Victim’s Age under POCSO Must Be Determined via JJ Act Section 94(2); Section 34 POCSO Confined to Juvenile‑Accused: Commentary on Murugesan @ Murugesh v. State

Citation: 2025 MHC 2357 | Court: Madras High Court | Bench: M.S. Ramesh, J. and V. Lakshminarayanan, J. | Date: 10-10-2025 | Case: Crl.A.No. 822 of 2018

Introduction

This decision of the Madras High Court in Murugesan @ Murugesh v. State reaffirms the protection of minors against sexual violence and delivers two doctrinal clarifications of wider import: (i) the determination of a victim’s age in prosecutions under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) must follow the evidentiary protocol laid down in Section 94(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act), with school records enjoying primacy; and (ii) Section 34 of the POCSO Act, which grants finality to age determinations by the Special Court, applies only when the accused is a child (i.e., a juvenile-accused scenario), not where the accused is an adult and the age in question is that of the victim.

The case arises from the conviction of the appellant for kidnapping (Section 366 IPC), aggravated penetrative sexual assault under POCSO (Section 5(l) read with Section 6), and commission of an IPC offence against a member of the Scheduled Castes attracting enhanced punishment under Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act). The victim (PW1) was a classmate of the appellant’s daughter (PW4). The evidence established repeated sexual intercourse by the appellant with PW1, then a minor, resulting in pregnancy and childbirth, and her removal from the lawful guardianship of her parents. On appeal, the defence principally challenged the proof of age, the locus to complain, and argued consensual relations and an alleged marriage.

Summary of the Judgment

Appeal dismissed; conviction and sentence affirmed. The High Court upheld the trial court’s convictions under Section 366 IPC, Section 5(l) read with Section 6 of POCSO, and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.
Victim’s age proved via school records under JJ Act Section 94(2). The Court held Ex.P7 (school certificate produced through the Headmaster, PW14) showing the victim’s date of birth (20.07.2000) is the primary mode of proof. With the occurrence on 22.10.2015, the victim was 15 years and a few months old; hence, a “child” under Section 2(d) POCSO.
Section 34 POCSO is inapplicable to victim-age in adult-accused cases. The finality clause in Section 34(3) POCSO pertains to proceedings where the accused is a child and the Special Court determines the accused’s age; it does not shield age determinations relating to victims from appellate scrutiny in cases involving adult accused.
Consent is legally irrelevant where the victim is below 18. The Court reiterated that a child cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse; thus, any argument of consent or purported marriage does not exculpate the accused for POCSO offences.
Section 29 POCSO presumption applied. The Special Court is mandated to “shall presume” commission of the offence under Sections 3, 5, 7, or 9 unless rebutted. The appellant failed to adduce rebuttal evidence.
SC/ST Act enhancement sustained. Given the victim’s Scheduled Caste status, known to the appellant, and the underlying offence being punishable with imprisonment of ten years or more (Section 6 POCSO), Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was attracted.
Kidnapping established. The removal of the minor victim from her lawful guardianship to Coimbatore satisfied Sections 361 and 366 IPC.
Complaint by the victim sufficient. Under Section 19 POCSO, any person aware of a child sexual offence may inform the police. Therefore, the locus objection (that parents did not complain) was rejected.
Distinction with P. Yuvaprakash (2023 INSC 626). Unlike that case, the defence here did not impeach the authenticity of school records; hence, no benefit of doubt arose on age.

Detailed Analysis

Factual Matrix and Procedural History

PW1 (the victim) and PW4 (the appellant’s daughter) were classmates from the 7th standard and studied together in John Britto Higher Secondary School, Denkanikottai. During Dussehra holidays, PW1 stayed at PW4’s house, where the appellant had sexual intercourse with her at night and continued to do so on subsequent occasions. The victim conceived and delivered a child; later, she was taken by the appellant to Coimbatore, away from her parents’ custody. PW1 lodged the complaint on 03.06.2016 (Crime No. 12 of 2016). The case was investigated by the Deputy Superintendent of Police owing to the victim’s SC status. The trial resulted in conviction and severe sentences, including life imprisonment under the SC/ST Act. The present judgment addresses the appellant’s challenge to those findings.

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

State of Maharashtra v. Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550.
- Key proposition: The testimony of the prosecutrix in sexual offence cases stands on par with an injured witness and does not, as a matter of law, require corroboration. Courts should not insist on corroboration except where special circumstances warrant caution.
- Influence: The High Court explicitly adopted this approach, assessing PW1’s testimony as primary evidence and accepting it, especially when corroborated by PW4 and the fact of pregnancy and childbirth.
State Of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Deepak v. State of Haryana, (2015) 4 SCC 762.
- Reaffirmed the Chandraprakash approach that a prosecutrix’s credible testimony can sustain conviction without independent corroboration.
- Influence: Guided the Court’s evidentiary evaluation, countering the defence’s attack on the absence of parent-lodged complaint or peripheral inconsistencies.
P. Yuvaprakash v. State, 2023 INSC 626.
- Held that where school records lack reliability (e.g., date of birth derived from a horoscope) and contemporaneous birth records are missing, benefit of doubt on age may accrue to the accused.
- Distinction drawn: In Murugesan, Ex.P7 is a school extract reflecting the date of birth from institutional records; crucially, PW14 (Headmaster) was not cross-examined to undermine its authenticity. The defence laid no foundation to challenge the record, rendering Yuvaprakash inapplicable.

