Uniform Superannuation in the Indian Coast Guard and the Limits of Article 33

Commentary on Cheeli J Ratnam v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 DHC 10356-DB (Delhi High Court, 24 November 2025)

1. Introduction

The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Cheeli J Ratnam v. Union of India & Ors. (decided on 24 November 2025) has delivered an important judgment at the intersection of constitutional law and military/service jurisprudence. The Court has:

Struck down Rule 20(1) and 20(2) of the Coast Guard (General) Rules, 1986 (“1986 Rules”) to the extent they prescribe a lower superannuation age of 57 years for officers up to the rank of Commandant and for enrolled personnel, while maintaining 60 years for officers above the rank of Commandant.
Mandated a uniform retirement age of 60 years for all ranks in the Indian Coast Guard.
Clarified the scope and limits of Article 33 of the Constitution as a defence to challenges under Articles 14 and 16.

The case arose from three writ petitions:

W.P.(C) 6028/2021 – Cheeli J Ratnam (Pradhan Adhikari – an enrolled rank)
W.P.(C) 9496/2020 – Comdt. AVW Rao
W.P.(C) 7579/2024 – Jitender Jit Singh Jamwal (Commandant)

All petitioners belonged to the Coast Guard and were compulsorily retired at age 57 under Rule 20. They challenged the constitutional validity of:

Rule 20(1) and 20(2) of the 1986 Rules; and
Subsequent orders of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Coast Guard Headquarters (CGHQ) refusing to equalize the retirement age.

The key constitutional issues were:

Whether Rule 20’s differential retirement age (60 vs 57) survives scrutiny under Articles 14 and 16.
Whether Article 33 shields such a rule, given that the Coast Guard is an “Armed Force of the Union”.
Whether the reasons advanced in official orders (21 July 2020, 20 May 2024, 2 December 2024) provide a constitutionally valid justification for the inequality.

In addressing these questions, the Court engages deeply with:

Its own earlier decision in Dev Sharma v. Indo Tibetan Border Police (2019) 174 DRJ 98 (DB);
Supreme Court jurisprudence under Article 33 (Ram Sarup, G.S. Bajwa, P.P.S. Bedi); and
Prior High Court decisions from Kerala and Madras, together with multiple executive reconsideration orders.

2. Factual and Procedural Background

2.1 Rule 20 of the Coast Guard (General) Rules, 1986

Rule 20 of the 1986 Rules provides:

Rule 20(1): Officers holding a rank higher than Commandant retire at 60 years; all other officers retire at 57 years.
Rule 20(2): “Enrolled persons” (subordinate officers, sailors, etc., as defined in Section 2(k) of the Coast Guard Act, 1978) retire at 57 years.

Thus, within the same armed force (the Coast Guard), there is a three-year gap in retirement age between:

Officers above Commandant; and
Officers up to and including Commandant, and all enrolled personnel.

2.2 The Dev Sharma precedent (CAPFs)

A similar differential structure existed earlier in the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) such as CRPF, ITBP, BSF, SSB, and also in CISF and Assam Rifles. In Dev Sharma v. Indo Tibetan Border Police, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that:

Providing a higher retirement age (60) to officers above Commandant and a lower age (57) to Commandant and below in CAPFs is discriminatory and violates Articles 14 and 16.
The differential was not supported by any rational or empirical basis relating to operational fitness or combat effectiveness.
The recommendations of the 7th Central Pay Commission (7th CPC), which supported a uniform age of 60, reinforced this conclusion.
Relief was to be implemented across all CAPFs, without requiring each member to litigate individually (¶¶ 113–115 of Dev Sharma).

The Union of India’s SLP and review against Dev Sharma were both dismissed by the Supreme Court (10 May 2019 and 16 July 2019), giving the decision finality.

The Ministry of Home Affairs thereafter issued an order dated 19 August 2019 implementing a uniform 60-year retirement age across all CAPFs and Assam Rifles.

However, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG) is not notified as a CAPF, and was not expressly covered by the MHA’s 19 August 2019 order nor by the operative portions of Dev Sharma.

2.3 Kerala High Court: V. Thulasi Nair

In V. Thulasi Nair v. Chief of Army Staff (Single Judge: 30 January 2015; DB: 10 August 2017), the Kerala High Court, in the context of ECHS benefits, observed that the Special Frontier Force and the Coast Guard are paramilitary forces, not part of the Armed Forces, and treated them as “central paramilitary forces”. The SLP against the Division Bench decision was dismissed in limine by the Supreme Court on 9 February 2018.

The Delhi High Court in the present case carefully notes (¶19.4) that the only relevant takeaway from Thulasi Nair is that the Coast Guard is a “paramilitary force”. It does not, however, alter the statutory character of the Coast Guard as defined in Section 4 of the Coast Guard Act, 1978, which calls it an “Armed Force of the Union”.

2.4 Madras High Court: Two Rounds of Litigation

2.4.1 First round: Parity extended then recalled in review

After Dev Sharma, BSF and CRPF officers approached the Madras High Court in a batch of writ petitions (led by W.P. No. 11956/2019), challenging the same differential retirement scheme. On 18 July 2019, the Madras High Court, following Dev Sharma, allowed those petitions.

Crucially, in that same order, the Court also extended relief to Coast Guard officers in W.P. No. 29647/2019 (Comdt. A.K.S. Panwar), even though that petition was not listed that day; it was said that the controversy was identical. The Union of India sought review (Review Application No. 156/2019), arguing that:

The Coast Guard is a sui generis force, distinct from CAPFs.
Dev Sharma did not consider the implications of Article 33.
The operational profile of Coast Guard officers (sea-going vs desk duties) justified differentiation.

On 10 March 2020, the Madras High Court:

Allowed the review insofar as it applied to the Coast Guard;
Recalled the 18 July 2019 judgment to that extent; and
Directed the Union to consider whether the retirement age of Coast Guard officers below Commandant could be increased to 60, treating Coast Guard as a paramilitary force performing akin functions.

2.4.2 MoD Order dated 21 July 2020 and second round in Madras

In response, the MoD passed an order dated 21 July 2020, refusing parity and citing several reasons:

Need for a younger age profile in a sea-going force.
High incidence of low medical category (LMC) in ages 50–54.
Possible “command and control” issues if superseded officers remained longer.
Impact on promotions and career progression.
Analogies with the Indian Navy’s structure and training.

This order was challenged in a new batch of writ petitions (led by W.P. No. 415/2021, Lakshmichandra Harishchandra Sharma v. Union of India). On 23 November 2023, the Madras High Court:

Set aside the MoD’s 21 July 2020 order as non-compliant with its earlier directions.
Noted that the order did not examine similarity/dissimilarity with CAPFs nor engage with Dev Sharma.
Indicated (citing Atul Shukla and Dev Sharma) that at least one key reason—offshore duties—was factually weak or doubtful.
Directed MoD to reconsider the matter, allowing petitioners to submit representations, and to pass a fresh order within four months.

2.5 CGHQ Order dated 20 May 2024 and MoD Order dated 2 December 2024

Pursuant to the Madras High Court’s 2023 judgment, the Coast Guard Headquarters issued an order dated 20 May 2024 once again refusing to equalize the retirement age. It:

Purported to compare Coast Guard and CAPFs, stressing differences in:
- Approach to 7th CPC (CAPFs made representations; Coast Guard did not).
- Time taken to reach the rank of Commandant.
- Nature of duties (maritime vs land-based; medical evacuation difficulties at sea).
Responded to various representations made by Coast Guard personnel.
Invoked Article 33, asserting that as an “Armed Force of the Union”, the Coast Guard’s service conditions, including retirement age, are governed by statutory rules not open to being overridden based on equality arguments, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikirtan Das (2023) 16 SCC 462 (¶44).
Asserted that differential superannuation age is permissible, citing CAPF medical officers (65 vs 60) and the Indian Navy’s structure.

On 2 December 2024, the MoD issued a further order to another retiree (Commandant L.H. Sharma), essentially reproducing the same reasoning and again deciding to “maintain status quo”.

These two orders (20 May 2024 and 2 December 2024), read together with the earlier 21 July 2020 order, formed the core executive response that the Delhi High Court had to assess.

3. Issues Before the Delhi High Court

Against this factual and procedural backdrop, the Delhi High Court identified the central controversy as (¶15):

“Whether Rule 20 of the 1986 Rules, to the extent it fixes 57 as the age of superannuation for officers upto the rank of Commandant, and 60 as the age of superannuation for officers above the rank of Commandant, is, or is not, legally sustainable.”

In more analytical terms, the main issues were:

Whether Dev Sharma automatically governs the Coast Guard situation, or whether a fresh analysis is required.
Whether Article 33 of the Constitution:
- Automatically validates rules that infringe fundamental rights in relation to armed forces; or
- Is subject to judicial scrutiny requiring a demonstrable link to “proper discharge of duties” and “maintenance of discipline”.
Whether, assuming Article 33 does not save Rule 20, the Rule meets the equality standards of Articles 14 and 16:
- Is there a permissible classification?
- Is there an intelligible differentia?
- Is there a rational nexus with the object of the legislation?
What relief should be granted to the petitioners who have already retired at 57.

4. Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench (C. Hari Shankar, J. and Om Prakash Shukla, J.) holds:

Dev Sharma does not automatically govern the Coast Guard because:
- It dealt expressly with CAPFs and Assam Rifles, not with the Coast Guard; and
- It did not discuss Article 33 (¶¶35–36).
Article 33:
- Empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate fundamental rights in relation to members of the armed forces (¶37.1).
- But only “so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them” (¶37.1).
- Does not create a blanket immunity from constitutional scrutiny; the Court must check whether the restriction is genuinely related to duties or discipline (¶¶37.2–37.5).
- In this case, the justifications for differential retirement age do not relate to those Article 33 purposes and are, in parts, “flabbergasting” or “astonishing” (¶¶38.4, 39.8.6–39.8.8).
Rule 20(1) and 20(2) violate Articles 14 and 16:
- They plainly discriminate between similarly situated persons (all members of the Coast Guard) by giving a higher superannuation age only to those above Commandant (¶39.5).
- The only real differentia is rank, and the reasons advanced do not establish a rational nexus with any legitimate object (¶¶39.6–39.8).
- The executive’s reasons are rhetorical, unsupported by empirical data, and in some respects internally inconsistent (¶39.8.6–39.8.8).
- Continuing such disparity is also likely to lower morale, which is antithetical to the very goals (operational effectiveness and discipline) that the Union claims (¶38.7, ¶39.9).
Rule 20(1) and (2) are struck down to the extent they fix 57 as the retirement age for:
- Officers of the rank of Commandant and below; and
- Enrolled persons (¶41–40).
Uniform retirement age of 60 years:
- The Court declares that the age of superannuation of 60 years applies to all ranks of the Coast Guard (¶41).
Relief to petitioners:
- They are to be treated as having continued in service notionally until age 60 (i.e., for three additional years beyond their actual retirement at 57) (¶42).
- They are entitled to:
  - Pay and allowances for that notional period, including increments and pay refixations; and
  - Recomputation of all retiral benefits (pension, gratuity, etc.) accordingly.
- The differentials are to be paid within 12 weeks from upload of the judgment (¶43).

5. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

5.1 Dev Sharma (Delhi High Court, 2019)

Dev Sharma v. Indo Tibetan Border Police laid the foundational principle that:

A mere policy decision on retirement age is not immune from judicial review if it is plainly discriminatory (¶21.4(i)).
The differential superannuation age between Commandant-and-below and above-Commandant in CAPFs lacked rational justification and violated Articles 14 and 16 (¶21.8–21.9).
Morale of CAPF personnel and parity with CISF and Assam Rifles were relevant considerations.

In the present case, the Delhi High Court:

Recognizes Dev Sharma as a binding coordinate Bench decision (¶36.1).
Notes that its key observation on morale—disparity in retirement ages may lower morale—applies with equal force to the Coast Guard (¶36.2, ¶38.7).
Nonetheless undertakes a fresh analysis because:
- Coast Guard is not a CAPF; and
- Dev Sharma did not consider Article 33 (¶35.3, ¶36.1).

5.2 Atul Shukla (Supreme Court, 2014)

In Union of India v. Atul Shukla (2014) 10 SCC 432, the Supreme Court struck down a differential retirement age for:

Group Captain (Select) vs
Group Captain (Time-Scale)

within the IAF, holding that concerns about “combat effectiveness” and “younger force profile” were too tenuous and unsubstantiated to justify different treatment (see ¶21.4(iii)–(v) of the present judgment).

The Delhi High Court uses Atul Shukla as:

A template for examining the empirical soundness of justifications for disparate retirement ages.
Authority for rejecting vague or perception-based arguments that lack data or concrete correlation to duty performance.

5.3 Article 33 Cases: Ram Sarup, P.P.S. Bedi, G.S. Bajwa

5.3.1 Ram Sarup v. Union Of India (Constitution Bench, 1965)

In Ram Sarup v. Union Of India, the Constitution Bench considered a challenge to Section 125 of the Army Act (choice between court-martial and criminal court) as being violative of Article 14. The Court held (¶15 of Ram Sarup, quoted at ¶37.8.3 of the present judgment) that:

“…if any such provision tends to affect the fundamental right under Part III…, that provision does not, on that account become void, as it must be taken that Parliament has thereby, in the exercise of its power under Article 33 of the Constitution, made the requisite modification…”

Although the Delhi High Court accepts this precedent, it emphasizes that:

Article 33 allows restriction/abrogation of rights only to the extent necessary to ensure proper discharge of duties or maintenance of discipline (¶37.1).
Courts still retain jurisdiction to test whether invoking Article 33 is bona fide and related to those purposes (¶37.4–37.5).

5.3.2 Lt Col P.P.S. Bedi v. Union of India (1982) 3 SCC 140

Quoted in Bajwa and referenced in the present judgment (¶37.9.4–37.9.5), P.P.S. Bedi clarified that Parliament need not specify, right by right, how each fundamental right is curtailed; the very enactment of the Army Act is treated as a modification of Part III rights subject to Article 33.

5.3.3 Union of India v. Ex Flt Lt G.S. Bajwa (2003) 9 SCC 630

Bajwa involved the question whether an Air Force officer had a fundamental right (under Article 21) to state-funded counsel in a court-martial. The Supreme Court held:

Article 33 empowers Parliament to restrict or abrogate any Part III rights for armed forces personnel.
If a provision in the Air Force Act or Rules restricts a Part III right, it cannot be struck down simply for that reason (¶19, ¶23).

The Delhi High Court, while acknowledging this line of authority, carefully carves out space for judicial review:

It stresses that courts must still verify that such restrictions are genuinely linked to “duties” and “discipline” (¶37.2–37.5).
The power is wide but not a license for arbitrary or unrelated curtailment.

5.4 Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmachari Sangh and Bikirtan Das

The respondents also relied upon:

Delhi Police Non-Gazetted Karmachari Sangh v. Union Of India (1987) 1 SCC 115 – upholding restrictions on police associations under Article 33 read with Article 19(4).
Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikirtan Das (2023) 16 SCC 462 – where the Supreme Court held that superannuation is governed by statutory rules and similarity of duties between posts is not, by itself, a ground to alter those rules (¶38.1(vii)–(viii)).

The Delhi High Court distinguishes Bikirtan Das, noting that:

It lays down that service conditions are governed by rules, but does not immunize such rules from constitutional challenge.
When those rules operate within an armed force and invoke Article 33, they must still pass the Article 14/16 test unless genuinely protected under Article 33 in the limited sense discussed (¶38.2–38.5, ¶39.1–39.4).

6. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

6.1 Dev Sharma and the Court’s Remit

The Court begins by clarifying its relationship to Dev Sharma:

As a coordinate Division Bench, Dev Sharma is binding (¶36.1).
However, it dealt with CAPFs and not with the Coast Guard, and it did not consider Article 33 (¶35.3).
Nonetheless, the finding that differential retirement ages harm morale is equally relevant to the Coast Guard (¶36.2).

The Court, therefore, proceeds to:

Accept Dev Sharma’s equality analysis and the importance of morale.
Superimpose on it a detailed consideration of Article 33, which had been missing earlier.
Conduct a full Article 14/16 review of Rule 20 in the Coast Guard context.

6.2 Article 33: Wide but Not Absolute

Article 33 allows Parliament, by law, to:

Determine to what extent Part III rights shall apply to members of:
- Armed forces,
- Forces charged with maintenance of public order,
- Intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies, and
- Certain telecom systems.
Restrict or abrogate those rights “so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them” (¶37.1).

The Court’s key clarifications are:

Judicial deference is high but not total:
- Courts must show “a great deal of latitude” to the executive on how armed forces should function (¶37.3).
- But where the restriction has no real nexus to duties or discipline, or is arbitrary, mala fide, or colourable, courts can and must intervene (¶37.4–37.5).
Fact-based scrutiny remains necessary:
- Courts cannot simply accept the executive’s invocation of Article 33 “blindly” (¶37.4–37.5, ¶37.10.3–37.10.4).
- They must examine whether the justifications offered actually relate to operational efficiency or discipline.
Scope of review:
- The Court describes its remit as “the peripheries of the area within which the Court can peregrinate” (¶37.10.4): it does not second-guess military policy, but it ensures that constitutional guardrails are not abandoned.

6.3 Application of Article 33 to Rule 20 and MoD/CGHQ Orders

Turning to the specific justifications cited in the 20 May 2024 order (and reiterated on 2 December 2024), the Court lists them (¶38.1) and critically evaluates whether they relate to:

Proper discharge of duties; or
Maintenance of discipline.

The Court notes that the reasons include:

No Coast Guard representation to the 7th CPC when CAPFs did (administrative history point).
Earlier selection to Commandant rank in Coast Guard than CAPFs.
Difficulties in evacuating older personnel from sea; risk and cost of medical evacuation.
Existing differential retirement ages for CAPF medical officers.
Assertion that Parliament’s Article 33 power, plus statutory rules, suffices.
Analogy with Indian Navy’s differential retirement structure.

The Bench finds (¶38.2–38.7):

These considerations have “nothing whatsoever to do” with ensuring proper discharge of duties or maintenance of discipline.
Some reasons are “flabbergasting” (¶38.4), such as the suggestion that officers between 57–60 years at sea pose markedly greater medical evacuation issues than those below 57.
The Court asks the obvious rhetorical question: “Is it that persons below the age of 57 years would not fall sick while at sea…?” (¶38.4).
Notably, the order does not identify specific duties or responsibilities that demand a 57-year ceiling for Commandant and below (¶38.6).
On the contrary, uniform retirement age could enhance morale and duty performance (¶38.7), aligning with the rationale in Dev Sharma.

Conclusion on Article 33: Article 33 cannot be used to insulate Rule 20 from scrutiny where the differential retirement ages are not demonstrably connected to duties or discipline (¶38.8).

6.4 Articles 14 and 16: The Classic Equality Test

Having found Article 33 inapplicable as a shield, the Court applies the well-settled equality test (¶39.1–39.4):

Does the rule discriminate between persons similarly situated?
Is there an intelligible differentia distinguishing them?
What is the object of the rule?
Is there a rational nexus between the differentia and the object?

6.4.1 Discrimination between similarly situated persons

The Court answers this in the affirmative:

All ranks are members of the same force, the Coast Guard.
Yet officers above Commandant retire at 60, while:
- Officers up to Commandant, and
- Enrolled personnel
retire at 57 (¶39.5).

6.4.2 Intelligible differentia

The only “differentia” is the rank distinction—Commandant and below vs above. The Court notes:

Madras High Court has already held many earlier reasons (offshore duties, etc.) unpersuasive (¶39.6.1).
The respondents had another opportunity to rationally justify the difference (post-23 November 2023), but the 20 May 2024 and 2 December 2024 orders largely restate flawed or irrelevant considerations (¶39.6.2).

6.4.3 Object of Rule 20

The only articulated object is that the Coast Guard has adopted “differential retirement age structure as per the needs and requirements of the service” (¶39.7.1). However:

No concrete explanation of these “needs and requirements” is provided beyond the same generalities (younger force, medical issues, promotions, etc.) (¶39.7.2).
Nor is there any data-driven demonstration that 57 vs 60 makes an operational difference.

6.4.4 Rational nexus (or the lack of it)

This is where the Court’s criticism is strongest:

The reasons in the 21 July 2020 order have already been undermined by the Madras High Court in Lakshmichandra Harishchandra Sharma (¶39.8.3).
The fresh reasons (20 May 2024 / 2 December 2024) are:
- “Not one of them has any connection with the needs and requirements of the Coast Guard” in any meaningful sense (¶39.8.4).
- Based on assumptions unsupported by any empirical data (¶39.8.6–39.8.8).
- Rely on abstract rhetoric—“optimum output and dynamic efficiency”, “sustained growth of the ICG fleet”, “age related afflictions”, “invariable supersession”, “complacency and inertia”—without evidentiary foundation (¶39.8.8).
The Court points out several logical flaws:
- No basis to assume officers are significantly less fit at 60 than at 57 (¶39.8.7).

The Court also emphasizes:

All other paramilitary forces (CRPF, CISF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, Assam Rifles) have already equalized the retirement age after Dev Sharma; the Coast Guard is now the only paramilitary force with a 3-year disparity (¶39.8.10).
The alleged “difference in the nature of duties” among these forces is, therefore, not being used in practice as a justification for disparity anywhere else (¶39.8.10).

Conclusion on equality: Rule 20’s differential retirement ages have no rational nexus to any legitimate object and are thus violative of Articles 14 and 16 (¶39.9).

7. Impact and Significance

7.1 Immediate Impact on the Indian Coast Guard

The judgment has direct, structural consequences:

Uniform retirement age of 60 now applies to:
- All officers, irrespective of rank; and
- All enrolled personnel.
Rule 20(1) and (2) will need to be formally amended to reflect this, but until then, the Court’s declaration governs.
Budgetary and cadre planning implications:
- Manpower planning, promotion cycles, and vacancy creation will be affected.
- However, these are administrative consequences the government must absorb; they cannot justify a constitutionally infirm rule.
Financial implications:
- All petitioners get notional continuity of service till 60 with full pay and allowances and recomputed pension/gratuity (¶42–43).
- Although limited to petitioners here, Dev Sharma indicates that similar benefits may logically have to be extended to other similarly situated Coast Guard personnel, unless distinguished on some valid ground.

7.2 Clarifying the Limits of Article 33

Perhaps the most doctrinally significant aspect is the Court’s treatment of Article 33:

It reaffirms the broad power Parliament has, but insists that:
- The aim of the restriction must be to ensure:
  - Proper discharge of duties; and/or
  - Maintenance of discipline.
- Courts may check whether there is any real connection between the measure and those aims.
It resists any simplistic reading of Ram Sarup and Bajwa as granting blanket immunity to all armed forces legislation irrespective of content (¶37.10.1–37.10.4).
It emphasizes that where restrictions on fundamental rights are not plausibly related to duties or discipline, they must “perish” as unconstitutional (¶37.5, ¶38.8).

This nuanced approach may influence future litigation involving:

Conditions of service (e.g., postings, promotions, tenures) in the armed forces and allied forces.
Use of “combat effectiveness” or “discipline” as a stock justification for unequal treatment.

7.3 Strengthening Equality in Service Jurisprudence

Building on Dev Sharma and Atul Shukla, the judgment reinforces that:

Retirement age differentials are subject to strict equality scrutiny.
Mere differences in:
- Rank,
- Labels (paramilitary vs armed force), or
- Abstract references to operational exigencies
are insufficient without empirical backing and rational connection.
Morale and fair treatment of personnel at different ranks is a relevant and significant factor under Articles 14 and 16.

7.4 Institutional Dialogue: High Courts and the Executive

The procedural history shows a prolonged dialogue:

Kerala HC classified Coast Guard as a paramilitary force.
Madras HC twice required a reasoned and data-based reconsideration by the Union.
The Union responded with similarly worded orders that failed to cure earlier defects.
Delhi HC ultimately struck down the rule itself, finding persisting non-compliance and constitutional infirmity.

