Tarun Sharma v. State of Haryana: Effective Legal Representation in Criminal Appeals and Rigorous Standards for Dying Declarations

Tarun Sharma v. State of Haryana (2025 INSC 1139):
Effective Legal Representation in Criminal Appeals and Rigorous Standards for Dying Declarations

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court of India’s decision in Tarun Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2025 INSC 1139, is a significant criminal law judgment at two levels:

  1. Procedural fairness in criminal appeals: It emphatically reiterates that the right to legal representation in criminal proceedings—especially where life imprisonment or the death penalty is involved—must be effective, not a mere formality. Appointment of an amicus curiae (court-appointed counsel) and rushing to judgment on the same day is condemned as falling short of Article 21’s guarantee of fair trial.
  2. Substantive standards for relying on a dying declaration: The Court closely scrutinizes the evidentiary value of a purported dying declaration, clarifying that when the surrounding medical and ocular evidence makes the declarant’s fitness doubtful, and when the recording process is procedurally defective, such a declaration cannot be the sole foundation for conviction.

The case thus operates at the intersection of constitutional criminal procedure (fair hearing, effective assistance of counsel) and evidence law (Section 32 of the Evidence Act on dying declarations, hostile witnesses, recovery of weapon, and the trial judge’s duty under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 CrPC).

2. Factual Background and Procedural History

2.1 The Incident

  • Date of incident: 31 March 2012, around 10:00 p.m.
  • Victim: Munish Kumar, resident of Village Jahangirpur, PS Mullana.
  • Alleged occurrence (as per purported dying declaration Exh. P-34):
    Munish and his brother Amit Bakshi (PW-1) were returning by car from Ambala to their village when they were allegedly intercepted near Mullana by a Scorpio and an Alto. Four persons were said to be involved:
    • Tarun Sharma (appellant) – allegedly inflicted a knife blow on the right side of Munish’s abdomen.
    • Sanjay – allegedly inflicted a knife blow on Munish’s head.
    • Bittoo and a bearded man – allegedly held Munish while the others assaulted him and robbed his phone and purse.
  • Medical chain:
    • CHC Mullana → Government Hospital, Ambala Cantt → General Hospital, Ambala City → GMCH Sec-32, Chandigarh → PGI Chandigarh.

2.2 Registration of FIR and Investigation

  • On 1 April 2012, at PGI Chandigarh, Sub-Inspector Somnath (PW-17) sought an opinion (Exh. P-32) regarding Munish’s fitness to make a statement. A fitness opinion (Exh. P-33) was allegedly given by an unidentified doctor.
  • On this basis, PW-17 claims to have recorded Munish’s statement (Exh. P-34), treated as the FIR, initially for offences under Sections 323, 324, 506 read with Section 34 IPC (FIR No. 58/2012).
  • Munish died on 14 April 2012. Section 302 IPC (murder) was added.
  • Accused arrested:
    • Tarun Sharma (Accused 1 – appellant)
    • Sandeep Sharma (Accused 2)
    • Balwinder Singh @ Bittoo (Accused 3)
    • Deepak Bhardwaj (Accused 4)
  • At the instance of Tarun Sharma (Exh. P-24, disclosure statement), a knife allegedly used in the assault was recovered (seizure memo Exh. P-6; sketch Exh. P-7).
  • The Investigating Officer (PW-25 Randhir Singh) found Sanjay “innocent” and did not charge-sheet him, despite his being named as a knife-wielding assailant in the alleged dying declaration.

