“Reasonable Grounds” Under Section 37 NDPS Act Are Less Than Proof:
A Detailed Commentary on Afraz Mehboob Tak v. Union of India

I. Introduction

The judgment in Afraz Mehboob Tak v. Union of India & Anr, Bail App No. 144/2025, decided by the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh (Jammu Bench) on 03.12.2025, is a significant addition to the jurisprudence on bail under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), particularly in relation to:

• the interpretation of “reasonable grounds” under Section 37 NDPS Act,
• the ingredients of the offence of “financing illicit traffic” under Section 27A, and
• the evidentiary value of Section 67 NDPS statements, bank transactions, and call data records in linking an alleged “financier” to narcotics trafficking.

The case is also notable because it is decided under the new procedural and evidentiary regime of the Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA), which have replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act, respectively. The High Court consciously harmonises long-settled bail principles with this new statutory framework.

The core legal contribution of this judgment is the explicit clarification that the expression “reasonable grounds” in Section 37 NDPS Act:

• cannot be equated with the standard of “proved” under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, and
• means something more than mere suspicion but less than full proof.

On facts, the Court grants bail to the petitioner, who was alleged to be the intended receiver and financier of commercial quantities of codeine-based cough syrup and tramadol capsules, primarily on the basis of:

• disclosure/confessional statements under Section 67 NDPS Act, and
• two small online transfers of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 4,000 to the co-accused.

The judgment carefully weighs these materials and concludes that, for the purpose of Section 37, they do not amount to “reasonable grounds” to believe the petitioner is guilty of Sections 21, 22, 27A read with 29 NDPS Act, thereby removing the statutory embargo on the grant of bail.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The Seizure and Initial Arrest

On 23.11.2024, the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Jammu Zonal Unit, received specific information that one Saqib Zaffar was carrying a huge quantity of narcotic drugs in a bus travelling from Delhi to Katra via Jammu. Acting on this information:

• An NCB team intercepted the bus at Kunjwani Chowk, NH-44, Jammu on 24.11.2024 at about 0630 hours.
• Accused Saqib Zaffar was apprehended, and from his possession the following were recovered:
  • 7.211 kg of Codeine Based Cough Syrup (CBCS), and
  • 900 capsules (0.550 kg) of Spasmo Proxyvon Plus containing Tramadol.
• The contraband was seized as per procedure, with the bus driver and conductor associated as witnesses.

2. Link to the Petitioner

The petitioner, Afraz (also spelt Arfaz) Mehboob Tak, was not physically present at the time of seizure. He was later roped in on the following basis:

1. Statement of co-accused under Section 67 NDPS Act:
   Accused Saqib Zaffar allegedly stated that:
   • he procured the contraband from a supplier in Delhi (named as Samar Zia / Sameer Ahmed), and
   • the petitioner was the intended receiver of the seized contraband;
   • the petitioner had transferred money to him via online modes for the purchase of the drugs.
2. Statement of the petitioner under Section 67 NDPS Act:
   On 10.03.2025, the petitioner’s own statement was recorded. As per NCB:
   • he allegedly admitted asking co-accused Saqib to bring tramadol capsules and codeine syrup for him,
   • he allegedly disclosed that he paid Saqib via:
     • Rs. 5,000 on 22.11.2024, and
     • Rs. 4,000 on 08.11.2024
     through J&K Bank’s M-pay/online modes for purchase of contraband, and
   • he allegedly contacted supplier Samar Zia through the IMO application.
3. Bank records and CDRs:
   Following these statements, NCB traced:
   • online money transfers of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 4,000 between the petitioner and co-accused Saqib, and
   • Call Detail Records (CDRs) showing contact between the petitioner and co-accused / alleged supplier.

It is important that:

• No contraband was recovered from the petitioner’s possession.
• No recovery was made at his instance pursuant to his alleged Section 67 disclosure.
• The alleged supplier Samar Zia remained unarrested; only a letter was sent to NCB Delhi for further action.

3. Procedural Posture

• The petitioner was formally arrested on 10.03.2025.
• He first applied for bail before the Special Judge (NDPS Cases), Jammu; the trial court rejected bail on 09.04.2025, largely on the premise that he was involved in financing illicit trafficking under a conspiracy.
• The NCB filed the final complaint (equivalent to charge-sheet) on 22.05.2025 for offences under Sections 8/21, 22, 27A and 29 NDPS Act against the petitioner and co-accused Saqib, reserving liberty to file a supplementary complaint against alleged supplier Samar Zia.
• The petitioner then moved the High Court with a successive bail petition under Section 483 BNSS.

