Introduction

This revisional judgment arises from a dismissal by the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Court-I, Calcutta, of an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), seeking directions to register an FIR and commence investigation into alleged hate speech by celebrated Bengali singer, Nachiketa Chakraborty. The petitioner, a secretary of an organisation, alleged that statements made by the artist at a live concert outraged the religious sentiments of followers of Lord Ram and attracted offences under Sections 153, 153A, 295A and 298 of the IPC.

The core dispute centers on territorial jurisdiction at the pre-cognizance stage: whether a Magistrate, upon an application under Section 156(3) CrPC, may direct police to register and investigate an offence in the absence of any demonstrated territorial nexus between the alleged offence and the police station within the Magistrate’s jurisdiction. The petitioner further invoked the Supreme Court’s directions on prompt action against hate speech (Shaheen Abdullah v. Union of India), and argued that the “Zero FIR” concept—now expressly codified in Section 173(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)—makes territorial objections immaterial at the FIR stage.

The High Court’s decision clarifies the distinct roles of: (i) police registration of a “Zero FIR” irrespective of territorial limits; and (ii) a Magistrate’s power to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC (now Section 175(3) BNSS), which remains territorially constrained. It also underscores the evidentiary threshold expected of complainants moving under Section 156(3): bare social media content without verifiable particulars of the alleged incident is not enough.

Summary of the Judgment

The Calcutta High Court dismissed the criminal revisional application and affirmed the Magistrate’s rejection of the petitioner’s Section 156(3) motion “for want of jurisdiction.” The Court held:

• A Magistrate’s power under Section 156(3) CrPC (corresponding to Section 175(3) BNSS) is territorially confined to ordering investigation by the officer-in-charge of a police station within the Magistrate’s jurisdiction. It does not extend beyond those territorial bounds.
• While Section 173(1) BNSS codifies “Zero FIR” and permits any police station to register a cognizable offence irrespective of where it occurred, that facilitation for police registration does not enlarge the Magistrate’s Section 156(3) power to direct investigation by a non-jurisdictional police station.
• In the present case, the petitioner failed to provide essential particulars—date, time, venue of the concert, or any proof of attendance—and the police inquiry reported that neither the accused resided within, nor had any concert or alleged hate speech occurred within, Shyampukur Police Station’s jurisdiction in the last three years. No other complaints or disturbances were reported.
• The Supreme Court’s directive in Shaheen Abdullah for suo motu police action against hate speech does not obviate the need for at least some specific information to locate the offence. With no identifiable incident linked to the jurisdiction, the Magistrate correctly declined to invoke Section 156(3).

Result: The revisional petition (CRR 4119 of 2023) was dismissed; the impugned order dated 04.08.2023 was upheld.

Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory Framework and the Court’s Synthesis

The Court placed the issue within a harmonised reading of the CrPC and the BNSS, acknowledging the BNSS’s codification of certain practices and its correspondence with prior CrPC provisions:

• Section 154 CrPC (FIR in cognizable cases): Mandates FIR registration for cognizable offences. The High Court notes that while Section 154 concerns registration, investigation and trial are subject to jurisdictional constraints by virtue of Sections 155–156 and Chapter XIII (jurisdiction of criminal courts).
• Section 156 CrPC (Police power to investigate) and Section 156(3) CrPC: Police may investigate cognizable offences that a court within the station’s local area would be competent to try. A Magistrate under Section 156(3) may order such investigation—but only within territorial limits. The BNSS counterpart is Section 175(3), which the Court explicitly connects to Section 156(3) CrPC.
• Section 173 BNSS (Information in cognizable cases): Expressly permits giving information of a cognizable offence to any police station “irrespective of the area where the offence is committed,” thereby codifying the practice of registering a Zero FIR and then transferring it to the competent police station.

The Court’s central synthesis is decisive: the “Zero FIR” policy under Section 173(1) BNSS ensures prompt police registration and early action, but it does not authorize a Magistrate to transcend territorial limits while exercising Section 156(3) power. Police flexibility in registration is not equivalent to judicial power to direct an investigation anywhere.

B. Precedents Cited: The Hate-Speech Mandate

The only judicial precedent directly cited is the Supreme Court’s order in Shaheen Abdullah v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 940 of 2022, order dated 28 April 2023). There, the Supreme Court directed States to ensure that police take immediate suo motu action to register cases when speech or conduct appears to attract offences such as Sections 153A, 153B, 295A, 505 IPC, even in the absence of a formal complaint.

The High Court acknowledges the directive but distinguishes its application in this case: the record here lacked specific, verifiable information tying the alleged speech to a particular time, place, or jurisdiction. The police inquiry reported no such event within the jurisdiction, and no resident complaints or breach of peace were recorded. Thus, the “suo motu action” directive does not automatically override the evidentiary deficit or the territorial limitations applicable to a Magistrate’s Section 156(3) jurisdiction.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Threshold deficiency in particulars: The petitioner relied largely on circulating social media content and did not provide essential particulars (date, time, venue) of the alleged concert or hate speech, nor any proof of attendance or first-hand knowledge. The police enquiry confirmed the absence of identifiable events within the Shyampukur PS jurisdiction and even in adjoining areas for three years.
2. Territorial jurisdiction is the pivot for Section 156(3): Section 156(1) CrPC itself ties police investigation to the local area of the station whose court can inquire into or try the offence. Section 156(3) adopts that same territorial premise for Magistrates ordering “such investigation.” The BNSS successor provision (Section 175(3)) is materially similar. Hence, in the absence of any territorial nexus, the Magistrate could not direct Shyampukur PS to register and investigate.
3. Zero FIR does not expand the Magistrate’s power: The Court expressly recognises Section 173(1) BNSS’s “Zero FIR” model—registration irrespective of area—followed by administrative transfer to the competent station. But this is a police-facing facilitation at the registration stage. It does not confer upon a Magistrate a power to issue Section 156(3) directions beyond territorial bounds.
4. Hate speech directions require actionable information: While acknowledging the seriousness of hate speech and the Supreme Court’s mandate for proactivity, the Court notes there was “no information regarding the alleged incident” to trigger such action. Mere social media circulation, bereft of time-place-actor specifics, cannot sustain a Section 156(3) direction.
5. No illegality in the Magistrate’s approach: The Magistrate prudently called for a police report, considered the enquiry results, and concluded there was no jurisdictional basis. The High Court found no illegality, infirmity, or perversity in that reasoning and dismissed the revision.

D. Impact and Significance

The decision is significant in at least four respects:

• Demarcation of roles post-BNSS: It is among the early High Court pronouncements that read BNSS Section 173(1)’s Zero FIR together with CrPC/BNSS provisions on investigation. It clarifies that statutory recognition of Zero FIR increases police accessibility and speed, but does not transform a Magistrate’s pre-cognizance powers into a borderless mandate.
• Guardrail against forum shopping: The ruling discourages the use of Section 156(3) applications to haul non-jurisdictional police stations into action based on generalized social media content. Complainants must identify a tangible territorial nexus or pursue appropriate police channels (including Zero FIR at any PS and escalation to the SP).
• Hate speech enforcement with procedural discipline: Even amid heightened sensitivity to hate speech, the Court insists on the minimum factual substrate (time, place, occurrence) and jurisdictional discipline. The Shaheen Abdullah mandate remains intact, but must be triggered by actionable information.
• Digital-era complaints: For online or widely shared content, complainants must secure authenticity and metadata wherever possible, and identify where the offence occurred (including where publication occurred or its effects were felt, depending on the offence) to ground jurisdiction. Absent that, Section 156(3) is an ill-suited route.

Complex Concepts Simplified

1) What is a “Zero FIR” and what does this judgment say about it?

A “Zero FIR” means a police station can register an FIR for a cognizable offence even if the offence did not occur within its territorial limits. The FIR is initially given the number “0” and then transferred to the appropriate police station with jurisdiction for investigation. BNSS Section 173(1) expressly codifies this practice (“irrespective of the area where the offence is committed”).

This judgment confirms that Zero FIR is a policing mechanism to prevent delay and preserve evidence. It does not mean a Magistrate may direct a non-jurisdictional police station to investigate under Section 156(3).

2) How is a Magistrate’s power under Section 156(3) territorially limited?

Section 156(3) CrPC lets a Magistrate order “such investigation” as contemplated by Section 156(1)—which in turn ties the investigation to a police station whose local court would have power to inquire into or try the offence. The BNSS equivalent is Section 175(3). In other words, the Magistrate cannot command an investigation by a police station wholly unconnected territorially to the offence.

3) Registration vs. Investigation vs. Trial—what’s the difference for jurisdiction?

• Registration (FIR): Under BNSS 173(1), information may be given at any police station (Zero FIR).
• Investigation: Conducted by the police station that has territorial jurisdiction over the offence; Magistrate’s Section 156(3) power is confined accordingly.
• Trial: Conducted by the court with jurisdiction as per the Code (e.g., where the offence was committed or other statutorily recognised venues).

4) What is required to succeed under Section 156(3)?

Although not exhaustively set out in this judgment, the ruling illustrates minimum expectations: specific, verifiable particulars (time, place, conduct) and a territorial nexus with the police station sought to be directed. Bare assertions sourced to social media, without authentication or locating particulars, are inadequate.

5) What about the Supreme Court’s direction on hate speech?

In Shaheen Abdullah, the Supreme Court directed police to act suo motu and register cases when hate speech offences appear to be committed. This is a policing directive and presupposes some ascertainable occurrence. It does not allow courts to dispense with jurisdictional or factual basics in Section 156(3) proceedings.

Practical Guidance and Procedural Pathways

• Preserve and particularise: If relying on a video clip or online post, preserve the source, URL, date and time stamps, metadata if accessible, and any witnesses. Identify where the event took place (venue, city, district) and when. These particulars are crucial to establish jurisdiction and prima facie occurrence.
• Use Zero FIR appropriately: Approach any nearby police station for prompt registration if you lack clarity on territorial jurisdiction. The station should register a Zero FIR and transfer it to the competent station.
• Escalate under the statute: If an officer-in-charge refuses to register, send the information to the Superintendent of Police (CrPC Section 154(3) / BNSS Section 173(4)). This route is specifically contemplated by the Codes.
• Section 156(3) is not a cure-all: A Magistrate can only direct investigation within territorial bounds. If the alleged offence clearly occurred elsewhere, seek registration and investigation in the correct police station or via Zero FIR, rather than pressing a non-jurisdictional Magistrate.
• Alternative remedy: Where police inaction persists but particulars are available, a private complaint (pre-cognizance) before the competent Magistrate is another pathway for judicial action, subject to the statutory requirements of the applicable Code.

Conclusion

The Calcutta High Court’s decision in Anirban Bhattacharya supplies a timely and clear doctrinal message for the BNSS era: the statutory enshrinement of Zero FIR in Section 173(1) enhances police responsiveness, but it does not expand a Magistrate’s territorial jurisdiction under Section 156(3) CrPC / Section 175(3) BNSS. A Section 156(3) application continues to demand a demonstrable territorial nexus and a credible, minimally particularised account of the alleged offence.

In the sensitive domain of hate-speech enforcement, the Court preserves the balance between responsiveness and legal discipline: proactive policing must be grounded in actionable information; judicial directions must respect the jurisdictional architecture of criminal procedure. The key takeaways are:

• Zero FIR is a registration tool for police, not a jurisdictional bridge for courts.
• Section 156(3) remains territorially confined; forum shopping is impermissible.
• Social-media-sourced allegations must be anchored in specifics to cross the prima facie threshold.
• Supreme Court’s hate-speech directives encourage prompt action, but do not dilute foundational procedural requirements.

As a precedent, the ruling will likely guide lower courts and litigants navigating the interface of online speech, communal harmony offences, and the procedural innovations of the BNSS. Its insistence on jurisdictional fidelity and evidentiary rigor is a salutary check against both inertia and overreach.