Statutory Framework and Legal Reasoning

1) Section 34 POCSO: Finality Limited to Juvenile‑Accused Proceedings

The Court clarified that Section 34(1)–(3) POCSO governs situations where the Special Court deals with an offence committed by a child (the accused being a juvenile). In such cases, the Court may determine the accused’s age and record reasons; that determination is insulated from invalidation by subsequent proof (Section 34(3)). The Bench held this regime does not extend to cases where the accused is an adult and the age at issue is that of the victim. Therefore, appellate courts may examine and review how the victim’s age was established in adult-accused POCSO cases.

2) Age Determination: JJ Act Section 94(2) Applies in POCSO Victim Cases

The POCSO Act does not prescribe a standalone procedure for determining a victim’s age. The Court adopted Section 94(2) JJ Act as the applicable evidentiary protocol, which establishes a hierarchy:

(i) Date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation certificate from the board (primary mode),
(ii) In its absence, birth certificate from the corporation/municipality/panchayat,
(iii) Only failing both, an ossification or other medical age determination test.

Applying this, Ex.P7 (school certificate) proved the victim’s date of birth as 20.07.2000. Since the incident occurred on 22.10.2015, she was aged approximately 15 years and 3 months. PW14’s testimony introducing Ex.P7 remained unshaken; thus, the victim was a “child” under Section 2(d) POCSO.

3) Consent by a Minor Is Legally Irrelevant Under POCSO

The defence suggested consensual intercourse and even an alleged marriage. The Court reaffirmed the settled law: a person below 18 cannot legally consent to sexual intercourse, and purported marital status does not sanitize sexual activity with a minor for purposes of POCSO liability. The sexual acts, the pregnancy, and the childbirth together established penetrative sexual assault of a child.

4) Section 29 POCSO: “Shall Presume” and Failure to Rebut

Under Section 29 POCSO, once the prosecution establishes foundational facts indicating the applicability of Sections 3, 5, 7, or 9, the Special Court must “shall presume” that the accused committed the offence unless the accused proves otherwise. The appellant offered no rebuttal evidence sufficient to displace this presumption. The credible testimony of PW1, corroborated by PW4 and the fact of pregnancy/childbirth, comfortably triggered Section 29; the presumption stood unrebutted.

5) Section 5(l) read with Section 6 POCSO: Aggravated Penetrative Sexual Assault

Given the victim’s minority and the nature and circumstances of the repeated sexual assaults culminating in pregnancy and childbirth, the conviction under Section 5(l) (aggravated penetrative sexual assault) read with Section 6 (punishment) was sustained. Section 6 prescribes a stringent minimum sentence, reinforcing POCSO’s protective design.

6) SC/ST Act Section 3(2)(v): Knowledge and Enhanced Punishment

Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act enhances punishment where an offence under the IPC punishable with ten years or more is committed against a person on the ground of their SC/ST status, and the offender knew the victim’s status. The Court found:

The underlying POCSO offence (Section 6) is punishable with ten years or more; and
On the evidence, the appellant knew the victim’s SC status (the school records noted caste; the relationship between the families made such knowledge reasonably inferable).

Accordingly, the life sentence under Section 3(2)(v) was upheld.

7) Kidnapping and Section 366 IPC

Sections 359–361 IPC define kidnapping, including kidnapping from lawful guardianship (Section 361). Section 366 penalizes kidnapping or abducting a woman with intent that she may be forced or seduced to illicit intercourse (among other intents). The Court found that the appellant removed the minor victim from the lawful guardianship of her parents to reside with him in Coimbatore, satisfying the ingredients of Section 366 on the facts.

8) Section 19 POCSO: Broad Locus for Reporting

The defence argued that since the parents did not complain, the prosecution fails. The Court rejected this, referencing Section 19 POCSO which authorizes “any person” to provide information about an offence under POCSO. Here, the victim herself lodged the complaint and made a Section 164 CrPC statement before the Magistrate, both of which are valid triggering events for investigation and prosecution.

