Withholding Salary for Work Actually Performed Amounts to Unconstitutional “Begar” under Article 23: A Commentary on Shri Anil s/o Mallappa Kanawade v. State of Karnataka

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1. Introduction

1.1. Parties and Context

The writ petition in Shri Anil s/o Mallappa Kanawade & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors. arises from a service and constitutional law dispute involving four school teachers employed in a grant-in-aid private school and the State education authorities.

• Petitioners: Four teachers (Assistant Teachers and a Physical Education Teacher) working in Shri Deshbhushan High School, Kothali Kuppanwadi, a grant‑in‑aid institution (respondent no. 5).
• Respondents:
  • The State of Karnataka (Department of Primary and Secondary Education) and its field-level officers – Additional Commissioner, Deputy Director of Public Instruction (DDPI), and Block Education Officer (BEO) (respondent nos. 1–4).
  • The grant‑in‑aid school, Shri Deshbhushan High School (respondent no. 5).

The State had granted permission to fill vacancies in the fifth respondent-school. The petitioners were duly appointed with the concurrence of the Government and have been continuously discharging their duties since 2023.

The core grievance is stark: despite working without break, the petitioners were denied salary from May 2024 onwards (for nearly 19 months by the time of judgment). The State justified the non‑payment on the ground that several writ proceedings concerning the validity of their appointments were pending.

1.2. Relief Sought

In this fourth round of litigation, the petitioners sought primarily:

• A writ of mandamus directing respondent nos. 2 to 5 to release their monthly salaries from May 2024 till the date of petition; and
• Such other appropriate reliefs as the Court deemed fit.

Unlike the previous writ petitions, which challenged orders withholding salary or cancelling appointments, the present petition was focused only on the release of salary for the period during which the petitioners admittedly worked.

1.3. The Central Constitutional Issue

The judgment is significant because the Court anchors the right to salary for work actually performed in Article 23 of the Constitution of India, which prohibits “traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour.”

The Court goes beyond conventional service law reasoning and holds that:

• Compelling teachers to work without wages for nearly 19 months constitutes “begar” and forced labour in violation of Article 23; and
• The State, by withholding salary despite taking the benefit of their labour, is effectively practising begar.

This constitutionalisation of a wage dispute, grounded explicitly in Article 23, is the key doctrinal contribution of the decision.

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2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1. Procedural Background

The matter comes after a complex sequence of proceedings:

1. Appointment process:
   • On 29.09.2022, respondent no. 2 (Additional Commissioner) permitted filling up of vacant posts in the fifth respondent-school.
   • The petitioners were selected and appointed as Assistant Teachers/Physical Education Teacher by order dated 24.03.2023 with governmental concurrence; salaries were fixed accordingly.
2. First writ petition (W.P. No. 104223/2024):
   • On 16.05.2024, the State issued a communication withholding the petitioners’ salaries with immediate effect, without prior notice and without any challenge to their appointment.
   • A co‑ordinate bench stayed this communication on 23.07.2024, holding that the salary could not be withheld in such manner.
3. Second writ petition (W.P. No. 105048/2024):
   • After the first interim order, the authorities issued a show cause notice proposing cancellation of appointments.
   • The petitioners challenged this in W.P. No. 105048/2024; on 28.08.2024 another co‑ordinate bench ordered that the respondents shall not “precipitate” the matter in pursuance of the show cause notice, and directed the petitioners to file objections.
4. Statutory appeal and third writ petition (W.P. No. 100863/2025):
   • Despite the interim protection, on 12.09.2024 respondent no. 2 cancelled the petitioners’ appointments and directed their relief from service.
   • The petitioners filed an appeal under Section 131 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983. The Appellate Authority set aside the cancellation and remanded the matter for fresh consideration.
   • On remand, respondent no. 2 again passed an order cancelling the appointments.
   • This second cancellation was challenged in W.P. No. 100863/2025, where, on 10.02.2025, the High Court granted an interim order of status quo qua the appointment.
5. Fourth writ petition (present case – W.P. No. 104367/2025):
   • Throughout these proceedings, the petitioners continued to work, initially under their appointment orders and thereafter under successive interim orders.
   • Yet, no salary was paid from May 2024 onwards, for nearly 19 months.
   • The present petition therefore sought a mandamus for release of salary alone.

