When Section 60 Cannot Apply: Patna High Court’s Writ Power to Release Vehicles Not Used in Prohibition Offences

I. Introduction

The decision in Karnal Kumar v. State of Bihar through the Principal Secretary, Deptt. of Excise, Govt. of Bihar, Patna, Criminal Writ Jurisdiction Case No. 2364 of 2025, decided on 10 November 2025 by the Patna High Court (per Arun Kumar Jha, J.), addresses an increasingly common but legally complex problem in Bihar’s prohibition regime:

Vehicles are seized on allegations of their use in transporting illicit liquor under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016.
Subsequent investigation sometimes reveals that the vehicle was not in fact used in any offence, or was implicated through manipulation or false implication.
Yet, trial courts (particularly the Exclusive Special Excise Courts) decline release of such vehicles, citing the bar of jurisdiction under Section 60 of the Act.

This case squarely raises the tension between:

The statutory bar created by Section 60 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, which restricts courts from passing orders regarding seized conveyances used in offences under the Act; and
The constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially when investigation itself exonerates the property from any involvement in an offence.

The key legal contribution of this judgment is twofold:

It clarifies the scope of Section 60, holding that the bar applies only to property actually “used in committing any offence” and properly “seized or detained under this Act”; and
It reaffirms and applies the Patna High Court’s earlier Division Bench ruling in Suresh Sah v. State of Bihar, 2020 (1) BLJ 706, that the bar under Section 60 does not oust the High Court’s writ jurisdiction to order release of vehicles in appropriate cases.

Though marked as NAFR (“Not Approved For Reporting”), and thus not intended to be a leading reported authority, the reasoning in Karnal Kumar is of significant practical importance in day-to-day prohibition enforcement and litigation in Bihar.

II. Factual Background and Procedural History

1. The Seizure and Alleged Offence

An information was given to the police that liquor was being transported on a motorcycle bearing registration no. BR-09AW-3244, a Hero Xtreme 160R registered in the name of the petitioner, Karnal Kumar. Acting on this information:

The police reached the indicated spot and found the motorcycle in a running condition lying in a maize field.
From a bag hanging from the handle of the motorcycle, the police recovered 1.08 litres of foreign liquor.
A case was registered as Lakho P.S. Case No. 44 of 2025 under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act.

2. Investigation and Discovery of False Implication

During the course of investigation, a different picture emerged:

The petitioner’s motorcycle had allegedly met with an accident with another motorcycle belonging to one Golu Kumar.
There was an altercation between the petitioner and Golu Kumar following the accident.
To falsely implicate the petitioner in a prohibition case, it was alleged that Golu Kumar placed the illicit liquor on the petitioner’s motorcycle and orchestrated its seizure.
Upon investigation, the police concluded that the case was in fact true against Golu Kumar, his motorcycle bearing registration no. BR-09AP-1610, and an unknown co-accused, and not against the petitioner’s vehicle.

In light of this conclusion, the concerned police official:

Filed an application before the learned Exclusive Special Excise Judge-1, Begusarai, explicitly stating that the petitioner’s motorcycle was not involved in the occurrence and that the case had been found true against others.

3. Order of the Exclusive Special Excise Judge

Despite the police’s clear stand that the petitioner’s vehicle was not involved in the transportation of liquor:

The petitioner moved an application before the Exclusive Special Excise Judge-1, Begusarai for release of his motorcycle.
By order dated 28.07.2025, the Special Excise Judge rejected the application, holding that, in view of the bar under Section 60 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016, the court had no jurisdiction to pass any order for release of the seized vehicle.

4. Writ Petition Before the Patna High Court

Aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the criminal writ jurisdiction of the Patna High Court under Article 226, seeking:

Quashing of the order dated 28.07.2025 of the Exclusive Special Excise Judge-1, Begusarai.
A direction to the respondents to release the motorcycle (Hero Xtreme 160R, Reg. No. BR-09AW-3244) seized in Lakho P.S. Case No. 44 of 2025.
Monetary compensation for the alleged illegal and arbitrary seizure of the motorcycle despite its non-involvement in any offence under the Excise Act.

At the hearing:

The State’s counsel sought time to file a counter affidavit.
The Court, however, observed that no counter affidavit was necessary, as the material on record, including the investigating officer’s own application, made the facts sufficiently clear.
Arguments were heard from both sides on the legal issue arising out of Section 60 and the High Court’s jurisdiction.

