Written Complaint as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite, Sexual Nexus for “Hostile Work Environment,” and Natural Justice in PoSH Inquiries: Kerala High Court in XXXXXX v. Abraham Mathai (2025 KER 57427)

Written Complaint as a Jurisdictional Prerequisite, Sexual Nexus for “Hostile Work Environment,” and Natural Justice in PoSH Inquiries: Kerala High Court in XXXXXX v. Abraham Mathai (2025 KER 57427)

Court: High Court of Kerala (Division Bench)

Bench: Raja Vijayaraghavan V, J. and K.V. Jayakumar, J.

Date: 1 August 2025

Citation: 2025:KER:57427 | W.A. No. 1622 of 2025


Introduction

This Division Bench decision affirms and sharpens the procedural and substantive boundaries of the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (the “PoSH Act”). The appellant, a former Accountant-cum-Manager of Amstor Information Technology (India) Pvt. Ltd., challenged a Single Judge’s judgment that had quashed: (a) a report of the Local Committee (LC) constituted under the PoSH Act, and (b) a consequential letter issued by the District Collector enforcing the report’s directions. The writ petitioner before the Single Judge was the Managing Director of the company (the first respondent in appeal).

The case arose against a backdrop of termination, a pending labour dispute, and an anonymous complaint forwarded by the District Collector to the Local Committee. Central questions included: whether a PoSH inquiry can proceed without a written complaint by the aggrieved woman (or compliant invocation of Rule 6 exceptions), whether allegations not linked to sexual conduct can sustain a finding of sexual harassment on the rubric of a “hostile work environment,” whether the LC adhered to principles of natural justice, and whether the High Court could intervene under Article 226 despite an alternative statutory remedy.


Summary of the Judgment

  • Appeal dismissed. The Division Bench upheld the Single Judge’s decision quashing the LC’s report dated 22.08.2018 and the District Collector’s letter dated 19.09.2018.
  • Written complaint is mandatory. In the absence of a written complaint by the aggrieved woman as required by Section 9 of the PoSH Act—and without satisfying Rule 6 exceptions—the LC lacked the legal foundation to conduct an inquiry. Oral statements could not substitute the statutory requirement, particularly where the appellant disowned the complaint forwarded to the LC.
  • Sexual nexus is essential. The allegations, as recorded by the LC itself, did not disclose unwelcome acts or conduct of a sexual nature under Section 2(n). A “hostile work environment” under Section 3(2)(iv) must be connected to sexual conduct; mere workplace hostility tied to employment disputes is not sexual harassment.
  • Natural justice violated. The LC recorded witness statements over telephone, did not afford the respondent an opportunity to cross-examine, and proceeded ex parte on critical material—contravening Rule 7(4)’s mandate to follow principles of natural justice.
  • Writ jurisdiction sustained. Despite alternative remedies under the PoSH framework, the High Court rightly intervened under Article 226 because the LC acted in contravention of statutory provisions and in gross violation of natural justice—an established exception to the rule of alternate remedy.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • Prasad Pannian v. Central University of Kerala (2020 SCC OnLine KER 6550)
    • Held that Section 2(n) lists instances but the essence is an act/behaviour of a sexual nature; Section 3(2) aggravating circumstances count as sexual harassment only when connected to sexual conduct.
    • Application in present case: The Bench applied this to hold that allegations of workplace hostility and termination, absent sexually tinged conduct, do not meet the statute’s threshold. The LC’s conclusion of sexual harassment was ultra vires.
  • Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [(1978) 1 SCC 248]; Mohinder Singh Gill v. CEC [(1978) 1 SCC 405]; D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Ltd. [(1993) 3 SCC 259]; State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Dei [AIR 1967 SC 1269]
    • These decisions enshrine that decisions impacting civil consequences must conform to natural justice (notice, hearing, and fair opportunity to meet the case). Cross-examination, where testimonial evidence is relied upon, is often integral.
    • Application: Telephonic recording of witness statements without affording the respondent an opportunity to cross-examine violated natural justice and Rule 7(4).
  • South Indian Bank Ltd. v. Naveen Mathew Philip [2023 INSC 379] with Whirlpool [(1998) 8 SCC 1] and Harbanslal Sahnia [(2003) 2 SCC 107]
    • Reaffirms that alternative remedies do not bar writ jurisdiction where (i) fundamental rights are at stake, (ii) natural justice is violated, or (iii) proceedings are without jurisdiction or challenge vires.
    • Application: The Division Bench endorsed the Single Judge’s writ intervention because the LC acted beyond jurisdiction and in violation of natural justice.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

2.1 Written Complaint: A Jurisdictional Gatekeeper under Section 9

Section 9(1) mandates a written complaint by the aggrieved woman to the Internal Committee (IC) or the Local Committee (LC). The proviso allows assistance in reducing an oral complaint to writing; and Rule 6 permits representatives to file in narrowly defined circumstances (physical/mental incapacity, death, or “other reason”)—always tethered to written consent where required.