2.2. Findings

The Court’s core findings are:

• It is undisputed that:
  • The petitioners have been working continuously from May 2024 till the date of judgment.
  • They have been marking attendance (the muster roll was placed on record).
  • No salary has been paid during this period.
• The State’s only defence is the pendency of writ proceedings concerning their appointments, not any assertion that they did not work or that their services were not utilised.
• Compelling the petitioners to work without wages for nearly 19 months amounts to “begar” and forced labour prohibited by Article 23 of the Constitution.
• The liability to pay salary for work taken from these teachers “squarely rests upon the State” and is “beyond contest.”
• Withholding salary on the sole ground that litigation is pending is “wholly untenable and bereft of any legal justification.”

2.3. Operative Directions

The Court consequently:

1. Allowed the writ petition.
2. Issued a writ of mandamus to respondent no. 2 to release the salaries of the petitioners from May 2024 till the date of judgment, on or before 04.12.2025.
3. Noted a memo of calculation indicating arrears of ₹12,44,386/‑ per petitioner for the period in question.
4. Though critical of the State’s conduct, the Court refrained from imposing exemplary costs, but:
   • Directed that if salaries are not released by 04.12.2025, the petitioners shall be entitled to litigation costs of ₹25,000/‑ each.

The appointment cancellations themselves remain sub judice in the other writ petition; this judgment is confined to the right to salary for work already rendered.

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3. Analysis

3.1. The Narrow Issue Framed Against a Complex Litigation Background

The Court carefully isolates the issue in the present writ petition from the larger and still‑pending disputes over the validity of the petitioners’ appointments. While acknowledging that:

• Show cause notices were issued;
• Cancellation orders were passed twice by respondent no. 2; and
• Appeal and multiple writ petitions are pending questioning those cancellations,

the Court chooses not to enter into the merits of appointment validity here. Instead, it focuses solely on an admitted factual matrix:

• The petitioners continued to work;
• The State and school took the benefit of their services; and
• No salary was paid for nearly 19 months.

By divorcing the wage issue from the appointment dispute, the Court underscores a key principle: regardless of any pending challenge to appointment, where the State takes benefit of labour, it cannot deny wages for that period.

3.2. Precedent Relied Upon: People’s Union FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS v. UNION OF India

The judgment centrally relies on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in People’s Union FOR DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS v. UNION OF India, (1982) 3 SCC 235 (“PUDR”). That decision interpreted Article 23 expansively to outlaw not only traditional bonded labour, but all forms of “forced labour,” whether or not any remuneration is paid.

3.2.1. Article 23: Scope and Nature

Article 23 provides:

“Traffic in human beings and begar and other similar forms of forced labour are prohibited and any contravention of this provision shall be an offence punishable in accordance with law.”

The Supreme Court in PUDR held that:

• Article 23 is horizontally applicable: it protects individuals not only against the State but also against private persons who practise forced labour.
• The provision is “all pervasive in its range” and intended to abolish every form of forced labour.
• “Begar” (a term of Indian origin) signifies labour or service which a person is compelled to give without any remuneration.
• However, Article 23 is not confined to situations where there is no remuneration. It extends to all “other similar forms of forced labour,” including work done for less than the minimum wage.

The Supreme Court held that where a person works for less than minimum wages, driven by economic compulsion, such labour constitutes “forced labour” within Article 23, even if some payment is made.

3.2.2. Key Principles from PUDR Applied in the Present Case

From the extensive extract reproduced in the High Court’s judgment, several doctrinal points are noteworthy:

• Broad meaning of “force”: “Force” includes not only physical or legal compulsion, but also economic compulsion arising from poverty, hunger, and lack of alternative employment.
• Every form of forced labour prohibited: Article 23 is intended to abolish “every form of forced labour,” whether the labour arises:
  • From a statute,
  • From coercion, or
  • Even from a contract voluntarily entered into but effectively rendered involuntary by economic circumstances.
• Forced labour even where contract exists: Even if an employee contractually agrees to provide labour, he cannot be legally compelled to work; enforcement of specific performance of a contract of labour would violate Article 23.
• Sub-minimum wages as forced labour: If remuneration is below minimum wage, that in itself can amount to forced labour because the worker is deprived of meaningful choice.
• Positive remedial dimension: A worker paid less than minimum wage can invoke Article 23 to seek payment of the minimum wage as a remedy to end the forced labour.

