police “can carry out their investigation and for the conclusion of the case”, warning that legal action will follow if she fails to attend (paras. 6–7). Simons J rightly characterises this as a police summons rather than a mere “invitation” (para. 7).

There is some discrepancy in the dating of the alleged incident vis-à-vis the letter itself. The judgment does not disclose the detail (for anonymity reasons) but notes that the IPAT later sought to rely on this discrepancy (para. 8).

The solicitor’s covering email described the attachment as:

“the attached documentation provided by our client in support of her application” (para. 9).

The IPAT secretariat acknowledged receipt, confirming the contents had been “duly noted and circulated to the relevant personnel in the Tribunal” (para. 9).

Over the following months (September–November 2023), the solicitor submitted further materials including country of origin information (COI) and character references, and written submissions were lodged on 11 December 2023 (para. 10). Those submissions did not specifically mention the police summons (para. 10).

An oral hearing took place by audio-visual link on 14 December 2023, and the IPAT issued its decision on 19 March 2024 (para. 11).

2.3 The IPAT decision

The IPAT found that the applicant’s claim lacked “general credibility” and, therefore, that she was not entitled to the “benefit of the doubt” under section 28 of the International Protection Act 2015 (“IPA 2015”) (para. 13).

Critically, in paragraph 4.13 of its decision, the IPAT stated:

“As the Appellant has produced no substantial external consistency to her case in the form of vouching documentation as the Tribunal would expect from a woman of her education and her husband's education. This is a negative credibility factor.” (para. 14).

In paragraph 2.16 of the IPAT decision, the Tribunal set out an enumerated list of documents it claimed to have considered. The police summons is not on that list (para. 12). At paragraph 2.18 the decision states:

“All of the documentation, (non‑exhaustive), COI (non‑exhaustive) and submissions and grounds of appeal provided have been fully considered” (para. 12).

Yet at no point does the decision mention the police summons, either as a document, as alleged corroborative evidence, or as something whose authenticity or weight was questioned.

2.4 Judicial review and the single ground

Judicial review proceedings were instituted on 29 April 2024 (para. 15). Leave was granted by Barr J on a single ground: that the IPAT had failed to consider the police summons submitted on appeal (para. 15).

The leave order reserved the question of compliance with time-limits, so the High Court at the substantive hearing had to deal both with:

The extension of time under section 5 of the 2000 Act; and
The substantive ground concerning the unconsidered police summons.

Written submissions were exchanged in March and June 2025; the case was heard on 30 October 2025, and judgment was delivered on 12 December 2025 (para. 16).

3. Summary of the Judgment

3.1 Extension of time

The applicant was notified of the IPAT decision on 25 March 2024; under section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, she had 28 days – until 22 April 2024 – to “make” an application for leave to seek judicial review (para. 19–20).

Due to the 2024 amendment to Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (coming into force on 26 April 2024), a leave application is now treated as “made” when papers are filed in the Central Office, rather than when the motion is first moved in court (para. 17). The papers were filed on 29 April 2024, seven days outside the statutory period (para. 20).

Applying the principles in G.K. v Minister for Justice and, by analogy, Thomson v An Bord Pleanála and Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v HPRA, the Court held that:

The phrase “good and sufficient reason for extending the period” is not limited to reasons for the delay itself; the court has a broader discretion (para. 21).
Lack of explanation for part of the period of delay is a serious factor but not automatically fatal (para. 21).
Under Order 84 rule 21, there is an additional requirement that the circumstances of delay be outside the applicant’s control; importantly, this requirement does not apply to section 5 of the 2000 Act (para. 23).

Simons J identified three main reasons why there was “good and sufficient reason” to extend time (paras. 24–30):

No actual delay in the hearing of the case: The seven‑day filing delay had no practical impact on when the case came on for hearing. Since the policy of strict time-limits is to ensure prompt determination, not to penalise applicants, it would be disproportionate to dismiss where the statutory purpose was not undermined (paras. 25, 30).
Prejudice balancing: There was no prejudice to the respondents, whereas the applicant faced the serious prejudice of being barred from challenging what turned out to be an unlawful refusal of protection. The applicant personally was not at fault for the delay (paras. 26–27).
Merits of the judicial review: Because the time-extension application and the merits were heard together, the Court had already concluded that the judicial review was well‑founded. It would be disproportionate to refuse an extension in those circumstances, particularly given the minimal degree of lateness and the absence of any actual delay in the ultimate resolution of proceedings (paras. 28–30).