2.3 Trial

  • Case committed to the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala.
  • Charges: Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC against all four accused.
  • Prosecution evidence: 25 witnesses, including:
    • PW-1 Amit Bakshi – brother of deceased, projected as eyewitness.
    • PW-2 Ashok Kumar – later claimed to have been in the car.
    • PW-9 Dr. Vijay Vivek – CHC Mullana doctor who first examined Munish.
    • PW-10 Dr. Nand Kumar Jha – General Hospital, Ambala City.
    • PW-17 SI Somnath – recording officer of Exh. P-34.
    • PW-18 Dr. Amandeep Singh – post-mortem doctor.
    • PW-25 Inspector Randhir Singh – Investigating Officer.
  • Key fact: PW-1 (Amit), PW-2 (Ashok), PW-3, PW-4, PW-5—all projected as eye-witnesses—did not support the prosecution and were declared hostile.
  • PW-9 and PW-10 described Munish’s critical condition, low blood pressure, serious stab injury to the right chest, and drowsiness, with probable alcohol intake; neither explicitly stated that Munish could speak.
  • Post-mortem (PW-18) confirmed a fatal stab track passing through chest wall, pleura, diaphragm, and into the liver, with death due to haemorrhagic and septicaemic shock from liver injury.
  • Trial Court’s result (26 August 2013):
    • Tarun Sharma convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment and fine.
    • Co-accused Sandeep Sharma (A-2), Balwinder Singh @ Bittoo (A-3) and Deepak Bhardwaj (A-4) acquitted for lack of evidence.
    • Conviction rested primarily on Exh. P-34 (purported dying declaration) and the recovery of the knife.

2.4 Appeal Before the High Court

  • Tarun Sharma appealed under Section 374(2) CrPC before the Punjab & Haryana High Court (CRA-D-1161-DB-2013).
  • Date of crucial hearing: 18 September 2024.
    • The matter was listed only to consider an application for release of the registration certificate of the seized Alto car for renewal.
    • The High Court, however, took up the main criminal appeal for final hearing on the same day.
    • Since the appellant’s engaged counsel was absent, the Bench appointed an amicus curiae and immediately proceeded to hear and reserve the appeal the same day, without:
      • Supplying the lower court record to the amicus, or
      • Granting reasonable time to prepare or consult the appellant.
  • The appeal was dismissed by judgment dated 24 September 2024, upholding the conviction and life sentence.

2.5 Appeal Before the Supreme Court

  • Tarun Sharma approached the Supreme Court by special leave (SLP (Crl.) No. 3965 of 2025).
  • The Supreme Court (Vikram Nath, J. and Sandeep Mehta, J.) granted leave, heard both sides, and delivered its judgment on 1 September 2025, allowing the appeal and acquitting the appellant.

3. Issues Before the Supreme Court

The Court addressed two broad clusters of issues:

  1. Procedural / Constitutional Issue
    Whether the High Court’s approach—appointing an amicus and hearing the criminal appeal on the same day, without affording reasonable time to prepare—violated the appellant’s right to effective legal representation and fair hearing under Article 21.
  2. Evidentiary / Substantive Issues
    • Whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC could be sustained solely on the basis of the purported dying declaration (Exh. P-34), when:
      • The alleged fitness certificate (Exh. P-33) was unsigned by any identified or examined doctor;
      • No treatment records from GMCH Sec-32 or PGI were produced;
      • Key eyewitness Amit Bakshi (PW-1) and the medical evidence indicated Munish was not in a condition to speak;
      • There were serious internal inconsistencies in the prosecution version.
    • What is the evidentiary impact of:
      • Hostile testimony of PW-1 and other eye-witnesses?
      • Investigation dropping Sanjay (named as an assailant in Exh. P-34) and the acquittal of accused Bittoo despite being named in the same declaration?
      • The recovery of a knife at the appellant’s instance, where FSL/serological reports did not link it scientifically to the deceased?
    • What are the duties of a trial judge under Section 165 of the Evidence Act and Section 311 CrPC when critical evidentiary gaps exist (e.g., identity of certifying doctor)?

4. Summary of the Judgment

4.1 On Procedural Fairness and Amicus Curiae

The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s manner of disposing of the appeal—appointing an amicus curiae and hearing the matter on merits immediately, without giving any meaningful time for preparation or consultation—fell “short of the standards of fairness” expected in criminal appellate adjudication, particularly where life imprisonment is involved.