III. Summary of the Judgment

Justice Mohd. Yousuf Wani allowed the successive bail application and ordered the petitioner’s release on bail, subject to stringent conditions.

Key Conclusions

1. No “reasonable grounds” of guilt under Section 37 NDPS Act:
   For the limited purpose of bail, the Court held that:

   “there appear no reasonable grounds of involvement of the petitioner/accused in the commission of offences punishable under Sections 8/21, 22, 27A r/w 29 NDPS Act…”

   This effectively meant that the statutory embargo in Section 37 did not apply in the petitioner’s case.
2. “Reasonable grounds” is not equivalent to proof:
   The Court elaborated that the phrase “reasonable grounds”:
   • cannot be read to mean “proved” as that term is used in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,
   • means something more than suspicion but less than legal proof, and
   • depends on the nature and quality of material produced at the bail stage.
3. Weakness of the evidentiary links:
   The Court implicitly accepted the defence argument that:
   • Section 67 NDPS statements (of the co-accused and the petitioner) are of limited or doubtful admissibility under the new evidentiary regime and long-settled law on confessions to investigating agencies;
   • small, solitary bank transfers of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 4,000, without corroborative evidence of drug transactions, do not amount to “financing” illicit traffic under Section 27A; and
   • the absence of any recovery from the petitioner or at his instance further weakens the prosecution’s case at the bail stage.
4. General bail principles reaffirmed:
   The Court reiterated that:
   • “Bail, not jail” remains the governing rule,
   • Pre-trial incarceration cannot be used as a substitute for punishment, and
   • Bail decisions must be guided by the likelihood of:
     • the accused attending trial,
     • avoiding tampering with evidence or threatening witnesses, and
     • not repeating the offence.
   On facts, there was no material to suggest risk of absconding, tampering, or repetition of offence.
5. Bail granted with conditions:
   The petitioner was admitted to bail on:
   • personal bond of Rs. 1,00,000, and
   • two sureties from among his relatives, each for Rs. 50,000,
   accompanied by conditions:
   • to appear punctually at trial,
   • not to influence witnesses,
   • not to leave the Union Territory of J&K without trial court’s permission, and
   • not to commit any offence.
   The trial court was authorised to proceed under Sections 491–492 BNSS in case of breach.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. NDPS-Specific Precedents Cited by the Petitioner

(a) State of West Bengal v. Rakesh Singh @ Rakesh Kumar Singh

The Supreme Court in this case, as summarised in the judgment, held that:

• Application of Section 27A was “seriously questionable”,
• There was no recovery from the respondent,
• The quantity involved was intermediate, so Section 37 did not apply,
• CCTV footage and CDRs did not adequately connect the respondent to the alleged offence, and
• Given his past history and absence of any material showing likelihood of re-offending, he was rightly granted bail.

Relevance to the present case:

• Emphasises that mere CDRs and circumstances without recovery or strong corroboration may be inadequate, particularly for invoking Section 27A.
• Shows judicial reluctance to apply Section 27A unless the “financing” element is clearly established.

(b) Saddam Hussan Qureshi v. Union of India & Anr (Bombay High Court)

Despite a huge seizure (132,000 Alprazolam tablets and 2,400 CBCS bottles), the Bombay High Court granted bail where:

• The applicant’s alleged involvement was based on:
  • direct contact with a “wanted accused”, and
  • his own voluntary statement under Section 67 NDPS.
• No contraband was recovered from the applicant.
• The Court held these two circumstances did not sufficiently connect the applicant with the actual trafficking.

Relevance:

• Directly analogous to the present case where:
  • the petitioner is linked by contact and statements, but
  • no recovery is made from him.
• Illustrates that even in “big seizures”, bail may be justified where the link evidence is weak.

(c) Mohd Aslam Chiko v. NCB (Delhi High Court)

The Delhi High Court in this case:

• Held that Section 67 statements are inadmissible in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu,
• Held that mere financial transactions, without proof of nexus with drug trafficking, were insufficient, and
• Granted bail due to lack of admissible and credible evidence.

