“Ground-Based” Requirement Reaffirmed: Supreme Court Narrows Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act Applicability and Reasserts Joint Liability in Gang-Rape

Commentary on Raju @ Umakant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 INSC 615

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 INSC 615) revisits two pivotal issues in Indian criminal jurisprudence:

1. the parameters for convicting a non-SC/ST accused under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (“1989 Act”), and
2. the contours of joint liability in gang-rape under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”).

The appellant, Raju @ Umakant (A-1), along with a co-accused (A-2 Jalandhar Kol), had been convicted by the Special Judge and the Madhya Pradesh High Court for kidnapping (s 366 IPC), gang-rape (s 376(2)(g) IPC), wrongful confinement (s 342 IPC) and, for A-1 alone, an additional conviction under s 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. The Supreme Court upheld the IPC convictions but set aside the conviction under the 1989 Act, modifying the life sentence for gang-rape to 10 years, harmonising it with the sentence of the co-accused.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• IPC Offences: Convictions under Sections 366, 342 and 376(2)(g) were affirmed on the basis of the sole, credible testimony of the prosecutrix (PW-1).
• Section 3(2)(v) 1989 Act: Conviction was quashed for want of evidence that the crime was committed on the ground of the victim’s caste identity, in line with the interpretive approach distilled in Patan Jamal Vali v. State of A.P.
• Sentence: Life imprisonment for gang-rape reduced to 10 years to align with A-2’s sentence; other sentences and fines retained; all sentences to run concurrently.
• Two-Finger Test: Court condemns the persistence of the obsolete “two-finger” test, reiterating earlier directions in Lillu and Shailendra Kumar Rai.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Evidence of Sole Prosecutrix – State of Rajasthan v. N.K. (2000), Rameshwar (1951), Chandraprakash Kewal Chand Jain (1990), and Gurmit Singh (1996) collectively establish that reliable testimony of a rape survivor needs no corroboration. The Court relied on these to uphold the IPC convictions.
2. Gang-Rape Liability – Pramod Mahto (1989) and Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2003) confirm that once common intention is shown under s 376(2)(g), proof of completed sexual act by each accused is unnecessary. The Court applied this to reject arguments that FIR silence on Raju’s penetrative act exculpated him.
3. Section 3(2)(v) Interpretation – Earlier restrictive readings in Dinesh alias Buddha (2006), Asharfi (2018) and Khuman Singh (2020) required evidence that the offence was committed because of the victim’s caste. Patan Jamal Vali (2021) reframed the test: caste must be a (not necessarily the sole) ground. The Court adopted this broader lens but still found no evidence even to that standard.
4. Two-Finger Test – Lillu alias Rajesh (2013) and Shailendra Kumar Rai (2022) outlawed the test; reliance here served only as an admonitory reminder.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Credibility of PW-1: Minor contradictions between FIR, subsequent complaint and deposition did not erode core assertions: forceful abduction, confinement and repeated sexual assault by both accused. The Court emphasised that absence of external injuries or negative forensic findings cannot overshadow consistent ocular evidence.

(b) Section 376(2)(g) – Existence of Common Intention: The choreography of events (joint abduction, transport on motorcycle, shared custody, sequential assaults) demonstrated a concerted plan. Under Explanation 1 to s 376(2)(g), liability attaches to each participant irrespective of individual penetrative acts.

(c) Presumption of No Consent – Section 114A, Evidence Act: Once sexual intercourse is proved and the survivor denies consent, the law mandates a presumption against consent. Defence suggestions of a prior affair with A-2 failed to rebut this presumption, especially in a context of gang-rape where consent to multiple assailants is legally implausible.

(d) Failure of Section 3(2)(v) Charge: The record lacked any indication that caste animus motivated the crime. Mere knowledge that the prosecutrix belonged to an SC community, without proof that caste identity prompted the assault, is insufficient even after the broadened ratio of Patan Jamal Vali. Conviction was therefore unsustainable.

(e) Sentencing Parity: Disparity between A-1’s life sentence and A-2’s 10-year term (for identical IPC counts) was rationalised by the overturning of the SC/ST Act charge. The Court invoked sentencing proportionality, reducing A-1’s term to maintain parity.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Clarificatory Precedent on s 3(2)(v): Reaffirms that prosecution must still establish a nexus between the offence and caste identity, even post-Patan Jamal Vali. Proves the section is not a strict-liability add-on; careful pleading and proof remain essential.
• Sentencing Guidance: Signals that where identical joint IPC offences are proved but SC/ST charge fails, sentences should not exceed the co-accused’s absent special reasons.
• Two-Finger Test Final Nail: The Court’s reiteration, though related to a 2004 examination, further delegitimises the practice and places renewed onus on forensic and medical authorities.
• Gang-Rape Litigation: Strengthens prosecutorial reliance on common-intention doctrine to secure convictions even when survivor/victim cannot narrate distinct acts by each assailant.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 3(2)(v) 1989 Act

Creates enhanced punishment when a non-SC/ST person commits a serious IPC offence because the victim is SC/ST. Proof requires showing that caste was at least one motivating factor, not merely incidental knowledge.

Section 376(2)(g) IPC (Gang-Rape)

A statutory form of joint liability. If two or more persons act with a shared intent to rape, each is guilty of gang-rape, even if only one physically rapes.

Section 114A Evidence Act

In rape trials, once intercourse is established and the survivor says she didn’t consent, the court must presume absence of consent. The accused must rebut this presumption with credible evidence.

Two-Finger Test

An invasive examination of vaginal laxity once used to opine on sexual habituation. Scientifically unsound, violative of dignity, and legally irrelevant. Categorically banned.

5. Conclusion

Raju @ Umakant cements two doctrinal pillars:

1. Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act is not automatically attracted to every grave offence against an SC/ST victim. Prosecutors must demonstrate that caste identity was a reason—however partial—for the crime. Absent such proof, courts must refuse to uphold the charge.
2. In gang-rape, once common intention is shown, the absence of detailed proof of penetrative acts by each participant is immaterial; collective criminality attaches to all.

The judgment also underscores a broader judicial resolve to extirpate archaic medical practices that stigmatise survivors. Practitioners, investigators and trial courts must adapt by:

• Gathering caste-motive evidence diligently whenever the 1989 Act is invoked;
• Framing charges and narrating facts to reflect the joint-intent requirement under s 376(2)(g);
• Ensuring survivor-centric medical protocols, unequivocally abandoning the “two-finger test”.

By harmonising statutory interpretation with victim-centred justice, the Supreme Court advances both doctrinal clarity and human dignity.