III. Issues Before the Court

While the judgment is concise, the following core legal issues clearly emerge:

Scope of Section 60: Does Section 60 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016 create an absolute bar preventing the Special Excise Judge from ordering release of a seized vehicle, even when the investigation itself concludes that the vehicle was not used in committing any offence?
Nature of Seizure: Where the investigating authorities explicitly state that the vehicle was not involved in an offence, can such a seizure be treated as one “under this Act” so as to attract Section 60 at all?
High Court’s Writ Jurisdiction: Even assuming Section 60 bars the Special Excise Court from ordering release, does this statutory bar extend to, or affect, the High Court’s powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India?
Relief: Given the investigative finding exonerating the petitioner’s vehicle, what relief should be granted—release of the vehicle, and/or monetary compensation?

IV. Summary of the Judgment

The Patna High Court allowed the writ petition and ordered release of the petitioner’s motorcycle, with the following key conclusions:

Section 60 is not an absolute bar in every situation of seizure. The language of Section 60 makes it clear that the bar on the court’s jurisdiction applies only where the liquor, material, or conveyance was “used in committing any offence” and is “seized or detained under this Act.”
Since the investigating authorities themselves affirmed that the petitioner’s motorcycle was not involved in transporting liquor, there was no legitimate occasion for treating the vehicle as seized or detained “under the Act” for an offence. The vehicle was therefore not liable to seizure or confiscation.
The Special Excise Court correctly felt constrained by Section 60 and, as per binding precedent (Suresh Sah v. State of Bihar), lacked jurisdiction to order release even when the vehicle was not liable to confiscation.
However, the bar under Section 60 does not extend to the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226. Citing Suresh Sah, the Court reaffirmed that the High Court can intervene in such situations and pass appropriate orders, including directing release.
Considering the “anomalous situation”—where the vehicle’s non-involvement is established, yet the Special Court is statutorily barred from ordering release—the High Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction and ordered release of the vehicle forthwith to the registered owner, subject to conditions to be imposed by the concerned court.
The writ petition was allowed. The judgment does not record any separate order granting the requested monetary compensation.

V. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Statutory Framework: Section 60 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016

Section 60 of the Act, reproduced verbatim in the judgment, provides:

“60. Bar of jurisdiction in confiscation.—Whenever any liquor, material, still, utensil, implements or apparatus or any receptacle, package, any animal cart, vessel, or other conveyance used in committing any offence, is seized or detained under this Act, no court shall have, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, jurisdiction to make any order with regard to such property".

Key elements of Section 60, which form the basis of the Court’s reasoning, are:

The bar applies to liquor, materials, implements, receptacles, and conveyances.
Such property must be “used in committing any offence” under the Act.
It must be “seized or detained under this Act”.
When these conditions are satisfied, “no court shall have” jurisdiction to “make any order with regard to such property,” notwithstanding anything in any other law.

In practice, this provision has been interpreted to:

Oust the jurisdiction of criminal courts (including the Magistrate or Special Judge) from making orders of interim custody or release of vehicles seized in excise cases; and
Channel issues of confiscation and release to the designated confiscating authority under the Act (usually an Excise or District authority) unless the High Court intervenes in writ jurisdiction.

However, as this case demonstrates, a mechanical reliance on Section 60, even where investigation itself rules out the involvement of the property in any offence, results in manifest injustice and legal anomaly.

B. Precedent Relied Upon: Suresh Sah v. State of Bihar, 2020 (1) BLJ 706

The single most important precedent cited and relied on is the Division Bench decision in Suresh Sah v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2020 (1) BLJ 706.

In Suresh Sah, the Division Bench addressed the exact question of the jurisdiction of the Special Excise Court versus that of the High Court in the context of Section 60. The relevant passage quoted in Karnal Kumar is paragraph 28:

“28. Even if the vehicle is not liable for confiscation then the Special Judge under the Act in view of the bar under Section 60 of the Act does not have the jurisdiction to direct for the release of the vehicle. However, such bar will not operate in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, since such power is required to be exercised in the given prevailing monstrous situation...............................”