The High Court draws on this last point in particular: just as a worker underpaid below minimum wages can ask the Court to direct payment of lawful wages, a worker unpaid altogether can legitimately seek a mandamus directing payment of full salary for work done.

3.3. Application of Article 23 to Non‑Payment of Teachers’ Salaries

3.3.1. Characterisation as “Begar” and Forced Labour

Justice Nagaprasanna’s reasoning turns on a powerful normative assertion. After recapitulating the uncontroverted fact that the petitioners have been working without salary for nearly 19 months, the Court states:

“To force these teachers or indeed any employee, to toil without wages strikes at the very heart of human dignity and stands in stark violation of Article 23 of the Constitution of India, which proscribes begar in all its forms.”

Later, after discussing PUDR, the Court explicitly concludes:

“The State has practised begar by non‑payment of salary to these petitioners for over 19 months, as the teachers have been made to work without salary.”

This is a crucial step: the Court does not treat the matter as a mere breach of service conditions or statutory rules; it frames the non‑payment of salary as a constitutional wrong engaging Article 23.

3.3.2. Why the State’s Defence Fails

The State’s principal argument was that salaries were withheld because:

• Writ petitions regarding the validity of the petitioners’ appointments were pending; and
• Cancellation orders had been passed (though kept in abeyance or under challenge).

The Court finds this defence wholly unacceptable for several reasons:

1. Undisputed work performed: There is no dispute, even from the State, that:
   • The petitioners have been working;
   • They have been marking attendance; and
   • The school has taken benefit of their services.
2. No legal basis for withholding pay while extracting labour: Even if the State doubts the validity of the appointments, it:
   • Cannot allow the petitioners to continue to work and then deny salary on the plea of pending litigation; if appointments were invalid, the lawful course would be to relieve them in accordance with law.
3. Violation of Article 23 is independent of appointment validity: The constitutional wrong lies in the extraction of labour without pay, not in the dispute over the source of appointment. So long as the State:
   • Accepts their services; and
   • Benefits from their work in public education,
   it cannot constitutionally justify non‑payment of wages.

Thus, the pendency of writ petitions and appeals cannot legitimise what, in effect, is forced, unpaid labour.

3.4. From Contractual Right to Constitutional Guarantee

Traditionally, salary disputes of government employees or aided‑school teachers are treated within the framework of:

• Service rules,
• Statutory entitlements, and
• Contractual obligations between employer and employee.

This judgment innovatively relocates the issue within the fundamental rights framework, emphasising:

• The dignity of labour;
• The broader socio‑economic objective underlying Article 23; and
• The Court’s duty to “expand the reach and ambit of fundamental rights” rather than attenuate them (echoing Maneka Gandhi as cited in PUDR).

By invoking Article 23 to protect teachers from unpaid work, the Court:

1. Transforms a wage dispute into a question of human dignity and freedom from exploitation;
2. Signals that the State’s financial or administrative difficulties cannot override fundamental rights; and
3. Reinforces that forced labour can occur even in standard employment relationships, not just in the context of classical bonded labour.

3.5. The Remedy: Mandamus, Limited Costs, and Conditionality

The Court grants a writ of mandamus directing the Additional Commissioner (respondent no. 2) to release the entire arrears of salary by a fixed date (04.12.2025). This is a clear instance of the Court using its constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 to:

• Enforce a fundamental right (Article 23); and
• Compel performance of a public duty (release of wages in a grant‑in‑aid school).

Notably:

• The Court refrains from awarding exemplary damages despite observing that the petitioners were forced to repeatedly approach the Court due to unlawful actions of respondent no. 2.
• Instead, it adopts a calibrated approach by:
  • Recording that petitioners are “entitled to, at the least, the cost of litigation,” and
  • Making such costs (₹25,000/‑ per petitioner) conditional – payable only if the State fails to release salaries by the stipulated date.

