Twin-Blockades and Conclusive Legitimacy: Supreme Court Restricts Court-Ordered DNA Profiling in Criminal Investigations Absent Non-Access and Direct Nexus to the Offence

Introduction

In R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 INSC 1304 (Supreme Court of India, 10 November 2025), the Court decisively curtailed the judicial use of DNA profiling in criminal investigations where the paternity of a child is merely a collateral issue. The appeal arose from High Court directions compelling the appellant (a medical practitioner) to undergo DNA testing along with respondent no.1 (the complainant) and her child, to support allegations of cheating under Sections 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4(1) of the Tamil Nadu Women Harassment Act.

The factual matrix is unusual: Respondent no.1, married to Abdul Latheef since 2001, alleged a long-standing extra-marital relationship with the appellant, leading to the birth of a child on 08.03.2007. After a public disclosure through a television programme in 2014, an FIR was registered. The investigating police sought DNA profiling; the Magistrate directed it; the appellant did not comply. Multiple writ rounds ensued. Ultimately, a Single Judge and then the Division Bench of the Madras High Court directed DNA sampling. The Supreme Court was asked: Was the High Court justified in directing the appellant to undergo DNA testing?

The case sits at the intersection of three powerful doctrines: (i) the conclusive presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; (ii) constitutional privacy and bodily autonomy under Article 21; and (iii) the scope of forensic compulsion under the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), particularly Sections 53 and 53A. The Court’s answer reaffirms the primacy of Section 112, adopts the “twin blockades” framework for DNA orders, and narrows the use of CrPC provisions where the alleged offence has no direct evidentiary nexus to paternity.

Summary of the Judgment

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court’s direction mandating DNA testing. The Court held:

• The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Evidence Act is conclusive unless rebutted by strong, unambiguous proof of “non-access” between the spouses at the time of conception; mere allegations of simultaneous access or infidelity are insufficient.
• Respondent no.1 failed to plead or prove non-access. Documentary records (birth and school certificates) consistently naming the husband as father reinforce the presumption.
• DNA testing cannot be ordered as a matter of course; the “eminent need” standard (Bhabani Prasad Jena) and the “twin blockades” test (Ivan Rathinam) were not met. The evidence was not insufficient and the balance of interests did not favor testing.
• Paternity is collateral to the alleged offences of cheating and harassment. Sections 53 and 53A CrPC apply only where a medical examination bears a direct and proximate nexus to the commission of the offence; that nexus was absent here.
• Compelled DNA testing would disproportionately infringe the privacy and bodily autonomy of the appellant and the now-major child. Respondent no.1 cannot waive others’ privacy. The Puttaswamy threefold test (legality, legitimate aim, proportionality) was not satisfied.
• No adverse inference can be drawn from the appellant’s refusal to undergo DNA testing before the threshold grounds for ordering such testing are met (Aparna Ajinkya Firodia).

Result: The impugned High Court orders were set aside. The child continues, in law, to be the legitimate child of Abdul Latheef under Section 112. The appeal was allowed.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Goutam Kundu v. State Of West Bengal (1993) 3 SCC 418:
  Foundation case setting parameters for blood/DNA testing: not as a matter of course; avoid roving inquiries; strong prima facie case required; consequences on legitimacy must be weighed; and no compulsion to give blood sample. This judgment supplies the baseline restraint that later privacy jurisprudence fortified.
• Sharda v. Dharmpal (2003) 4 SCC 493:
  Recognized courts’ power (in matrimonial matters) to order medical tests without violating Article 21, but only upon a strong prima facie case, with the possibility of drawing adverse inference upon non-compliance. The current judgment uses Sharda conjunctively with later privacy-sensitive standards to stress circumspection.
• Bhabani Prasad Jena v. Convenor Secretary, Orissa SCW (2010) 8 SCC 633:
  Crystallized the “eminent need” test: courts should direct DNA tests only after balancing privacy and legitimacy concerns, and only if the truth cannot be reached without the test. The Supreme Court applies Bhabani to conclude there was no such eminent need here.
• Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram (2001) 5 SCC 311:
  Explained the elevated standard to rebut Section 112: higher than mere preponderance but less than beyond reasonable doubt, ensuring “no possibility” of conception through the husband. The Court adopts this exacting threshold to hold the presumption unrebutted.
• Nandlal Wasudeo Badwaik v. Lata Nandlal Badwaik (2014) 2 SCC 576:
  Distinguished: In Nandlal, the DNA test had already been conducted without objection; the issue was the evidentiary value of that result vis-à-vis Section 112. Here, by contrast, ordering a fresh DNA test at the threshold against an unwilling party was sought—an entirely different question.
• Dipanwita Roy v. Ronobroto Roy (2015) 1 SCC 365:
  Also distinguished: The DNA test in that case was directed in a divorce proceeding to decide adultery—legitimacy was incidental, and the Court expressly preserved Section 112. The present case attempts to use DNA to dislodge legitimacy for criminal charges—qualitatively different.
• Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 175:
  Key articulation of the “twin blockades” for DNA orders: (i) insufficiency of existing evidence; and (ii) a positive balance of interests. The Supreme Court applies this test to hold both blockades were not crossed.
• Inayath Ali v. State of Telangana (2024) 7 SCC 822:
  Rejected DNA sampling of minor children where paternity was collateral to the criminal charges; underscored Section 112’s protective role and warned against treating children as “material objects” for forensic purposes. This case strongly supports the collateral-issue rationale in Rajendran.
• Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia, 2023 INSC 146:
  Clarified sequencing: a court must first be satisfied that a DNA test is necessary; only after a lawful order and a party’s refusal does adverse inference arise (the “outer fence/inner fence” metaphor). Applied to reject adverse inference here.
• K.S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1 and Puttaswamy (Aadhaar) (2019) 1 SCC 1:
  Furnished the privacy framework: legality, legitimate aim (need), and proportionality. Compelled DNA sampling is a grave intrusion; absent a direct nexus and proportionality, the order fails constitutional scrutiny.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Section 112 presumption and “non-access”
   • Section 112 creates “conclusive proof” of legitimacy for children born during a valid marriage—rebuttable only by proving non-access (i.e., impossibility of sexual relations) at the relevant time.
   • Non-access is a narrow concept. Absence of cohabitation, infidelity, separate residences, or non-communication are not conclusive. Simultaneous access with a third party does not negate the husband’s access.
   • Respondent no.1 neither pleaded nor proved non-access. Conversely, public documents consistently named the husband as father. The presumption stands unrebutted.
2. Stringent thresholds for DNA testing
   • Reaffirming Goutam Kundu and Bhabani Prasad Jena: DNA testing is not routine; it requires a strong case and “eminent need.”
   • Applying Ivan Rathinam’s twin blockades:
     • Insufficiency of evidence? No. Section 112 presumption, supported by records, suffices absent non-access pleadings.
     • Balance of interests? Weighs against testing, given privacy and dignity of the appellant and the adult child, with limited investigative utility.
3. Privacy and proportionality
   • Compelled DNA sampling engages Article 21 privacy and bodily autonomy. Puttaswamy requires legality, a legitimate state aim, and proportionality.
   • Respondent no.1’s consent cannot waive the privacy of others. The supposed aim (establishing paternity) lacks direct relevance to the alleged offences; proportionality fails because the intrusion outweighs any incremental probative value.
4. CrPC Sections 53 and 53A are inapplicable
   • These provisions authorize medical examination where it directly yields evidence of the alleged offence (e.g., bodily fluids in sexual offences).
   • Cheating and harassment charges here do not turn on paternity; thus, there is no proximate evidentiary nexus to justify DNA profiling under these sections.
5. Adverse inference under Section 114 Evidence Act
   • Per Aparna Ajinkya Firodia, a court must first lawfully decide to order a DNA test; only then does refusal trigger possible adverse inferences.
   • At the threshold stage—where the test is not warranted—no adverse inference arises.
6. Collateral nature of paternity to the penal charges
   • As in Inayath Ali, paternity was not central to proving offences under Sections 417/420 IPC or the TN Women Harassment Act.
   • DNA testing would therefore be a disproportionate, privacy-invasive exercise to resolve a non-essential, collateral fact.