Relying on Chaluvegowda v. State, Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State Of Assam, and Anokhilal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh, the Court reaffirmed:

  • The right to be represented by a lawyer must be real and effective, not an “empty formality” or “eyewash”.
  • Appointment of an amicus requires that the counsel be given reasonable time (normally at least seven days) to inspect the record, study the case, and meet the accused.
  • In serious criminal cases, especially involving possible life imprisonment or death sentence, courts must not rush through hearings simply to dispose of matters quickly.

However, in the present case—given the long incarceration already suffered by the appellant—the Court chose not to remit the matter back to the High Court, but instead decided to finally adjudicate the case on merits itself “in the interest of justice”.

4.2 On the Dying Declaration and Other Evidence

The Court concluded:
  • The prosecution’s entire case rested on the purported dying declaration (Exh. P-34), allegedly recorded by SI Somnath (PW-17) at PGI, based on a fitness certificate (Exh. P-33).
  • A series of serious infirmities rendered this dying declaration unreliable:
    • The certifying doctor of Exh. P-33 was never identified or examined.
    • No treatment records from GMCH Sec-32 or PGI Chandigarh were produced.
    • PW-17 did not record his own satisfaction about Munish’s fitness, nor did Exh. P-34 bear the time of recording.
    • Key eyewitness Amit Bakshi (PW-1) and the medical evidence (PW-9 and PW-10) consistently indicated that Munish was mostly unconscious and was never in a condition to speak meaningfully.
    • The prosecution later attempted to project Ashok Kumar (PW-2) as present in the car, contradicting Exh. P-34 which did not mention him.
    • Named assailant Sanjay was dropped by the IO as “innocent,” and alleged assailant Bittoo was acquitted, despite both being specifically implicated in Exh. P-34—showing even the courts and prosecution did not give full credence to that statement.
  • The hostile testimony of PW-1 (Amit) could not be discarded in toto. Portions of his statement—about:
    • Inability to identify assailants due to darkness,
    • The fact that the accused in court did not assault Munish, and
    • Munish remaining essentially unconscious and unable to speak—
    were found credible, corroborated by medical evidence, and had to be given due weight.
  • The recovery of the knife at the appellant’s instance was found inconsequential:
    • The FSL report (Exh. P-1) did not indicate any blood group.
    • No serological report linked the blood on the knife (if any) with that of the deceased.
    • In any case, mere recovery of a weapon—even if stained with the same blood group—cannot by itself establish guilt, especially where the main substantive evidence is infirm (see Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh).

On this cumulative assessment, the Court held that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dying declaration was too doubtful to be the sole basis of conviction, and the other evidence did not supply the missing link.

Accordingly, both the trial court’s conviction and the High Court’s affirming judgment were set aside. Tarun Sharma was acquitted and directed to be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.

5. Detailed Analysis

5.1 Fair Hearing and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Appeals

5.1.1 Precedents Cited and Their Deployment

The Court relied on three key precedents on fair hearing and appointment of amicus:

  1. Chaluvegowda v. State (2012) 13 SCC 38
    In Chaluvegowda, the High Court appointed a new amicus when the previously appointed one was absent and proceeded to hear and reserve judgment on the same day. The Supreme Court:
    • Set aside the judgment;
    • Emphasised that the right to be represented by a lawyer must not be an “empty formality” or “sham”; and
    • Held that every accused must be given a fair, just and reasonable opportunity to be heard before being condemned.
    The present judgment quotes para 19 and 25 of Chaluvegowda, using its language to stress that procedure followed by the High Court here was similarly defective.
  2. Mohd. Sukur Ali v. State Of Assam (2011) 4 SCC 729
    In Mohd. Sukur Ali, where counsel for the accused was absent, the Court held:
    • The appeal should not be decided against an accused merely because his counsel is absent.
    • If counsel is absent, the court must appoint an amicus and fix another date for hearing, giving the amicus time to prepare.
    • If the original counsel later appears without sufficient cause for earlier absence, he may be precluded from arguing; however, the accused can engage someone else or proceed with the amicus.
    The Supreme Court uses this precedent to underscore that even if an amicus is appointed, deciding the case forthwith is unacceptable.
  3. Anokhilal v. State Of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196
    A three-judge bench laid down concrete norms for appointment of amicus and provision of time:
    • In cases involving possible life or death sentences:
      • Only advocates with at least 10 years’ practice should be appointed as amicus.
      • In death sentence confirmation, preferably senior advocates should be appointed.
    • Whenever a counsel is appointed as amicus, a minimum of seven days’ time should usually be given to prepare.
    • Amicus must be allowed to meet and consult the accused.
    The present Court treats these norms as generally binding yardsticks for ensuring effective defence in serious criminal cases.

5.1.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court finds the High Court’s approach “disturbing and unjustified” because:

  • The case involved a life sentence, demanding the highest degree of procedural fairness.
  • The matter was listed for a limited purpose (release of RC), but the High Court converted it into a final hearing on merits, without prior notice of that shift.
  • The amicus was:
    • Appointed on the same day,
    • Not given lower-court records, and
    • Not given time to consult the accused or prepare.

The Court reiterates a core constitutional proposition: fair hearing is not satisfied by the mere physical presence of a lawyer’s name on record. Effective representation:

  • Requires adequate time and facilities to prepare;
  • Is a component of Article 21’s guarantee of fair trial and due process; and
  • Cannot be compromised merely for docket management or speedy disposal.

Yet, instead of remitting the case (as done in Chaluvegowda), the Court balances fairness with the practical injustice of further delay, given the appellant’s long incarceration, and proceeds to examine merits. This shows a pragmatic, victim/accused-centered approach: where the appellate record allows a full re-assessment and the accused has already been confined for long, the Supreme Court may cure procedural unfairness by itself deciding the appeal rather than prolonging proceedings.

5.1.3 Impact of This Procedural Holding

This judgment:

  • Reinforces (rather than creates from scratch) an important rule: Appointment of an amicus curiae in a criminal case is meaningful only if accompanied by adequate time and opportunity to mount an effective defence.
  • Extends the tone of death-penalty jurisprudence on fair hearing (as in Anokhilal) emphatically to life-imprisonment appeals.
  • Signals to High Courts that “same-day amicus appointment and final hearing” in serious criminal appeals will likely be treated as incompatible with Article 21.

5.2 Dying Declarations, Hostile Witnesses, and Judicial Duties: Substantive Analysis

5.2.1 The Legal Framework on Dying Declarations

Dying declarations are governed primarily by Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (now mirrored in Section 26 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023). The Court reaffirms long-standing principles, especially from:

  • Laxman v. State of Maharashtra (2002) 6 SCC 710
    The Constitution Bench held:
    • Certification by a doctor as to fitness is a rule of caution, not an absolute legal requirement.
    • What is essential is that the person recording the declaration (Magistrate/police officer) must be satisfied that the declarant is in a fit state of mind to make the statement.
    • Even in the absence of a doctor’s certificate, a dying declaration can be accepted if the recorder’s testimony demonstrates such satisfaction and the declaration is found voluntary and truthful.
  • Atbir v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1
    Atbir collected and summarized principles into ten succinct propositions, of which the Court especially highlights:
    • Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction if it inspires full confidence.
    • If the declaration is suspicious or if the deceased was unconscious and could not have made any statement, it cannot be relied upon without corroborative evidence (and often not at all).
    • When an eyewitness affirms that the deceased was not in a fit or conscious state to make a dying declaration, a contrary medical opinion cannot prevail.

The Court uses these authorities to test whether Exh. P-34 meets the threshold of reliability and whether it can legally be made the sole basis of conviction.