This conditional cost order functions as both:

• A compliance incentive for the State; and
• A signal of judicial displeasure at the repeated illegal actions which necessitated four rounds of litigation.

3.6. Relationship with Statutory Remedies under the Karnataka Education Act

The Court notes that the petitioners did avail of a statutory appeal under Section 131 of the Karnataka Education Act, 1983 against cancellation of their appointments. The Appellate Authority set aside the cancellation and remanded the matter. Yet, on remand, cancellation orders were repeatedly passed by respondent no. 2, and further writ proceedings ensued.

The Court’s approach here underscores two points:

1. Exhaustion of statutory remedies is not an absolute barrier to a writ petition where a fundamental right is at stake, especially when:
   • The wrong complained of (unpaid labour) is ongoing; and
   • The statutory forum does not provide an immediate or adequate remedy for wage arrears.
2. The high court distinguishes between:
   • The validity of appointments (being addressed in the statutory appeal and other writs), and
   • The right to wages for work actually done (addressed in the present writ by invoking Article 23 and the writ of mandamus).

This dual‑track approach preserves the autonomy of the statutory regime while ensuring that fundamental rights violations are not left unremedied.

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4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1. What is “Begar”?

“Begar” is a term of Indian origin that has been incorporated into English legal vocabulary. In simple terms:

• Begar means a situation where a person is forced to work without receiving any payment.

Historically, it referred to compulsory unpaid labour imposed by feudal landlords or authorities. The Constitution explicitly prohibits begar because it is fundamentally inconsistent with human dignity and a free democratic society.

4.2. What is “Forced Labour” under Article 23?

“Forced labour” is any labour or service that a person is compelled to provide against his will. According to the Supreme Court in PUDR, this includes:

• Labour extracted by physical force (e.g., threats or violence);
• Labour compelled by law (e.g., imprisonment for refusing to work);
• Labour compelled by economic circumstances (e.g., extreme poverty leaving no real choice but to accept unfair terms); and
• Labour where remuneration is less than minimum wages or, as in this case, no remuneration at all.

In the present case, the Court holds that making teachers work without salary for nearly 19 months is forced labour, and since they receive no pay, it is also a classic instance of begar.

4.3. What is a Writ of Mandamus?

A writ of mandamus is an order issued by a High Court or the Supreme Court directing a:

• Public authority; or
• Body performing a public function

to perform a duty imposed on it by law. It is a command to “do your duty.”

In this case, the Additional Commissioner (respondent no. 2) had a duty to release salary for work already performed by teachers in an aided school. The Court therefore issued mandamus compelling the officer to release arrears of salary.

4.4. What are Interim Orders – “Stay” and “Status Quo”?

• Stay order: Temporarily suspends the operation of an impugned order. In the first writ petition, the High Court stayed the communication withholding salaries.
• Status quo order: Directs parties to maintain the existing state of affairs. In the third writ petition, the Court ordered “status quo qua the appointment,” meaning the petitioners should continue in the same position in service as they were on that date.

Despite these interim protections, the salary was not released, leading to the present writ.

4.5. What is a Grant‑in‑Aid Institution?

A grant‑in‑aid school is a privately managed institution that receives financial assistance (including salary grants for approved posts) from the Government. Here:

• The fifth respondent is such an institution; and
• Once teachers are appointed with governmental concurrence against aided posts, the State bears the salary liability.

Hence, the Court states that the liability to pay salary “squarely rests upon the State.”

4.6. Section 131 Appeal under the Karnataka Education Act, 1983

Section 131 of the Karnataka Education Act provides a statutory right of appeal against certain orders (including adverse orders affecting teachers in aided institutions) passed by education authorities.

In this case:

• The petitioners used this remedy to challenge the first cancellation order.
• The Appellate Authority set aside the cancellation and remanded the matter.

However, the persistence of adverse orders on remand and the separate issue of non‑payment of wages necessitated independent recourse to the High Court under Articles 226 and 227.

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5. Impact and Future Implications

5.1. Extension of Article 23 into Mainstream Service Jurisprudence

Article 23 has often been invoked in cases involving:

• Bonded labour,
• Construction workers, and
• Labour paid less than minimum wages.

