“Process, Not Possession” – Supreme Court Clarifies that Delivery of Property Is NOT an Ingredient of Section 387 IPC

Case Comment on: M/s Balaji Traders v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. — 2025 INSC 806 (5 June 2025)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in M/s Balaji Traders v. State of U.P., seized the opportunity to resolve a recurring interpretational conflict surrounding Section 387 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — “Putting a person in fear of death or grievous hurt in order to commit extortion.” The appellant-complainant, proprietor of a betel-nut business, alleged armed intimidation and monetary demands by the respondent-accused, who was running a rival business under the identical trade name. When the High Court quashed the summoning order on the ground that no money or property had in fact been delivered, the complainant approached the Supreme Court.

The core issue: Is actual “delivery of property” an indispensable element for prosecution under Section 387 IPC? The Supreme Court answered in the negative, setting aside the Allahabad High Court’s order and restoring criminal proceedings.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Leave granted and appeal allowed.
• The High Court’s quashing of Complaint Case No. 58/2022 (u/s 387 IPC) is set aside.
• Supreme Court holds that Section 387 targets the preparatory stage — the act of putting a person in fear with the intent to extort — and does not demand actual transfer of money or property.
• Two prima facie ingredients suffice for cognisance under Sec 387: (i) intentional fear of death/grievous hurt; (ii) done in order to commit extortion.
• Strict-construction arguments advanced by the accused were rejected; instead, the Court found the High Court conflated Sec 384/386 with Sec 387.
• Proceedings restored; trial court directed to expedite; parties to appear on 12 Aug 2025.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and their Influence

1. R.S. Nayak v. A.R. Antulay (1986 2 SCC 716) – Listed traditional ingredients of “extortion” under Section 383. Used by the High Court; Supreme Court distinguishes it because Sec 387 does not require completion of extortion.
2. Dhananjay @ Dhandhanjay Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2007 14 SCC 76) – Concerned Sec 384; relied on by High Court. Supreme Court labels reliance “misplaced” as the case did not address Section 387.
3. Radha Ballabh v. State of U.P. (1995 Supp (3) SCC 119) & Gursharan Singh v. State of Punjab (1996 10 SCC 190) – Earlier authorities upholding Sec 387 convictions absent actual payment. They bolster the Court’s reading that ‘delivery’ is unnecessary.
4. Somasundaram v. State (2020 7 SCC 722) – Three-Judge Bench confirming that Sec 387 applies even where threats precede any transfer; cited to reaffirm the aggravated nature of the offence.
5. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335) & Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (2007 12 SCC 1) – Canonical guidelines on Section 482 CrPC quashing. Supreme Court re-applied these, finding no ground for quash under any Bhajan Lal category.
6. Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021 19 SCC 401) – Quashing to be a “rarity”, reiterated.
7. Tolaram Relumal v. State of Bombay (1954 1 SCC 961) & Dilip Kumar Sharma v. State of M.P. (1976 1 SCC 560) – Principles of strict construction of penal statutes. Supreme Court clarifies that fidelity to statutory text does not warrant importing non-existent elements.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The bench (Karol J. & Misra J.) employed a textual, structural, and purposive approach:

• Textual Reading: Section 387 criminalises “putting or attempting to put any person in fear of death or grievous hurt, in order to commit extortion.” The phrase “in order to” denotes purpose, not completion.
• Structural Comparison: Chapter XVII separates offences involving completed extortion (Sec 384, 386, 388) from offences criminalising steps towards extortion (Sec 385, 387, 389). The legislative scheme evidences two distinct layers — process vs. achievement.
• Purposive Logic: Denying penal consequences until property is handed over would leave victims of deadly threats unprotected at the crucial stage of intimidation. Section 387 is designed to deter precisely this preparatory violence.
• Strict Construction Re-examined: The Court emphasised strict construction means “no added ingredients,” not “read fewer offences.” Where statute clearly criminalises conduct, the judiciary must apply it.
• Error-Correction: The High Court conflated Section 387 with elements of Section 383/384. Its reliance on 384-based precedents was therefore legally infirm.
• Bhajan Lal Framework: Allegations, accepted at face value, did disclose a cognisable offence (threat at gunpoint + demand of ₹5 lakh). None of the seven Bhajan Lal categories for quashing were attracted.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

The ruling has multidimensional implications:

1. Settles statutory ambiguity nationwide. Trial courts and High Courts now have authoritative guidance that actual transfer of property is not a sine qua non for Sec 387 cognisance or conviction.
2. Prevents premature quashing. Defence arguments predicated solely on “no money paid” will usually fail at the Section 482 stage, thereby allowing evidence to be led before trial courts.
3. Strengthens victim protection. Victims subjected to life-threatening intimidation get immediate statutory shield without needing to “hand over” assets before the law intervenes.
4. Crystallises the ‘process-offence’ doctrine. The decision underlines Parliament’s intention to criminalise preparatory conduct in violent crimes, a doctrinal point equally relevant to Sections 385 & 389.
5. Guides investigative agencies. Police can charge under Sec 387 based on credible threats with homicidal/grievous overtones, regardless of whether money changed hands.
6. Influences trademark/business disputes. The Court flagged that civil IP disputes do not immunise accused from criminal intimidation liabilities — discouraging parties from using violence in commercial competitions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Extortion (Sec 383): Forcing someone, through fear, to deliver property or valuable security.
• Putting in Fear “in order to” Commit Extortion (Sec 387): Causing fear of death or serious injury with the purpose of making the victim hand over property — even if that hand-over never happens. Think of it as the “attempt” stage but with aggravated threats.
• Grievous Hurt: Injuries specified in Sec 320 IPC (loss of limb, fracture, etc.). Threat thereof, when used to facilitate extortion, triggers Sec 387.
• Quashing (Sec 482 CrPC): High Court’s inherent power to nip criminal proceedings that are frivolous, malicious, or legally unsustainable, but used sparingly.
• Strict Construction of Penal Statutes: Courts must not expand or subtract elements of an offence. They interpret words as they are, not as they wish them to be.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Balaji Traders draws a bright line in Indian criminal jurisprudence: Section 387 IPC penalises the act of threatening with death or grievous hurt, irrespective of whether the extortion is consummated. By correcting the High Court’s conflation of distinct statutory provisions, the Court reaffirmed the autonomy of process-oriented offences and fortified doctrinal clarity for future benches.

In practical terms, the decision closes a defence loophole, protects victims earlier in the intimidation cycle, and equips both prosecutors and investigators with definitive guidance. In doctrinal terms, it exemplifies harmonious reading of chapter-wise IPC structure, confirms disciplined application of the Bhajan Lal quashing parameters, and refines the interplay between strict statutory construction and purposive interpretation.

Key takeaway: Under Indian law, one need not lose property before the law recognises the terror of an armed threat — the threat itself, when made for the purpose of extortion, is a standalone crime punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment.