“Dynamic Statutory Reference” Doctrine: Bombay High Court Clarifies that IPC Offences in PMLA Schedule Automatically Map to Corresponding BNS Provisions

1. Introduction

On 8 July 2025, the Bombay High Court, in Nagani Akram Mohammad Shafi v. The Union of India & Anr., confronted a rarely-litigated but crucial question triggered by India’s sweeping criminal-law overhaul. With effect from 1 July 2024, the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) were repealed and replaced by the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The applicant, arrested for money-laundering, argued that because Parliament has not yet substituted the old IPC numbers in the Prevention of Money-laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) Schedule with the new BNS numbers, his prosecution was void.

Thus, within the apparently routine bail application lay a foundational issue: Do statutory references to repealed enactments perish with repeal, or do they live on by attaching themselves to the nearest modern counterpart? The Court’s affirmative answer in favour of continuity crystallises what this commentary calls the “Dynamic Statutory Reference” doctrine.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court dismissed the bail application in limine on the sole legal contention raised, holding that the PMLA prosecution was perfectly maintainable.
Relying on s. 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the Court held that any reference in an existing Central Act to a repealed statute must, unless a contrary intention appears, be construed as a reference to the re-enacted provision. Therefore, the IPC sections listed in the PMLA Schedule automatically stand substituted by the corresponding BNS sections.
The references in the PMLA Schedule constitute “legislation by reference”, not “legislation by incorporation”; they are dynamic and not frozen in time.
Accepting the applicant’s construction would create an absurd legislative vacuum, crippling the PMLA every time the underlying penal code is structurally amended.
Government notification dated 16 July 2024 (directing that all IPC/CrPC references be read as BNS/BNSS references) was treated as merely clarificatory; the true source of continuity is the General Clauses Act itself.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529 — Distinguished. This decision explains the difference between incorporation (static) and reference (dynamic). The defence tried to invoke it to claim “incorporation”; the Court held the PMLA Schedule is mere reference.
Collector Of Customs v. Nathella Sampathu Chetty, (1962) 3 SCR 786 — Cited for the principle that where an Act borrows another by reference only, later changes in the borrowed Act flow into the parent Act.
Insolvency & Bankruptcy Board of India v. Satyanarayan Bankatlal Malu, (2024) 5 SCR 1 — Relied upon for reaffirming Mahindra’s distinction but emphasising contextual intent.
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union Of India, (2022) 6 SCR 382 — Cited to stress the indispensability of the predicate offence to sustain a PMLA charge, thereby underscoring the need for a continuity-oriented interpretation.
K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173 — Quoted for the rule of avoiding absurd outcomes where two constructions are possible.
Rai Sahib Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1955) 2 SCR 225 — Used to delimit executive power and explain why the July 2024 notification is only explanatory, not legislative.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Justice Amit Borkar’s reasoning proceeds through the following logical steps:

Nature of the PMLA Schedule. It names IPC sections but does not reproduce their text. That is a classic case of legislation by reference.
Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act. Where one Central Act refers to another that is “repealed and re-enacted”, the reference pivots automatically to the new Act, “unless a different intention appears”.
No Contrary Intention. Neither the PMLA nor the BNS reveals any intent to sever money-laundering enforcement. The core offences (cheating, forgery, etc.) are preserved; only renumbered.
Purposive / Updating Construction. Accepting a frozen incorporation would paralyse the PMLA whenever Parliament recasts the penal code — an absurd result Parliament could not have intended.
Executive Notification. Even assuming arguendo that the July 2024 notification lacked full statutory force, the outcome is dictated by statute (General Clauses Act) itself; the notification merely reiterates what §8 already achieves.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

Continuity in Anti-Money-Laundering Enforcement. The ruling prevents a massive enforcement hiatus that could have been exploited between 1 July 2024 and eventual parliamentary amendment.
Template for Other Special Laws. Dozens of statutes (NDPS Act, Arms Act, UAPA, etc.) embed IPC/CrPC references. Those references will now, by judicial authority, seamlessly translate into BNS/BNSS equivalents.
Reduced Legislative Burden. Parliament need not hurriedly amend every cross-referencing statute; courts will supply the updating construction unless a statute expressly opts out.
Guidance to Investigative Agencies. ED, CBI, NIA, and State Police may proceed under existing special laws without fear that their cases will collapse on the ground of “Schedule obsolescence”.
Doctrinal Clarification. Reaffirms that “legislation by incorporation” is the exception; “reference” and §8 General Clauses Act is the rule, especially after full-scale code substitution.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Legislation by Reference	One law points to another without reproducing it. The pointer updates automatically when the target changes.
Legislation by Incorporation	One law lifts and embeds the exact words of another. The embed is frozen; later changes to the source law do not flow in.
Predicate / Scheduled Offence	The underlying crime that generates “proceeds of crime”. Under PMLA, laundering can be tried only if that underlying crime appears in the Schedule.
Section 8(1) – General Clauses Act, 1897	A default rule: statutory references to a repealed Act shall be read as references to the new Act that re-enacts it, absent contrary intention.
Updating Construction	Judicial approach that reads a continuing statute in light of current, not historical, circumstances to keep it effective.

5. Conclusion

“In view of the above discussion, offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 which correspond to offences listed in the PMLA Schedule, as erstwhile IPC provisions, are to be regarded as scheduled offences for the purposes of PMLA, 2002.” — Amit Borkar, J.

The Bombay High Court’s articulation of the “Dynamic Statutory Reference” doctrine decisively answers the transitional anxieties arising from India’s first major criminal code revamp in more than 150 years. By anchoring the answer in the well-entrenched s. 8 of the General Clauses Act and rejecting a rigid incorporation thesis, the Court preserves the operational integrity of the PMLA and, by extension, every other special statute linked to now-repealed codes. In doing so, the judgment:

Affirms continuity over disruption;
Respects legislative purpose over literal rigidity;
Provides immediate practical certainty to investigators, prosecutors, and accused alike;
Reiterates the constitutional boundaries between Parliament’s legislative supremacy and the Executive’s limited clarificatory role.

Unless overruled by the Supreme Court or reversed by Parliament through explicit contrary wording, Nagani Akram Mohammad Shafi will stand as the leading authority on how India’s statutes must be read in the era of BNS/BNSS — ensuring that the fight against money-laundering, and by implication other serious crimes, remains unbroken in the face of statutory evolution.