Tushar @ Nandi @ Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh:
Strict Scrutiny of Externment under the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 and Unimpaired Writ Jurisdiction under Article 226

1. Introduction

The decision of the Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Tushar @ Nandi @ Anand v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Writ Appeal No. 1035 of 2025, decided on 13.11.2025) is a significant reiteration and refinement of the law governing externment orders under the Madhya Pradesh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (“Act, 1990”). It also emphatically clarifies that a statutory bar on interference (Section 10 of the Act, 1990) cannot curtail the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

The case arose out of an externment order passed by the District Magistrate, Betul, directing the appellant to remove himself not only from District Betul but also from several adjoining districts, for a period of one year. The order was based upon the appellant’s alleged criminal antecedents and an assertion that witnesses were unwilling to depose against him due to fear.

On appeal, the Divisional Commissioner, Narmadapuram, affirmed the externment order. Subsequently, a writ petition challenging these orders was dismissed by a learned Single Judge, who placed considerable weight on the fact that the procedure under the Act was followed and on the so‑called restriction in Section 10 of the Act, 1990 against interference with such orders.

The Division Bench (Hon’ble the Chief Justice Sanjeev Sachdeva and Hon’ble Shri Justice Vinay Saraf), hearing an intra‑court appeal (writ appeal), reversed this outcome. The Court quashed the externment order, the appellate order of the Divisional Commissioner, and the Single Judge’s judgment.

This commentary analyses the judgment in depth – its factual context, legal reasoning, use of precedents, and its broader impact on the law of externment and judicial review in Madhya Pradesh.

---

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1. Initiation of Externment Proceedings

• On 22.03.2024, the Superintendent of Police, District Betul, submitted a recommendation to the District Magistrate (DM), Betul, proposing the externment of the appellant under the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990.
• The stated basis was that as many as 12 criminal cases had been registered against the appellant in the past, that he was a “habitual” offender, and that his presence allegedly created an atmosphere of fear, deterring witnesses from coming forward to depose against him.
• Interestingly – and crucial to the Division Bench’s reasoning – the last paragraph of the recommendation reportedly requested externment of “one Golu s/o Prabhakar Solanki”, yet the order actually passed targeted the present appellant, highlighting a serious issue of non‑application of mind.

2.2. Show Cause Notice and District Magistrate’s Order

• Acting on the SP’s recommendation, the District Magistrate, Betul, issued a show cause notice to the appellant under Section 8(1) of the Act, 1990 on 19.04.2024.
• After recording statements of certain witnesses and hearing the appellant, the District Magistrate passed an order on 21.11.2024 under Sections 3(1), 5(a) & 5(b) read with Section 7 of the Act, 1990.
• The order directed the appellant to remove himself from:
  • District Betul, and
  • Adjacent districts: Chhindwara, Narmadapuram, Khandwa and Harda,
  for a period of one year from the date of the order, with a prohibition on re‑entering these districts during that period, and a requirement to furnish information about his whereabouts.
• It is material that there was a gap of about 7–8 months between the SP’s recommendation (22.03.2024) and the DM’s externment order (21.11.2024), and during this interregnum, no new criminal incident involving the appellant was reported.

2.3. Appeal to the Divisional Commissioner

• The appellant preferred a statutory appeal under Section 9 of the Act, 1990 before the Divisional Commissioner, Narmadapuram.
• By order dated 18.02.2025, the Divisional Commissioner dismissed the appeal, upholding the externment order of the District Magistrate.

2.4. Writ Petition and Single Judge’s Decision

• Aggrieved, the appellant filed Writ Petition No. 8689/2025 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
• A learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition by order dated 02.04.2025 (the judgment text shows “02.04.2024” at one place, but the operative reference is to 2025), affirming both the DM’s and the Divisional Commissioner’s orders.
• The Single Judge reasoned, inter alia, that:
  • Show cause notice defect (wrong name typed) caused no prejudice since the appellant participated fully;
  • The procedure prescribed under the Act, 1990 had been followed; and
  • Because of the restriction in Section 10 of the Act on interference with orders under Sections 3–6, the writ petition could not be entertained to upset the externment.