Accordingly, the Court extended time under section 5 of the 2000 Act (para. 55).

3.2 Failure to consider the police summons

On the substantive ground, the Court addressed two principal questions:

Did the IPAT in fact consider the police summons?
If it did not, was the omission legally significant (i.e. was the document “material”)?

Despite the IPAT’s reliance on a presumption of regularity and its generic statement that all documentation was considered, the Court concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, the IPAT had not considered the police summons. The presumption was rebutted (para. 33).

The Court then held that the police summons was both a relevant and a material element of the protection claim, such that the failure to consider it vitiated the decision. It was directly tied to the core of the applicant’s claim: risk of prosecution by reason of sexual orientation. On any approach to the “materiality” test, the summons could reasonably have influenced the outcome (paras. 47–50).

Crucially, the Court emphasised that deciding whether the summons is authentic is a matter for the IPAT, not for the judicial review court. The High Court’s role is to ensure the legality of the process, not to substitute its own credibility assessment (paras. 50–51).

3.3 Orders and costs

The Court:

Set aside the IPAT decision of 19 March 2024 (para. 54);
Remitted the appeal to a differently constituted IPAT panel for reconsideration, directing that it be decided in accordance with the findings in the High Court judgment (para. 54);
Recorded that an extension of time had been granted under section 5 of the 2000 Act (para. 55);
Indicated a provisional view that the applicant, being “entirely successful”, should receive her costs under section 169 of the Legal Services Regulation Act 2015, subject to any contrary application by the respondents (para. 56).

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

4.1 Time limits and “good and sufficient reason”

(a) G.K. v Minister for Justice [2002] 2 IR 418

G.K. is a foundational decision on section 5 of the 2000 Act. The Supreme Court stressed that the statutory language does not confine the court to asking whether there was good and sufficient reason for the failure to apply in time. Instead, the test is whether there is good and sufficient reason to extend the period (para. 21).

This wider formulation allows the court to weigh a range of factors, including:

Nature and importance of the decision challenged;
Length and effect of delay;
Conduct of the parties; and
Any broader public interest considerations.

Simons J expressly builds on this, emphasising that limiting the enquiry solely to the explanation for delay would improperly narrow the statutory discretion (para. 21).

(b) Thomson v An Bord Pleanála [2025] IESC 31

Although this is a planning case arising under the Planning and Development Act 2000, it uses similar wording about “good and sufficient reason”. As summarised by Simons J:

The Supreme Court reiterated that the provision does not focus solely on the reason for missing the statutory deadline but on the broader question of whether there is good and sufficient reason to extend the period (para. 21).
It may be extremely important that an applicant explains the whole period of delay, and failure to do so may weigh heavily against an extension, but it is not automatically fatal (para. 21).

Simons J uses Thomson to support a more flexible approach to section 5, recognising that while delay and explanation matter, they are not the only factors.

(c) Arthropharm (Europe) Ltd v Health Products Regulatory Authority [2022] IECA 109

In Arthropharm, the Court of Appeal summarised the relevant factors under Order 84 rule 21 RSC (judicial review general time limits). These include (para. 22):

Nature of the impugned decision;
Conduct of the applicant and respondent;
Effect of the decision on the applicant;
Steps taken after the decision; and
The public policy imperative of prompt public law litigation.

Arthropharm also points out that while the “blameworthiness” of an applicant is relevant, it is only one factor and not determinative (para. 22).

For immigration cases, Simons J draws analogies from Arthropharm, but also contrasts the stricter requirements of Order 84 rule 21 (which additionally demands that the circumstances causing delay were outside the applicant’s control) with the more flexible regime under section 5 of the 2000 Act, which contains no such requirement (para. 23).

(d) Heaney v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 123

Heaney is cited to explain the earlier practice under the pre‑2024 version of Order 84. Under that regime, an ex parte leave application was considered to be “made” only when it was actually moved before the High Court. The 2024 Rules amendment changes this, providing that the application is “made” upon filing of papers (para. 18).