Relevance:

• Undermines reliance on:
  • confessional statements recorded by NCB officers, and
  • bank transfers where there is no clear link to drugs.
• Supports the argument that post-Tofan Singh and under the BSA regime, NCB-confession plus bank transfer cannot on their own satisfy the stringent standard of Section 37.

(d) Jasbir Singh v. NCB (Delhi High Court)

In Jasbir Singh, the Delhi High Court held:

• Bank transactions between the accused and a co-accused, who were in a personal relationship, could be “in the normal course of events”.
• Under Section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act (now echoed in BSA provisions), entries in books of account (including bank statements) cannot alone prove liability; they require independent corroboration.
• Mere existence of financial transactions does not automatically demonstrate drug-related conspiracy or financing.

Relevance:

• The petitioner in Afraz Mehboob Tak also explained that:
  • he knew the co-accused from the same locality, and
  • he had sent small sums (Rs. 5,000 and 4,000) for legitimate purposes (purchasing items for his hotel).
• The High Court’s reasoning here aligns with Jasbir Singh: small, isolated transactions, particularly between acquaintances, do not automatically prove financing of drug trafficking.

(e) Rahul Kumar v. State of Uttarakhand & Anr

This decision clarifies the scope of Section 27A NDPS:

• Merely indulging in trafficking activities is not punishable under Section 27A.
• What is punishable is “financing” those activities or harbouring offenders.
• Where the allegation was only that the accused possessed smack for sale to a co-accused, the Court said this did not equate to “financing”.

Relevance:

• Supports a strict construction of Section 27A.
• In the present case, even assuming that the petitioner made some payments, they were:
  • small, occasional and not clearly tied to any established trafficking chain.
• This weakens the prosecution’s attempt to label him a “financier” under Section 27A.

(f) Akashdeep Singh @ Akash v. State of Punjab

The Punjab & Haryana High Court in this case held:

• “Solitary transactions” do not amount to “financing illicit traffic in narcotics” because the notion of “trafficking” implies continuity and regularity in dealing.
• Mere recovery of cash from a co-accused, without more, is insufficient to prove financing.
• Application of Section 27A in such weak-link scenarios is questionable, and consequently the rigours of Section 37 NDPS Act do not automatically apply.

Relevance:

• Directly analogous to the present fact situation, where:
  • the prosecution relies on two small online transfers, and
  • no pattern of regular financial support for drug trafficking is shown.
• Strengthens the petitioner’s case that his conduct falls short of “financing illicit traffic” in the sense used in Section 27A.

(g) Yugraj Singh v. Union Territory of J&K & Anr (J&K High Court)

This is a particularly important local precedent, also decided by the J&K High Court, dealing with Section 27A NDPS. Key holdings as summarised in the judgment:

• Confessional statements of the accused, or details given by co-accused, made to police officers while in custody, are inadmissible under Section 26 of the Evidence Act (now conceptually continued under BSA).
• Section 27 Evidence Act (discovery based on confession) applies only when the disclosure leads to discovery of a new fact; in Yugraj Singh, there was no such recovery, so the disclosure remained inadmissible.
• Statements by co-accused about involvement of another accused, given in police presence, are inadmissible in view of Tofan Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu and a prior J&K decision (Rayees Ahmad Dar).
• The only link was CDRs showing contact between accused and co-accused; this was held to be merely suspicious, not sufficient to hold the accused guilty of Section 27A.
• The Court held there were reasonable grounds to believe that the accused was not guilty of Section 27A, and granted bail.

Relevance:

• Yugraj Singh is strongly analogous to the present case:
  • no recovery from the alleged financier,
  • reliance on custodial statements and CDRs,
  • no “discovery” pursuant to confessions, and
  • questionable invocation of Section 27A.
• This precedent gives the Court a solid local foundation to reiterate that such sparse material does not satisfy the “reasonable grounds” test in Section 37.

2. General Bail Jurisprudence Cited by the Court

The Court relies heavily on a line of Supreme Court decisions that articulate general principles governing bail.

(a) State of Rajasthan v. Balchand (AIR 1977 SC 2447)

• Propounds the classic principle: “Bail, not jail”.
• Denial of bail is justified only where there are real risks of:
  • absconding,
  • thwarting the course of justice,
  • repeating offences, or
  • intimidating witnesses.

