Threshold for PILs Seeking New Legislation: Allahabad High Court declines to compel enactment of a ‘Men’s Protection Act’ on cursory, media-based pleadings

Introduction

In Chandrama Vishvakarma v. Union of India & Ors., PIL No. 2985 of 2025, decided on 24 September 2025, the Allahabad High Court (Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra) summarily dismissed a public interest litigation that sought a direction to the Union of India to “make an Act” for the protection of men from alleged illegal prosecution and harassment by women. The petition relied essentially on certain news reports and contained what the Court described as “wholly cursory averments.”

The central issues raised—though not elaborated by the Court—inevitably implicated two well-settled doctrinal limits: (i) the maintainability standards for public interest litigation (PIL) under Article 226 when pleadings lack specificity and evidentiary foundation, and (ii) the separation of powers constraint that courts cannot issue a writ of mandamus compelling the legislature or the executive in its legislative capacity to enact a particular statute.

• Court: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Chief Justice’s Court
• Bench: Hon’ble Arun Bhansali, Chief Justice; Hon’ble Kshitij Shailendra, J.
• Date of Judgment: 24 September 2025
• Case type: Public Interest Litigation (PIL No. 2985 of 2025)
• Parties: Chandrama Vishvakarma (Petitioner) v. Union of India & 3 others (Respondents)
• Prayer: Direction to “make an Act” to protect men from illegal prosecution/harassment by women

Summary of the Judgment

The High Court dismissed the PIL at the threshold. It noted that the petition, apart from referring to some news items, contained only cursory averments and failed to establish any basis for treating it as a public interest litigation warranting judicial intervention. Concluding that “no case is made out in the petition for entertaining the same as public interest litigation,” the Court dismissed the petition.

Although the order is brief and does not elaborate, the dismissal reflects two converging reasons apparent from the record:

• Insufficient pleadings and material: reliance on newspaper reports and generalized assertions without concrete facts, data, or rights-based framing.
• Nature of the relief: a request to direct the State to enact legislation—a form of relief courts have consistently declined due to separation of powers.

Analysis

1. Precedents and Jurisprudence Relevant to the Decision

The order does not cite authorities. However, its reasoning is squarely aligned with established Supreme Court and High Court jurisprudence in two domains—(a) limits on judicial power to direct legislation, and (b) gatekeeping standards for PILs and the insufficiency of media reporting as evidentiary foundation.

(a) No mandamus to legislate; separation of powers

• Supreme Court Employees’ Welfare Assn. v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 187: The Court held that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued to compel the legislature to enact a particular law. Courts may compel performance of a legal duty already existing, but not require a new law to be made.
• Suresh Seth v. Commissioner, Indore, (2005) 13 SCC 287: Reiterated that courts cannot direct legislation or amendment of a law, respecting the constitutional separation of powers.
• V.K. Naswa v. Union of India, (2012) 2 SCC 542: Emphasized that courts cannot direct the State to enact a law to create new offences or to legislate as a remedy; the judicial role is not to fill legislative gaps by compulsion.
• Manoj Narula v. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 1: The Supreme Court reaffirmed that policy choices and legislative matters fall primarily within the domain of the executive and legislature; courts exercise restraint and cannot mandate specific legislative outcomes.
• Public Interest Foundation v. Union of India, (2019) 3 SCC 224: The Supreme Court refused to direct disqualification of chargesheeted candidates by judicial fiat, underscoring that creation of new disqualifications is a legislative function; courts confined themselves to transparency-enhancing directions consistent with statutory/constitutional powers.

(b) PIL maintainability; evidentiary and pleading standards; misuse prevention

• State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402: Laid down rigorous guidelines on PIL maintainability—petitions must disclose bona fide public interest, provide specific pleadings, and be supported by credible materials. Courts should weed out frivolous or motivated PILs at the threshold.
• Holicow Pictures (P) Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra, (2007) 14 SCC 281, and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305: Warned against misuse of PIL for oblique motives and reiterated the need for strict scrutiny of maintainability and locus.
• Laxmi Raj Shetty v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1988) 3 SCC 319: Held that newspaper reports are hearsay and not proof of facts; they cannot, by themselves, be treated as evidence unless proven. This principle has consistently been used to caution against reliance on media reports as the primary foundation of judicial relief.
• Tehseen S. Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 9 SCC 501: The Supreme Court cautioned against indiscriminate PILs and emphasized that courts should decline petitions built on conjecture or inadequate factual substrate.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

While the order is concise, the legal reasoning implicit in the dismissal can be understood through two core principles:

• Maintainability and pleading rigour in PIL:

  The Court characterized the averments as “wholly cursory” and noted the petition relied merely on “news items.” PILs must demonstrate a public law injury with specificity: concrete facts, affidavits, data, and a legal right or duty in play. Generalized claims about societal problems, unsupported by credible material, do not meet the threshold. The Allahabad High Court thus exercised its gatekeeping function, declining to invest judicial time in a petition not meeting the basic standards set out in Balwant Singh Chaufal and allied cases.