This shift is central to calculating whether the application in C. (Nigeria) was out of time: the filing date (29 April 2024) determined the breach of the 28-day limit (para. 17–20).

4.2 Presumption of regularity and documentary consideration

(a) G.K. v Minister for Justice (again)

G.K. is also invoked in relation to the presumption of regularity in administrative decision-making – the idea that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts will assume that officials have performed their duties properly.

(b) Rana v Minister for Justice [2024] IESC 46

In Rana, the Supreme Court confirmed that:

A formal statement by a decision-maker that all material before them was considered is generally sufficient; additional affidavit evidence is not required unless there is a concrete reason to doubt that assertion (para. 32).
In the immigration context, decision‑makers are not obliged to list every single document or address each in detail in their reasons (para. 32).

The IPAT relied heavily on this presumption. However, Simons J concludes that it is rebutted on the facts (para. 33).

(c) B.C. (Zimbabwe) v IPAT [2019] IEHC 488

In B.C. (Zimbabwe), the Court noted that while a decision-maker is not legally obliged to list every document, the omission of certain documents from an enumerated list can legitimately raise doubts about whether they were in fact considered. Simons J quotes this by analogy, stating that such an omission “did not inspire confidence” that the documents had been considered (para. 36).

He treats the omission of the police summons from the IPAT’s list of documents (para. 12) as one of the cumulative factors supporting the conclusion that the Tribunal did not in fact see or consider it (para. 36).

4.3 Materiality and unconsidered documentation

(a) S.E. v Minister for Justice and Equality [2022] IEHC 138

In S.E., the High Court suggested a very stringent “no difference” test for harmless error in the context of unconsidered documents. The “highwater mark”, as described by Simons J, is that a court must be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that missing documentation could have made no difference to the decision before it will refuse relief on that basis (para. 42).

This approach sets the bar for refusing relief quite high: unless the court is practically certain that the omission could not have influenced the outcome, the error is treated as material.

(b) A.M.C. (Mozambique) v IPAT [2018] IEHC 133

Humphreys J in A.M.C. formulated the test more positively: the key question is not whether the document would necessarily have changed the outcome, but whether it was capable of influencing the decision. If so, failure to consider it renders the decision invalid (para. 43).

This presents a relatively low threshold for materiality: the applicant does not have to prove that the decision would have been different, only that it could reasonably have been.

(c) O.M. v IPAT [2025] IEHC 51

Both parties in C. (Nigeria) relied on O.M., in which (as cited by Simons J) the High Court appears to have required that the reviewing court be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that consideration of the missing documentation could have made no difference to the outcome before refusing relief (para. 46).

Simons J notes that the precise formulation of the materiality threshold is complex and potentially problematic from a judicial review perspective because it obliges the court to engage, at least to some degree, with the substantive merits of the decision (para. 44). However, he ultimately sidesteps choosing between the different formulations because, on any version of the test, the police summons clearly qualifies as material (para. 47).

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

5.1 Extension of time under s.5 of the 2000 Act

(a) The statutory and procedural framework

Section 5 of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000 requires that an application for leave to seek judicial review of an IPAT decision be made within 28 days of notification, unless the High Court considers that there is “good and sufficient reason” to extend time (para. 19).

Following the 2024 amendment to Order 84 RSC, the date the application is “made” is now the date of filing in the Central Office (para. 17), rather than the date it is first moved before a judge (the pre‑amendment position described in Heaney, para. 18). On this basis, the application was made seven days out of time (para. 20).

(b) A broader, merits-aware discretion

Drawing on G.K. and Thomson, Simons J emphasises that the test is not narrowly confined to explaining delay. Section 5 does not say time can only be extended where there is good reason for the failure to apply in time; it asks whether there is good and sufficient reason to extend the period (para. 21).

He also adopts the multi-factorial approach from Arthropharm (para. 22), including:

Nature and impact of the decision;
Conduct of parties;
Absence or presence of prejudice; and
Public interest in prompt challenges.

In addition, he underscores an important structural difference (para. 23):

Under Order 84 rule 21, the court must be satisfied that the circumstances causing the delay were outside the applicant’s control.
There is no equivalent requirement in section 5 of the 2000 Act.