C. Impact and Future Trajectory

• Criminal investigations: The decision significantly narrows the use of DNA orders where paternity is collateral, requiring a direct and demonstrable nexus between the test and the elements of the offence. Investigators must rely on conventional evidence to prove cheating/harassment without resorting to paternity determinations.
• Section 112 fortified: The judgment strengthens the “legitimacy shield,” emphasizing that:
  • Simultaneous access does not rebut legitimacy.
  • Non-access must be specifically pleaded and proved at a high threshold.
  • Scientific tests cannot be used to casually destabilize a child’s legal status.
• Privacy jurisprudence deepened: Compelled DNA testing of unwilling adults or now-major children requires rigorous Puttaswamy-compliant justification. One party’s waiver does not bind others.
• Procedural discipline on adverse inference: Parties cannot leap to Section 114 inferences without first crossing the legal threshold for ordering a test.
• CrPC 53/53A constrained: Courts and police must establish a proximate evidentiary link between the medical examination and the offence; otherwise, such orders are ultra vires and disproportionate.
• Child-centric ethics: The Court foregrounds the psychological and social costs of involuntary genetic testing, particularly for children (now adults), reinforcing that individuals are not “material objects” for forensics.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Section 112 (Evidence Act): Conclusive proof of legitimacy
  If a child is born during a valid marriage, the law treats the husband as the father. This can be rebutted only by proving “non-access”—that the spouses could not have had sexual relations at the relevant time.
• “Non-access”
  A narrow concept meaning impossibility of sexual relations (e.g., physical absence, incapacity). Mere infidelity or separate residence does not amount to non-access. Simultaneous access with a third party does not disprove the husband’s access.
• “Eminent need” for DNA testing
  DNA tests should be ordered only when the truth cannot be reached without them and after carefully balancing privacy and potential harm (Bhabani Prasad Jena).
• “Twin blockades” test (Ivan Rathinam)
  Before ordering DNA profiling, the court must find: (i) existing evidence is insufficient; and (ii) the balance of interests (privacy, dignity, stigma) positively supports testing.
• Privacy proportionality (Puttaswamy)
  Any intrusion into privacy must satisfy: legality (authorized by law), legitimate aim (a real need tied to a state objective), and proportionality (the means are the least intrusive for the goal). Compelled DNA sampling is a severe intrusion requiring strict justification.
• Collateral fact
  A fact not central to proving the offence’s elements. If paternity is collateral to cheating/harassment charges, compelling DNA testing to prove it is generally disproportionate.
• Adverse inference (Section 114 Evidence Act)
  Courts may sometimes presume against a party who withholds evidence—but only after the court has lawfully required that evidence. If a DNA order is unwarranted, refusal cannot attract adverse inference.
• CrPC Sections 53 and 53A
  Permit medical examination (including DNA profiling) of an arrested accused when such examination can directly yield evidence of the alleged offence (e.g., sexual offences). They do not authorize fishing for unrelated facts.

Conclusion

This judgment delivers a robust, privacy-conscious, and child-centric calibration of when DNA profiling may be judicially compelled in criminal proceedings. Three central takeaways emerge:

• Legitimacy shield preserved: Section 112 remains a bulwark against casual illegitimization. Without a specific, cogent plea of non-access at a heightened standard of proof, legitimacy stands, and courts will not order DNA tests to unsettle it.
• DNA orders are exceptional: Applying Bhabani and Ivan Rathinam, the Court insists on “eminent need” and the “twin blockades”—insufficient existing evidence and a favorable balance of interests. Privacy and dignity, including that of now-major children, weigh heavily against compulsion.
• Nexus to offence required: CrPC 53/53A cannot be invoked absent a direct, proximate evidentiary link between the medical examination and the offence. Paternity here was collateral to cheating and harassment charges, rendering DNA testing disproportionate and unconstitutional.

By setting aside the High Court’s order, the Supreme Court reiterates that scientific tools, however advanced, must not become instruments of speculation or stigma. The ruling will serve as a controlling precedent against routine recourse to DNA profiling in criminal cases where the offence charged does not genuinely hinge on paternity, and it reaffirms the principled centrality of Section 112 and Article 21 in safeguarding children’s legitimacy and individuals’ bodily autonomy.