On facts, the appellant conceded she had not filed a written complaint and even distanced herself from the complaint that reached the Collector. She simultaneously had the capacity to complain elsewhere (police, Women’s Commission, Labour Court), undercutting any plea of inability. The LC’s proceedings therefore lacked a statutory trigger; oral statements recorded after disowning the original complaint could not cure this jurisdictional defect.

2.2 Sexual Nexus: “Hostile Work Environment” Requires Sexual Conduct

The LC’s findings leaned on rumours allegedly spread to discredit the appellant and on abusive, sexist language in the office. The appellant expressly stated that the respondent “had not touched her or asked her for sexual favours” and was “not sure whether there was any sexual harassment.” The Bench applied Prasad Pannian: Section 3(2) clauses (e.g., interference with work, hostile environment) qualify as sexual harassment only if they connect to conduct “of a sexual nature” in Section 2(n). The Court held the allegations, viewed as part of a labour dispute culminating in termination (for which the appellant already obtained a Labour Court award), did not disclose such a sexual nexus.

2.3 Natural Justice: Fair Hearing and Cross-Examination in PoSH Inquiries

Rule 7(4) obligates the Committee to conduct inquiries “in accordance with the principles of natural justice.” Here, the LC recorded witness statements telephonically and did not afford the respondent an opportunity to cross-examine or otherwise meaningfully contest the testimony. Drawing on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on civil consequences and fair procedure, the Bench found the inquiry fatally flawed. While PoSH proceedings are intentionally less formal and Rule 7(6) bars legal practitioners, they must still be fair, especially when testimonial evidence informs punitive outcomes or reputational consequences.

2.4 Article 226 Despite Alternative Remedy

Relying on South Indian Bank, Whirlpool, and Harbanslal, the Bench reiterated that writ intervention is appropriate where proceedings are without jurisdiction and violate natural justice. Both defects were present: no valid written complaint to invoke jurisdiction, and a procedurally unfair inquiry.

2.5 The Undecided Constitutional Question: Rule 7(6)

The writ petition had also challenged the constitutional validity of Rule 7(6) (bar on legal practitioners). The Single Judge granted relief on other grounds and the Division Bench did not revisit or decide the constitutional issue. The bar on legal practitioners thus remains in place; its constitutionality awaits another day.

3) Impact and Prospective Significance

  • Bright-line procedural threshold. Committees must ensure there is a written complaint from the aggrieved woman or a Rule 6-compliant substitute with requisite written consent and reasons. Anonymous or third-party complaints cannot be acted upon unless they meet Section 9 read with Rule 6.
  • Substantive clarity on “hostile work environment.” Mere workplace hostility or employment-related grievances will not qualify as sexual harassment unless tethered to conduct “of a sexual nature.” This alignment protects the integrity of PoSH mechanisms while discouraging their use as proxies for labour disputes.
  • Procedural fairness is non-negotiable. Even within PoSH’s summary framework, Committees must ensure fair play—sharing material, allowing responses, and providing opportunities to contest and, where appropriate, to cross-examine witnesses whose statements are relied upon.
  • Writ courts will intervene early in egregious cases. High Courts can and will exercise Article 226 jurisdiction to correct inquiries conducted without jurisdiction or in breach of natural justice, despite statutory remedies.
  • Compliance culture and training. Employers must recalibrate PoSH compliance—IC/LC Chairs and members require training on jurisdictional prerequisites, evidence handling, and natural justice obligations to avoid quashment and institutional liability.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • PoSH Act Committees:
    • Internal Committee (IC): Set up by every employer at the workplace.
    • Local Committee (LC): Constituted by the District Officer to receive complaints where the workplace has no IC or when the respondent is the employer.
  • Section 2(n) – “Sexual harassment”: Any unwelcome act or behaviour of a sexual nature, including physical advances, request for sexual favours, sexually coloured remarks, showing pornography, or any other sexual conduct (verbal/non-verbal/physical).
  • Section 3(2) – “Hostile work environment” and other circumstances: Interference with work, threats to employment status, preferential treatment promises, etc., may amount to sexual harassment only if connected to conduct of a sexual nature under Section 2(n).
  • Section 9 and Rule 6 – Complaint mechanics:
    • General rule: The aggrieved woman must file a written complaint within 3 months (extendable by another 3 months with reasons).
    • Exceptions: Where she is unable (physical/mental incapacity, death, or other reasons), specified persons may file, often requiring her written consent or the legal heir’s consent.
  • Rule 7 – Inquiry and natural justice: The LC/IC must conduct inquiries fairly—provide copies of the complaint, allow replies and evidence, and adhere to natural justice. Although lawyers are barred by Rule 7(6), committees must still ensure fairness, which can include permitting cross-examination or equivalent procedures when testimonial evidence is decisive.
  • Natural justice: Core procedural fairness principles—notice of the case, an opportunity to respond, an unbiased tribunal, and in appropriate cases, the chance to test adverse evidence (e.g., via cross-examination).
  • Alternative remedy vs. writ jurisdiction: Courts ordinarily require parties to use statutory remedies first, but will step in under Article 226 for violations of fundamental rights, natural justice breaches, lack of jurisdiction, or vires challenges.

