When an Impulsive Stab on a Vital Part Leading to Septicemia Attracts Section 304 Part I, Not Section 302

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India in Nandkumar @ Nandu Manilal Mudaliar v. State of Gujarat (2025 INSC 1302), decided on 10 November 2025 by a Bench comprising N.V. Anjaria, J. (author) and K. Vinod Chandran, J., re-calibrates the boundary between “murder” under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” under Section 304 Part I IPC. The case arose out of a late-night incident on 12/13 June 1998 in which the appellant inflicted knife injuries on the deceased, Louis Williams, following a neighborhood quarrel. The victim succumbed 13 days later due to septicemia following surgery for internal injuries.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Sections 302 and 504 IPC; the High Court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reconsidered the mens rea in light of the nature of injuries, the absence of premeditation, the immediacy and impulsivity of the assault, and the cause of death (septicemia), ultimately altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I, while treating the 14 years already undergone as sufficient.

Core issues before the Court included:

• Whether the appellant’s act constituted “murder” under Section 300 IPC or “culpable homicide not amounting to murder” under Section 304 IPC;
• How to assess intention versus knowledge when a single/limited number of stabs are delivered on a vital part in an impulsive quarrel;
• Whether a delayed death due to septicemia undermines the chain of causation or influences the degree of culpability;
• The evidentiary worth of related eyewitnesses and the role of medical evidence in determining culpability.

Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court accepted the reliability of two related eyewitnesses—Gajraben (PW-2), the victim’s sister, and Rajesh (PW-4), the victim’s nephew—along with the medical evidence of Dr. Dharmila Shah (PW-8), which established intentional knife-inflicted injuries including a deep stab below the belly with internal damage (including to the spleen and small intestine). The Court held that:

• The appellant intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury on a vital part with knowledge of its likely fatal consequences;
• However, the assault emerged from an impulsive altercation without premeditation or clear intention to cause death;
• In such circumstances, the offence is culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part I IPC;
• The conviction under Section 302 IPC was set aside and converted to Section 304 Part I IPC;
• The period of incarceration already undergone (more than 14 years) was treated as sufficient; bail bonds were discharged.

The conviction under Section 504 IPC (intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace) was not disturbed.

Detailed Analysis

Factual Matrix and Evidence

The prosecution case was that on the evening of 12 June 1998, the appellant had a quarrel with his brother, during which Rajesh (PW-4), the deceased’s nephew, intervened and allegedly suffered injuries. Later, around 1:00 a.m. (as borne out by the record despite a typographical reference to “1.00 p.m.”), the appellant went to the deceased’s house, hurled abuses, and inflicted knife blows—one below the belly and two on the hand. The victim was taken to L.G. Hospital, where surgery revealed internal injuries, including to the spleen and small intestine. He was discharged and later re-admitted; he died on 26 June 1998 due to septicemia.

The medical testimony of PW-8 recorded:

• A stab wound 5 x 2 cm below the belly on the left side;
• An L-shaped cut on the hand;
• A crushed wound on the right hand;
• On opening the abdomen: internal bleeding, a 2 x 0.5 x 1 cm stomach wound, and small-intestine injury; spleen removal and suturing were performed;
• Death occurred due to septicemia after a period of treatment.

The appellant later surrendered with the knife, which was recovered as muddamal. The trial court convicted under Sections 302 and 504 IPC (and acquitted under Section 324 IPC); the High Court affirmed.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Kesar Singh & Anr. v. State of Haryana, (2008) 15 SCC 753:
  • Clarifies the mens rea distinction between Section 300 and Section 304 IPC, and explains the three degrees of culpable homicide;
  • Emphasizes that intention and knowledge are the crucial differentiators in classifying homicide;
  • Recognizes that “culpable homicide is the genus and murder its species,” and explains when homicide falls short of murder.
• Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465:
  • Provides the classic “four-step” analysis for Clause “thirdly” of Section 300—requiring (i) an intention to inflict the particular injury, and (ii) that the injury inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death;
  • Distinguishes culpability based on the specific intention regarding the injury, not merely the result.
• Shankar Narayan Bhadolkar v. State of Maharashtra:
  • Reinforces the doctrinal divide between Section 304 Part I and Part II IPC:
  • Part I applies where there is an intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
  • Part II applies where there is no such intention, but there is knowledge that death is likely.

These authorities guided the Court’s framing of the mens rea inquiry: whether the appellant intended death, or at least intended bodily injury likely to cause death; and how to treat the role of knowledge in light of an impulsive assault and a delayed septicemic death.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three structured steps:

1. Establishing culpable homicide and causation:
   • Knife blows were intentionally inflicted on a vital part (below the belly) causing internal injuries necessitating surgery (including spleen removal);
   • Medical evidence unequivocally tied the death by septicemia to the knife-inflicted abdominal injuries, maintaining an unbroken chain of causation;
   • Delayed death did not exonerate the assailant or attenuate causation; it only informed the degree of culpability.
2. Intention vs knowledge and the choice between Section 302, 304 Part I, and 304 Part II:
   • The Court ruled out premeditation and a direct intention to cause death, noting the quarrel’s impulsive nature and the immediate context of abuse and anger;
   • Nonetheless, the appellant intentionally delivered a serious stab on a vital region—an intentional act of causing bodily injury which, by the nature and location of the blow, was likely to cause death;
   • On these facts, the Court concluded that the correct classification is Section 304 Part I—the offender intended to cause a bodily injury likely to cause death, even though he may not have intended the death itself.

   Note: The judgment expressly acknowledges that “intention to cause death” was not proved, but the act evidenced intention to cause a potentially fatal injury on a vital part, accompanied by knowledge of its likely consequences—placing it squarely within Part I, not Part II. This is consistent with the jurisprudence in Kesar Singh and the Virsa Singh framework.

3. Witness credibility and corroboration:
   • The Supreme Court endorsed the High Court’s reliance on PWs 2 and 4; relationship to the deceased alone does not render testimony unreliable. Their accounts aligned with the medical evidence;
   • The medical narrative (PW-8) played a key corroborative role—connecting external injuries to internal damage and, ultimately, septicemia.

Impact and Doctrinal Significance

This decision clarifies and reinforces several important principles likely to influence future homicide prosecutions:

• Impulsive, non-premeditated stabbings to vital parts:
  Where a single or limited number of intentional stabs on a vital part occur in an impulsive quarrel without premeditation, the offence may fall under Section 304 Part I if the court finds an intention to cause a bodily injury likely to cause death but no intention to kill.
• Delayed septicemic death and causation:
  Death occurring days later due to septicemia, following surgery for injuries intentionally inflicted, maintains the causal link to the assailant’s act. The delay does not dilute culpability; it may, however, inform the mens rea assessment and sentencing calibration.
• Choice between Part I and Part II of Section 304:
  The judgment illustrates why Part I, not Part II, is attracted when the accused deliberately causes a grave injury on a vital area, reflecting intention to cause a potentially fatal injury, even in the absence of a demonstrable intention to kill.
• Related eyewitnesses:
  The Court restates the settled rule that evidence of related witnesses is not inherently suspect and can sustain a conviction if otherwise credible and corroborated—especially by medical evidence.
• Sentencing under Section 304 Part I:
  The Court treated the 14 years already undergone as sufficient. While Section 304 Part I permits imprisonment for life or up to ten years (and fine), appellate courts often reduce the sentence to “period already undergone” when culpability is reclassified and prolonged incarceration has already occurred.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Culpable Homicide (Section 299) vs Murder (Section 300):
  All murders are culpable homicides, but not all culpable homicides are murders. Murder requires a higher mental element (e.g., intention to cause death, or intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death). If that heightened mental element is missing, the act is a culpable homicide not amounting to murder.
• Section 304 IPC—Part I vs Part II:
  - Part I: Intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death (even if no intention to kill).
  - Part II: No such intention, but knowledge that death is likely.
• Clause “thirdly” of Section 300 and the Virsa Singh test:
  Focuses on whether the accused intended the particular injury that proved fatal and whether that injury, viewed objectively, was sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. If both are established, the offence is generally murder, unless exceptions apply or the overall facts negate the intention to kill but still prove intention to cause a potentially fatal injury—then Section 304 Part I may be appropriate.
• Septicemia and chain of causation:
  Septicemia is a systemic infection. If it develops as a direct complication of surgically treated injuries inflicted by the accused, the causal chain remains intact. The fact that death occurs days later does not, by itself, break causation.
• Related vs interested witnesses:
  “Related” merely describes kinship; “interested” suggests a stake in the outcome. Courts evaluate credibility on internal consistency, corroboration, and cross-examination, not on relationship alone.
• Muddamal:
  A term commonly used to denote material objects seized during investigation and produced as evidence (e.g., the knife in this case).
• Wardhi:
  A hospital intimation/report sent to the police regarding medico-legal cases (e.g., admission for stab injuries).

Practice Pointers

• For prosecution: Meticulous medical documentation linking external wounds to internal injuries and subsequent complications like septicemia can be decisive both for causation and to establish the gravity of the injuries.
• For defence: Demonstrating lack of premeditation, the context of a sudden quarrel, and the nature of the blows can recalibrate mens rea from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I or II, depending on whether the intention to cause a potentially fatal injury is proved.
• For courts: A structured Virsa Singh/Kesar Singh analysis—mapping facts to intention versus knowledge and to the body part injured—ensures principled classification under Sections 302, 304 Part I, or 304 Part II.

Conclusion

Nandkumar @ Nandu Manilal Mudaliar v. State of Gujarat is a careful reaffirmation of the doctrinal boundaries between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It underscores that:

• An impulsive, non-premeditated stabbing on a vital part, with clear intention to cause a serious bodily injury and corresponding knowledge of likely fatality, but without demonstrable intention to cause death, fits Section 304 Part I.
• Delayed death due to septicemia does not sever causation; it may nonetheless affect the mens rea assessment and sentencing.
• Related eyewitness testimony can reliably ground conviction when corroborated by medical evidence.

The ruling thus offers a nuanced, fact-sensitive template for courts to classify homicidal acts where the immediacy of intent to kill is equivocal but the gravity and location of the inflicted injury speak to a high level of culpability—justifying conviction under Section 304 Part I rather than Section 302.

Key Takeaways

• Absence of premeditation and presence of an impulsive quarrel can negate the intention to kill without negating the intention to cause a potentially fatal injury.
• Single or limited knife blows on vital parts can support Part I classification even in the absence of a direct intent to kill.
• Septicemia following surgery for stab wounds does not absolve the assailant; it reinforces the medical chain from injury to death.
• Time already undergone may be treated as sufficient upon reclassification to Section 304 Part I, consistent with appellate sentencing practice.
• Conviction under Section 504 IPC remains unaffected where not specifically challenged or re-evaluated on appeal.