5.2.2 Hostile Witnesses: Legal Position and Application

Several important decisions on hostile witnesses are discussed and applied:

  • C. Muniappan v. State of T.N. (2010) 9 SCC 567
    It reiterates that:
    • Testimony of a hostile witness is not automatically effaced from the record.
    • Court can rely on such portions of the testimony that are found to be credible and consistent with the rest of the evidence.
  • K.P. Tamilmaran v. State, 2025 SCC OnLine SC (as cited)
    This recent decision refines the governing principles:
    • The testimony of a witness who has been cross-examined by the calling party remains “evidence” under Section 3 of the Evidence Act.
    • There is no statutory bar on using such evidence; its evidentiary value is for the court to assess.
    • Discarding the entire testimony of a hostile witness may unjustifiably harm both prosecution and defence; courts should separate the “wheat from the chaff”.
    • The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus (false in one thing, false in everything) does not apply in India.

Applying these principles, the Court holds that Amit Bakshi’s (PW-1) hostile testimony cannot be jettisoned entirely. Instead, it carefully accepts those parts which:

  • Appear spontaneous and consistent;
  • Are corroborated by independent medical evidence; and
  • Directly undermine the reliability of the dying declaration.

Significant accepted portions include PW-1’s assertions that:

  • The incident occurred in darkness, so neither he nor Munish could identify the assailants.
  • The accused present in court (including the appellant) did not cause injuries to Munish.
  • Munish was unconscious after the assault and, even when briefly conscious, was not in a position to speak; PW-1 conveyed to doctors that unknown persons had assaulted Munish.

These statements, supported by the medical condition described by PW-9 and PW-10, directly clash with the prosecution’s claim that Munish gave a coherent, detailed statement naming specific assailants (including addresses, roles, vehicles).

5.2.3 The Fitness Certificate (Exh. P-33) and the Missing Doctor

Central to the Court’s reasoning is the serious procedural and evidentiary flaw concerning Exh. P-33:

  • The doctor who allegedly certified Munish “fit to make statement”:
    • Was never named in the evidence by PW-17 or any other witness.
    • Was never examined in court.
    • Could not be cross-examined by the defence on Munish’s medical condition, level of consciousness, or the circumstances of giving the certificate.
  • No explanation was provided for failing to produce this critical medical witness.

The Court characterizes the trial court’s failure here as “total apathy” and “lackadaisical”. It underscores the duty of the trial court under:

  • Section 165 Evidence Act (Section 168 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023):
    The judge has wide power to ask questions and call evidence to discover the truth and must not remain a mute spectator when critical evidentiary gaps exist.
  • Section 311 CrPC (Section 348 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023):
    The court may summon any person as a witness or re-examine any witness “at any stage” if their evidence appears essential to a just decision of the case.

In a case where the conviction might rest on a dying declaration, the certifying doctor’s testimony is “essential” in the strongest sense. The Court is clear that the trial judge should have suo motu:

  • Traced the identity of the doctor; and
  • Summoned him/her as a court witness to test the genuineness of Exh. P-33.

The failure to do so not only harms the defence but also undermines the integrity of the trial process.

5.2.4 Missing Treatment Records and Adverse Inference

The Court notes that:

  • No “bed head ticket” or treatment records from GMCH, Sec-32, or PGI were produced or proved.
  • These would have captured:
    • Vital signs and neurological status (conscious, oriented or not);
    • Any record of statements made by the patient; and
    • Timing of transfers and interventions.

Given PW-9 and PW-10’s evidence of serious condition, low blood pressure, and drowsiness, the absence of such records is critical. The Court accordingly draws an adverse inference against the prosecution: that these records, if produced, might not have supported the claim that Munish was in a fit condition to give a detailed statement.