Practical Guidance Arising from the Decision

  • For LCs/ICs:
    • Do not commence an inquiry without confirming a compliant written complaint under Section 9/Rule 6.
    • Where a woman appears orally, assist her in reducing the complaint to writing, obtain signatures, and record reasons for delay, if any.
    • Disclose material to the respondent and allow a meaningful response; document hearings and ensure a fair process.
    • When relying on witness testimony, avoid ex parte telephone statements; provide opportunities to question or test credibility consistent with natural justice.
  • For Employers:
    • Constitute a compliant Internal Committee promptly and train members on jurisdiction, evidence, confidentiality, and fairness.
    • Differentiate PoSH issues from general HR/labour disputes; refer matters appropriately to avoid conflation and legal invalidation.
  • For Complainants:
    • File a written complaint or avail Rule 6 mechanisms if personally unable; maintain clarity on dates, incidents, and the sexual nature of conduct.
    • Remember that abusive behaviour unconnected to sexual conduct may be actionable under labour or other laws, though not necessarily under PoSH.
  • For Respondents:
    • Insist on access to the complaint and evidence; seek opportunities to rebut and cross-examine where witness testimony is relied on.
    • Writ remedies remain open in cases of jurisdictional defect or grave procedural unfairness.

Key Passages from the Record

The LC’s own extract recorded that the appellant “said the respondent had not touched her or asked her for sexual favours, and was not sure whether there was any sexual harassment in the case.” The Bench treated this admission—combined with the absence of a written complaint and the labour-dispute context—as fatal to the LC’s jurisdiction and conclusions.


Conclusion

This judgment crystallizes three interlocking principles for PoSH jurisprudence in Kerala with wider persuasive value:

  1. Jurisdictional trigger: A written complaint by the aggrieved woman is a sine qua non for a PoSH inquiry, unless Rule 6’s narrow exceptions apply with requisite written consent and reasons. Anonymous or third-party complaints cannot be actioned otherwise.
  2. Substantive nexus: “Hostile work environment” and other Section 3(2) eventualities count as sexual harassment only when connected to conduct “of a sexual nature” under Section 2(n). Workplace disputes without a sexual element fall outside PoSH.
  3. Procedural fairness: Even in an informal, non-adversarial PoSH setting, natural justice remains binding. Reliance on witness testimony without disclosure and a fair chance to contest (including, where appropriate, cross-examination) vitiates the inquiry.

By dismissing the appeal and upholding the quashment of the LC’s report and the Collector’s directive, the Court reinforces both the protective purpose of the PoSH Act and the procedural guardrails that lend it legitimacy. The ruling promotes clarity for committees, employers, and litigants alike, ensuring that genuine cases are handled with rigour while preventing the statutory process from being stretched beyond its intended scope.


Case Metadata

  • Case Title: XXXXXX v. Abraham Mathai
  • Citation: 2025:KER:57427
  • Case No.: W.A. No. 1622 of 2025 (arising out of W.P.(C) No. 39915 of 2018)
  • Disposition: Writ Appeal dismissed; LC report and Collector’s communication quashed (as upheld).

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Kerala High Court

Judge(s)

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE RAJA VIJAYARAGHAVAN VHONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K. V. JAYAKUMAR

Advocates

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