The statutory scheme for immigration judicial review is thus somewhat more flexible than the general public law regime.

(c) No actual delay and proportionality

The first decisive factor is that the short delay in filing did not in fact delay the substantive hearing at all (para. 25). The policy rationale for strict time-limits – to ensure that valid challenges are resolved quickly – was not undermined. To dismiss the case would therefore serve no legitimate public interest purpose; it would be purely punitive (para. 30).

(d) Prejudice balancing

The Court then weighs the absence of prejudice to the State against the serious potential prejudice to the applicant:

The respondents are in no worse position by reason of a seven‑day delay that had no practical effect;
The applicant would otherwise lose the opportunity to challenge what is ultimately determined to be an invalid refusal of international protection (para. 26).

Moreover, the applicant herself was not to blame for the delay (para. 26), an important though not decisive factor.

(e) Role of the merits when extension and review are heard together

A particularly important aspect of the reasoning is the Court’s frank engagement with the relevance of the underlying merits. Simons J distinguishes between two scenarios (paras. 28–29):

Where the extension application is heard before the substantive judicial review, the court should generally consider the merits only in clear cases where the claim is either obviously unarguable or obviously unanswerable, to avoid turning the extension application into a mini‑trial of the case (para. 28).
Where, as here, the extension application is heard together with the substantive judicial review (“omnibus hearing”), the judge has already heard full argument on the merits by the time the time‑limit issue is decided (para. 27).

In the latter situation, it would be “artificial” to ignore the merits. If the court has concluded that the decision under challenge is unlawful, it would be disproportionate to refuse relief solely because leave was sought a few days late (para. 29).

This is vividly illustrated here: a decision made in March 2024 was only resolved by December 2025; the statutory goal of “prompt resolution” was not achieved regardless of the seven‑day delay (para. 30).

5.2 Whether the IPAT considered the police summons

(a) The presumption of regularity and its rebuttal

The IPAT relied on the presumption of regularity, backed by G.K. and Rana, and the statement at paragraph 2.18 of its decision that all documentation had been considered (para. 32).

Simons J accepts that:

Such a presumption exists and is generally sufficient, in the absence of contrary evidence;
Decision‑makers are not required to list every document or address each individually (para. 32).

However, he finds that this presumption is rebutted in the present case for three main reasons.

(b) First and central: the Tribunal’s own reasoning

The most powerful factor is the Tribunal’s statement that:

“the Appellant has produced no substantial external consistency to her case in the form of vouching documentation …” (para. 14, quoted at para. 33).

Simons J describes it as “inconceivable” that the Tribunal would have made this statement if it had seen the police summons (para. 33):

The police summons is plainly a form of vouching documentation, potentially corroborating the applicant’s account of State interest in her for reasons linked to sexual orientation (para. 33).
Even if the Tribunal doubted its authenticity or gave it little weight, it could not legitimately assert that there was no such documentation; at most, it could say that the only document produced was of doubtful value (para. 34).

The fact that the Tribunal spoke in absolute terms, without qualification, strongly suggests it had never seen – or had not appreciated – the summons.

(c) Second: procedural plausibility of oversight

The manner and timing of submission of the police summons make it quite plausible that it never reached the tribunal member. It was sent separately from the appeal file, after the appeal was lodged, and there is no direct evidence that it was appended to the case materials ultimately considered (para. 35).

This practical reality – that late‑filed documents can go astray in administrative systems – supports the inference that the tribunal member did not have sight of the document, despite the Secretariat’s acknowledgement.

(d) Third: omission from the enumerated list

The police summons does not appear in the decision’s list of documents considered (para. 2.16 of the IPAT decision, discussed at para. 12). While there is no general obligation to list every document, the omission of a document which, if seen, would be centrally relevant and important is, at minimum, a “slight” additional indication that it was not in fact before the decision-maker (para. 36, citing B.C. (Zimbabwe)).

(e) Combined effect

Taken together, these three elements – (1) a reasoning passage that can only sensibly be read as ignoring the summons, (2) the plausible administrative path by which the document might have been omitted, and (3) its absence from the enumerated list – persuade the Court, on the balance of probabilities, that the IPAT did not consider the police summons at all (para. 33).

