Void sale deeds and limitation: Article 65 governs suits for possession; cancellation unnecessary for non‑executants

Case: Shanti Devi (since deceased) through LRs. Goran v. Jagan Devi & Ors.

Citation: 2025 INSC 1105 (Supreme Court of India, 12 September 2025)

Bench: J.B. Pardiwala, J.; R. Mahadevan, J.

Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi delivers a clear and structured clarification on a recurring and often litigated question under the Limitation Act, 1963: which article governs a suit where the plaintiff challenges a registered sale deed on the ground that it was never executed by the plaintiff and/or is otherwise void, and seeks possession (or joint possession) based on title?

The appellant (original defendant), purchaser under a registered sale deed dated 14 June 1973, resisted a 1984 suit by the plaintiff (a co-sharer) who alleged that she never executed the deed, that it was obtained through impersonation/fraud, and that no sale consideration was paid. The trial court dismissed the suit. The first appellate court decreed it, applying Article 65 (12-year limitation for possession based on title). The High Court affirmed the decree but opined that Article 59 (3-year limitation to cancel or set aside an instrument) would apply, yet the suit was still in time. On further appeal, the Supreme Court confined itself to the limitation issue and reconciled the jurisprudence.

Anchored in authoritative precedents (Prem Singh v. Birbal; State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar; Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar; and the 2025 decision in Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman), the Court holds that where the impugned sale deed is void ab initio—either because the plaintiff did not execute it at all (impersonation/non-execution) or because there was no consideration—Article 65 governs a suit for possession based on title. The plaintiff, particularly a non-executant, need not sue for cancellation under Article 59; even the inclusion of a declaratory prayer does not convert the governing limitation to Article 59.

Summary of the Judgment

• Issue confined: Whether the plaintiff’s 1984 suit was barred by limitation, given the sale deed dated 14 June 1973.
• Findings on voidness underpinning limitation: Concurrent findings (first appellate court and High Court) established that the plaintiff never executed the deed (thumb impressions not hers) and that payment of consideration was unproved. Both defects render the instrument void ab initio.
• Applicable article: Article 65 (12 years) applies to suits for possession based on title against void transactions; Article 59 applies to voidable instruments where cancellation is necessary.
• Non-executant principle: A plaintiff who is not a party/executant is not obliged to sue for cancellation; at most, a declaration of non-binding effect may be sought. Inclusion of such a declaratory prayer does not change the governing limitation.
• Commencement and timeliness: Even if time is computed from the date of the sale deed (14.06.1973), the suit filed on 28.02.1984 falls within 12 years. The Court also noted, in the co-owner context, the relevance of when the defendant’s possession became adverse; it therefore accepted the suit as timely.
• Outcome: Appeal dismissed. The Supreme Court corrected the High Court’s articulation (Article 65, not Article 59, governs) but upheld the ultimate conclusion that the suit was within limitation.

Factual and Procedural Background

• Parties: Original plaintiff (also referred to as “Rasali/Risali” in the record) claimed 1/3rd share in 31 kanals 4 marlas in Village Bisar Akbarpur, Tehsil Nuh, District Gurgaon. Original defendant (Shanti Devi) claimed under a registered sale deed of 14.06.1973 allegedly executed by plaintiff and her brother Ram Saran.
• Suit (1984): Permanent injunction to protect possession; in the alternative, joint possession and a declaration that the 1973 deed was fraudulent/void qua plaintiff’s share; allegations included impersonation and non-receipt of consideration.
• Trial Court: Dismissed the suit (14.10.1991); all issues against the plaintiff.
• First Appeal: Allowed (07.10.1996); decree for plaintiff; applied Article 65; found deed void (non-execution) and treated claim for joint possession as within 12 years.
• Second Appeal: Dismissed by Punjab & Haryana High Court (22.02.2018); affirmed findings of voidness and decree; though it said Article 59 applies, the suit was in time on the High Court’s reasoning.
• Supreme Court: Granted leave; confined to limitation; clarified that Article 65 applies; suit within time; appeal dismissed (12.09.2025).

Detailed Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and Their Influence

a) State of Maharashtra v. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (2000 SCC OnLine SC 522)

• Held that when the impugned documents are void ab initio (there, a sale deed and order rendered void after Bhim Singhji struck down a statutory restriction), a plaintiff can ignore them and sue directly for possession based on title. Article 65’s 12-year period applies from when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse; a declaration under Article 58/59 is unnecessary.
• Crucially, even if a plaintiff also sought a declaration of invalidity, that did not change the governing limitation for the possession claim; the action remained within Article 65.

b) Prem Singh v. Birbal ((2006) 5 SCC 353)

• Draws the core distinction between void and voidable instruments for limitation purposes:
  • Void instruments (e.g., non-execution, lack of capacity, or fraud as to the very character of the document) are nullities; no cancellation is required; Article 59 does not apply.
  • Voidable instruments (e.g., fraud/misrepresentation as to contents, coercion, undue influence) are prima facie valid until set aside; Article 59 applies to cancellation suits.
• Also elucidates that a minor’s void deed allows dual tracks for recovery (within 12 years of the deed or within 3 years of majority), underscoring that voidness aligns with longer limitation for possession.

c) Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman (2025 SCC OnLine SC 892)

• Reiterates that a non-executant is not obliged to sue for cancellation; logically, only parties/their representatives can cancel “in toto.” A non-executant may seek a declaration that the instrument is non-binding, or simply sue for possession/title, setting up the voidness as a defense to the instrument in collateral proceedings.
• Draws on classic authorities: Unni v. Kunchi Amma (1890), Bijoy Gopal Mukerji (1907 PC), and Vellayya Konar (1939), cementing the doctrinal basis.

d) Kewal Krishnan v. Rajesh Kumar ((2022) 18 SCC 489)

• Interprets Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: consideration is an essential ingredient of a sale; a sale without price (paid, or agreed to be paid) is no sale at all and is void.
• Affirms that a void sale deed need not be specifically challenged; its nullity can be asserted collaterally, and possession/joint possession can be sought on title.

e) Additional references noted in the judgment

• Ajudh Raj v. Moti—recognizing that orders passed without jurisdiction may be ignored as nullities; Article 65 applies to possession suits.
• Ningawwa v. Byrappa—clarifying fraud as to character (void) versus contents (voidable) of instruments.
• High Court’s mention of Section 44 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act (presumption of correctness of mutation entries) was noted but, for limitation, the Supreme Court’s focus remained on the nature of the instrument and the relief sought.

2) The Court’s Legal Reasoning

• Character of the transaction: The lower appellate court and High Court concurrently found that the plaintiff never executed the 1973 deed (forensic mismatch of thumb impressions; failure to produce the original deed; lack of impartial attesting witnesses; husband of the vendee, who allegedly paid the balance consideration, never testified). Those findings were not disturbed. The Court treated the deed as void ab initio on this non-execution/impersonation ground.
• Lack of consideration as an independent voidness ground: The plaint alleged no consideration was ever received; defendants led no credible proof of either part-payment (Rs. 9,000) or balance payment (Rs. 6,000). Applying Kewal Krishnan and Section 54 TPA, the Court reiterated that sale without price is no sale, reinforcing the conclusion of voidness.
• Consequent relief architecture:
  • Where the instrument is void, a plaintiff may ignore it; cancellation is not a condition precedent.
  • Therefore, suits for possession/joint possession based on title are governed by Article 65 (12 years), not Article 59 (3 years).
  • Even if the plaint carries an ancillary declaratory prayer (that the deed is void/non-binding), the governing limitation for the possession relief remains Article 65 (Pravin Kamdar).
• Commencement of limitation under Article 65: The statute states “when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff.” In co-ownership settings, adverse possession ordinarily requires clear ouster and hostile assertion. The Court observed that the suit was within time even from the date of the deed (14.06.1973), and also referred to the point of knowledge in expressing how adverse possession can be appraised in such contexts. Either way, the suit filed on 28.02.1984 was comfortably within 12 years.
• Rejection of Article 59 for these facts: Because the deed was void (non-execution, no consideration), the plaintiff did not need to sue for cancellation. Article 59’s 3-year period is engaged where an otherwise prima facie valid (voidable) instrument is to be set aside (Prem Singh).
• Non-executant not obliged to cancel: Citing Hussain Ahmed Choudhury and earlier authorities, the Court reaffirmed that only a party/representative can seek cancellation in toto; a third party/non-executant may seek a declaration of non-binding effect or directly sue on title.

3) Impact and Future Implications

a) Doctrinal clarity on Articles 59 vs 65

• Reaffirms and consolidates the jurisprudence: if the impugned deed is void, Article 65 governs a possession/joint possession suit based on title. This curbs the common misstep of treating all deed challenges as Article 59 cases.
• Even where a declaratory prayer is added, courts should not misclassify the suit for limitation purposes if the core relief is possession on title and the deed is void.

b) Pleadings and reliefs strategy

• Plaintiffs alleging non-execution/impersonation or absence of consideration may safely structure suits as possession/joint possession suits on title, optionally adding a declaration of non-binding effect, without fear of collapsing into Article 59’s 3-year bar.
• Non-executants need not shoulder the burden of cancellation; this is especially relevant to co-sharers and reversioners confronting third-party instruments.

c) Evidence and trial management

• Registered documents carry a presumption of valid execution, but it is rebuttable. Expert opinion on signatures/thumb impressions (Evidence Act, s. 45), non-production of the original deed, absence of neutral attesting witnesses, and failure of material witnesses (e.g., alleged payor) to testify can decisively rebut the presumption.
• Where consideration is disputed, defendants should lead cogent proof: proof of payment, capacity to pay, and contemporaneous records. Absence can independently render the deed void.

d) Co-ownership and adverse possession

• In suits by co-owners for joint possession, adverse possession typically requires proof of ouster—clear, hostile, and unequivocal denial of the co-owner’s rights. This affects the accrual of limitation under Article 65. The Court’s acceptance of timeliness under either computation reduces litigation risks in similar cases.

e) Administrative records and mutation

• Mutations may carry a rebuttable presumption (e.g., Section 44, Punjab Land Revenue Act), but they do not cure the underlying voidness of a deed; nor do they redefine the limitation framework laid down here.

