“Issued” Means “Issued and Served”: Supreme Court Reasserts Judicial Discipline and Strict Vesting Preconditions under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act

Introduction

In Rohan Vijay Nahar & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others, 2025 INSC 1296 (decided on 7 November 2025), a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of India (Vikram Nath, J., author; and Prasanna B. Varale, J.) allowed a batch of 96 appeals arising from a common judgment dated 27 September 2018 of the Bombay High Court. The litigation concerns the long-running controversy on “private forests” in Maharashtra, the effect of pre-1975 proceedings under the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA as amended in the erstwhile State of Bombay and in Maharashtra), and the operation of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA).

The core questions were:

• Whether a mere Gazette publication or assertion that a notice under Section 35(3) IFA was “issued” in the 1960s is, by itself, sufficient to treat land as “private forest” under Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA and hence as vested under Section 3 MPFA on the appointed day (30 August 1975);
• Whether “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA inherently requires due service on the owner under Section 35(5) IFA and a live, proximate, and lawfully advanced process towards a potential Section 35(1) IFA notification;
• Whether post-2000 revenue mutations and annotations branding lands as “Private Forest – Forest Department” can perfect vesting; and
• Whether the Bombay High Court could distinguish or sidestep the binding ratio in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430.

The appellants—private landowners and subsequent purchasers—contended that there was no proof of service of Section 35(3) IFA notices, no inquiry or final Section 35(1) notification, no contemporaneous steps under the MPFA (including possession under Section 5), and that later mutations could not substitute for missing statutory steps. The State urged that issuance and Gazette references sufficed to attract Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA and that later revenue entries merely reflected statutory vesting.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and allowed all writ petitions, issuing the following operative directions:

• All mutation entries and declarations treating the subject lands as private forests are quashed and set aside; consequential corrections must be made in revenue records.
• The State is at liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, strictly in accordance with law and due process.

Key holdings:

• “Issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA necessarily means “issued and served” on the owner under Section 35(5) IFA. Service triggers the right to object and the duty to consider objections; without service, the jurisdictional foundation fails.
• Only “live” or “pipeline” notices proximate to 30.08.1975 can be counted for Section 2(f)(iii); stale, dormant or inchoate notices lapse into desuetude and cannot trigger vesting.
• There was no proof across the batch of service of Section 35(3) notices, no final Section 35(1) notification, no possession under Section 5 MPFA, and no contemporaneous action under Sections 4, 6, or 7 MPFA. Any one missing step defeats vesting; here, several were missing.
• Revenue mutations are ministerial. They do not create or transfer title and cannot perfect an acquisition that lacks statutory predicates.
• Post hoc materials (e.g., 2016 panchanamas or satellite imagery; a nineteenth century notification raised for the first time on appeal) cannot be used to shore up administrative action; orders must stand or fall on their original reasons.
• Subsequent purchasers stand on the same footing as original owners for jurisdictional compliance. Presence or absence of construction is irrelevant to vesting.
• Remand for a Section 6 MPFA inquiry after half a century is neither efficacious nor a substitute for missing mandatory preconditions.
• High Courts are bound by Supreme Court precedent under Article 141, and all authorities are duty-bound to act in aid of the Supreme Court under Article 144. The Court deprecates attempts to avoid binding precedent by drawing immaterial distinctions.

Analysis

A. Precedents and Prior Decisions

The judgment is anchored in, and clarifies, a line of decisions on Maharashtra’s private forests regime:

• Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 143:
  Earlier two-Judge authority had treated “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA as satisfied by a bare notice without requiring proof of service. This approach overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 IFA and was later overruled to that extent.
• Oberoi Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 311:
  The Bombay High Court relied on Chintamani to uphold vesting based on old Section 35(3) notices and ministerial mutations. This decision was set aside in Godrej & Boyce.
• Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430:
  A three-Judge Bench held that:
  • “Issued” under Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA includes due service on the owner under Section 35(5) IFA;
  • Only “live” pipeline notices proximate to 30.08.1975 can be counted; stale notices cannot;
  • MPFA is expropriatory and must be strictly construed; long State inaction and acquiescence cannot upend settled arrangements; and
  • On the facts in that case, vesting had not occurred.
  The present judgment reaffirms and applies this ratio, correcting what it characterizes as the High Court’s impermissible attempt to avoid it.
• Post-Godrej Bombay High Court decisions:
  A series of decisions (e.g., Satellite Developers; Sinhagad Technical Education Society; Ozone Land Agro; Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar; Lalit A. Sangtani; Bharat Chandulal Nanavati; Global Estate Developers; Indrajeet Kashinath Kaiswal; Nana Govind Gavate; Shree Maruti Sansthan; Vishram Vishwanath Kunte) consistently applied Godrej’s holdings on service, “live” notices, and the ministerial nature of mutations. The impugned 2018 judgment departed from that consistent line.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds along a clear statutory chain and constitutional discipline:

1. Statutory preconditions under the IFA:
   • Section 35(3) IFA authorizes issuance of a show-cause notice to the owner; Section 35(5) mandates service “in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure” and publication as per rules.
   • Service is inherent to the scheme because it enables the owner to object, produce evidence, and be heard; Section 35(4) allows interim restraints; Section 35(7) attaches penal consequences to violations.
   • A draft text of a Section 35(1) notification printed beneath a Section 35(3) show-cause in the Gazette is not a final notification; a notice cannot coexist with its culmination without rendering the hearing illusory.
2. The MPFA vesting construct:
   • Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA includes within “private forest” any land “in respect of which a notice has been issued under Section 35(3) of the IFA.” The Supreme Court reiterates that “issued” necessarily means “issued and served.”
   • Only “live” or “pipeline” notices—those actively pursued within a reasonable temporal proximity to 30.08.1975—can be relied upon. Dormant or inchoate notices lapse and cannot cause vesting under Section 3(1).
   • Vesting under Section 3(1) is expropriatory and must be strictly construed. “Any one missing step would defeat vesting.”
   • On facts across the batch, multiple mandatory steps were missing: no proof of service; no Section 35(1) final notification; no possession under Section 5 MPFA; no contemporaneous action under Sections 4, 6, or 7; continuous private possession in revenue records; and reliance on post hoc or extraneous materials.
3. Mutations are ministerial:
   • Entries by Talathis/Circle Officers post-2001 in village forms cannot create or vest title; they only reflect underlying legal events. Where statutory predicates are absent, mutations cannot perfect vesting.
   • Directions in PILs to “update records” cannot displace substantive statutory requirements of service and due process.
4. No post hoc rationalization:
   • Administrative orders must stand or fall on the reasons originally given. Later-discovered materials (e.g., satellite imagery from 2016, undated possession papers, a nineteenth century notification not forming the original basis) cannot be used to retrospectively justify vesting.
5. Subsequent purchasers and construction are irrelevant to vesting:
   • Jurisdictional compliance does not turn on whether the litigant is an original owner or a subsequent purchaser, nor on whether construction exists. The State cannot penalize restraint by placing subsequent purchasers in a worse position.
6. No remand after five decades:
   • A Section 6 MPFA inquiry is intended to be contemporaneous with the appointed day. A remand now would be largely academic and cannot replace missing mandatory preconditions (service and progression towards Section 35(1)).
7. Constitutional discipline and stare decisis:
   • The Court foregrounds Articles 141 and 144: “These are not ceremonial recitals… they convert dispersed adjudication into a single system that speaks with one voice.”
   • It admonishes attempts to distinguish binding precedent on immaterial grounds, emphasizing that judicial discipline turns hierarchy into harmony and preserves equality before law.

C. The Court’s Categorization and Why It Did Not Matter

To test the High Court’s perceived distinctions, the Supreme Court classified the 96 appeals into three descriptive groups:

• Ownership character: 77 derivative titles; 19 continuing titles.
• Timing of acquisition: 72 acquired post-MPFA; 24 pre-MPFA owners.
• Construction: 26 with some construction; 70 without or unclear.

The Court held that none of these distinctions bear on the controlling legal predicates for vesting. The common, dispositive defects were jurisdictional: absence of service, no final Section 35(1) notification, no contemporaneous MPFA action, and continuous private possession.

D. Impact and Prospective Significance

The judgment has significant doctrinal and practical implications:

• Reinforcement of Godrej & Boyce:
  This decision cements Godrej & Boyce as the controlling authority on Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA and Section 35 IFA, closing avenues for evasion by characterizing differences as “fact-specific.”
• Administrative practice and revenue records:
  Mass annotations branding lands as “Private Forest – Forest Department” without proof of service, live process, and lawful culmination are vulnerable. Revenue officers must correct records when statutory foundations are missing.
• Due process and Article 300-A:
  The Court’s insistence on strict construction of expropriatory statutes and adherence to Article 300-A underscores that deprivation of property must be strictly in accordance with law and procedure.
• Litigation management and stare decisis:
  High Courts are reminded to apply precedent faithfully; distinguishing on immaterial facts risks reversal and systemic uncertainty. The Court’s discourse on Article 141/144 will influence judicial method beyond forest law.
• State’s future action:
  Liberty is reserved for the State to initiate fresh proceedings “in accordance with law.” Any renewed attempts must:
  • Serve Section 35(3) IFA notices in CPC manner and afford hearing;
  • Proceed expeditiously towards a lawful Section 35(1) notification where warranted;
  • Take possession under Section 5 MPFA in accordance with law, if and only if vesting is validly triggered;
  • Respect the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980, for any non-forest use approvals; and
  • Base administrative decisions on contemporaneous, appointment-day facts and reasons.
• Urban development and planning:
  While planning permissions do not trump statutory vesting, this judgment will protect long-settled urban and peri-urban holdings from destabilization premised solely on stale, unserved notices. Authorities must align conservation objectives with due process.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Issued” vs “Served” (Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA read with Section 35 IFA):
  A notice is “issued” only when it is both formally made and duly served on the owner as per law. Service triggers the right to object and is a jurisdictional step; without it, the statutory process cannot lawfully proceed.
• “Live” or “Pipeline” Notice:
  A notice that is actively pursued to its lawful culmination within a reasonable time. A decades-old, dormant notice is considered “stale” and cannot be used to effect vesting.
• Section 35 IFA Framework:
  Section 35(3) requires a show-cause notice with service and hearing; Section 35(1) enables regulation/prohibition via final notification; Section 35(4) allows interim restraints; Section 35(5) prescribes service; Section 35(7) penalizes contraventions. A draft notice printed in the Gazette is not a final notification.
• “Private Forest” under MPFA:
  Section 2(f) defines it to include several categories, notably 2(f)(iii) for lands with a validly “issued” (i.e., served) Section 35(3) notice. Section 2(c-i) defines “forest” broadly, but its application must be rooted in appointment-day facts and proper process.
• Mutation Entries:
  Entries in revenue records (Form VII/XII, other rights columns) reflect facts; they do not create or extinguish title. They cannot cure missing statutory conditions for vesting.
• Expropriatory Statute:
  A law that transfers private property to the State. Such laws are strictly construed; authorities must follow every mandatory step, and courts will not infer compliance.
• Article 300-A of the Constitution:
  No person shall be deprived of property save by authority of law. This embeds due process in property deprivations and informs strict compliance with statutory requirements.
• Sections 22-A and 24 MPFA:
  Section 22-A (introduced later) provides a mechanism for restoration in limited scenarios, but it presupposes that there was a lawful vesting to begin with. Section 24 repealed Sections 34-A to 37 of the IFA from the appointed day, with a re-enactment mechanism only for lands restored under Section 22-A. Neither can be used to retro-justify an unlawful vesting.

Key Takeaways and Practical Checklist

• Authorities must be able to produce contemporaneous proof of service of Section 35(3) IFA notices on the then owner, evidence of hearing, and a lawful progression towards (or issuance of) a Section 35(1) notification. Absent any one of these, vesting fails.
• Revenue annotations cannot be the source of vesting; they can only reflect it. Entries made pursuant to general directions or PILs cannot override missing statutory steps.
• Post hoc reliance on later documents, imagery, or archival notifications that were not the original basis of action is impermissible.
• Subsequent purchasers have the same right as original owners to challenge jurisdictional defects; construction on land is irrelevant to the threshold question of vesting.
• Remand decades later will not be ordered to supply missing jurisdictional facts. Proceedings must be timely and fair.
• High Courts must apply Godrej & Boyce and this ruling faithfully; attempts to distinguish on immaterial facts risk being viewed as avoidance of precedent, contrary to Articles 141 and 144.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Rohan Vijay Nahar crystallizes and fortifies the legal framework governing acquisition of private forests in Maharashtra. It does three things of enduring importance.

1. It reaffirms, with emphasis, that “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) MPFA means “issued and served,” and that only live notices proximate to the appointed day can trigger vesting. Expropriation demands strict, step-by-step compliance; mutations and administrative expediencies cannot replace mandatory statutory predicates.
2. It rejects post hoc rationalizations and reminds administrators that orders must stand on their original reasons, assessed against appointment-day facts. Article 300-A’s insistence on lawful deprivation frames the entire inquiry.
3. It elevates judicial discipline from aspiration to operational mandate: Articles 141 and 144 require faithful adherence to Supreme Court precedent. Distinguishing on immaterial facts, or misreading the statutory scheme to reach a foreordained result, undermines the unity of law and public confidence in the judiciary.

By quashing mutations and declarations premised on stale or unserved notices, and by reserving liberty to the State to proceed afresh strictly in accordance with law, the Court balances forest governance with due process and legal certainty. Going forward, both revenue and forest authorities must ensure rigorous compliance with the IFA and MPFA before asserting vesting, and courts must insist on nothing less. In that discipline lies, as the Court memorably states, “the confidence of litigants and the credibility of courts.”