Supreme Court Clarifies Admissibility of FIR where the Informant is Deceased

1. Introduction

The case Lalita v. Vishwanath (2025 INSC 173) came before the Supreme Court of India as a criminal appeal preferred by the mother of the deceased. The deceased, named Dev Kanya, had allegedly committed suicide after facing harassment from her husband (Respondent No.1), father-in-law, mother-in-law, and the husband’s first wife. She was married approximately one and a half years prior to the incident. The appellant contended that continuous harassment and the demands related to farmland transfer ultimately drove her daughter to take her own life.

The Trial Court had convicted all four accused (the husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law, and the husband’s first wife) under Sections 306 and 498A read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). However, on appeal, the High Court of Judicature at Bombay (Bench at Aurangabad) reversed this decision, leading to their acquittal. Unsatisfied with the High Court’s order, the mother filed the current appeal in the Supreme Court.

Significantly, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s order of acquittal, underscoring the lack of direct evidence to prove abetment of suicide and elucidating the principles regarding the admissibility of a First Information Report (FIR) in situations where the original informant has passed away.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Supreme Court, dismissing the mother’s appeal, held that:

• There was insufficient evidence to link the accused with the abetment of suicide. The Court emphasized that mere harassment or cruelty, on its own, does not necessarily amount to abetment under the law.
• The presumption under Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act”), cannot be invoked unless cogent evidence of cruelty or harassment leading to suicide is established.
• The crucial difference between Section 113A (where the court may presume abetment of suicide) and Section 113B (where the court shall presume dowry death) was extensively discussed.
• On the procedural side, the Court clarified that if the first informant dies before testifying, the Investigating Officer (IO) cannot prove the contents of the FIR as substantive evidence unless they meet the criteria under Section 32 of the Evidence Act (dying declaration or otherwise falling within exceptional circumstances). The IO can only attest to the fact that such an FIR was registered but not prove its contents for their truth.
• No incriminating evidence was produced by the prosecution to indicate that the accused directly aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide. The underlying possibility that the deceased was emotionally disturbed by the presence of her husband’s first wife was insufficient to prove legal abetment.

3. Analysis

a) Precedents Cited

The Supreme Court referred to its recent pronouncement in Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015, decided on January 9, 2025), clarifying the scope of Section 113A of the Evidence Act. That decision highlights that the court’s power to presume abetment of suicide is permissive (“may presume”) rather than mandatory. The Court stated that a presumption under Section 113A cannot be raised without adequate evidence of cruelty, harassment, or a clear link between the accused’s conduct and the suicide.

Several other authorities were discussed to illustrate the appropriate use and limitations of an FIR:

• Damodar Prasad v. State of U.P.
  Referenced for the principle that an FIR can sometimes be viewed as a dying declaration (in narrow circumstances under Section 32 of the Evidence Act) if the informant’s death is directly tied to the facts of the FIR.
• Munna Raja v. State of M.P.
  Cited to show that an FIR can be used as a dying declaration if the informant dies from the injuries complained of in the FIR.
• Harkirat Singh v. State Of Punjab
  Demonstrated that an FIR by the deceased cannot be treated as substantive evidence unless it meets an exception (e.g., Section 32). The investigating officer cannot recite its content as proof of the facts stated in the FIR if the informant is deceased and the cause of death is unrelated to the injuries or circumstances documented in the FIR.
• Hazarilal v. State (Delhi Administration)
  Clarified statutory bars under Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and evidentiary limitations for witness statements recorded by the police during investigation.
• Umrao Singh v. State Of M.P.
  Emphasized the distinction between proving the fact that an FIR was made and the truth of its content—where the latter remains hearsay unless it meets an established exception in law.

b) Legal Reasoning

First, the Supreme Court examined whether the acquittal by the High Court was legally sustainable. The Court concluded that harassment of a general nature or domestic discord is insufficient to prove the necessary mens rea for abetment under Section 306 of the IPC. A direct or proximate link between the alleged acts of the accused and the suicide is crucial. Given the deceased may have felt distraught due to personal circumstances, without direct involvement or instigation from the accused, the charge of abetment could not be sustained.