The key points from Suresh Sah that influence the present decision are:

Absolute bar for the Special Judge: The Division Bench interpreted Section 60 to bar even the Special Excise Judge (who otherwise deals with offences under the Act) from releasing vehicles even when they are not liable for confiscation.
Unimpaired writ jurisdiction: Importantly, the Bench held that this statutory bar does not extend to the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226. The High Court retains the power to pass appropriate orders to correct injustices and address the “monstrous situation” of indiscriminate seizure and continued detention of vehicles.
Context of “monstrous situation”: The Division Bench was clearly concerned about the large-scale practical hardship caused by mass seizure of vehicles and the inability of ordinary criminal courts to provide effective relief due to the statutory bar.

Thus, Suresh Sah lays down a two-tier framework:

Special Excise Courts are bound by Section 60 and cannot release seized vehicles, even when they are not ultimately liable for confiscation under the Act.
The High Court, however, can intervene in writ jurisdiction to pass orders, including orders of release, wherever justice so requires.

In Karnal Kumar, the single-judge bench faithfully applies this framework, but adds an important interpretative clarification on what qualifies as a seizure “under this Act” and when Section 60 can be invoked at all.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Interpretation of Section 60: When Does the Bar Apply?

The trial court had treated the bar under Section 60 as absolute, refusing to consider the application for release even though the investigating officer’s own application said the petitioner’s vehicle was not involved in the offence. Justice Arun Kumar Jha disagreed with this approach.

The High Court specifically notes:

Section 60 applies where “any ... conveyance used in committing any offence is seized or detained under this Act.”
Therefore, the bar is triggered only when:
- The property was actually used in committing an offence under the Act; and
- The seizure or detention is lawfully referable to the Act, i.e., it is a seizure “under this Act”.

The Court then draws a critical conclusion:

“But when the investigating authorities have themselves submitted before the court concerned that the vehicle was not involved in the occurrence, there was no occasion for it being seized or detained under the Excise Act.”

This reasoning does two things:

It narrows the automatic use of Section 60. Where investigation discloses that the vehicle was never actually used in the offence, the State cannot continue to rely on Section 60 to justify non-release.
It implicitly distinguishes between:
- a seizure that is validly and substantively under the Act (because the property is clearly linked to an offence); and
- a seizure that, once facts are clarified, turns out to be unsupported in law or based on false implication. In the latter case, the seizure is no longer properly “under the Act” within the meaning of Section 60.

Thus, Section 60 does not create a shield for the State to indefinitely detain property that is, on the State’s own admission, unconnected with any offence.

2. Binding Effect of Section 60 on the Special Excise Court

The Court accepts that the Exclusive Special Excise Judge was bound by Section 60 as interpreted in Suresh Sah. This explains why:

Even when the investigating officer stated that the vehicle was not involved in the offence,
The Special Judge still declined release, believing that the jurisdictional bar under Section 60 was absolute and extended even to vehicles not liable for confiscation.

Paragraph 11 of the judgment explicitly acknowledges the holding in Suresh Sah that:

“...in the light of Section 60 of said Act, jurisdiction of Special Excise Court is barred...”

This ensures that the single-judge decision in Karnal Kumar remains consistent with the Division Bench precedent on the limits of the Special Court’s jurisdiction.

3. High Court’s Writ Jurisdiction Remains Intact

Having accepted that the Special Excise Court was jurisdictionally constrained, the High Court then turns to the scope of its own power under Article 226.

Relying again on Suresh Sah, the Court notes that:

“...such bar does not operate in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.”

The Court thus reaffirms a crucial constitutional principle:

A statutory provision such as Section 60 can limit the powers of subordinate courts, including Special Courts constituted under the Act.
But no statutory bar can curtail the constitutional powers of the High Court under Article 226, unless the Constitution itself expressly so provides.

In other words, even if Section 60 is interpreted to comprehensively bar “any court” from making orders regarding property seized under the Act, that phrase cannot be read as including the High Court acting in its constitutional capacity. This is in line with long-settled constitutional doctrine that statutory bars do not oust the writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts.

The High Court explicitly refers to the “extra-ordinary power under Article 226” and invokes it in paragraph 12 to resolve what it describes as a “present anomalous situation”.

4. The “Anomalous Situation” and the Need for Judicial Intervention

The anomaly is clear:

The police themselves say the petitioner’s vehicle was not involved in any offence under the Act.
The vehicle is therefore not liable for seizure or confiscation under the statutory scheme.
Yet, due to the judicial understanding of Section 60, the Special Excise Court cannot release such a vehicle even when satisfied that it is not liable for confiscation.

