Mr. G.W Dillon (with him Munshi Haribans Sahai), for the appellant:—Dr. Surendra Nath Sen (with him Munshi Jang Bahadur Lal), for the respondents:—There are two questions which the Court has to decide. First, whether the compromise could be admitted in evidence without registration, and, secondly whether the plaintiff's suit was liable to dismissal inasmuch as she did not offer to pay up the mortgages made by her father and mother. On the first question the court below has now found that the father of the plaintiff was separate from his brothers and consequently the plaintiff had a right to inherit the property in dispute. This right she relinquished under the compromise, that is to say, she purported to transfer her rights to the defendants. The compromise therefore fell under section 17 of the Registration Act and was compulsorily registrable. Even if it is admitted in evidence it would not affect any property. Refers to section 49 of the Registration Act. If the compromise does not purport to transfer any interest to the defendants they have no right to the property and the plaintiff is entitled to possession, inasmuch as it has been found that the title is in her. Suppose no case had been instituted but the parties had come to an arrangement similar to the one in the present case aud recorded the arrangement it would not only have been compulsorily registrable but would have been liable to stamp-duty. The document is not exempt from registration as being incorporated in a decree. In the first place the Revenue Court only passes an executive order, and not a decree, and secondly the compromise is not incorporated in that decree or order. The following cases were cited as supporting the proposition that the compromise required registration. Sadar-ud-din Ahmad v. Chajju, (1) Bharosa v. Sikhdar, (2) Pranal Anni v. Lakshmi Anni, (3) Bhagwan Sahai v. Har Chain, (4) Deo Chand v. Pearay, (5) Mahadeo Singh v. Jagmohan Singh, (6) Ravula Parti Chelamanna v. Ravula Parti Rama Row(7).The defendants do not rely upon the document as showing their title to the property. There was a dispute between the plaintiff on the one hand and the defendants on the other in which the defendants claimed the property as their own. In 1907, the parties were doubtful as to the claim. The plaintiff admitted their antecedent title and this admission was recorded in the document. It does not purport to be, or operate as, a transfer of property. It is only a family arrangement and as such does not require registration. Stapitton v. Stapitton, lays down that an arrangement entered into upon a supposition of a right or of a doubtful right, though it comes out after that the right was on the other side, is a family settlement. The case here is exactly similar. The Transfer of Property Act does not apply to a family arrangement which does not amount to an alienation. The Registration Act does not apply to a transaction which is not in writing. The petition addressed to the Revenue Court was an intimation about the withdrawal of a claim, which had taken place without the drawing up of any formal instrument. Sale, lease, mortgage, exchange and gift require registration under certain circumstances and must be in writing as provided by the Transfer of Property Act. The law of Registration applies to these documents and not to transactions like the one in the present case. Here there is neither sale, gift nor exchange; it is not a transfer of title. (Refers to section 9 of the Transfer of Property Act). In each case the nature of the compromise should be looked to. If it involves a transfer of title it will require registration. The defendant's claim is founded upon family arrangement and not on relinquishment. The Privy Council have laid down a general rule of law in Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain. In case of family arrangement no property is transferred. It does not even require a document aud if a document is executed narrating that a settlement has already taken place it need not be registered. Family settlements are based upon the assumption of an antecedent title, and any document embodying the arrangement merely acknowledges or defines the said right. It does not amount to an alienation; Musammat Hiran Bibi v. Musammat Sohan Bibi, Khunni Lal v. Govind Krishna Narain. Further the document is not a deed of relinquishment. It does not extinguish or limit any right as the plaintiff had no right which she could relinquish. Section 17 of the Registration Act requires only those documents to be registered which purport to create, assign, etc., a right in favour of another. This the document does not do. It is only an intimation given to the Revenue Officer that the parties have arrived at an understanding. The petition of compromise not being relied upon either as a title deed or as a document modifying the terms of a registered instrument or as an agreement relating to property outside the scope of the order of the Revenue Court and the said order not being relied on as res judicata, the rulings in 22 Mad., 508 : 31 All. 13 : 32 All., 206 : 8 A.L.J, 309, and 33 All., 378, do not apply.Reference was made to M.R.M.A Subramanian Chettiar v. Rajah Rajeswara Dorai, Nur Ali v. Imaman, Bindesri Naik v. Ganga Saran Sahu, Kokla v. Piarelal, Daya Shanker v. Hub Lal, Sital Prasad v. Lal Bahadur.The order of the Revenue Court is an order in a judicial proceeding and if the compromise has been given effect to by the mutation court which was a proper judicial proceeding it satisfies the test laid down by the Privy Council in I.L.R, 20 All., 171.Mr. G.W Billon, replied.