“When Does the Clock Start Ticking?” – Supreme Court Clarifies that a Single-Judge’s Direction to Place a Matter Before the Contempt Bench Itself Initiates Proceedings under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

1. Introduction

Case: Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan v. High Court of Madras (2025 INSC 619)

Bench: Sudhanshu Dhulia & Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.

Area of Law: Criminal Contempt – Limitation – Forgery of Court Orders

The Supreme Court of India was called upon to decide three criminal appeals filed by contemnors sentenced by the Madras High Court to six months’ simple imprisonment for fabricating and using forged interim stay orders in execution proceedings. The principal arguments before the Court centred on (a) the bar of limitation under Section 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; (b) adequacy of “formal” framing of charges; (c) the standard of proof in criminal contempt; and (d) proportionality of sentence.

Besides affirming guilt, the Court laid down an important clarification on when contempt proceedings are deemed to be “initiated” for the purpose of limitation – a point hitherto left somewhat uncertain after Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001) 7 SCC 549.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The convictions of Contemnors 3, 4 and 7 for criminal contempt were upheld.
The Court held that limitation did not bar the proceedings because initiation occurred on 05-09-2018, the date on which a Single Judge, having been prima facie satisfied, directed the Registry to place the matter before the Division Bench for criminal-contempt action. This date fell within one year of the contemptuous act (17-04-2018).
It rejected arguments regarding absence of “formal” charges, reliance on probabilities, and improper standard of proof.
However, observing that six months’ imprisonment was excessive in the circumstances, the Court reduced the sentence to one month’s simple imprisonment while keeping the conviction intact.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Sukhdev Singh Sodhi v. Chief Justice & Judges, PEPSU HC (1954)
– Established that a High Court’s power to punish for its own contempt flows directly from the Constitution; no legislation can abrogate it. Used to rebut the limitation plea.
Pritam Pal v. High Court of M.P. (1993 Supp (1) SCC 529)
– Re-emphasised that Articles 129 and 215 confer inherent, unfettered power; Act of 1971 adds but does not derogate. Court relied on this to state that Section 20 must be harmonised with constitutional power.
Pallav Sheth v. Custodian (2001) 7 SCC 549
– Core precedent on limitation. The present judgment parses Pallav Sheth, highlighting paras 41-44 to conclude that initiation occurs on the earliest judicial step (application/referral/order) within a year, not necessarily issue of notice.
In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh (2001) 5 SCC 501
– Stands for the principle that utilisation of a forged order itself is contempt, regardless of who forged it. Formed basis for liability of Contemnor 3 (beneficiary user).
In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra (1995) 2 SCC 584
– Clarifies that contempt procedure may be summary but must afford fair opportunity; used to dismiss the “no formal charge” argument.
Khushi Ram v. Sheo Vati (1953) 1 SCC 726
– Cited by appellants to assert “proof beyond reasonable doubt”; Court distinguished facts but acknowledged the standard while holding it satisfied.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Supreme Court

a) Limitation under Section 20
The Court framed the crucial question: “What is the point of initiation for suo motu contempt?” Drawing from Pallav Sheth, it reasoned:

Section 20 speaks of initiation “by the court.” For suo motu cases, this is the first judicial act evidencing intent to proceed.
The Single Judge’s order dated 05-09-2018, directing listing before the Contempt Bench, demonstrated such intent and therefore started the clock.
Subsequent misplacement of the file for four years did not negate that initiation; otherwise, courts could be disempowered by mere clerical lapses – an anomaly Pallav Sheth warned against.

b) Standard and Sufficiency of Proof
Although the High Court had observed that “strict proof” is unnecessary, the Supreme Court held that – in any event – the evidence met the stricter criminal standard:

Confessional statements to CBCID.
Section 164 CrPC witness statements.
Digital forensics (email trail, seized computers, voice comparisons).
Affidavits of the contemnors themselves (especially Contemnor 3 implicating Contemnor 4).

c) Opportunity to Defend
Invoking Vinay Chandra Mishra, the Court found that the contemnors had notice, access to materials, and a chance to file affidavits—satisfying natural justice despite absence of a “charge-sheet” akin to criminal trials.

d) Sentencing
After affirming guilt, the Court balanced:

Seriousness: forging High Court orders undermines justice.
Mitigating factors: length of litigation, first-time offence, partial acquittals by High Court, and contemnors’ personal circumstances.

Result: sentence reduced from six months to one month’s simple imprisonment, still ensuring deterrence.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Limitation Clarified: Trial courts and High Courts now have a specific reference-point—the earliest judicial direction evidencing intent—for calculating limitation. Administrative delays or missing files will no longer cripple contempt jurisdiction.
Digital Fraud Deterrence: The case signals that forging electronic or paper orders will attract swift contempt punishment in addition to IPC offences.
Procedural Guidance: High Courts may adopt internal protocols to record the “initiation date” contemporaneously, minimising future litigation over Section 20.
Sentencing Philosophy: By trimming sentence yet upholding conviction, the Supreme Court balances deterrence with proportionality—likely to influence future appellate reviews of contempt punishments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Civil vs. Criminal Contempt: Civil contempt enforces compliance with court orders; criminal contempt punishes acts that scandalise or obstruct justice (here, forging orders).
Section 2(c)(iii) of the 1971 Act: Defines criminal contempt as any act that “interferes, or tends to interfere, with the due course of any judicial proceeding.”
Section 20 – Limitation: A one-year limit applies, but the countdown starts when the court initiates contempt action (filing of application or court’s own directive), not necessarily when notice is served.
Suo Motu: Latin for “on its own motion.” The court commences proceedings without an external application.
Standard of Proof “Beyond Reasonable Doubt”: The highest evidentiary threshold, generally applied in criminal matters, meaning no plausible reason exists to believe otherwise.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shanmugam @ Lakshminarayanan cements an important procedural precedent: for calculating limitation under Section 20, the Court’s first conscious judicial step—here, a Single-Judge’s order directing contempt action—constitutes initiation. This interpretation safeguards the judiciary’s constitutional contempt power from being thwarted by administrative lapses, while still respecting the statutory time-bar.

Equally significant is the Court’s affirmation that creating or using forged court orders strikes at the heart of the justice system and warrants stern punishment, albeit tempered by proportionality. The ruling therefore strengthens deterrence against digital and documentary fraud, clarifies procedural uncertainties, and reinforces the constitutional architecture that underpins contempt jurisdiction in India.