Evaluation of the Evidence

PW1 (victim): Presented a consistent account of sexual assault, pregnancy, and removal from guardianship. She was not cross-examined on the core fact of the sexual acts.
PW4 (accused’s daughter): A “natural witness” who corroborated critical circumstances (presence in the house, sleeping arrangements, and discovery of appellant and PW1 sharing a bed).
PW14 (Headmaster): Proved Ex.P7 (school records showing date of birth and SC status). The defence did not challenge the provenance or authenticity of the document through cross-examination.
Medical evidence (PW8–PW10) and 164 CrPC statement: Supplemented the prosecution’s case. The Court emphasized that pregnancy and childbirth themselves corroborate the occurrence of sexual intercourse, and, given the victim’s minority, suffice to sustain the aggravated POCSO charge.

Impact and Significance

Doctrinal Clarifications with Systemic Effect

Victim-age determination anchored in JJ Act Section 94(2): Trial courts in POCSO matters should prioritize school records to establish age, resorting to municipal birth certificates only if school records are unavailable, and to medical age tests only as a last resort.
Section 34 POCSO confined to juvenile-accused: Appellate review remains open on victim-age determinations in adult-accused cases; the Section 34(3) finality shield does not apply.
Operationalization of Section 29 POCSO: The decision demonstrates effective use of the statutory presumption, emphasizing the accused’s burden to meaningfully rebut once foundational facts are proved.

Practical Consequences for Stakeholders

Prosecution and Investigators:
- Secure and prove school records early, through the competent custodian (Headmaster/Board official), anticipating Section 94(2) JJ Act.
- Document and prove the victim’s SC/ST status where applicable to assess and invoke SC/ST Act enhancements.
- Leverage Section 29 POCSO; ensure consistent statements (FIR, Section 164 CrPC) and natural witnesses are recorded.
Defence:
- Age challenges must be substantiated by impeaching the provenance and accuracy of school records through rigorous cross-examination or contrary documentary proof; mere conjecture or belated reliance on Yuvaprakash will not suffice.
- Arguments based on consent or putative marriage are legally untenable where the victim is below 18.
Trial Courts:
- Apply the JJ Act Section 94(2) hierarchy consistently; record reasons where any doubt persists.
- Treat victim testimony as central evidence in line with Chandraprakash and Gurmit Singh; avoid overemphasis on corroboration where the testimony inspires confidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Child” under POCSO: Any person below 18 years (Section 2(d)). Consent by such a person to sexual activity has no legal effect.
Section 34 POCSO: Governs age determination of the accused when the accused is a child; the Special Court’s determination is insulated by Section 34(3). It does not apply to the victim’s age in adult-accused prosecutions.
JJ Act Section 94(2) Age Hierarchy:
1. School/matriculation records (primary),
2. Municipal/Panchayat birth certificate (secondary),
3. Medical age tests (tertiary, only if 1 and 2 are unavailable).
Section 29 POCSO – “Shall Presume”: A mandatory presumption of guilt once foundational facts are shown; the accused must rebut it (typically on a preponderance of probabilities) by credible evidence. Failure to do so sustains conviction.
Kidnapping from Lawful Guardianship (Section 361 IPC): Taking or enticing a minor (below 18 for females) from the lawful guardian without consent. Section 366 punishes such kidnapping where the intent relates to illicit intercourse (among other intents).
SC/ST Act Section 3(2)(v): Enhances punishment to life where a person, knowing the victim is SC/ST, commits an IPC offence punishable with ten years or more against such person on account of their caste/tribe status.

Conclusion

The Madras High Court’s decision in Murugesan @ Murugesh v. State is a robust affirmation of POCSO’s protective mandate and a clarifying judgment on two important procedural points. First, it firmly situates victim-age determination within the JJ Act Section 94(2) framework, placing school records at the apex of evidentiary preference. Second, it limits the reach of Section 34 POCSO’s finality to juvenile-accused cases, ensuring that adult-accused prosecutions remain subject to appellate scrutiny regarding victim age. The Court also applied established Supreme Court jurisprudence that victim testimony in sexual offences needs no corroboration if credible, and underscored POCSO’s Section 29 presumption in the absence of rebuttal. By sustaining the SC/ST Act enhancement and the kidnapping conviction, the judgment sends a clear message on accountability where vulnerable minors from SC communities are targeted.

Key takeaways:

Victim age under POCSO is to be proved per JJ Act Section 94(2), ideally through school records.
Section 34 POCSO does not shield victim-age determinations in adult-accused cases from appellate review.
Consent or purported marriage is legally irrelevant where the victim is under 18.
Section 29 POCSO’s presumption is potent; defendants must actively rebut it with credible evidence.
Evidence of knowledge of caste coupled with a serious predicate offence justifies the SC/ST Act’s enhanced punishment.

Overall, this judgment strengthens procedural clarity and evidentiary discipline in POCSO prosecutions, while ensuring that the statutory objectives of both POCSO and the SC/ST Act are effectively realized.

Victim’s Age under POCSO Must Be Determined via JJ Act Section 94(2); Section 34 POCSO Confined to Juvenile‑Accused: Commentary on Murugesan @ Murugesh v. State (Madras High Court, 10 Oct 2025)