“Jurisdictional-Fact” Threshold for Police-Protection Writs:
Kerala High Court’s Guiding Light in M.A. Sunil v. M.R. Pradeep (2025)

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court (Chief Justice Nitin Jamdar and Justice Basant Balaji) decided two connected writ appeals—W.A. Nos. 1866 & 2086 of 2023—arising from a property dispute within the Mannazhath family. The crux was whether the writ court may order police protection to enable one set of co-owners (the writ-petitioners, Pradeep & Chitra) to lock an eastern gate, even though their prayer for identical relief had earlier failed in a fully-contested civil suit (O.S. No.190/2013). The Single Judge had granted protection; the aggrieved family members (Aravindakshan, Sudheer and Sunil) appealed.

The Bench has now quashed the Single Judge’s order, restored the writ petition for fresh consideration, and in doing so crystallised an important doctrinal step:

A writ of mandamus seeking police protection can be issued only when the existence of a bona fide law-and-order threat is pleaded and proved as a jurisdictional fact; mere assertion of civil rights or disobedience of civil decrees is insufficient.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Bench accepts the appellants’ core submission that the impugned order conflated adjudication of civil rights with maintenance of public order.
• Referring to s.27 Kerala Police Act, 2011 and s.149 CrPC (now s.168 BNSS 2023), the Court stresses that police duties are triggered by law-and-order exigencies, not by every civil trespass allegation.
• Relying on Supreme Court and earlier Division Bench precedents, it holds that jurisdictional facts—actual or reasonably apprehended breach of peace—must precede any writ compelling police action.
• Because the Single Judge recorded no such finding, the order was unsustainable.
• The appeals are disposed of by: (i) setting aside the Single Judge’s directions, (ii) restoring the writ for proper fact-finding, and (iii) allowing parties to seek civil-court remedies (Order XXXIX r.2-A/ s.151 CPC) in the interim.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. P.R. Muralidharan v. Swami Dharmananda T. P. (2006) 4 SCC 501
   Supreme Court cautioned High Courts against using police-protection writs to short-circuit civil adjudication. The Bench adopts this dictum verbatim.
2. Sadananda Bai T.V. v. C.M. Ravi 2008 (3) KLT 542
   Warned of “special original jurisdiction” being created under the guise of protection orders. The present decision echoes this structural concern.
3. Kondo Syokai Leisure (P) Ltd. v. A.C.P. 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 22605
   Reiterated that disputed title/possession questions must go to civil court; police protection is ancillary to law-and-order, not a substitute for trial.
4. Essar Telecom Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. C.I. of Police 2010 (2) KHC 445 (FB)
   The Full Bench carved an exception: where facts are undisputed and obstruction purely unlawful, police aid could be directed. The Division Bench distinguishes Essar: there, no private civil dispute existed; here, the parties exhausted civil remedies and injunctions were refused.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

• Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine: A writ court’s authority is contingent on existence of a fact—real and demonstrable—showing that public peace is endangered. Absence of such fact vitiates the writ. The Court articulates this doctrine as the threshold requirement.
• Separate Spheres—Civil vs. Constitutional: The decision re-demarcates boundaries. Civil courts determine ownership, possession, easement and may itself enforce decrees with police aid. High Court under Art. 226 intervenes only for public law enforcement.
• Discretion & Alternative Remedy: Even where Article 226 jurisdiction technically exists, its exercise is discretionary. Availability of efficient civil remedies militates against writ relief, especially when police involvement would siphon finite state resources.
• Statutory Framework: Sections 27 K.P. Act 2011 & 149 CrPC/168 BNSS prescribe police duties; they do not mandate intervention in every private contest. The Bench harnesses these provisions to anchor the discussion in positive law, not merely equitable considerations.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

1. Streamlines “Police Protection” Litigation: Petition-writers must now plead concrete law-and-order facts (threats, mob action, cognisable offence) and place prima facie material. Absence of such averments will likely invite summary dismissal.
2. Reinforces Primacy of Civil Courts: Parties disappointed by civil-court verdicts cannot relitigate under Article 226 to gain practical advantage (e.g., blocking a gate) without appellate recourse.
3. Resource-Allocation Signal: The Bench expressly cautions about police bandwidth. Trial courts and litigants should expect stricter scrutiny before manpower is diverted.
4. Interplay with BNSS 2023: By referencing the yet-to-be-notified Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, the Court seeds jurisprudence that harmonises traditional doctrines with the re-codified criminal procedure framework.
5. Template for Other High Courts: The ruling may be cited nation-wide to repel attempts at converting writ court into a quasi-civil court with a police arm.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Writ of Mandamus: A court order compelling a public authority to perform a statutory duty.
• Police-Protection Jurisdiction: A colloquial label for writ petitions that seek police aid to implement court orders or protect property.
• Jurisdictional Fact: A foundational fact that must exist before a court can validly exercise a particular power.
• Order XXXIX Rule 2-A CPC: Provision empowering civil courts to punish breach of injunction orders—often accompanied by police assistance.
• Section 151 CPC: Preserves the court’s inherent power to make orders necessary for justice, including police aid, where no specific provision exists.
• Alternate Remedy Rule: High Courts ordinarily decline writ relief where a statutory or efficacious remedy (appeal, suit) is available.
• BNSS 2023: Forthcoming code to replace the Code of Criminal Procedure, re-numbering key policing provisions; the Court’s foresight avoids future doctrinal gaps.

5. Conclusion

M.A. Sunil v. M.R. Pradeep is more than a familial tussle; it is a jurisprudential checkpoint reminding courts and litigants that constitutional remedies are not shortcuts around adverse civil-court findings. By insisting on a demonstrable law-and-order predicate, the Kerala High Court has fortified the doctrinal wall between public-law policing duties and private-law property rights. The decision is poised to curb the burgeoning trend of “police-supported possession” litigation and to conserve police resources for genuine public safety imperatives. Future petitioners must now cross the jurisdictional-fact threshold before the writ court will marshal the state’s coercive apparatus to their aid.