The Imperative of Framing Substantial Questions of Law Before Granting Interim Relief in Second Appeals

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in U. Sudheera & Others v. C. Yashoda & Others (2025 INSC 80) addresses a crucial procedural requirement in second appeals filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The controversy centered around the grant of an interim order—status quo—by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh without first determining whether a “substantial question of law” existed and without issuing notice to all respondents. This commentary explores the background of the dispute, the core legal issues, and the Supreme Court’s ruling on the requirement to frame substantial questions of law before awarding interim relief in a second appeal.

The parties involved include the appellants, who are legal representatives of one of the defendants (Defendant No.5) and other defendants, and the original plaintiff, who brought suit for permanent injunction over a piece of property in Mangalam Village, Tirupati. The Court’s decision reaffirms and clarifies the interplay between the High Court’s discretion in granting interim relief and the statutory mandate to satisfy itself of a substantial question of law under Section 100 CPC.

2. Summary of the Judgment

In U. Sudheera v. C. Yashoda, the plaintiff initially succeeded in the trial court with a decree for permanent injunction over disputed land based on revenue records. The first appellate court reversed that decision, concluding that a mere suit for injunction without seeking declaration of title was procedurally infirm. On second appeal to the High Court, an interim order was granted, directing maintenance of status quo before the court had framed any substantial question of law and before all respondents were served. Challenging this ad interim status quo order, the defendants approached the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s interim order, emphasizing that the second appellate jurisdiction is strictly controlled by Section 100 CPC, which mandates the satisfaction of a substantial question of law before the High Court can proceed on the merits. The Court clarified that no interim order—whether for maintaining status quo or otherwise—should be granted unless and until the High Court has formed a prima facie view that one or more substantial questions of law arise in the appeal.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

The Supreme Court cited several of its own earlier decisions that strictly construe Section 100 CPC. Key among them were:

• Ram Phal v. Banarasi (2003) 11 SCC 762: Held that the High Court cannot issue an interim stay on the execution of a decree without first framing a substantial question of law.
• Raghavendra Swamy Mutt v. Uttaradi Mutt (2016) 11 SCC 235: Reiterated that proceeding in a second appeal without first formulating the substantial question of law violates the letter and spirit of Section 100 CPC.
• Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594: Explained that a suit for bare injunction without seeking declaration of title is not maintainable if title is seriously in dispute.
• Bhimabai Mahadeo Kambekar v. Arthur Import & Export Co. (2019) 3 SCC 191: Affirmed that revenue records do not confer or take away title over land.

These precedents collectively underscore the narrow scope of interference available to the High Court when dealing with a second appeal and bar interim relief when the statutory prerequisites are not met.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court underscored that second appeals are not a matter of right but must be predicated on the existence of a substantial question of law under Section 100 of the CPC. Specifically:

1. The High Court’s jurisdiction to hear and decide a second appeal on the merits commences only after it is “satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law,” pursuant to Section 100(1), and then formulates such questions under Section 100(4).
2. Granting interim relief before framing substantial questions of law effectively bypasses the mandatory statutory threshold. It places the cart before the horse, giving relief to the appellant even as the court itself has not decided whether it can hear the matter substantively.
3. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of avoiding contradictory outcomes and possible injustice. If the High Court ultimately determines there is no substantial question of law, then the entire exercise of grant of interim relief would be unfounded and prejudicial to the successful litigants in the lower courts.

C. Impact

The Court’s decision strengthens the procedural discipline imposed by Section 100 CPC:

• Ensures an orderly process: High Courts must now be more circumspect about granting ad interim orders in second appeals. The statutory requirement for a substantial question of law acts as a procedural checkpoint.
• Discourages litigious abuse: By litigants who might seek interim relief in manifestly unmeritorious second appeals; they can no longer leverage the pendency of an appeal for indefinite advantage.
• Clarifies appellate pathway: This judgment reinforces well-settled appellate limits, urging lower courts and litigants to appreciate that findings of fact are typically binding in second appeals unless a genuine question of law arises.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Below are some clarifications of essential legal concepts referenced by the Supreme Court that may not be immediately clear to non-specialists:

• Second Appeal & Substantial Question of Law: A second appeal is a higher-level appeal from the first appellate court’s judgment. It can only be entertained if a significant legal issue—one that affects the broader interpretation or application of the law—exists, as opposed to mere factual disputes.
• Ad Interim Relief: This is a short-term, urgent order often granted to preserve the subject matter in question or maintain the status quo until the court can examine the case in more detail.
• Bare Injunction vs. Declaration of Title: Where property ownership is contested, Indian courts usually require a party to seek a declaration of ownership in addition to or instead of a mere injunction. A “bare injunction” suit is purely for restraining interference without establishing underlying title.
• Revenue Records: In Indian law, these are administrative documents recording land possession or revenue liabilities. They are only indicative and do not necessarily confer or extinguish title.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s ruling in U. Sudheera & Others v. C. Yashoda & Others reiterates that second appeals require strict compliance with Section 100 CPC. Before passing any order—particularly an interim order that can alter parties’ positions—the High Court must be satisfied that the appeal raises substantial questions of law and formally record those questions. Consequently, courts cannot use inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to circumvent the discipline inherent in Section 100.

This decision has a salutary effect, preventing attempts to prolong litigation or gain undue advantage through interim orders in appeals that may not, in fact, contain any real question of law. By insisting on the framing of substantial questions of law at the threshold, this judgment ensures that appellate jurisprudence remains consistent with the legislative policy, promotes procedural regularity, and safeguards the rights of parties who have already received favorable judgments in the lower courts.