2.5. Writ Appeal before the Division Bench

• The appellant preferred the present writ appeal (an intra‑court appeal) challenging:
• DM’s externment order dated 21.11.2024,
• Divisional Commissioner’s appellate order dated 18.02.2025, and
• The learned Single Judge’s order dated 02.04.2025.
• The appeal was heard finally with consent of parties, as the externment period was due to expire shortly (20.11.2025).

---

3. Summary of the Judgment

The Division Bench allowed the writ appeal and quashed:

• The District Magistrate’s externment order dated 21.11.2024;
• The Divisional Commissioner’s appellate order dated 18.02.2025; and
• The Single Judge’s order in W.P. No. 8689/2025 dated 02.04.2025.

The key conclusions were:

1. The conditions prescribed in Section 5(a) & 5(b) of the Act, 1990 were not satisfied:
   • No recent or proximate incidents justifying externment;
   • No cogent material to show that the appellant’s presence posed an immediate danger to public order or property;
   • No material to support the claim that witnesses were unwilling to depose due to fear.
2. The proceedings suffered from non‑application of mind, evident from:
   • The SP’s recommendation actually praying for externment of another individual (Golu s/o Prabhakar Solanki), while the appellant was externed;
   • The long, unexplained delay between recommendation and order, with no intervening incident.
3. The externment order was passed in a mechanical manner and imposed serious restrictions on the appellant’s fundamental rights under Articles 19(1) and 21. Such a drastic measure demands strict scrutiny and cannot be justified on stale or trivial material.
4. The learned Single Judge’s reliance on Section 10 of the Act, 1990 as a bar to interference was erroneous. The High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 remains fully available to test the legality and constitutionality of externment orders.
5. Consequently, the appellant was declared free to enter the boundaries of District Betul and the adjoining districts.

---

4. Detailed Legal Analysis

4.1. Statutory Framework: Section 5 of the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990

The case principally turns on the interpretation and application of Section 5 of the Act, 1990, which empowers the District Magistrate to direct a person to remove himself from a district or specified area (“externment”) in certain circumstances.

The relevant parts of Section 5, as reproduced in the judgment, are:

Whenever it appears to the District Magistrate:

(a) that the movements or acts of any person are causing or calculated to cause alarm, danger or harm to person or property; or

(b) that there are reasonable grounds for believing that such person is engaged or is about to be engaged in the commission of an offence involving force or violence, or an offence punishable under Chapters XII, XVI or XVII or under Sections 506 or 509 of the Indian Penal Code, or in the abetment of any such offence, and when in the opinion of the District Magistrate witnesses are not willing to come forward to give evidence in public against such person by reason of apprehension as regards their safety or property; or

...

the District Magistrate may by order in writing direct such person:

• (a) to so conduct himself as necessary to prevent violence or alarm, or the spread of disease, or
• (b) to remove himself outside the district or specified area and not to return for a specified period.

Thus, Section 5 sets out the substantive conditions for externment:

• Under clause (a): Actual or likely alarm, danger or harm caused by the person’s acts or movements;
• Under clause (b):
  • Reasonable grounds to believe engagement or impending engagement in specified serious offences, and
  • A clear opinion of the DM based on material that witnesses are unwilling to depose openly due to fear.

Externment is therefore not a routine administrative measure; it is a drastic preventive step which can be invoked only when statistical criminal history is coupled with a live and proximate threat to public order and an environment of intimidation preventing effective criminal prosecution.

---

4.2. Precedents and Their Use in the Judgment

4.2.1. Division Bench: Ashok Kumar Patel v. State Of M.P., 2009 (4) MPLJ 263

The Division Bench heavily relies upon its earlier judgment in Ashok Kumar Patel v. State Of M.P., which elaborated the core pre‑conditions for a valid externment under Section 5(b).

The key principles from Ashok Kumar Patel, quoted and applied here, are:

1. For an order under Section 5(b) two conditions must both be satisfied:
   • There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the person is engaged or about to engage in offences involving force or violence, or offences under Chapter XII, XVI, XVII or Sections 506/509 IPC, or in the abetment thereof;
   • The District Magistrate must form an opinion, based on material, that witnesses are not willing to come forward to give public evidence against such person by reason of apprehension regarding their own safety or property.
2. A mere recital of statutory language or a bald reference to “fear and terror in the public” does not satisfy the second condition; the DM must record a clear, material‑based opinion.
3. Where police have already filed charge‑sheets after recording statements under Section 161 CrPC, and the DM’s order contains no reference to any actual reluctance of witnesses before court, an externment under Section 5(b) cannot be sustained.
4. Because externment imposes serious restrictions on the fundamental rights under Articles 19(1) and 21, the conditions in Section 5(b) must be strictly complied with; otherwise, the order must be quashed.

The present Division Bench applies this ratio almost verbatim, concluding that the two statutory conditions for externment were not satisfied on the facts of the appellant’s case, and therefore the order could not stand.

4.2.2. Single Judge Decisions: Sudeep Patel and Shyamsunder Sen

Counsel for the appellant drew support from two Single Judge decisions:

• Sudeep Patel v. State Of M.P. & Ors., (2018) 3 MPLJ 413:
  • This case underscored that externment is a measure of preventive action and not a substitute for normal criminal law;
  • No order of externment should be passed unless there is sufficient material showing that such preventive action is necessary for maintenance of public order and peace;
  • Mere registration of cases, without more, is insufficient.
• Shyamsunder Sen v. State of M.P. & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine MP 7426:
  • The Order passed under Section 5(b) was quashed in that case due to want of material indicating urgency, proximity, or witness reluctance;
  • The Court reiterated the need for strict compliance with the statutory preconditions.

Though the present judgment does not analyse these two decisions in detail, their principles are in harmony with the approach adopted by the Division Bench: externment cannot rest on stale or trivial antecedents, and must be demonstrably justified by current, concrete, and compelling circumstances.

4.2.3. Supreme Court precedents: Gurbachan Singh and Pandharinath Rangnekar

In Ashok Kumar Patel, and quoted here, the High Court referred to the Supreme Court’s classic externment decisions:

• Gurbachan Singh v. State Of Bombay, 1952 SCR 737 = AIR 1952 SC 221;
• Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar v. Dy. Commissioner of Police, State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 372.

The Supreme Court in these cases:

• Upheld the constitutionality of externment provisions (originally under the City of Bombay Police Act, later re‑enacted), recognising them as preventive measures to protect society;
• At the same time, stressed that such provisions make a serious inroad on personal liberty and, therefore, must be strictly construed and strictly complied with;
• Emphasised that the limited “safeguards” – such as notice, opportunity of hearing, and recorded satisfaction – must be scrupulously followed;
• Recommended that authorities exercise externment powers with great care and circumspection.

The present Division Bench judgment is firmly anchored in this constitutional framework: externment laws are valid but their application must be narrow, careful, and rigorously justified.

---

4.3. Legal Reasoning of the Division Bench

4.3.1. Absence of Proximity and Seriousness of Offences

A central plank of the Bench’s reasoning is the requirement that the antecedents relied upon to justify externment must have a close temporal and contextual nexus with the order.

The Court notes that:

• Except for Crime No. 272/2016 and Crime No. 754/2021, there was no other case of “heinous” nature against the appellant that could reasonably trigger the extraordinary step of externment.
• After 2021, the only significant IPC case appears to be Crime No. 117/2024 under Sections 294, 323, 506, 34 IPC, and the other matters involved Gambling Act (Section 13) read with Section 109 IPC, and an Istagasa (a type of preliminary report). Such cases, in the overall factual context, were held insufficient to justify externment.
• There was no recent incident of violence or grave threat close to the date of the externment order that could demonstrate an immediate and ongoing risk to public order or property.
• Crucially, during the 7–8 month gap between the SP’s recommendation (22.03.2024) and the DM’s order (21.11.2024), no offence at all was registered against the appellant.

From this, the Bench draws the conclusion that the alleged offences did not have the required “close proximity” to the order of externment. The Court expressly observes that:

“It is trite law that for passing an order of externment, the alleged offence should have close proximity to the order of externment…”

Externment cannot be justified merely on the basis of old, stale and largely minor cases. There must be a live link between the person’s current conduct and the perceived threat to society.

4.3.2. No Evidence of Witness Reluctance due to Fear

An equally important deficiency identified by the Court is the absence of material to satisfy the second limb of Section 5(b) – that witnesses are unwilling to come forward to give public evidence against the proposed externee because of fear for life or property.

