Introduction

This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution presented a stark example of alleged misuse of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO). The petitioner, a designated Senior Advocate practicing for over two decades, sought quashing of an FIR (Crime No. 255/2025 dated 11 June 2025, P.S. Civil Lines, Rewa) registered under Section 65(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) and Sections 5 and 6 of the POCSO Act.

The complainant (respondent no. 4), who had previously engaged the petitioner as counsel and later received a No-Objection Certificate (NOC) upon the petitioner’s withdrawal, levelled multiple allegations of sexual assault—some as extraordinary as an alleged rape of her two-year-old daughter “in front of Court Room No. 15” of the High Court itself. Police inquiries, CCTV analysis, forensic reports, and witness statements repeatedly found her allegations to be false. Despite an initial general diary (Rojnamcha Sanha) entry closing the complaint and noting her habit of making false accusations, a formal FIR was registered hours later—an action the petitioner attributed to the mandatory-registration rule of Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P.

The central issues were: whether the FIR and subsequent proceedings constituted an abuse of process warranting quashment; whether the High Court could intervene even after the police had filed a closure report before the Magistrate; and whether, in the backdrop of a demonstrable pattern of false complaints, the Court could direct prosecutorial action against the informant and craft a prospective procedural safeguard.

Summary of the Judgment

• The High Court quashed FIR No. 255/2025 and all subsequent proceedings, holding that allowing the case to continue would amount to a “malicious prosecution” and a “clear abuse of process.”
• The Court relied on a comprehensive investigation that disproved the complainant’s allegations through medical (MLC), forensic (Y-STR DNA), CCTV, travel records, and multiple witness statements, and highlighted the complainant’s established habit of making false accusations.
• Recognizing the closure report already filed and approved within the police hierarchy and placed before the Magistrate, the Court nevertheless exercised its writ jurisdiction to terminate the proceedings forthwith, citing Supreme Court authority that quashment is maintainable even post-charge-sheet/closure report.
• Going beyond quashment, the Court directed the Superintendent of Police, Rewa, to initiate immediate proceedings against the complainant under:
  • Section 22(1) of the POCSO Act (punishment for false complaint or information), and
  • Sections 240 and 248 of the BNS, 2023 (false information respecting an offence; false charge of offence made with intent to injure).
• Prospectively, the Court directed that if this complainant files any future complaint, the authorities must conduct a preliminary enquiry before taking any coercive action. This tailored safeguard was anchored in the “peculiar facts” of habitual false reporting by the same complainant.
• No order as to costs.

Detailed Analysis

Factual substrate and evidentiary assessment

The High Court meticulously cross-referenced documentary and testimonial evidence generated in multiple complaint episodes against different persons, including the petitioner. Key factors included:

• Prior complaints where even the complainant’s elder daughter did not support the allegations; Child Welfare Committee (CWC) and special court findings labelling those cases as fabricated.
• Allegations of a public sexual assault in the High Court premises, disproved by CCTV, travel records (tickets and Supreme Court proximity card data), and police inquiries; the complaint was closed as false.
• For the 7–8 June 2025 incident, the Rojnamcha Sanha entry of 11 June 2025 recorded no specific allegation and noted her habitual false accusations; later, an FIR was nevertheless registered the same day.
• Medical and forensic evidence:
  • MLC of 11 June 2025: “Nothing was found.”
  • Forensic report of 15 July 2025: No male Y-STR DNA profile detected.
  • Doctor’s statement: The complainant did not report rape; lack of child specialist prompted referral to a government hospital.
• Statements of husband, tenants, and landlord collectively indicating that no intrusion occurred and confirming the complainant’s pattern of false reporting.