5.3 Failure to consider a relevant and material document

(a) Statutory duty to assess “elements” of the claim

Section 28(3) IPA 2015 defines “elements” of an international protection application to include, among other things:

All documents submitted by the applicant regarding his or her reasons for seeking protection.

The IPAT, acting in cooperation with the applicant, must assess these elements (para. 37).

The police summons is clearly such a document: it relates directly to the reasons for the application (risk of prosecution and State action due to bisexual orientation) (para. 37–38).

(b) Relevance to persecution and risk

On its face, the summons indicates that:

The Nigerian police are investigating the applicant for conduct described in terms directly tying it to bisexual same‑sex activity (paras. 6–7, 38);
There is a threat of legal action if she fails to attend the station.

This is potentially powerful evidence of personalised risk of persecution or serious harm – not merely the existence of criminal laws but the initiation of a case against the individual applicant (paras. 38, 48).

Under sections 7 and 8 of the IPA 2015, persecution may consist of prosecution or punishment for reasons including membership of a particular social group (which can include sexual minorities), especially where such prosecution is discriminatory or disproportionate (para. 39).

Therefore, the police summons goes to the very heart of the protection claim.

(c) Relevant consideration vs materiality

In administrative law terms, failing to take into account a factor that the decision‑maker is obliged to consider – a relevant consideration – is a classic ground for judicial review. Here:

The police summons is a required “element” under s.28(3); and
It is directly relevant to the risk and credibility assessment.

Simons J accepts that some case law suggests a further requirement of materiality: an error will not lead to quashing unless the omitted factor was capable of affecting the outcome (para. 41).

He notes the conceptual tension: assessing materiality forces the court to engage somewhat with the substantive merits, which sits uneasily with the traditional view that judicial review is about legality, not correctness (para. 44).

In practice, however, existing case law has set the threshold so low that relief will be refused only if the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the omission could not have made any difference (paras. 42, 45–46).

(d) Application of materiality to this case

Simons J ultimately avoids pinning himself to a single formulation of the test, because the police summons is so significant that it satisfies any conceivable standard (para. 47).

He gives several reasons:

The summons goes to the core of the claim: risk of prosecution on account of sexual orientation (para. 48).
It suggests a concrete, individualised risk, not a speculative or abstract concern (para. 48).
The Tribunal itself acknowledged, in general terms, that documentary corroboration is highly relevant to credibility and expressly treated the absence of such documentation as a key negative factor (paras. 13–14, 49).

In that context, to argue in judicial review that the newly discovered (but previously submitted) document is immaterial is, as the Court puts it, a “volte-face” (para. 49).

Simons J concludes:

“On any analysis, the police summons was material to the assessment of the claim for international protection. The failure to consider same vitiates the decision to refuse international protection.” (para. 50)

(e) Authenticity is for the IPAT, not the High Court

The respondents had sought to argue that the discrepancy in dates on the summons suggested it might not be authentic (para. 34). Simons J firmly rejects any implication that the High Court should itself discount the document on this basis:

The Court of judicial review is concerned with process legality, not with performing a fresh credibility assessment (para. 50).
Where a material document has not been considered, the usual remedy is to remit the matter to the specialist tribunal for reconsideration by a different panel (para. 50).
It is then for that tribunal to assess authenticity, weight, and significance in the usual way (para. 51).

Only in an extreme case, where a document is self‑evidently inauthentic on its face, might a court treat the omission as immaterial (para. 51). That is not the situation here: the summons “passes muster on initial perusal” (para. 51).

(f) No reliance on failure to highlight in submissions

The IPAT could not escape its statutory duty by pointing out that the applicant’s written submissions did not explicitly refer to the summons. Simons J is clear (para. 52):

Section 28 imposes an obligation on the IPAT to assess, in cooperation with the applicant, the relevant elements of the application, which includes all documents submitted.
Once a document has been submitted and receipt acknowledged, its relevance does not depend on it being expressly signposted in written submissions (para. 52).

In short, a tribunal cannot remedy its failure to consider a relevant and material document by pointing to an applicant’s failure to argue it more forcefully.