This illustrates how repeated judicial directions, coupled with inadequate executive responses, can culminate in stronger judicial remedies—here, invalidation of the rule rather than just quashing of individual orders.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

8.1 Superannuation

“Superannuation” simply means retirement from service on reaching a fixed age. Service rules prescribe:

The age at which an employee must retire; and
Whether that age can be extended in specific circumstances (usually not in this context).

8.2 Articles 14 and 16: Equality and Non-Discrimination

Article 14 guarantees “equality before the law” and “equal protection of the laws”. This prohibits arbitrary state action and unreasonable classification.
Article 16 specifically guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.

A classification is valid only if:

There is an intelligible differentia distinguishing those grouped together from others; and
This differentia has a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved by the law or policy.

8.3 Article 33: Special Provisions for Armed Forces and Similar Services

Article 33 allows Parliament to:

Limit or take away certain fundamental rights of:
- Members of the Armed Forces,
- Forces maintaining public order,
- Certain intelligence organisations, and
- Relevant telecom personnel.
But only so far as necessary to:
- Ensure proper discharge of duties; and
- Maintain discipline.

Thus, Article 33 is a targeted exception to Part III rights, not a blanket immunity for all rules relating to armed forces.

8.4 CAPFs, Paramilitary Forces, and “Armed Force of the Union”

CAPFs (Central Armed Police Forces): Statutorily defined forces under MHA such as CRPF, BSF, ITBP, CISF, SSB, Assam Rifles.
Paramilitary Forces: A broader descriptive category often used judicially and administratively for forces that are organized on military lines but not part of the three main defence services.
Indian Coast Guard: Under the Coast Guard Act, 1978, specifically designated as an “Armed Force of the Union” (Section 4), and under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence.

Label differences (CAPF vs paramilitary vs armed force) do not, by themselves, justify unequal retirement ages without rational justification.

8.5 Coordinate Bench and Binding Precedent

A “coordinate Bench” is a bench of the same strength (e.g., a two-judge Division Bench vis-à-vis another two-judge Division Bench). As a rule:

One coordinate Bench is bound by the decisions of another coordinate Bench of the same court.
If it disagrees, it should refer the matter to a larger Bench rather than overrule it.

Here, Dev Sharma is such a coordinate Bench decision binding on the present Division Bench, though it can be distinguished on facts or supplemented by additional analysis (like Article 33).

9. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

The judgment in Cheeli J Ratnam v. Union of India is significant for several reasons:

Substantive equality triumphs over unsupported policy claims:
- The Court strikes down a three-year differential in retirement age within the same force as unconstitutional.
- It refuses to accept high-level claims about “young profile”, “combat effectiveness”, or “command and control issues” without concrete evidence.
Article 33 is given principled boundaries:
- The Court harmonizes older Supreme Court precedents with a modern equality-focused approach.
- It emphasizes that restrictions must be demonstrably tied to duty performance or discipline, not merely asserted in abstract.
Uniform retirement age in the Indian Coast Guard:
- All Coast Guard personnel—officers and enrolled—will now retire at 60, aligning with other paramilitary forces post-Dev Sharma.
- This enhances parity, morale, and fairness among ranks within the Coast Guard.
Reinforcement of judicial review in service matters:
- While reiterating that fixation of retirement age is policy, the Court reaffirms that such policy is reviewable where discriminatory or arbitrary.
Remedial justice for affected personnel:
- The petitioners, already retired at 57, receive notional continuity and financial benefits for the additional three years.
- This mirrors the sensitive remedial structure adopted in Dev Sharma, balancing “no work, no pay” with fair pension adjustment.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment strengthens the principle that:

Armed forces and paramilitary personnel, while subject to special discipline regimes, are not outside the Constitution. Article 33 narrows, but does not extinguish, their fundamental rights, and any curtailment must be justified, necessary, and non-arbitrary.

By extending the Dev Sharma logic of equality to the Coast Guard and simultaneously refining the use of Article 33, the Delhi High Court sets an important precedent for future service and constitutional litigation involving uniformed forces.