f) Second appeals and concurrent findings

• Where there are concurrent findings on factual questions like execution and consideration, Supreme Court intervention is rare; the emphasis in second appeals remains on substantial questions of law. Here, the sole legal refinement was on the correct limitation article.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Void vs. voidable instruments:
  • Void: a legal nullity from the outset (e.g., non-execution by the owner, impersonation, lack of consideration, lack of capacity). It need not be cancelled; it can be ignored.
  • Voidable: prima facie valid until set aside (e.g., fraud as to contents, undue influence). Requires cancellation; Article 59’s 3-year limitation generally applies.
• Fraud as to “character” vs “contents” (Ningawwa):
  • Character: deceived about the very nature of the document (e.g., thought it was a power of attorney but it was a sale). The deed is void.
  • Contents: deceived about terms within the deed (e.g., price or boundaries). The deed is voidable.
• Article 59 vs. Article 65 (Limitation Act, 1963):
  • Article 59 (3 years): suits to cancel/set aside instruments or decrees; applies where cancellation is legally necessary (voidable instruments).
  • Article 65 (12 years): suits for possession based on title; applies when the plaintiff can ignore the instrument because it is void ab initio.
• Non-executant principle: A person who did not execute a deed is not obliged to seek its cancellation. They may sue for possession/title and assert in that suit that the instrument is a nullity or non-binding.
• Consideration as an essential of sale (Section 54, TPA): A sale of immovable property requires a price; if none is paid or promised, there is no sale at all—the instrument is void.
• Adverse possession (Article 65 accrual): Limitation begins when the defendant’s possession becomes adverse to the plaintiff’s title. For co-owners, this typically requires proof of ouster—mere exclusive possession is generally insufficient.

Practical Guidance and Checklists

For plaintiffs challenging a sale deed and seeking possession/joint possession:

• Plead clearly if you allege:
  • Non-execution/impersonation (voidness), and/or
  • Absence of consideration (voidness under Section 54 TPA).
• Frame the suit as one for possession or joint possession based on title; you may add a declaration that the deed is non-binding/void qua you, but you need not seek cancellation if you are a non-executant.
• Collect and marshal evidence to rebut the presumption of due execution:
  • Obtain expert opinion on signatures/thumb impressions (s. 45 Evidence Act).
  • Seek production of the original sale deed; an unexplained failure to produce may weigh against the defendant.
  • Identify and examine neutral attesting witnesses; expose relationships that indicate bias.
• On consideration: specifically plead non-receipt; insist on the defendant proving actual payment and capacity to pay; look for contemporaneous receipts/endorsements and bank records where applicable.
• Limitation: for void instruments, rely on Article 65; in co-ownership, address ouster/adverse possession allegations head-on.

For defendants relying on a registered deed:

• Produce the original instrument and all supporting contemporaneous evidence (receipts, bank entries, witnesses) to sustain the presumption of due execution and payment of price.
• Ensure material witnesses (e.g., payor of consideration, attesting witnesses) step into the box; failure may be fatal.
• Where co-ownership is involved, be prepared to prove ouster if you claim adverse possession against a co-sharer.
• Do not assume Article 59 will defeat a possession suit against a void deed; the governing framework is Article 65.

Nuances Worth Noting

• Article 56 argument: Although the appellant invoked Article 56 (declaration of forgery), the Supreme Court resolved the matter within the Article 59 vs. 65 framework, consistent with precedent. A freestanding forgery declaration is unnecessary when the suit’s gravamen is possession on title against a void deed.
• “Date of knowledge” language: Article 65 measures from when possession becomes adverse, not per se from “knowledge.” However, in co-owner disputes, knowledge can be relevant to determining when adverse possession (via ouster/hostile assertion) begins. The Court’s acceptance of timeliness on either approach avoids prejudice to the plaintiff.
• Mutation presumption: Revenue entries (mutation) do not validate a void transaction nor alter the limitation analysis applicable to judicial vindication of title.

Conclusion

Shanti Devi v. Jagan Devi is a careful restatement and consolidation of a vital slice of limitation law in property disputes. The Court clarifies that:

• When a sale deed is void ab initio—because the plaintiff never executed it (impersonation/non-execution) or because there was no consideration—cancellation is not required, especially for a non-executant.
• A suit for possession/joint possession based on title is governed by Article 65 (12 years). Article 59’s 3-year period is confined to suits for cancellation of voidable instruments.
• Even if a declaratory prayer is added, the governing limitation for the possession relief does not shift to Article 59.

On the facts, concurrent findings established non-execution and lack of consideration—either of which renders the sale deed a nullity. The suit filed within 11 years of the deed date was comfortably within Article 65. The Supreme Court thus dismissed the appeal, endorsed the decree in the plaintiff’s favour, and refined the High Court’s legal reasoning by squarely locating the limitation analysis under Article 65.

The judgment provides litigants and courts with a practical, principled roadmap: identify whether the instrument is void or voidable; determine who must sue for what remedy; and then apply the appropriate limitation article. In doing so, it promotes doctrinal coherence and procedural efficiency in land and title litigation.