“Public Purpose” Re-Examined: Kerala High Court Bars State from Acquiring Private Land Merely to Compensate Minority Institutions – Commentary on Sulaiman M.S. v. State of Kerala (2025 KER 62727)

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court, comprising A. Muhamed Mustaque and Harisankar V. Menon JJ., delivered a seminal ruling on 21 August 2025 in Sulaiman M.S. v. State of Kerala. The case arose from a convoluted land acquisition sequence in which:

• Land belonging to Sree Venkateswara English Medium School (managed by the Thulu Brahmana Yogam – a linguistic minority) was taken for widening a public bridge.
• Recognising the constitutional embargo of Article 30(1A)—which requires a specific law for compulsory acquisition of minority educational property—the State entered into a compromise with the school: it would acquire adjacent private parcels owned by the appellants and hand them over to the school as “compensation”.
• The adjacent owners (heirs of late Sulaiman M.S. and others) challenged the resultant Section 4(1) notification of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“1894 Act”) as a colourable exercise of power lacking “public purpose”.

The judgment annuls the entire acquisition and orders market compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“2013 Act”), thereby laying down an important precedent on:

• The limits of “public purpose” under the 1894 Act.
• The impermissibility of using State acquisition machinery to cure an unconstitutional taking from a minority institution.
• The pragmatic transition from the 1894 Act to the 2013 Act while awarding compensation in quashed proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court held:

1. The acquisition aimed solely at fulfilling a private arrangement between the State and the minority-run school; it did not satisfy the statutory definition of “public purpose” in Section 3(f) of the 1894 Act.
2. The State’s strategy was a “deceitful means” to bypass Article 30(1A) of the Constitution, which mandates a specific law (not an executive compromise) to acquire property of a minority educational institution.
3. Consequently, the entire land acquisition process—including the Section 4(1) notification and the subsequent award—was quashed.
4. Given that possession had already changed hands and the appellants wanted compensation rather than restitution, the Court directed the District Collector to compute and disburse compensation under the more beneficial 2013 Act; thereafter the appellants would execute conveyance deeds.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Considered

• Society of St. Joseph’s College v. Union of India (2002 1 SCC 273): Supreme Court ruled that Article 30(1A) requires a law—not merely executive action—for compulsory acquisition of minority educational property. The Bench relied on this to hold that the State could not sidestep the constitutional safeguard by a compromise.
• Gopakumar V.M. v. State of Kerala (2009 (3) KHC 361): A single-judge decision permitting acquisition for temple parking as “public purpose”. The Division Bench distinguished it, emphasising that in Gopakumar the public character was demonstrable, whereas here the beneficiary was purely private.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolds in three concentric layers:

1. Constitutional Layer – Article 30(1A): The State must enact a specific statute to compulsorily acquire property of minority educational institutions. The absence of such a law rendered the initial taking from the school constitutionally vulnerable. The compromise could not cure this defect.
2. Statutory Layer – Section 3(f) & Part VII of the 1894 Act:
   • Section 3(f)(vi) allows acquisition for “educational scheme sponsored by Government”. The school here was private, and the land was not being taken for the State or a public educational scheme.
   • Part VII restricts acquisition for companies/private entities to purposes in Section 40(1). None applied.
   • Hence, the acquisition lacked the sine qua non of “public purpose”.
3. Mala Fides & Colourable Exercise of Power:

   The compromise revealed an ulterior object: providing substitute land to a private school, not serving the broader community. This was a misuse of eminent-domain power, amounting to colourable legislation/executive action.

3.3 Impact of the Decision

• Public Purpose Doctrine Sharpened: The judgment narrows the State’s discretion under the 1894 Act (and by extension the 2013 Act) by emphasising that acquisitions benefiting only a private body—without demonstrable larger public interest—will be struck down.
• Minority Institution Safeguards Reinforced: Any attempt to indirectly acquire minority educational property, or to remedy such acquisition, must adhere strictly to Article 30(1A) and a dedicated legislative framework.
• Compensation Jurisprudence: Even where an acquisition is invalidated, courts may direct compensation under the 2013 Act in equity, recognising possession realities—potentially guiding future transitional cases.
• Administrative Accountability: Government departments are put on notice that contractual “adjustments” cannot substitute statutory compliance.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public Purpose: A legally recognised benefit to the community that justifies the coercive power of eminent domain. Private advantage disguised as public good does not qualify.
• Article 30(1A): A constitutional clause protecting minority educational institutions; it allows compulsory acquisition only through a specific law assuring compensation that does not stifle the institution’s functioning.
• Colourable Exercise of Power: When the State ostensibly acts within its legal powers but the real objective is different and illegitimate.
• Section 4(1) Notification: The first statutory step under the 1894 Act announcing intention to acquire land; defects at this stage taint the entire proceeding.
• 2013 Act vs. 1894 Act: The 2013 statute replaced the colonial 1894 law, offering higher compensation, social-impact assessment, and consent requirements for certain private projects.

5. Conclusion

Sulaiman M.S. v. State of Kerala re-asserts two fundamental propositions: (1) eminent domain cannot be weaponised to serve private bargains, and (2) constitutional safeguards for minority institutions are inviolable absent tailored legislation. By striking down the acquisition yet providing a pragmatic compensation route under the 2013 Act, the Kerala High Court balances legality with fairness. The decision will likely influence future land-acquisition contests, especially where governmental creativity attempts to override explicit constitutional or statutory fetters.