(b) Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab (AIR 1980 SC 1632)

• Emphasises that bail decisions are highly fact-specific.
• Extracts from American Jurisprudence to stress that the main purpose of bail is to secure the accused’s presence at trial, not to punish.

(c) Sanjay Chandra v. CBI (2012) 1 SCC 40

• Reiterates that pre-trial detention is not punitive and that:

  “punishment begins after conviction.”

• Seriousness of the charge is a factor, but not the only factor in bail decisions.
• Courts must balance:
  • the accused’s right to liberty, with
  • the interests of society and justice.

(d) Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi (2001) 4 SCC 280

This case sets out a comprehensive list of factors for courts to consider while granting bail:

• Nature and gravity of accusation,
• Nature of supporting evidence,
• Severity of possible punishment,
• Character and status of the accused,
• Possibility of securing presence at trial,
• Risk of tampering with witnesses,
• Public interest and State interest, etc.

(e) State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi (2005) 8 SCC 21

Reinforces the same spectrum of factors and underscores that:

• vague allegations of possible tampering are not enough to deny bail,
• but if material shows that the accused will likely subvert justice, bail must be refused.

(f) Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre and Sushila Aggarwal

Though primarily on anticipatory bail, these cases are cited to highlight:

• the centrality of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution,
• the need to avoid mechanical arrests, and
• the obligation to comprehend the exact role of an accused before curtailing liberty.

These authorities collectively reinforce a rights-oriented, liberty-protective approach to bail decisions, even in special statutes like NDPS, subject to statutory constraints like Section 37.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Interpretation of “Reasonable Grounds” under Section 37 NDPS Act

The heart of the judgment lies in the Court’s careful elaboration of what “reasonable grounds” means in Section 37.

Key formulations by the Court:

• The Court must record satisfaction whether there appear “reasonable grounds” of involvement of the accused in offences attracting Section 37.
• The “reasonable grounds” test is qualitatively different from “proof”:

  “The words ‘reasonable grounds’ cannot be read to mean proved as used in ‘Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam’.”

• If “reasonable grounds” were treated as equivalent to “proved”, it would defeat the power of courts to grant bail pending trial under NDPS.
• “Reasonable grounds” is defined as:
  • more than mere suspicion and conjecture, but
  • less than full proof.
• It must be something which would prima facie enable a person of ordinary prudence to believe that the accused is or is not guilty.
• What constitutes “reasonable grounds” varies from case to case; it cannot be put into a straightjacket.

The Court also emphasises the methodology:

• At the bail stage:
  • The Court is not conducting a preliminary trial.
  • It should avoid going “at a tangent” or embarking on fact-finding as if deciding guilt.
  • It should instead see whether, on the prosecution’s material, if unrebutted, there is a serious possibility of conviction.
• Whether there are reasonable grounds depends on:
  • what evidence is offered at this stage, and
  • its nature, character, and reliability.

This nuanced articulation is an important clarification in the post-BSA era. It ensures that the heightened threshold in Section 37 does not effectively eliminate the possibility of bail, but operates as a careful filter requiring courts to examine whether the material is strong enough to cross from suspicion to reasonable belief.

2. Application to the Present Case

Applying this framework, the Court evaluates the prosecution’s material concerning the petitioner:

• No recovery from the petitioner’s person or premises, and no recovery at his instance.
• Section 67 NDPS statements:
  • of co-accused Saqib implicating the petitioner as intended receiver and financier, and
  • of the petitioner allegedly admitting his role.
  These are viewed with serious caution in light of:
  • the jurisprudence on confessions made in custody to investigative officers being inadmissible unless saved by discovery, and
  • the petitioner’s specific challenge under BSA and precedents like Yugraj Singh, Mohd Aslam Chiko, and Tofan Singh.
• Bank transfers of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 4,000 from the petitioner’s account to co-accused:
  • are small in quantum,
  • occurred on only two occasions, and
  • are plausibly explained by the petitioner as payments for legitimate purposes (purchasing items for his hotel).
• CDRs and alleged contact with co-accused and supplier:
  • show association but do not by themselves prove criminal conspiracy or financing.
  • Consistent with Yugraj Singh, they create at best a suspicion but not “reasonable grounds” of guilt.

Against this backdrop, the Court concludes:

• The prosecution’s evidence against the petitioner:
  • is too weak and circumstantial to cross the line from suspicion to reasonable belief of guilt,
  • especially regarding the serious allegation of “financing illicit traffic” under Section 27A.
• Consequently, there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty, or at the very least, there are no reasonable grounds of his involvement.
• This finding satisfies the first limb of Section 37’s twin conditions (absence of reasonable grounds of guilt) in favour of bail.

3. Consideration of Flight Risk, Tampering, and Re-Offending

Even after bypassing Section 37’s embargo, the Court must apply the general bail factors.

On these:

• Risk of absconding:
  • The petitioner is a permanent resident of J&K, a businessman running a hotel and restaurant, and the sole breadwinner for his family.
  • No past record of absconding or non-cooperation is shown.
• Risk of tampering with evidence / threatening witnesses:
  • No specific material is placed indicating any attempt or intention to do so.
• Likelihood of repeating the offence:
  • No criminal antecedents under NDPS Act or otherwise are pointed out.
  • The Court notes that prosecution has not furnished details to justify apprehension of re-offending.

Balancing these factors with the fundamental principle that pre-trial detention is an exception, the Court concludes that continued incarceration would amount to “pre-trial conviction”, incompatible with Article 21 and established bail jurisprudence.

4. Successive Bail Under BNSS

Although the petition is explicitly termed a successive bail petition under Section 483 BNSS, the Court does not dwell at length on the doctrine requiring a change in circumstances for entertaining successive bail applications.

However, by:

• noting the filing of the final complaint,
• examining a more complete record (including statements of prosecution witnesses recorded in investigation), and
• applying a detailed “reasonable grounds” analysis under Section 37,

the Court effectively proceeds on the basis that sufficient new material and a more settled picture of the case now exist to reassess bail, even though the trial court earlier denied it.

C. Impact and Future Significance

1. Clarification of the “Reasonable Grounds” Standard Under Section 37 NDPS

This judgment is especially important for:

• Lower courts in J&K (and persuasive authority elsewhere) dealing with bail in commercial quantity NDPS cases, and
• cases invoking Section 27A for alleged financiers, “kingpins” or “back-end” conspirators.

Key takeaways:

• “Reasonable grounds” is:
  • a calibrated threshold,
  • not as low as suspicion, but not as high as proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Courts must:
  • look at the quality and reliability of the material,
  • ensure they are not conducting a “mini trial”, but
  • also not merely rubber-stamping the prosecution’s allegations under the shadow of Section 37.
• Explicitly disassociating “reasonable grounds” from the concept of “proved” under the BSA prevents Section 37 from becoming a near-absolute bar to bail.

2. Tighter Scrutiny of Section 27A (“Financing Illicit Traffic”) Allegations

The judgment, read with the precedents cited, reinforces several important points:

• Section 27A targets financing, not mere participation in trafficking.
• To invoke Section 27A, the prosecution must show:
  • a pattern of regular, substantial financial support to drug trafficking activities, or
  • harbouring of offenders.
• Solitary, low-value transfers, particularly with plausible lawful explanations and no corroborative evidence of drug dealing, are unlikely to suffice.
• This judgment will likely discourage reflexive addition of Section 27A in NDPS cases simply to trigger Section 37’s stringent bar.

3. Evidentiary Standards in the BSA Era: Confessions, Bank Records and CDRs

The decision also consolidates the following evidentiary positions:

• Section 67 NDPS statements (confessional or otherwise):
  • are suspect when made to officers performing investigative functions, especially in custody,
  • can no longer be treated as sole or primary basis of conviction or strong linkage, particularly in light of Tofan Singh and BSA’s confessional regime.
• Bank account entries:
  • are akin to “books of account” entries; they need independent corroboration to prove criminal liability,
  • are neutral without contextual evidence linking them to drugs.
• CDRs:
  • may show contact but not necessarily the content or nature of contact,
  • raise suspicion but rarely by themselves cross the “reasonable grounds” threshold.

This will likely influence investigative and prosecutorial strategies, incentivising:

• stronger corroborative evidence (surveillance, controlled deliveries, financial trail analysis), and
• greater caution in over-relying on statements and technical records in isolation.