5.2.5 Defects in the Recording of the Dying Declaration (Exh. P-34)

Key infirmities identified by the Court include:

  • No recorded satisfaction of PW-17:
    SI Somnath (PW-17) did not record anywhere that he was personally satisfied that Munish was:
    • Conscious,
    • Oriented, and
    • Capable of understanding and answering questions
    at the time of making the statement. This directly cuts against the standard in Laxman, which requires the person recording the statement to be satisfied about the fit state of mind.
  • No mention of time in Exh. P-34:
    The declaration does not state when it was recorded. This:
    • Prevents correlation with medical evidence about Munish’s condition at the time;
    • Prevents assessment of whether there was undue delay or intervening factors; and
    • Undermines the document’s reliability and authenticity.
  • Unverified signature of Munish:
    PW-17 claims Munish signed the statement, but:
    • No effort was made to corroborate this via PW-1 (Amit) or any handwriting/forensic comparison.
    • In a context where Munish’s consciousness and motor ability were disputed, mere assertion by PW-17 was insufficient.
  • No identification of the doctor’s signature on Exh. P-33:
    PW-17 does not even identify the doctor’s signature on the fitness certificate, leaving its origin opaque.

Taken together, these procedural defects substantially erode the reliability of Exh. P-34.

5.2.6 Internal Inconsistencies and Partial Rejection of the Dying Declaration

Even the prosecution and courts below did not consistently stand by the contents of Exh. P-34:

  • Sanjay: Named in Exh. P-34 as a knife-wielding assailant who inflicted a head injury. Yet the IO (PW-25) found him “innocent” and did not charge-sheet him.
  • Bittoo: Allegedly one of the assailants in Exh. P-34, later equated with Balwinder Singh (A-3). The trial court itself acquitted Balwinder, effectively rejecting Exh. P-34’s version as to him.

Thus, as the Supreme Court notes, neither the trial court nor the High Court gave “full imprimatur” to the dying declaration. When a statement is internally inconsistent and selectively believed, its credence as a standalone basis for conviction becomes weak. Under the cautionary rule articulated in Atbir, a suspicious or partially unreliable dying declaration must be corroborated by strong independent evidence—which was lacking here.

5.2.7 Recovery of the Knife and Its Evidentiary Insufficiency

The prosecution also relied on the recovery of a knife following the appellant’s disclosure (Exh. P-24). The Court, however, finds this recovery to be of “inconsequential” evidentiary value because:

  • The FSL report (Exh. P-1) did not specify any blood group on the weapon.
  • No serological report was produced linking any stains on the knife to the deceased.
  • In the absence of such scientific linkage, the recovery remained merely that—a recovery—without probative value connecting it specifically to the crime.
  • The Court reminds that even if the blood group had matched, as held in Raja Naykar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2024) 3 SCC 481, weapon recovery alone cannot establish guilt, especially when:
    • Primary substantive evidence (like a dying declaration) is shaky; and
    • There is no trustworthy eyewitness or other corroboration.

5.2.8 Overall Evaluation: Benefit of Doubt and Acquittal

The Court ultimately identifies six major infirmities (para 63), which can be grouped as follows:

  1. Medical and ocular evidence contradicting the alleged declaration:
    PW-1 and the doctors (PW-9, PW-10) indicate Munish was not in a fit state to speak; thus Exh. P-33 and Exh. P-34 become doubtful.
  2. Non-examination and non-identification of the certifying doctor:
    This deprives the defence of cross-examination and makes the fitness certificate itself unreliable.
  3. Non-production of treatment records:
    Absence of medical charts from GMCH and PGI invites an adverse inference against the prosecution.
  4. Procedural defects in recording the dying declaration:
    No recording of PW-17’s satisfaction, no mention of time, no verification of Munish’s signature.
  5. Partial and selective reliance on the dying declaration:
    Sanjay’s exoneration and Bittoo’s acquittal show the declaration is not fully trustworthy.
  6. Contradictions by PW-1:
    PW-1’s credible testimony that the accused did not assault Munish and that assailants could not be identified due to darkness seriously undercuts Exh. P-34.

