“Once You Approbate, You Cannot Reprobate” – Supreme Court Crystallises Estoppel Against Post-Decree Challenges to Arbitrability

Introduction

In Sanjit Singh Salwan & Ors. v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan & Ors., 2025 INSC 988, the Supreme Court of India resolved a vexed question that frequently arises when parties, after consenting to arbitrate and obtaining a consent decree, subsequently seek to resile from their bargain by invoking statutory bars to arbitrability.

The litigation stemmed from a tussle between rival factions of trustees of the Guru Tegh Bahadur Charitable Trust (“the Trust”). Respondents originally filed a perpetual-injunction suit to restrain the appellants from entering a school run by the Trust. After the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground of Section 92 CPC (public-trust jurisdiction), both sides voluntarily appointed an arbitrator, obtained an award, and caused the District Court to dispose of the pending first appeal in terms of a compromise deed (viz. a “consent decree”). When the appellants later sought interim measures under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the respondents somersaulted and argued that the award was a “nullity” because disputes concerning public trusts are non-arbitrable. The Commercial Court and the High Court accepted that submission, prompting the present civil appeal.

Summary of the Judgment

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court (Atul S. Chandurkar & Augustine George Masih, JJ.) held:

By consciously submitting to arbitration, accepting the award, and procuring a consent decree, the respondents induced the appellants to alter their position; they are therefore estopped from contending that the award is void.
The doctrine of approbate and reprobate (election/estoppel by conduct) precludes a party from asserting inconsistent positions to the prejudice of the opposite side.
The impugned orders of the Commercial Court and the High Court were set aside; the appellants were permitted to revive execution of the consent decree.
The Court deliberately refrained from pronouncing on the inherent arbitrability of trust disputes under Section 92 CPC, treating the issue as overridden by estoppel in the present fact-matrix.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

Mumbai International Airport (2010) 10 SCC 422 – expounded the doctrine of election; extensively quoted to show that a litigant cannot accept benefits under an order and later challenge its validity.
C. Beepathuma v. V.S. Kadambolithaya, AIR 1965 SC 241 – foundational on “qui approbat non reprobate”.
Dhiyan Singh v. Jugal Kishore, AIR 1952 SC 145 – applied where parties, by conduct, are estopped from disputing an award’s validity even if the arbitrator exceeded jurisdiction; relied upon as a “complete answer” to the respondents’ plea of “estoppel against law”.
Booz Allen & Hamilton (2011) 5 SCC 532 & Vimal Kishor Shah (2016) 8 SCC 788 – leading cases on non-arbitrability under Section 92 CPC; cited by respondents, but distinguished because those authorities contemplate objections raised before the parties have accepted and acted upon an award.
State of Rajasthan v. Surendra Mohnot (2014) 14 SCC 77 – “no estoppel against law”; Court held that the principle cannot be deployed when the party’s own conduct created an equitable bar.

2. Legal Reasoning

Estoppel by Conduct / Election
The bench synthesised common-law authorities (e.g., Scarf v. Jardine, 1882) with Indian jurisprudence. It stressed that estoppel operates when (a) a representation of fact is made, (b) the other side relies on it, and (c) acts to its detriment. All three prongs were satisfied: the respondents represented that the arbitral award was final, the appellants relied by withdrawing an FIR, paying monies, and foregoing other remedies, and thereby altered their legal position.
Hierarchy between Consent Decree and Jurisdictional Objection
Although jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, the Court carved out a nuanced path: where jurisdiction is doubtful but parties have already reaped the fruits of a consent decree, equity intervenes to prevent abuse. The decree is not void in the sense of being inexecutable; at worst it is voidable, but only at the instance of a vigilant party, not one who has itself procured it.
Remedial Consequence
Rather than resurrecting the Section 9 petition, the Court restored the more appropriate remedy—execution of the consent decree—thereby aligning form with substance without causing multiplicity of proceedings.

3. Impact on Future Litigation

Clarity on Post-Decree Challenges: Parties can no longer raise belated “non-arbitrable” arguments if they have already turned an award into a consent decree and enjoyed its benefits. This deters tactical volte-faces.
Strengthening Finality of Compromised Judgments: Consent decrees grounded in arbitral awards acquire an additional protective layer; their executability cannot be undercut by afterthought jurisdictional objections.
Arbitration Practice: While Booz Allen & allied precedents on non-arbitrability remain intact, the judgment carves an estoppel-based exception when parties have crossed the Rubicon of acceptance and decree.
Trust-Law Disputes: Trustees contemplating arbitration must either object at the threshold or forever hold their peace; they cannot oscillate once a decree is passed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 92 CPC – A special provision requiring suits involving public charitable or religious trusts to be filed with the Advocate-General’s consent; creates a statutory forum and limits private litigation regarding trust administration.
Consent Decree – A judgment by a court embodying the terms of a settlement between parties; treated as a contract with the imprimatur of the court, hence directly executable.
Estoppel / Election / “Approbat & Reprobate” – Legal principles preventing a person from asserting contradictory positions to another’s detriment. If you accept benefits under an act or order, you are barred from later challenging its validity.
Non-Arbitrability – Certain subject-matters (e.g., criminal offences, matrimonial status, testamentary matters, public-trust administration) are deemed unsuitable for private arbitration because they involve rights in rem.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in Sanjit Singh Salwan is significant not because it dilutes the settled law of non-arbitrability, but because it reinforces the bedrock principle of finality through estoppel. Once parties consciously elect a forum, accept an award, and transmute it into a consent decree, they cannot subsequently sabotage that very process by draping themselves in jurisdictional niceties. The decision harmonises contractual autonomy, procedural equity, and judicial economy, sending a powerful message: litigation is not a chessboard where one may whimsically rearrange the pieces after every move. Future courts are now armed with a clear precedent to shut the door on such strategic volte-faces, thereby fostering certainty in arbitral consensuses and decrees alike.