If the High Court were also to refuse to intervene, the net effect would be:

Property of an innocent person could be indefinitely detained.
There would be no effective remedy despite the State’s own admission of non-involvement.

Recognising this as an unacceptable outcome, the Court states:

“Having regard to the position of law and the peculiar facts and circumstances giving rise to the present anomalous situation, this Court thinks it fit and proper to exercise its extra-ordinary power under Article 226...”

It then orders release of the vehicle “forthwith” to the registered owner, subject to such conditions as the concerned court may impose (for instance, bonds or undertakings).

D. Relief Granted and Relief Not Granted

1. Release of the Vehicle

The central relief granted is:

Release of the vehicle, motorcycle bearing registration no. BR-09AW-3244, in favour of the petitioner as the registered owner.
The release is to be effected “forthwith”.
However, it is made subject to conditions to be imposed by the concerned court (typically conditions ensuring production of the vehicle if required in future proceedings).

2. Quashing of the Special Judge’s Order

Although the judgment does not explicitly use the language of “quashing,” the effect of the High Court’s direction is to override and set aside the Special Judge’s refusal to release the vehicle, restoring to the petitioner what the trial court declined to grant solely on jurisdictional grounds.

3. Monetary Compensation

The petitioner had also prayed for monetary compensation for the alleged illegal and arbitrary seizure of his motorcycle. The judgment:

Does not specifically discuss or analyse any separate basis for awarding compensation.
Does not contain any operative direction granting compensation.

Accordingly, it is reasonable to read the judgment as:

Granting the petition only to the extent of ordering release of the vehicle, and
Not granting (at least not expressly) the relief of compensation.

Questions relating to compensation for wrongful seizure under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act thus remain open for further doctrinal development in future cases.

E. Broader Impact and Significance

1. Protection Against Misuse of Prohibition Law

The facts of the case involve deliberate false implication by a private individual (Golu Kumar) who allegedly planted liquor on the petitioner’s motorcycle after an accident and altercation. The Court’s approach sends a clear signal:

Where investigation reveals that a vehicle was wrongly or maliciously implicated,
That vehicle cannot continue to be detained under the cover of Section 60, and the High Court will step in to restore the owner’s rights.

This provides a measure of protection for citizens against the misuse of stringent prohibition laws for settling personal scores.

2. Clarifying the Threshold for Section 60: “Used in Committing Any Offence”

By insisting that Section 60 applies only where a conveyance is actually “used in committing any offence”, the Court curbs:

The tendency to treat every seizure as automatically attracting Section 60, regardless of subsequent factual findings.
The practice of indefinitely detaining vehicles even after the prosecution itself concedes lack of involvement.

This interpretation will aid courts and authorities in distinguishing:

Between cases where Section 60 legitimately applies, and
Cases where the initial seizure, on full discovery of facts, turns out to be factually or legally unwarranted.

3. Reinforcing the High Court’s Supervisory Role Under Article 226

The judgment reinforces and operationalises the Division Bench ruling in Suresh Sah by:

Demonstrating how the writ jurisdiction can be used to remedy situations where subordinate courts are statutorily barred from granting relief, even when justice plainly demands it.
Ensuring that statutory bars like Section 60 do not result in a “remedy-less wrong”.

In future prohibition-related litigation, litigants whose vehicles are:

Seized under the Act, but
Later found by investigation to be not involved in any offence,

will likely rely on Karnal Kumar to approach the High Court directly for release of their vehicles.

4. Administrative and Practical Implications

The decision carries several practical implications:

Police and investigating officers may be more cautious in seizing vehicles or in resisting their release once their non-involvement is clear.
Exclusive Special Excise Courts are reminded that, despite their inability to order release due to Section 60, they should accurately reflect investigative findings in records, facilitating appropriate High Court intervention.
There may be an increase in writ petitions where there is a clear investigative conclusion absolving a vehicle of involvement, but statutory bars prevent subordinate courts from acting.

From a systemic perspective, the judgment gently underscores the need for:

Either legislative refinement of Section 60, or
Clear administrative guidelines on timely release of vehicles found to be unconnected with offences,

to reduce the burden on writ courts and minimise hardship to vehicle owners.

VI. Simplifying Complex Legal Concepts

1. What is “Criminal Writ Jurisdiction”?

The High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 allows it to issue orders, directions, or writs to any person or authority, including the government, when legal or fundamental rights are violated.