5.4 Separation of functions and the limits of judicial review

Simons J repeatedly emphasises the supervisory, not appellate, nature of judicial review:

The High Court does not decide whether the applicant is in fact entitled to refugee status or subsidiary protection.
It does not determine whether the police summons is ultimately genuine or what weight it should carry.
Its task is to ensure that the IPAT’s process complies with statutory duties and basic principles of administrative law.

Accordingly, the only appropriate remedy is:

Quashing the unlawful decision; and
Remitting the matter to a differently constituted Tribunal, which will reconsider the appeal in light of all documents, including the summons (para. 54).

By explicitly stating that nothing in the judgment prefigures the IPAT’s assessment of authenticity (para. 54), the Court maintains the proper institutional division of labour between courts and specialist tribunals.

6. Complex Concepts Simplified

6.1 Presumption of regularity

The presumption of regularity means that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, courts assume that public bodies and decision‑makers have properly performed their duties and followed the law.

In practice:

If a decision states “all documents were considered”, the court will usually accept this as true.
The applicant must point to something concrete that indicates otherwise (e.g. internal inconsistency, documentary omissions).

In this case, the presumption was rebutted by:

The Tribunal’s assertion that there was no vouching documentation, despite the existence of a police summons;
The procedural likelihood that the summons never reached the deciding member;
Its omission from the documents list.

6.2 “Good and sufficient reason” for extending time

“Good and sufficient reason” under section 5 of the 2000 Act is a flexible standard. It is not limited to showing:

Why the applicant missed the deadline; or
That the delay was beyond the applicant’s control (that additional requirement arises under the general judicial review time-limit in Order 84, not under section 5).

The court can consider:

How long the delay was;
Whether the delay actually slowed down the court process;
The importance of the decision for the applicant (e.g. risk of refoulement);
Prejudice to the State and to the applicant;
The merits of the case, especially if those merits have already been fully argued.

6.3 Relevant considerations vs materiality

A relevant consideration is a factor that the decision‑maker is legally obliged to take into account. Failure to consider it can render a decision unlawful.

Materiality asks: was that factor potentially important enough that, if it had been properly considered, it could have influenced the outcome?

If a factor is relevant and material, ignoring it nearly always requires quashing the decision.
Relief will only be refused if the court is effectively certain the omission made no difference at all.

Here, the police summons is both:

Relevant, because section 28 IPA 2015 requires consideration of all such documents; and
Material, because it directly underpins the core basis of the protection claim.

6.4 Benefit of the doubt under section 28 IPA 2015

Section 28 IPA 2015 sets out rules for assessing credibility and evidence in international protection cases. In broad terms, once an applicant passes certain threshold conditions, the decision‑maker may give them the benefit of the doubt on points that cannot be conclusively proved, provided the applicant’s general narrative is credible.

In this case, the IPAT concluded that the applicant’s general narrative lacked credibility and therefore that she did not reach the threshold required to benefit from this more favourable approach (para. 13).

The availability of documentary corroboration – like the police summons – is highly relevant to whether that threshold is met.

6.5 Judicial review vs appeal

A judicial review is not a rehearing of the case. It is a review of the lawfulness of the process and the reasoning, not a fresh decision on the facts.

The High Court does not decide whether the applicant is a refugee or not.
It does not make its own findings on credibility or on the authenticity of documents (except in extreme cases where a fraud is obvious on the face of the record).
If it finds that the original process was legally flawed (e.g. by failing to consider a material document), the proper remedy is usually to quash and remit.

7. Impact and Future Significance

7.1 For the IPAT and other protection decision-makers

The judgment sends several clear signals to the IPAT and similar bodies:

File management and document tracking matter. Documents sent after the formal appeal lodgement (especially via email) must be reliably amalgamated into the case file and placed before the deciding member. The court is willing to infer non‑consideration where there is a plausible path for loss or omission.
Be cautious with absolute statements. If a decision states that “no vouching documentation” was produced, when in fact some was lodged, this will strongly support a conclusion that material was overlooked. Decision‑makers should adopt more precise formulations (e.g. “no reliable vouching documentation”, with reasons).
Credibility findings must be consistent with the documentary record. Where documentary corroboration exists, it must be grappled with – including, where necessary, by explaining why it is considered unreliable or of limited weight.
The statutory duty under s.28 is proactive. The Tribunal cannot wait for applicants to flag every document in written submissions. Once a document is submitted, its relevance should be assessed ex officio.