4. Continuity of Bail Jurisprudence Under BNSS and BSA

By repeatedly citing pre-BNSS and pre-BSA Supreme Court decisions, the High Court underscores that:

• The substantive principles of bail—“bail not jail”, presumption of innocence, necessity of detention—survive intact under BNSS and BSA.
• New codes do not dilute the constitutional centrality of personal liberty.
• Special statutes like NDPS must be harmonised with these fundamental principles, with Section 37 operating as a strong but not insurmountable exception.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Section 37 NDPS Act – The Bail Bar

Section 37 NDPS Act imposes special conditions before bail can be granted for:

• offences involving commercial quantity, and/or
• offences under Section 27A (financing illicit traffic or harbouring offenders).

Two key conditions (“twin conditions”) must be satisfied:

1. The Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty of such offence.
2. The Court must also be satisfied that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

This means:

• The bar applies in addition to normal bail factors (flight risk, tampering, etc.).
• Yet, as this judgment clarifies, “reasonable grounds” is a mid-level standard—stronger than suspicion but weaker than proof.

2. Section 27A NDPS – “Financing Illicit Traffic”

Section 27A punishes:

• “financing any of the activities” specified in the definition of “illicit traffic” (which includes production, manufacture, transport, etc.), and
• “harbouring persons engaged in such activities.”

From the case law cited:

• Simply being found with drugs, or even selling them, is ordinarily punishable under Sections 21/22/23, not necessarily under Section 27A.
• “Financing” implies:
  • providing funds or financial support to enable trafficking,
  • usually with some degree of continuity, planning, or organisational involvement.
• One-off, low-value transfers with a plausible legitimate explanation are generally insufficient to invoke Section 27A.

3. Section 67 NDPS Act – Statements to Investigating Officers

Section 67 enables certain officers to:

• call for information,
• examine persons acquainted with the case, and
• record statements.

However, after Tofan Singh and parallel principles under the Evidence Act / BSA:

• Officers of NCB performing investigative functions are treated effectively as police officers.
• Confessional statements made to them, especially while in custody, are generally:
  • inadmissible as confessions, unless
  • they lead to discovery of new facts (in which case only the discovered portion may become admissible under the “discovery rule”).

In the present case:

• Neither the petitioner’s nor the co-accused’s Section 67 statements led to any new recovery from the petitioner.
• Thus, their evidentiary weight is significantly weakened at the bail stage.

4. Successive Bail Applications

A successive bail application is a second (or later) request for bail after an earlier one has been rejected.

Courts generally expect:

• a material change of circumstances (e.g., completion of investigation, new evidence, change in charges, worsening health) to justify reconsideration.

In this case:

• The High Court entertained the successive bail petition after:
  • the final complaint had been filed, and
  • a more developed evidentiary picture was available.

VI. Conclusion

The decision in Afraz Mehboob Tak v. Union of India is a robust reaffirmation of constitutional and jurisprudential commitments to personal liberty even in the demanding terrain of NDPS law. Its key contributions may be synthesised as follows:

• It clarifies and recalibrates the interpretation of “reasonable grounds” in Section 37 NDPS Act, ensuring that it:
  • remains a meaningful filter against frivolous bail, yet
  • does not morph into a de facto requirement of trial-level proof.
• It subjects allegations of “financing illicit traffic” under Section 27A to rigorous scrutiny, indicating that:
  • isolated, low-value financial transactions without strong corroborative evidence do not suffice, and
  • prosecution must demonstrate a real financial backbone to trafficking operations.
• It aligns NDPS bail jurisprudence with the evolving Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam and long-standing doctrine on confessions:
  • custodial statements to investigative officers are inherently suspect and often inadmissible, and
  • cannot, in isolation, sustain the stringent Section 37 bar.
• It reasserts enduring bail principles—“bail, not jail”, presumption of innocence, and the necessity of detention as the operative test—within the new procedural framework of BNSS.

In practical terms, this judgment is likely to operate as an important precedent in J&K (and as persuasive authority elsewhere) for:

• granting bail to alleged “financiers” or “intended receivers” where the evidence against them is limited to:
  • inadmissible or weak confessions,
  • CDRs showing contact, and
  • minor financial transfers without clear drug nexus.
• guiding investigative agencies to build stronger, multi-layered cases rather than over-relying on statements and technical records.

Above all, the judgment underscores that even in the face of the grave societal menace of drugs, the rule of law requires that restrictions on liberty be justified by evidence, not assumptions; and that statutory stringency must be interpreted in light of constitutional guarantees of fairness and freedom.