Applying the standard of beyond reasonable doubt and the benefit-of-doubt rule, the Court holds that such a “doubtful piece of evidence” as Exh. P-34 cannot be the foundation for conviction, especially where the supporting evidence is weak or absent.

6. Key Legal Principles Clarified or Reaffirmed

  1. Effective representation, not mere formal representation, is a component of fair trial under Article 21.
    Appointment of an amicus in a serious criminal appeal must be accompanied by adequate time and opportunity to prepare, inspect the record, and meet the accused. Same-day appointment and final hearing will usually be constitutionally suspect.
  2. Trial courts have an active duty under Section 165 Evidence Act and Section 311 CrPC.
    Where critical evidence (such as identity and testimony of a certifying doctor for a dying declaration) is missing, courts must proactively summon such witnesses, even suo motu, to avoid miscarriage of justice.
  3. Dying declarations can be the sole basis for conviction only if unimpeachably reliable.
    Where:
    • The declarant’s consciousness and fitness are seriously in doubt;
    • The certifying doctor is not examined;
    • Treatment records are missing; and
    • Key witnesses assert the declarant could not speak, and the statement itself is partly disbelieved by courts,
    then a dying declaration cannot safely sustain a conviction.
  4. Testimony of hostile witnesses remains usable evidence.
    Courts must dissect hostile testimony and can rely upon those parts that are credible, consistent, and corroborated, even if they support the defence.
  5. Mere recovery of weapon is weak corroboration.
    Without proper FSL/serological linkage to the victim, weapon recovery at an accused’s instance has minimal probative value and cannot compensate for defective primary evidence.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

7.1 Dying Declaration

A “dying declaration” is a statement made by a person about the cause of their death or the circumstances of the transaction resulting in their death. Under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, it is an exception to the hearsay rule: even though the maker cannot be cross-examined (being dead), the statement is admissible.

However, because it cannot be tested by cross-examination, courts insist on:

  • Clear proof that the maker was conscious, oriented, and mentally fit.
  • Proper recording by a reliable person (preferably a Magistrate, but also a doctor or police officer when necessary).
  • Absence of tutoring, coercion, or manipulation.
  • Internal consistency and coherence.

7.2 Hostile Witness

A “hostile witness” is one who shows hostility to the party who called them—usually by:

  • Denying earlier statements that supported that party; or
  • Giving testimony that appears to help the opposing side.

The party calling such a witness may be allowed to cross-examine them. But the witness’s evidence does not automatically vanish. The court can still rely on any portion of their testimony that appears truthful and consistent with other evidence.

7.3 Amicus Curiae

Amicus curiae means “friend of the court”. In criminal cases, courts sometimes appoint an advocate as amicus when:

  • The accused is unrepresented; or
  • The engaged counsel is absent or fails to appear.

The amicus’s role is to assist the court and defend the accused’s rights. But this is meaningful only if the amicus:

  • Is competent and experienced; and
  • Has enough time and access to case materials to prepare properly.

7.4 Sections 165 Evidence Act and 311 CrPC

  • Section 165 Evidence Act
    Gives the judge power to:
    • Ask any question to any witness at any time, in any form; and
    • Order production of any document,
    in order to discover the truth. It is designed to prevent the judge from being a passive umpire and instead make them an active seeker of truth.
  • Section 311 CrPC
    Allows the court to:
    • Summon any person as a witness;
    • Recall and re-examine any already-examined witness;
    • At any stage of inquiry or trial,
    if the person’s evidence appears essential for a just decision. It is a powerful tool to cure gaps, mistakes, or omissions in evidence.

8. Likely Impact on Future Cases and Criminal Justice Administration

8.1 On High Courts and Appellate Practice

  • High Courts will have to be more cautious in:
    • Converting interlocutory hearings into final hearings without notice;
    • Appointing amicus and proceeding to final hearing the same day in serious criminal appeals.
  • Registry and benches may need to:
    • Ensure that amicus is appointed well in advance where required;
    • Provide the lower court records and sufficient time to prepare;
    • Document compliance with Anokhilal-type guidelines in orders.