7.2 For applicants and practitioners

For applicants and their legal representatives, the decision provides both comfort and guidance:

Comfort: If a tribunal clearly misstates the record (e.g. denying the existence of submitted documents), that can form a strong basis for judicial review.
Guidance: Practitioners should:
- Ensure that all important documents are clearly identified, preferably in the grounds of appeal and/or submissions;
- Cross‑check that such documents appear in any list of materials in the decision; and
- Retain proof of submission (email acknowledgements, etc.), which may later be critical in rebutting a presumption of regularity.

The judgment is particularly important for applicants whose claims turn on sexual orientation or gender identity, where:

Objective documentation may be scarce; and
Any official State action (such as a police summons) is potentially powerful corroboration, and must be treated as such by decision‑makers.

7.3 Clarifying materiality in judicial review

Although the Court does not finally resolve doctrinal disputes about the precise threshold of “materiality”, it confirms several pragmatic points:

The test is pitched low in practice: only obviously harmless errors will be tolerated.
If a document touches the “core” of a claim, as the summons does here, it will almost certainly be treated as material.
Attempts by the respondent to retrospectively characterise such a document as immaterial will carry little weight, especially where their own decision relied on the supposed absence of such documentation.

This will influence future litigation involving:

Unconsidered medical or psychiatric reports;
Documents from prosecution authorities or courts in the country of origin;
Key COI materials pointing to risk patterns matching an applicant’s profile.

7.4 Time-limits and the role of merits

On time-limits, C. (Nigeria) reinforces and refines earlier case law by:

Confirming that “good and sufficient reason” under section 5 is not confined to explanations of the delay – broader factors, including the merits, are relevant.
Explaining that where an extension application is heard together with the substantive case, it may be artificial and unjust to ignore the fact that the claim has been found well‑founded.
Emphasising proportionality: minor technical breaches that cause no real delay should not bar meritorious challenges in high‑stakes immigration cases.

This will likely encourage courts to adopt a more nuanced, context‑sensitive approach to late applications, particularly where:

The delay is short;
There is no prejudice to the State; and
The case raises significant issues about protection from refoulement or serious harm.

8. Conclusion

C. (Nigeria) (Unconsidered documents) v International Protection Appeals Tribunal [2025] IEHC 606 is a doctrinally rich judgment with concrete practical consequences. It articulates and applies several important principles:

Rebuttable presumption of regularity: While courts will ordinarily accept a tribunal’s statement that it considered all material, that presumption can and will be displaced where the decision’s reasoning is inconsistent with the existence of a key document, especially in credibility assessments hinging on documentary corroboration.
Duty to consider all relevant and material documents: Under section 28 IPA 2015, the IPAT must, in cooperation with the applicant, assess all documentary elements of a protection claim. Failure to consider a document that directly underpins the core of the claim – like a police summons relating to alleged bisexual conduct – is a classic relevant‑consideration error, and, given its materiality, vitiates the decision.
Materiality test set at a low threshold: The Court endorses the practical approach that unless it is beyond reasonable doubt that an omitted document could make no difference, the error is material. Submissions attempting to reclassify obviously relevant corroborative documents as immaterial will fail.
Judicial review remains supervisory: Propriety requires that questions of authenticity and weight of evidence be remitted to the tribunal; the High Court does not step into the shoes of the IPAT to reassess credibility.
Flexible and proportionate approach to time-limits: Interpreting section 5 of the 2000 Act in light of G.K., Thomson and Arthropharm, the Court confirms that “good and sufficient reason” includes considering the seriousness of the claim, the absence of actual delay or prejudice, and – when the merits have been heard – the fact that the decision is found unlawful. Strict time-limits serve procedural efficiency, not as traps to defeat well‑founded claims.

In the broader landscape of Irish asylum and administrative law, this judgment reinforces a strong commitment to procedural fairness in international protection determinations, particularly in sensitive areas such as sexual orientation claims. It provides clear guidance to tribunals and practitioners alike on documentation, credibility, and the interplay between time-limits and access to justice.