The Court found that:

• Witnesses examined in the externment proceedings did not support the police case; “nothing was deposed against the appellant”.
• There was no concrete material to show that witnesses in pending criminal cases were refusing to testify in court due to apprehension of harm.
• The DM’s order contained only general and bald assertions of fear and danger, without linking them to actual reluctance of any witness in specific proceedings.

In line with Ashok Kumar Patel, the Bench held that simply reproducing the language of Section 5(b), without supporting material, cannot justify an externment order. The requirement is not formulaic; it is substantive and evidentiary.

4.3.3. Non‑Application of Mind and Mechanical Exercise of Power

The Court was particularly critical of the mechanical manner in which the authorities proceeded.

Key indicators of non‑application of mind included:

• The SP’s recommendation prayer referring to an entirely different person (Golu s/o Prabhakar Solanki) as the subject of externment, while the appellant was actually externed. This kind of error suggests that standard templates or pre‑drafted formats may have been used without careful scrutiny.
• The long delay between recommendation and order, during which the appellant apparently remained in the area without any new incident. If he truly posed a serious immediate threat, such a delay is inexplicable.
• The absence of any reasoned discussion in the DM’s order about:
  • Why existing criminal law mechanisms (like bail conditions, preventive bonds, or ordinary prosecution) were insufficient;
  • Why externment across multiple districts, rather than limited or alternative restrictions, was necessary.

The Bench expressly remarks that passing an externment order in a mechanical manner is condemnable, since such an order seriously impinges upon the personal liberty and freedom of movement of a citizen.

4.3.4. Constitutional Dimension: Articles 19(1) and 21

Reaffirming earlier jurisprudence, the Court emphasises that:

• Externment entails serious restrictions on the fundamental right to move freely throughout the territory of India (Article 19(1)(d)); and
• It also significantly affects the right to personal liberty under Article 21.

Given these consequences, the Bench insists on:

• Strict satisfaction of the statutory preconditions under Section 5;
• Strict scrutiny of material and reasoning by the courts; and
• Limited and careful use of externment powers, keeping in view the larger public interest and individual rights.

The judgment thus situates externment firmly within the constitutional balance between social order and personal liberty.

4.3.5. Writ Jurisdiction vs. Section 10: Clarifying the High Court’s Power of Judicial Review

One of the more important clarifications in this judgment concerns the interplay between:

• Section 10 of the Act, 1990 – which purports to restrict or bar certain kinds of challenges to orders passed under Sections 3–6; and
• Article 226 of the Constitution – conferring wide writ jurisdiction on High Courts to enforce legal and fundamental rights.

The learned Single Judge had taken a view that, because Section 10 restricts interference with externment orders, the writ petition could not be entertained to quash the DM’s order, particularly since the procedure under the Act was followed.

The Division Bench unequivocally disagrees with this approach, holding that:

• The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 to examine the legality, validity and constitutional propriety of orders under the Act cannot be ousted by a mere statutory provision;
• Where an externment order adversely affects fundamental rights, particularly personal liberty, judicial review is not only permissible but necessary;
• Courts have repeatedly examined and set aside externment orders when the factual and legal foundation was insufficient.

In short, the Bench reasserts that Section 10 does not and cannot curtail the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Any contrary reading would be unconstitutional and is therefore rejected.

---

5. Simplifying Complex Concepts

5.1. What is “Externment”?

“Externment” is a preventive measure under special laws like the M.P. Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990, by which an executive authority (usually the District Magistrate) orders a person to leave a specified geographical area (a district or multiple districts) and not re‑enter for a specified period.

It is not a punishment for a past crime (unlike imprisonment after conviction), but a preventive step based on the belief that the person’s continued presence in the area poses a risk to public order or safety.

5.2. “Preventive” vs. “Punitive” Measures

• Punitive action: Comes after a criminal offence has been proved; e.g. a jail sentence after conviction in a trial.
• Preventive action: Taken before or without a conviction, primarily to forestall anticipated harm; e.g. preventive detention, externment, bonds for good behaviour.

Externment is preventive, justified only if there are reasonable grounds to think the person is likely to cause serious harm or disturb public order, and usual mechanisms (like prosecution or bail conditions) are inadequate.

5.3. “Close Proximity” of Offences

“Close proximity” means that the incidents or offences relied upon must be relatively recent or ongoing enough to show a present threat. Stale or old incidents – especially if followed by a long period of peace – do not ordinarily justify a drastic measure like externment.

In this judgment, the Court stresses that for externment:

• The alleged offences must not be too remote in time from the date of the order; and
• There must be a genuine continuity of threat, not just a historical record.

5.4. Witnesses “Not Willing to Come Forward”

One statutory precondition (under Section 5(b)) is that, in the District Magistrate’s opinion, witnesses are not willing to give evidence in public against the person due to fear regarding their own safety or property.

This cannot be based on vague suspicions or general statements. Authorities need:

• Specific instances where witnesses have refused to testify;
• Statements or materials indicating such reluctance due to fear; and
• Some credible linkage between the person’s conduct and this climate of fear.

Without such evidence, the second condition of Section 5(b) is not fulfilled, and the externment is invalid.

5.5. Intra‑Court (Writ) Appeal

An intra‑court appeal (here, a writ appeal) is an appeal from a Single Judge’s decision to a Division Bench of the same High Court, where the High Court’s rules permit. It is a way to have important questions of law or serious errors revisited without going directly to the Supreme Court.

---

6. Impact and Significance of the Judgment

6.1. Higher Threshold for Externment in Madhya Pradesh

The decision significantly reinforces that externment under the Act, 1990 cannot be treated as a routine administrative tool. Authorities must now be acutely conscious that courts will:

• Demand concrete and proximate incidents demonstrating a current threat;
• Scrutinise whether witness reluctance due to fear is supported by evidence;
• Value the seriousness and nature of offences, not just their number; and
• Strike down orders passed in a mechanical or template‑based manner.

This will likely curb the tendency to use externment as a shortcut whenever a person has multiple past cases, regardless of their nature or recency.

6.2. Strengthening Judicial Safeguards and Article 226 Review

By expressly rejecting the notion that Section 10 of the Act, 1990 can restrict the High Court’s writ jurisdiction, the judgment:

• Fortifies judicial review as a critical safeguard against executive overreach in matters affecting fundamental rights;
• Provides clear guidance to Single Judges and lower courts that constitutional remedies cannot be ousted by statute;
• Ensures that persons aggrieved by externment orders retain a robust mechanism to challenge them before the High Court.

6.3. Guidance to Law‑Enforcement Agencies

For police and district administration, the judgment sends several clear messages:

• Recommendations for externment must be carefully drafted, with correct identification of the person and case‑specific reasoning;
• A mere “history‑sheeter” label or number of registered cases will not suffice; the quality, nature and recency of incidents matter far more;
• Authorities must document and place on record any actual reluctance of witnesses and explain why externment, rather than ordinary criminal process, is required;
• Failure to demonstrate such application of mind will expose their orders to being set aside with adverse judicial comment.

6.4. Protection of Fundamental Rights and Liberties

On a broader plane, the decision reinforces the constitutional guarantee that:

• Personal liberty and freedom of movement (Articles 21 and 19(1)(d)) cannot be curtailed lightly, even in the name of public order;
• Preventive powers, though valid, must be used sparingly and strictly in accordance with law;
• Citizens are not to be banished from their home districts merely because of their past record, without compelling and current justification.

---

7. Conclusion

The decision in Tushar @ Nandi @ Anand v. State of M.P. is a notable reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory limits on the power of externment in Madhya Pradesh. While the State retains the authority to act pre‑emptively against genuinely dangerous individuals, the Court makes it clear that:

• Externment orders must be founded on recent, serious, and relevant material;
• The twin conditions of Section 5(b) – involvement in qualifying offences and witness reluctance due to fear – must be strictly proved, not merely recited;
• Stale or trivial cases, or a mere multiplicity of FIRs, are inadequate grounds;
• Mechanical or template‑based orders, especially those tainted by errors like referring to another person in recommendations, will not withstand judicial scrutiny;
• Most importantly, statutory bars like Section 10 cannot oust the High Court’s writ jurisdiction under Article 226 to safeguard fundamental rights.

In quashing the externment of the appellant and restoring his right to enter District Betul and adjoining districts, the Division Bench underscores that the maintenance of public order cannot come at the cost of casual encroachments on personal liberty. The judgment strengthens the jurisprudence that externment is an exceptional recourse and that its use must be justified by clear, cogent and proximate evidence, subject at all times to rigorous constitutional scrutiny.