“Grounds-of-Arrest Bail Doctrine”: Calcutta High Court Makes Written Communication of Arrest Grounds a Pre-condition for Valid Custody under the NDPS Act

“Grounds-of-Arrest Bail Doctrine”: Calcutta High Court Makes Written Communication of Arrest Grounds a Pre-condition for Valid Custody under the NDPS Act

Introduction

On 11 June 2025, the Calcutta High Court (Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri) delivered a landmark ruling in Sudhar Mangar v. State of West Bengal, 2025 CHC-JP 77. While deciding a second bail application under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), the Court crystallised a powerful constitutional doctrine: an arrest is vitiated, and statutory embargoes on bail stand displaced, if the arresting officer fails to communicate the grounds of arrest effectively and preferably in writing at the time of arrest.

The case arose from the recovery of 40 bottles of “Rc-Kuff” cough syrup (containing codeine phosphate) from the petitioner’s residence. The police registered Jaigaon P.S. Case 62/2024 for offences under Sections 21(c) (commercial quantity) and 29 (conspiracy) of the NDPS Act and arrested Sudhar Mangar. A prior bail plea had been rejected. The petitioner’s renewed motion squarely challenged the legality of his custody, asserting that he was never told—much less given in writing—the grounds of his arrest as required by Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 52(1) of the NDPS Act.

Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court allowed bail on a personal bond of ₹20,000 with two sureties of ₹10,000 each, despite the offence involving a commercial quantity and the stringent Section 37 NDPS bar.
  • Justice Krishna Rao held that non-communication of arrest grounds in a meaningful manner constitutes a breach of Article 22(1) and Section 52(1); such breach vitiates the arrest and any subsequent detention orders.
  • The State’s reliance on post-facto entries in the FIR, case diary, and forwarding memo was rejected for want of contemporaneous proof given to the arrestee.
  • The magistracy was criticised for failing to ascertain compliance and for not providing legal-aid counsel; the Registrar General was directed to place the order before the Chief Justice for possible action against the Chief Judicial Magistrate and the Special NDPS Judge.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Court’s reasoning is deeply anchored in a recent constitutional trend elevating the right to be informed of arrest grounds:

  • Prabir Purkayastha v. State (2024) 8 SCC 254 – A two-judge bench imported the logic of Article 22(5) preventive-detention jurisprudence into Article 22(1), underlining the need for written communication. Justice Rao treated this as the primary authority.
  • Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 – Reaffirmed that non-compliance with Article 22(1) ipso facto vitiates arrest and empowers courts to grant bail notwithstanding statutory embargoes. The judgment provided a six-point summary that the High Court reproduced and applied.
  • PANKAJ BANSAL v. UNION OF INDIA (2024) 7 SCC 516 & DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT v. SUBHASH SHARMA, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240 – Both emphasise contemporaneous written communication under the PMLA. The High Court extended their rationale to NDPS arrests.
  • Neeraj Singal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 64 and other High Court rulings were cited by the State, but were distinguished because these cases involved some demonstrable written or acknowledged communication.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual Harmonisation: Article 22(1) uses “informed”, but the Court read this in the light of Article 22(5)’s “communicate to such person the grounds”, concluding that the qualitative standard of communication is identical in preventive and punitive contexts.
  2. Burden of Proof on the State: Following Vihaan Kumar, once an arrestee alleges breach, the prosecution must prove compliance. Merely reciting in the FIR or case diary that grounds were “explained” does not discharge that burden. The absence of any signature, written note, or acknowledgment contemporaneous with the arrest was fatal.
  3. Displacement of Statutory Bail Embargo: Section 37 NDPS ordinarily erects a high threshold for bail in commercial-quantity cases. However, the Court held that an unconstitutional custody cannot be salvaged by statutory restrictions – constitutional supremacy prevails.
  4. Role of Magistracy and Legal Aid: Echoing the Supreme Court’s mandate, the Court faulted magistrates for rubber-stamping remand without probing Article 22(1) compliance and for not assigning legal-aid counsel to an undefended accused—a dual breach of Articles 21 and 22(1).

3. Impact of the Judgment

The decision is poised to have far-reaching consequences:

  • Operational Protocol: Police and specialised agencies (Narcotics Control Bureau, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, etc.) will be compelled to serve a written “grounds-of-arrest memo” in local language, have it countersigned by the arrestee/relative, and annex it to the arrest memo to avoid inevitable bail orders.
  • Section 37 NDPS Dilution through Constitution: High Courts now possess a firm doctrinal lever to bypass the NDPS bail embargo whenever Article 22(1) violations are substantiated.
  • Magisterial Scrutiny: Magistrates must actively enquire into Article 22(1) compliance; failure could trigger administrative or disciplinary proceedings, as threatened here.
  • Legal Aid Vigilance: The judgment signals a zero-tolerance stance on the denial of immediate legal representation, likely spurring systemic reforms in court-annexed legal-aid services in Bengal.
  • Template for Other Special Laws: Because the Court drew parallels with PMLA, Customs, UAPA, and FERA provisions, the ruling will influence bail jurisprudence across specialised offences.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Article 22(1) vs. Article 22(5): The Constitution grants two separate but similar safeguards. Article 22(1) applies to ordinary arrests for crime; Article 22(5) applies to preventive detention. Both require swift communication of reasons, now effectively in writing.
  • Section 37 NDPS: A stringent clause that ordinarily bars bail in commercial-quantity cases unless (i) the Court is satisfied there are reasonable grounds that the accused is not guilty, and (ii) is unlikely to commit further offences. The present judgment clarifies that constitutional violations can override this bar.
  • Commercial Quantity: Quantities of narcotic substances exceeding a statutory threshold. In codeine-based cough syrup, 10 kg of mixture is commercial; 40 bottles of 100 ml each weigh 4 litres (~4 kg), but courts often calculate based on net codeine content. The State treated it as commercial, and the Court did not contest, focusing instead on arrest illegality.
  • Case Diary: A confidential daily record kept by the Investigating Officer. Entries therein are not, by themselves, proof of constitutional compliance unless the accused had contemporaneous access.

Conclusion

Sudhar Mangar cements a pivotal principle in Indian criminal procedure: constitutional mandates surrounding arrest are not procedural niceties but substantive conditions precedent to lawful custody. By insisting on a demonstrable, preferably written, communication of arrest grounds—and by granting bail despite Section 37 NDPS—the Calcutta High Court has strengthened personal liberty safeguards and amplified judicial accountability. Future investigative and judicial actors must internalise this “Grounds-of-Arrest Bail Doctrine” or risk the collapse of even well-founded prosecutions.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Calcutta High Court

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