Although writ jurisdiction is often thought of in civil or administrative contexts, it is equally available in criminal matters—for example:

Challenging illegal arrest or detention,
Challenging the illegal seizure or continued detention of property,
Correcting jurisdictional errors of criminal courts or authorities.

In Karnal Kumar, the petitioner uses this jurisdiction to challenge both:

The Special Judge’s order refusing release, and
The continued detention of his motorcycle despite the investigation’s conclusion of non-involvement.

2. “Bar of Jurisdiction” – What Does It Mean?

A statutory “bar of jurisdiction” means that a particular court or class of courts is legally prohibited from hearing certain matters or passing certain types of orders.

Section 60 of the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act creates such a bar:

Ordinary criminal courts, including Special Excise Courts, cannot pass orders relating to the release or disposal of properties (including vehicles) seized for excise offences.
Instead, issues regarding confiscation or release are meant to be handled under the special procedure provided by the Act.

However, as the High Court reaffirms, this bar does not apply to the High Court’s constitutional powers under Article 226.

3. Seizure vs. Confiscation vs. Release

Seizure: Temporary taking of property by the State, usually at the investigative stage, to prevent its misuse, preserve evidence, or secure it for possible confiscation.
Confiscation: A formal legal process by which the State permanently takes ownership of property used in the commission of an offence.
Release: Returning the seized property to its owner, either:
- On the ground that it is not required for any purpose of investigation or trial, or
- Because it is ultimately found not liable to confiscation.

In Karnal Kumar, the crucial point is that the motorcycle, on the State’s own admission, was never validly subject to confiscation because it was not used in the commission of an offence.

4. “Used in Committing Any Offence” – Why It Matters

The phrase “used in committing any offence” in Section 60 is central:

If a vehicle is genuinely used for transporting illicit liquor, it falls squarely within Section 60, and the bar of jurisdiction applies.
If, however, a vehicle is falsely implicated or merely found near the scene without any nexus to the offence—and the investigation confirms this—then continuing to invoke Section 60 is legally unsound.

The Court’s insistence on this factual and legal nexus protects innocent owners from being penalised by mere proximity rather than actual involvement.

5. “NAFR” and Reporting Status

At the end of the judgment, the notation reads:

AFR/NAFR: NAFR

This generally indicates that the judgment is “Not Approved For Reporting” in official law reports. It is an administrative classification used by some High Courts:

AFR – Approved For Reporting (typically considered more significant or precedent-setting).
NAFR – Not Approved For Reporting (usually in routine or fact-specific matters).

However, even NAFR decisions can be:

Persuasive in similar factual situations, and
Relied upon by litigants and lawyers where the reasoning is directly relevant and consistent with binding higher precedents.

VII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

The decision in Karnal Kumar v. State of Bihar is an important application and refinement of existing law on vehicle seizure under the Bihar Prohibition and Excise Act, 2016. The principal takeaways are:

Section 60 is not a carte blanche: The bar on court jurisdiction under Section 60 applies only where the vehicle or property is actually used in committing an offence and is lawfully seized or detained under the Act. Once investigation establishes that the vehicle was not involved, continuing to invoke Section 60 is untenable.
Special Excise Courts remain constrained by Section 60: Consistent with Suresh Sah, the judgment affirms that even if a vehicle is not liable for confiscation, the Special Judge under the Act does not have jurisdiction to direct its release due to the statutory bar.
High Court’s writ power is unimpaired and crucial: The bar created by Section 60 does not extend to the High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226. In anomalous or unjust situations—such as where investigation exonerates the vehicle—the High Court can and will intervene to order release of the property.
Protection against wrongful implication: The case underscores judicial sensitivity to situations where prohibition law is misused to falsely implicate innocent owners, and affirms that such misuse cannot be shielded by a technical reading of Section 60.
Unresolved question of compensation: While the Court orders release, it does not grant or analyse the claim for monetary compensation. The broader issue of State liability for wrongful seizure under the prohibition law remains an area for future development.

In sum, Karnal Kumar strengthens the doctrinal position that statutory bars on jurisdiction cannot be allowed to perpetuate manifest injustice, particularly where the enforcement of stringent prohibition laws has serious collateral consequences for property owners. By combining a careful reading of Section 60 with a firm assertion of its constitutional role, the Patna High Court provides a clear pathway for relief in cases where vehicles are seized but ultimately found innocent.