Precedents cited and their influence

• Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. (2013): Establishes mandatory registration of FIR upon disclosure of a cognizable offence. The defense acknowledged that the police likely registered the FIR post-Rojnamcha due to Lalita Kumari. The High Court’s final relief carefully avoided diluting Lalita Kumari: the Court did not bar registration in future, but directed a preliminary enquiry before “coercive action” by police in complaints from this particular informant, tailoring relief to the proven habitual-misuse pattern.
• State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335): The canonical framework for quashing, identifying categories where interference is warranted, such as where allegations are absurd, inherently improbable, or maliciously instituted to wreak vengeance. The Court’s narrative keyed into these categories, describing the prosecution as “malicious” and “monstrous.”
• Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021) 19 SCC 401: Reiterated that quashing is exceptional and courts should rarely stall investigations. The High Court distinguished the posture here—investigation had concluded, a closure report was filed, and the State conceded no case was made out—thus squarely situating the matter in an exceptional zone where continued proceedings would be abusive.
• HAJI IQBAL @ BALA v. STATE OF U.P. (2023): Emphasized balancing the gravity of rape with the equal gravity of false allegations; the Court must scrutinize the totality of circumstances and read “between the lines” where mala fides are alleged. This decision underpinned the High Court’s close, record-based scrutiny beyond the four corners of the FIR.
• Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2019) 11 SCC 706: Clarified that the High Court’s power to quash is not confined to the pre-charge-sheet stage; it can intervene even when the case has progressed to a charge-sheet or (as here) a closure report, to prevent abuse of process.
• Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1985) 2 SCC 537 (cited by counsel): Recognizes the informant’s right to be heard before a Magistrate accepts a closure report. The High Court noted that the complainant did not appear despite service; she surfaced before the trial court only after the closure report was filed. In any event, the writ quashment rendered the closure proceedings infructuous.
• Madras High Court persuasive decisions:
  • N. Dharmarajan v. State (Crl.O.P. No. 1022/2024): Directed action under POCSO Section 22 against those who manipulated minors to fabricate POCSO complaints.
  • N. Chandramohan v. State (Crl.O.P. No. 21414/2019): Directed prosecution of a false complainant under Section 22 POCSO, noting the severe societal consequences of POCSO prosecutions.
  These reinforced the propriety of invoking Section 22 POCSO against false informants.
• Other authorities cited by the petitioner (e.g., Prashant Bharti v. NCT of Delhi, (2013) 9 SCC 293; a Delhi High Court decision in ABC v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine Del 8113) broadly align with quashing where allegations are demonstrably false or inherently improbable, though the Court primarily anchored its reasoning in the Supreme Court corpus above.

Legal reasoning and application

The Court’s reasoning proceeded in three layers:

• Layer 1: Evidentiary Implosion of the FIR — The Court catalogued contradictions and objective exculpatory material: neutral CCTV and travel records for the alleged High Court incident; a negative MLC and Y-STR DNA result; the husband’s and neighbors’ statements negating house entry; and a prior Rojnamcha noting no specific allegation and habitual false reporting. These findings made the allegations “inherently improbable” and bereft of prima facie substance.
• Layer 2: Abuse of Process under Bhajan Lal categories — The cumulative record indicated malicious institution of proceedings following the petitioner’s decision to withdraw from the complainant’s earlier case, constituting a vendetta-type initiation, squarely justifying quashment.
• Layer 3: Remedial Directions and Deterrence — Invoking Section 22(1) POCSO and BNS Sections 240 and 248 (analogous to the former IPC regime on false information and false charge), the Court mandated prosecutorial action against the complainant. It also crafted a prospective, complainant-specific direction for a preliminary enquiry before “coercive action” in any future complaint by her—carefully framed as a response to “peculiar facts,” thereby not unsettling the general rule in Lalita Kumari regarding registration of FIRs.