This judgment extends that logic into the realm of regular employment relationships in the public sector/grant‑in‑aid sector, by holding:

• Non‑payment of salary for work actually performed by teachers in an aided school amounts to forced labour and begar.

The ruling therefore opens the door for:

• Government servants and employees of aided institutions;
• Contractual or outsourced workers performing public functions

to invoke Article 23 where there is a sustained pattern of work without lawful payment.

5.2. Constraints on State Practice of Withholding Salaries During Litigation

A frequently seen administrative practice is to:

• Allow employees to work,
• Use their services, but
• Withhold salary on the ground that:
  • Their appointment is under dispute;
  • A disciplinary inquiry is pending; or
  • Budgetary sanctions are awaited.

This judgment sends a clear message: if the State takes work, it must pay for it. Pending litigation or internal disputes about appointment cannot be used as a justification for extracting unpaid labour.

5.3. Implications for Aided Educational Institutions

For aided schools and colleges, the judgment underscores:

• Once appointments are made with the concurrence of the State and teachers are allowed to work, salary cannot be stopped arbitrarily.
• The Government, as the funding authority, must ensure continuous payment of salaries unless:
  • The appointment is lawfully terminated; and
  • The employee is relieved from service.
• Failure to do so may expose both the State and the management to constitutional scrutiny under Article 23.

5.4. Reinforcing the Dignity of Teachers and Public Servants

Teachers are central to the right to education and the functioning of public education systems. The Court’s description—that forcing teachers to toil without wages strikes at the “very heart of human dignity”—has a symbolic as well as legal resonance.

Going forward, this ruling could:

• Discourage authorities from casually withholding the salaries of teaching and non-teaching staff in educational institutions; and
• Encourage courts to view prolonged non‑payment of salaries as a fundamental rights issue, not just a service irregularity.

5.5. Litigation Strategy for Employees

Employees in similar situations—especially where:

• They have continued to work;
• The employer is a State or public authority; and
• There is a prolonged denial of wages,

may strategically:

• Invoke Article 23 to argue that:
  • Non‑payment of salary is not only illegal but unconstitutional;
  • They are being subjected to forced labour.
• Seek writs of mandamus for immediate release of salaries, independently of disputes over appointment or disciplinary proceedings.

However, courts are likely to insist, as here, on clear proof that:

• The employee actually worked during the period claimed; and
• The employer benefited from that labour.

5.6. Potential for Broader Application

The judgment’s logic may also have implications for:

• Prolonged suspension without subsistence allowance: If an employee is kept under suspension with negligible or no subsistence allowance for an extended period, arguments could be made—by analogy—that this verges on forced labour if work is still extracted, or at least violates dignity and basic fairness.
• Delayed payments in government projects: Where workers or contractual employees in public works are made to wait for months for their wages, the Article 23 argument may be pressed more vigorously.

While each case will turn on its own facts, this decision provides a strong doctrinal foothold.

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6. Conclusion

The judgment in Shri Anil s/o Mallappa Kanawade v. State of Karnataka is a significant addition to Article 23 jurisprudence. It holds that:

• Prolonged non‑payment of salary to teachers who are continuously working in a grant‑in‑aid school amounts to “begar” and forced labour prohibited by the Constitution;
• The State practises begar when it compels such unpaid work, regardless of pending disputes concerning the validity of appointments; and
• In such cases, a writ of mandamus lies to compel the State to release salary arrears, with the Court willing to characterise the issue as a violation of fundamental rights rather than a mere breach of service rules.

The High Court’s reliance on PUDR to extend Article 23 into a conventional public employment setting underscores a broader constitutional vision: that India must be a republic where no person—whether a bonded labourer or a qualified school teacher—is compelled to work without just remuneration.

By drawing a direct connection between unpaid labour and the constitutional prohibition of begar, the decision sends a clear message to public authorities: administrative disputes and procedural manoeuvres cannot be used to justify extracting unpaid labour from employees. The State’s obligations to its workers are not merely contractual or statutory; they are grounded in fundamental rights and human dignity.

In practical terms, the ruling strengthens employees’ hands in demanding timely payment of wages where work has been done, especially in the public and aided sectors. In doctrinal terms, it reaffirms the expansive and dynamic character of Article 23 as an instrument for combating exploitation in all its modern forms.