8.2 On Trial Courts

  • Stronger expectation that trial judges will:
    • Not passively accept defective or incomplete evidence (e.g., unsigned medical certificates, unexplained missing records);
    • Invoke Section 311 CrPC and Section 165 Evidence Act when a crucial witness (like a certifying doctor) is missing or unexamined;
    • Record specific satisfaction regarding fitness of declarants in dying declaration cases, particularly where the recorder is a police officer.
  • This judgment can be used in judicial training to highlight the proactive adjudicatory role expected in criminal trials.

8.3 On Police and Prosecution

  • Investigating Officers will be under greater pressure to:
    • Ensure that the doctor certifying fitness for a dying declaration is clearly identified and later examined in court;
    • Collect and preserve all treatment records (bed head tickets, case sheets) from each hospital through which a victim passes;
    • Avoid selective prosecution (e.g., dropping named assailants without cogent explanation) when their non-prosecution undermines the credibility of key inculpatory statements.
  • Prosecutors will need to:
    • Anticipate challenges regarding fitness, consciousness, and recording procedures for dying declarations; and
    • Present robust, corroborated evidence—beyond just production of a typed “Exhibit”—to sustain convictions.

8.4 On Defence Strategy

  • Defence counsel can draw on this judgment to:
    • Challenge dying declarations where:
      • Certifying doctors are absent or unidentified;
      • Medical records are missing; or
      • Eyewitnesses and doctors suggest unconsciousness.
    • Extract and rely on favourable portions of hostile witness testimony (like PW-1 in this case).
    • Argue that mere recovery of a weapon without strong forensic linkage cannot sustain conviction.

8.5 On Substantive Criminal Jurisprudence

  • The case strengthens the line of jurisprudence that:
    • Fair trial rights are non-negotiable, even at the appellate stage; and
    • Courts must exercise caution in convicting solely on dying declarations, rigorously testing their reliability against the entire evidentiary matrix.

9. Conclusion

Tarun Sharma v. State of Haryana is an important reminder that criminal adjudication is not a mere exercise in paperwork or procedural ritual. The Supreme Court’s analysis exposes how, in this case, both procedural safeguards and evidentiary standards were compromised:

  • Procedurally, the High Court failed to ensure effective representation when it hurriedly appointed an amicus and decided the appeal in a single sitting, contrary to established constitutional norms.
  • Substantively, the conviction rested on a deeply flawed dying declaration:
    • Unsupported by any examined certifying doctor,
    • Contradicted by medical and eyewitness testimony about the victim’s condition,
    • Undermined by missing treatment records,
    • Only partially believed even by the trial court and prosecution.

By acquitting the appellant, the Supreme Court not only corrects an individual miscarriage of justice but also:

  • Reaffirms that effective legal representation is intrinsic to Article 21 and cannot be reduced to a formal appointment of counsel without real opportunity to defend.
  • Reinforces that dying declarations must be handled with evidentiary rigour—particularly as to the declarant’s fitness, the recording procedure, and consistency with the broader evidentiary record—before they can be the sole basis of conviction.
  • Emphasizes the active judicial role mandated by Section 165 Evidence Act and Section 311 CrPC in bridging crucial gaps in evidence and preventing unjust convictions.

In the broader legal landscape, this judgment serves as a pointed caution to courts, investigators, and prosecutors alike: in serious criminal cases, neither procedural shortcuts nor evidentiary shortcuts are tolerable. The integrity of the criminal justice system demands, in both form and substance, that fairness and proof beyond reasonable doubt remain the guiding stars.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court Of India

Judge(s)

Justice Vikram NathJustice Sandeep Mehta

Advocates

ABHIMANYU TEWARI

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