Impact and significance

• Deterrence against misuse of POCSO: By directing prosecution under Section 22(1) POCSO, the Court signals that the statute’s protective umbrella cannot be exploited to harass or defame others. This may deter malicious litigants while protecting the credibility of genuine prosecutions.
• Clarifying police practice post-Lalita Kumari: The judgment reaffirms mandatory FIR registration for cognizable offences but demonstrates that, in narrowly tailored, demonstrably abusive scenarios involving the same complainant, authorities may be directed to undertake a preliminary enquiry before employing coercive measures. This nuance balances victim-centric policing with safeguards for the wrongly accused.
• Judicial gatekeeping post-investigation: The Court’s reliance on Anand Kumar Mohatta underscores that quashing is available even after a case has matured to a closure report or charge-sheet, especially when continuation would compound abuse.
• Reputation and due process: The Court explicitly recognized the severe reputational consequences of sexual offence accusations and framed the right to dignity of the accused as a factor in curbing malicious prosecutions, aligning with Haji Iqbal.
• Operational guidance:
  • For police: Keep meticulous general diary (Rojnamcha) entries; collect objective evidence (CCTV, tower data, forensic samples) promptly; and where allegations collapse, consider action under POCSO Section 22 and BNS Sections 240/248.
  • For magistrates: Even where closure is placed before you, quashment by the High Court may supervene if abuse is manifest.
  • For defense counsel: Use documentary, forensic, and electronic trail to demonstrate inherent improbabilities under the Bhajan Lal framework.
  • For complainants: The judgment serves as a cautionary note that false accusations—particularly under POCSO—invite penal consequences.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Article 226 vs. Section 482 CrPC: Both empower the High Court to prevent abuse of process. Article 226 is a constitutional writ power; Section 482 is a statutory “inherent” power in criminal cases. Here, the Court exercised Article 226 to quash the FIR.
• Rojnamcha Sanha: The daily diary maintained at police stations. Entries can record preliminary information or the closure of non-cognizable or unsubstantiated complaints prior to a formal FIR.
• MLC (Medico-Legal Case) and Y-STR DNA: An MLC documents medical findings relevant to alleged offences. Y-STR DNA analysis detects male-specific genetic markers. A negative Y-STR does not conclusively rule out sexual assault but, alongside other exculpatory facts, can be significant.
• POCSO Section 22(1): Penalizes false complaints or false information given “solely with the intention to humiliate, extort, threaten or defame.” The requirement of intent is crucial—mere acquittal or failure of proof does not automatically trigger S.22.
• BNS Sections 240 and 248: New penal provisions (analogous to prior IPC offences) targeting false information about an offence (S.240) and false charges instituted with intent to injure (S.248). They embody the system’s interest in truthful reporting and the integrity of criminal process.
• Preliminary enquiry vs. FIR registration: Lalita Kumari made FIR registration mandatory upon disclosure of a cognizable offence, with limited scope for preliminary enquiry in specified categories. The present judgment does not derogate from that rule; it only requires a preliminary enquiry before “coercive action” in future complaints by this complainant, given a proven pattern of abuse.
• Closure report: When police find no evidence to proceed, they file a closure (or final) report before the Magistrate. The informant is entitled to be heard if the Magistrate intends to accept it (Bhagwant Singh). The High Court’s quashment here preempted those proceedings, based on abuse of process findings.

Conclusion

This decision is a robust reaffirmation of the High Court’s role as a constitutional sentinel against malicious prosecutions, especially in the emotionally and socially charged domain of sexual offences against children. While carefully acknowledging the imperative of mandatory FIR registration under Lalita Kumari, the Court acted decisively once investigation yielded emphatic exculpatory material and a pattern of abuse became undeniable.

Three doctrinal contributions stand out:

• A meticulous application of the Bhajan Lal framework to quash an FIR post-investigation, fortified by Neeharika and Anand Kumar Mohatta, ensuring that writ remedies remain meaningful even after procedural milestones like a closure report.
• An explicit operationalization of POCSO Section 22(1) and BNS Sections 240 and 248 against false informants, thereby safeguarding the sanctity of POCSO while protecting the reputational and dignitary interests of the falsely accused.
• A narrowly tailored, prospective procedural safeguard—mandating a preliminary enquiry before coercive action in any future complaint by the same informant—crafted to address habitual misuse without diluting the general Lalita Kumari regime.

In sum, Prakash Upadhyay v. State of Madhya Pradesh provides a carefully calibrated template for courts confronting demonstrably false POCSO accusations: quash where abuse is manifest, deter misuse through appropriate prosecution of the informant, and, in exceptional habitual-complainant scenarios, design narrowly tailored procedural checks to avert future miscarriages of justice.