“No Compulsion in Custom” – Karnataka High Court Affirms the Right to Abstain from Traditional Tasks during Communal Festivities

Madiga Dandora v. State of Karnataka, W.P. No. 201685 of 2025, Karnataka High Court (Kalaburagi Bench), decided on 26 June 2025.

1. Introduction

The writ petition in Madiga Dandora v. State of Karnataka arose out of a simmering dispute in Tumkur village, Yadgiri District, where the Madiga community (a Scheduled Caste) refused to continue the traditional beating of the percussion instrument “halige” during the Muharram celebration known locally as “Alai Bhosai Kunitha.” Historically, members of the Madiga community were required—often involuntarily—to perform this act as part of the festival. Their refusal resulted in communal tension between Dalits and certain upper-caste Hindus.

The petitioner organisation, Madiga Dandora, filed a series of representations requesting the district authorities to prohibit public celebration of the festival unless the coercive practice was abandoned. When no decision was taken, the petitioner approached the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution seeking a writ of mandamus directing the authorities to consider their representation.

Central issues before the Court included:

• Whether the State must intervene to regulate or prohibit a public religious celebration to prevent caste-based coercion and communal violence.
• Whether any community can be compelled to perform a customary task it finds demeaning or offensive.
• The extent of the State’s duty to safeguard law and order while protecting freedom of religion and equality.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Justice M. I. Arun disposed of the petition with the following operative directions:

1. The district authorities (Respondents 2–5) shall expeditiously consider the petitioner’s representation after hearing all stakeholders and decide whether public festivities may proceed.
2. If festivities are allowed, no person can compel the Madiga community (or any other group) to beat the halige or perform any act they despise.
3. The State must ensure adequate police protection to maintain peace and safeguard participants.

Although the Court stopped short of issuing an outright ban, it established an explicit principle: customary participation in religious festivities cannot be enforced where the practice violates an individual’s dignity or equality, and the State must balance communal harmony with fundamental rights.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The judgment itself does not list specific authorities, but it implicitly draws from several constitutional doctrines and landmark cases that consistently emphasise:

• Right to equality and dignity (Articles 14 and 21) – echoing Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) and Puttaswamy (Privacy) (2017) on inherent dignity.
• Freedom of religion without compulsion (Article 25) – analogous to Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala (1986) where students could not be forced to sing the National Anthem; and Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Sri Lakshmindra Swamiar (1954) recognising a distinction between essential religious practice and practice amenable to secular regulation.
• State’s duty to maintain public order – building on Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) and Himmat Lal Shah v. Commissioner of Police, Ahmedabad (1973).
• Protection of Scheduled Castes from degrading treatment – per the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Supreme Court dicta in State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale (1995).

Thus, while the Court relied on first principles rather than citing case law explicitly, its reasoning sits well within the existing constitutional matrix.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s rationale proceeds in three distinct steps:

1. Primacy of Human Dignity over Tradition: Describing the social context of Hyderabad-Karnataka’s communal harmony, the Judge nevertheless underscores that any practice despised by a group, especially if historically rooted in untouchability, cannot be forced upon them. This draws implicitly from Articles 14, 17 (abolition of untouchability), and 21 of the Constitution.
2. Balancing Religious Freedom with Public Order: While festivals promoting inter-community goodwill are encouraged, celebration must not endanger law and order. The decision “is best left to the State authorities,” placing the primary responsibility on the executive under the Police Act and Code of Criminal Procedure to assess real-time risk.
3. Procedural Fairness: The Court chooses a mediated path—directing authorities to give all parties (petitioner, local Muslims, upper-caste Hindus, village elders) a hearing. This ensures participatory decision-making and reduces perception of bias.

3.3 Expected Impact on Future Cases and Legal Landscape

• Affirmation of “Negative Religious Liberty”: The ruling emphasises the lesser-litigated negative dimension of Article 25—the right to not participate in religious acts. Future courts may invoke this precedent to protect individuals or communities from forced religious/cultural performances.
• Executive Accountability: District magistrates and police are reminded that simply citing “tradition” is not a defence if public order or fundamental rights are threatened. Administrative inertia could invite writs of mandamus similar to the present case.
• Caste-Based Custom Review: The judgment could spur re-examination of other practices (e.g., hereditary temple drumming, processional roles, festival-specific manual scavenging) that disproportionately burden Dalits.
• Conflict-Sensitive Festival Management: Local administrations may institutionalise stakeholder consultations and contingency orders (Cr.P.C. §144) earlier in the festival calendar, reducing last-minute litigation.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Madiga Dandora crystallises an important corollary to freedom of religion: the right to abstain from traditional tasks that offend one’s dignity or equality. By directing an inclusive consultative process rather than imposing a blanket ban, the Karnataka High Court walks a careful line—affirming cultural pluralism while rejecting caste-based coercion. The decision signals that “tradition” cannot override the Constitution’s moral compass, and that the State’s foremost duty is to preserve both public order and individual dignity.