• Non-justiciability of a prayer to “make an Act”:

  The relief sought falls outside the remit of a writ court. Courts enforce pre-existing legal duties and rights; they do not command legislative action. Even when courts issue structural directions to fill administrative gaps, they do so within a statutory or constitutional framework, not by compelling the legislature to legislate. The petitioner’s core prayer—directing enactment of a “Men’s Protection Act”—is thus facially non-justiciable under the separation of powers doctrine.

3. Impact and Future Implications

The order adds to the line of decisions that filter out PILs lacking factual and legal depth at the very outset. Its practical significance lies in reaffirming two messages to future litigants and counsel:

• PILs cannot be vehicles for policy-lawmaking:

  Petitioners seeking systemic reforms should approach the legislature, Law Commission, or relevant ministries through policy advocacy. Courts will not direct the enactment of a new statute absent a clear constitutional mandate and, even then, will act with great restraint.

• Evidentiary discipline is essential:

  Reliance on media reportage, unaccompanied by empirical data, expert studies, official statistics, or affidavits from affected persons, will not suffice. Petitioners must demonstrate a concrete public law problem, a violation of identifiable legal or constitutional norms, and a remedy that a court is institutionally competent to grant.

• Channeling grievances through appropriate legal frames:

  Where allegations concern misuse of existing criminal laws (for example, claimed misuse of Section 498A IPC), targeted reliefs are more appropriate—such as seeking enforcement of existing Supreme Court safeguards on arrests and investigations, or challenging specific executive practices. The Supreme Court’s decisions in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273 (caution against automatic arrests) and the subsequent recalibration in Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar v. Union of India (2018) 10 SCC 443 illustrate how courts can refine executive implementation without legislating from the bench. Broad-brush demands for a new statute are unlikely to be entertained.

• Docket discipline in High Courts:

  The ruling reinforces a trend across High Courts to summarily dismiss PILs that do not demonstrate an immediate and justiciable public law issue. This conserves judicial resources for petitions with substantiated rights violations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Public Interest Litigation (PIL):

  A judicial innovation that permits any public-spirited individual to move the court for redress of a public wrong or enforcement of public duties, even without being a directly affected party. However, PIL is not a free pass; it is subject to strict scrutiny to prevent abuse and ensure that only bona fide, evidence-backed public causes are entertained.

• Maintainability:

  The threshold question whether a court should hear a case at all. In PILs, maintainability requires: (i) a genuine public interest, (ii) specific pleadings supported by credible material, and (iii) a judicially manageable standard to grant relief within the court’s constitutional role.

• Separation of Powers and “No Mandamus to Legislate”:

  The Constitution distributes power among the legislature (makes laws), executive (implements laws), and judiciary (interprets/enforces laws). Courts issue writs to enforce existing legal duties. They do not order legislatures to enact particular laws—or the executive to exercise legislative power in a particular way—because doing so would usurp legislative functions.

• “Cursory averments”:

  Bare, general statements without detailed facts, specific instances, supporting documents, or data. Courts typically require more than generalized claims to entertain a PIL.

• Newspaper reports as evidence:

  Media reports are considered hearsay—second-hand accounts—not proof of facts by themselves. They can trigger an inquiry or support a case when corroborated, but courts rarely rely on them alone to grant substantive relief.

Conclusion

Chandrama Vishvakarma v. Union of India & Ors. is a succinct but instructive reaffirmation of two enduring constraints in Indian constitutional adjudication: (i) PILs must be grounded in specific, credible pleadings and cannot rest on newspaper clippings and general assertions; and (ii) courts will not entertain prayers that effectively seek to compel the legislature to enact a new statute. The decision reinforces the judiciary’s gatekeeping role, curbs the instrumentalization of PIL for policy lobbying, and directs reform-seekers to appropriate fora—legislatures, commissions, and ministries—while leaving the door open for targeted, evidence-backed litigation that seeks the enforcement of existing legal duties and safeguards.

Key takeaway: A PIL seeking enactment of a “Men’s Protection Act” without concrete data, demonstrable public law breach, or justiciable relief is not maintainable. Sustainable reform in such policy arenas must proceed through legislative channels or through carefully crafted litigation aimed at enforcing existing constitutional and statutory protections.