Supreme Court Clarifies:
No Probation or Sentence-Reduction for PoFA Offences Committed Between 1976-2006

1. Introduction

In Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu; Naresh Chandra v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2025 INSC 703) the Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Dipankar Datta (with Justice Manmohan concurring), delivered a common judgment deciding two criminal appeals that raised an identical question of sentencing under the now-repealed Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (“PoFA”).

Although the factual matrices differed – one concerned adulterated curd (2001) and the other obstruction of a Food Inspector (1985) – both appellants sought mitigation of the mandatory six-month imprisonment prescribed by PoFA on the twin grounds that:

• they should be released on probation as first-time offenders, and/or
• the lighter punishment envisaged by the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSS Act”) should retrospectively apply.

The Court rejected both submissions and, while converting imprisonment into enhanced fines on equitable grounds, laid down two binding propositions that will govern future food-safety prosecutions:

1. Between 1976 (insertion of s.20AA PoFA) and 2006 (its repeal), no offender – save those under 18 – can invoke the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (“Probation Act”) or s.360 CrPC.
2. Where the repealing statute (here, the FSS Act) contains a “repeal & savings” clause that expressly preserves prior penalties, courts cannot import the newer, lighter sentence by resorting to the doctrine of beneficial construction.

2. Summary of the Judgment

After traversing extensive precedent, the bench answered the two certified questions thus:

1. Probation barred. Section 20AA PoFA, read with the savings clause in s. 97 FSS Act, is “too clear admitting of no absurdity”. Therefore, courts are statutorily prohibited from granting probation for PoFA offences committed in the relevant period.
2. No automatic mollification. The rule that a subsequent statute reducing punishment should benefit an accused (e.g., T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe) cannot override an explicit savings clause. Hence, the comparatively lenient penalties under the FSS Act are inapplicable.

On facts, however, the Court noticed (a) a glaring discrepancy between two laboratory reports in the curd case and (b) the 40-year pendency in the chilli-powder case. Invoking equity and a co-ordinate bench decision in A.K. Sarkar & Co. v. State of W.B. – though with reservations – it converted the custodial sentences into substantial fines (₹30,000 and ₹20,000 respectively), to be paid by June 2025.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Ishar Das v. State Of Punjab (1973): Pre-1976 authority permitting probation for PoFA offences; now eclipsed by s.20AA.
• Pyarali K. Tejani & Prem Ballab: stressed societal menace of food adulteration; foreshadowed legislative bar on probation.
• T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe (1983): pivotal on beneficial construction leading to reduced sentence when Central law supersedes State law. The present Court distinguished it on three counts (Central v. State conflict, absence of probation issue, and no savings clause).
• Babu Ram v. State of Haryana (1987): directly held that s.20AA overrides Probation Act; now reaffirmed.
• Basheer v. State of Kerala (2004): upheld constitutionality of excluding “appeals-pending” from retrospectivity; supplied analytical template on savings clauses.
• A.K. Sarkar & Co. (2024): applied FSS fine in lieu of PoFA imprisonment; present bench follows it on comity, yet questions its reasoning – signalling possible reconsideration by a larger bench in future.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Literal rule prevails. Because s.20AA’s language – “Nothing contained in the Probation Act or s.360 CrPC shall apply…” – is unequivocal, courts cannot invoke purposive or beneficial interpretation to bypass it.
2. Distinction between probation & sentence-reduction. The Court clarifies that probation replaces custodial punishment with community supervision, whereas mollification merely scales down the quantum. The former is completely ousted; the latter is subject to the savings clause.
3. Savings clause supremacy. Section 97 FSS Act mirrors s.6 General Clauses Act, safeguarding prior liabilities, penalties and prosecutions “as if this Act had not been passed.” Thus, Parliament intended continuity of PoFA penalties.
4. Constitutional alignment. Articles 14 & 21 were invoked by appellants. The Court holds the classification (pre-2006 PoFA convicts v. post-2006 offenders) rational and non-arbitrary because (a) food adulteration imperils public health, (b) the legislature deliberately imposed mandatory minimums during that period.
5. Equitable fine-conversion. While doctrinally disallowing probation/reduction, the bench exercised appellate discretion to substitute imprisonment with fines – citing discrepant evidence, age of proceedings, and proportionality – demonstrating that individualized justice remains possible within statutory confines.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation & Regulatory Regime

• Bars courts from entertaining probation pleas for any PoFA offence committed between 1-4-1976 and 4-8-2006, irrespective of the offender’s age (except minors).
• Constrains reliance on T. Barai-style arguments when a repealing statute contains an express savings clause. This will resonate beyond food law (e.g., NDPS, customs, environmental regimes).
• Signals to trial courts the need for meticulous sample-testing, as analytical discrepancies can still tilt the balance on sentence, even when statutory minima apply.
• Invites a possible larger-bench reference on whether A.K. Sarkar was correctly decided; until then, that judgment survives but stands on fragile footing.
• Re-affirms Parliament’s ability to carve out exceptions to rehabilitative sentencing policies where public-health goals demand deterrence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probation vs. Sentence Reduction: Probation suspends jail altogether, placing the offender under supervision. Sentence reduction merely lowers or substitutes the jail term (e.g., fine) but keeps the conviction intact.
• Section 20AA PoFA: A “non-obstante” clause – legal shorthand for “overrides anything contrary elsewhere.” It statutorily blocks probation for PoFA convicts above 18.
• Repeal & Savings Clause: When one statute repeals another, Parliament often “saves” old liabilities, ensuring prosecutions/punishments under the old law continue unaffected. Think of it as a legal bridge preserving pending cases.
• Beneficial (Mollifying) Construction: Courts normally apply lighter subsequent punishments retrospectively – but only if the legislature is silent. An explicit savings clause trumps this doctrine.
• Article 20(1) Constitution: Prohibits retrospective creation of offences or harsher penalties, but allows retrospective lighter penalties unless barred by statute.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision cements a strict sentencing regime for historical PoFA offences by:

• Unequivocally reaffirming that s.20AA PoFA overrides the Probation Act and s.360 CrPC; and
• Declaring that a savings clause forecloses retrospective application of lenient punishments found in the repealing FSS Act.

While the Court ultimately spared the appellants custodial incarceration on equitable grounds, the doctrinal holdings are uncompromising. For practitioners, regulators, and trial courts, the ruling:

Draws a bright-line rule: PoFA convicts (1976-2006) cannot claim probation or lighter FSS sentences; any relief must arise from evidentiary infirmities or appellate discretion, not statutory loopholes.

In the broader legal canvas, Nagarajan underscores the primacy of clear legislative intent over interpretive liberalism, especially where public health is at stake – a message likely to reverberate across regulatory criminal jurisprudence.