“When Cancellation Is the Core Relief” – Supreme Court Clarifies Limitation, Proof of Wills and Lis-Pendens
Commentary on Rajeev Gupta & Ors. v. Prashant Garg & Ors., Civil Appeal 11061/2024 (2025 INSC 552)

1. Introduction

The decision in Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg resolves a two-decade-long intra-family property dispute that travelled through three rounds of suits and culminated in a Supreme Court verdict. The issues canvassed ranged from proof of a 1951 registered will, the effect of alleged collusive compromises, lis-pendens transfers, ostensible ownership under §41 of the Transfer of Property Act (“TPA”), to the critical question of limitation for a composite suit seeking both cancellation of sale‐deeds and recovery of possession.

Importantly, the Court reconciles divergent lines of authority on Articles 58, 59 and 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, expressly distancing itself from certain observations in the larger-bench ruling in Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood (2019). The judgment therefore sets a fresh precedent on the following points:

• Where cancellation of a registered instrument is a necessary relief, the suit is governed by Article 59 (three years), even if recovery of possession is also claimed.
• Merely giving up—or belatedly re-introducing—the relief of cancellation/declaration cannot shift the suit to Article 65 (twelve years).
• A will forming the basis of title must be proved in strict compliance with §68 Evidence Act; admission in earlier (possibly collusive) suits does not dispense with proof.
• Section 41 TPA protects bona-fide purchasers where the vendor is held out as owner and necessary predicates are satisfied.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. The Court allowed the appeal, restored the trial-court decree dismissing the suit, and set aside concurrent appellate decrees.
2. Held that the 2003 suit was time-barred; primary relief was cancellation of 1992 sale-deeds, so Article 59 applied (3 years from knowledge).
3. Rejected reliance on lis-pendens because the earlier injunction suit was collusive; transfer was not void but only subservient to final outcome.
4. Applied §41 TPA: plaintiffs had allowed Ramesh Chand’s name to remain mutated and rent to be collected for decades, making appellants bona-fide purchasers.
5. Found the 1951 will unproved; certified copy could not be used without establishing loss of original or calling at least one attesting witness.
6. Consequently, plaintiffs had no title; without declaration/cancellation the decree for possession was unsustainable.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. UOI (2011) – emphasised “first accrual” language in Art 58, forming basis for limitation analysis.
• Shakti Bhog Foods v. CBI (2020) – distinction between Art 58/59 and Art 113; Court imported its reasoning to hold that Art 59 counts from first knowledge.
• L.C. Hanumanthappa v. Shivakumar (2016) and Rajpal Singh v. Saroj (2022) – reiterated that substantive relief governs limitation.
• Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood (2019) – three-Judge ruling suggesting 12-year limitation where possession also sought; current bench distinguishes/clarifies this.
• G.T. Girish v. Y. Subba Raju (2022) – lis-pendens does not void transfer.
• Benga Behera v. Braja Kishore Nanda (2007); Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh (2020) – secondary evidence of a will; need to prove loss of original.
• Anathula Sudhakar v. Buchi Reddy (2008) – categorisation of suits for declaration/possession; applied to hold declaration indispensable.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Limitation

The Court identified the first jeopardising event—execution & registration of the 1992 sale-deeds coupled with delivery of possession—as the point when the plaintiffs’ right was invaded. It refused to accept the plaintiffs’ strategy of shedding the cancellation prayer mid-trial to stretch limitation to 12 years. Holding cancellation to be the primary relief and possession merely ancillary, Article 59 applied. Suit filed in 2003 was therefore hopelessly late.

b) Validity of Sale Deeds & Lis-Pendens

The ad-interim injunction in the 1992 “second suit” was never communicated to the purchasers; compromise in that suit was collusive and post-dated the transfers. Relying on G.T. Girish, the Court held transfers pendente lite are not void—only subordinate to eventual decree. Absence of bona-fide challenge to the compromise stripped the plaintiffs of lis-pendens advantage.

c) Ostensible Ownership – §41 TPA

For nearly four decades Ramesh Chand’s name remained mutated; he collected rent openly. Purchasers lived next door and bought after registered deeds. All statutory ingredients of §41 were met, entitling the appellants to protection as bona-fide purchasers for value without notice.

d) Proof of the Will

Because the will was the cornerstone of plaintiffs’ title, §68 Evidence Act required at least one attesting witness. Plaintiffs instead produced only a certified copy and failed to prove loss of the original—pre-conditions under §65(c). Admissions in earlier suits could not obviate formal proof, especially since the appellants were strangers to those admissions and alleged collusion.

e) Necessity of Declaration / Cancellation

Drawing on Anathula Sudhakar, the Court noted that where defendant’s title is on record via registered deeds, plaintiff cannot bypass declaratory relief. Appellate court’s decree for possession sans declaration was an illegality beyond curative jurisdiction of §96 CPC.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

• Limitation Doctrine Settled: Trial lawyers can no longer rely on Sopanrao to treat possession as the governing relief. Where cancellation is inexorably linked, Article 59 applies.
• Litigation Strategy: Plaintiffs must scrupulously include, pursue and prove cancellation within 3 years or face dismissal at the threshold under §3 Limitation Act.
• Proof of Testamentary Documents: Reinforces stringent approach; certified copies will not suffice without foundational evidence of loss and attesting witness(es).
• Bona-Fide Purchaser Protection Expanded: The judgment is a robust endorsement of §41 TPA, signalling that long-standing revenue mutations and open possession can create ostensible ownership.
• Lis-Pendens Nuance: Parties relying on §52 must show absence of collusion and communication of injunction; otherwise, transfers may still bind them.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Primary vs. Ancillary Relief: The primary relief addresses the root problem (here, setting aside sale-deeds). Ancillary relief flows naturally (here, possession). Limitation is computed on the primary relief.
• Article 58, 59, 65 (Limitation Act):
  • Art 58 – 3 years for suits seeking declaration (when right first accrues).
  • Art 59 – 3 years for cancellation of instruments (when facts first become known).
  • Art 65 – 12 years for possession based on title (when defendant’s possession becomes adverse).
• Section 41 TPA (Ostensible Owner): If the real owner allows another to appear as owner and a third party buys in good faith after reasonable care, the sale binds the real owner.
• Section 68 Evidence Act: A will must be proved by calling at least one attesting witness, unless the witness is dead/unavailable, in which event other routes to proof open.
• Lis-Pendens (§52 TPA): Transfers during litigation aren’t automatically invalid; they remain subject to the suit’s final result and can bind transferees if no collusion/notice issues arise.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg recalibrates the law on limitation for composite suits, fortifying a strict three-year window where cancellation of an instrument is essential. By insisting on rigorous proof of wills and demonstrating a pragmatic approach to lis-pendens and ostensible ownership, the Court protects bona-fide purchasers and discourages tactical pleadings aimed at evading limitation bars.

Practitioners should treat this judgment as the authoritative guide: whenever a registered sale-deed clouds a claimant’s title, cancellation must be pleaded, pursued, and proved within three years—no procedural sleight of hand will extend the clock to twelve.