Secondly, with respect to the procedural law concerning FIRs, the Court provided an extensive analysis. The father of the deceased, who lodged the FIR, passed away before the trial. As a result, the FIR was presented at trial through the Investigating Officer. The Court reiterated that:

• Under Section 154 CrPC, the FIR sets the criminal law in motion but is not by itself substantive evidence of the facts alleged therein.
• The Investigating Officer can testify to the factum that the FIR was filed and identify any signatures, but cannot prove its content for the truth of the matter stated except in certain circumstances covered under Section 32 of the Evidence Act (e.g., a dying declaration) or when it qualifies under another recognized exception.
• There is a broad distinction between using an FIR to corroborate or contradict its maker (pursuant to Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act) and treating the FIR’s content as substantive evidence in the absence of the informant's testimony.

With this legal framework, the Court concluded that the High Court’s approach in evaluating the content of the FIR was correct and that the Investigating Officer’s presentation of the FIR’s content could not serve as direct proof of abetment or cruelty.

c) Impact

This ruling solidifies key principles for future cases where the informant dies prior to cross-examination:

• It firmly clarifies the limitations on relying upon the FIR content where the informant is unavailable, preventing misuse of untested statements in criminal trials.
• It underscores that courts must look for direct evidence establishing a connection between the accused’s conduct and the deceased’s decision to end her life, rather than relying on general allegations of harassment.
• The difference in the presumptions under Sections 113A and 113B of the Evidence Act is reiterated, guiding lower courts to carefully assess evidence before drawing inferences of abetment.

Overall, the decision upholds due process in criminal proceedings and ensures that convictions are based on legitimate, admissible proof rather than inferences alone. The ruling will likely influence how trial courts handle the death of a complainant or other key witnesses, particularly regarding the evidentiary scope of the FIR.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Abetment of Suicide (IPC Section 306): To prove abetment, the prosecution must establish that the accused intentionally aided, instigated, or conspired in the act of suicide. Simple domestic quarrels or general ill-treatment do not automatically qualify as abetment.
2. Section 113A and Section 113B of the Evidence Act:
   • Section 113A: The court may presume abetment of suicide by a husband or his relatives if a married woman commits suicide within seven years of marriage and there is evidence of cruelty. However, it is not mandatory for the court to hold the accused guilty—the evidence must justify raising such a presumption.
   • Section 113B: Deals with presumption in dowry deaths, and the presumption of a dowry death is mandatory once certain initial facts are established. This is a stronger and more stringent provision but does not automatically apply to abetment of suicide with no dowry context.
3. Admissibility of FIR Content: An FIR is generally not considered substantive evidence on its own. Rather, it is meant to inform the police of an alleged offense. Where the person who lodged the FIR is deceased, the FIR can only be considered as evidence if it qualifies as a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Evidence Act or if it is used to merely corroborate or contradict the maker’s testimony. Otherwise, the investigating officer can only prove the fact that the FIR was filed, not the truth of its contents.
4. Investigating Officer’s Role: The IO can testify to procedural aspects—date, location, and fact of the FIR’s registration—but cannot recite the FIR’s statements as evidence of the truth when the original informant is absent, unless an exception under the Evidence Act applies.

5. Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s dismissal of the appeal in Lalita v. Vishwanath confirms the High Court’s acquittal and reaffirms two fundamental principles. First, courts require more than “mere harassment” to convict someone for abetment of suicide; a clear nexus between the accused’s behavior and the suicidal act must be proven. Second, and equally significant, the decision clarifies the scope of proving FIR contents when the original informant has passed away, rejecting the use of an investigating officer’s testimony to transform the FIR itself into substantive proof.

By underscoring these points, the judgment sets a precedent that promotes rigorous evidentiary standards in criminal cases. Ultimately, this ruling will guide lower courts and law enforcement authorities to carefully distinguish between permissible factual testimony and impermissible attempts to read unverified hearsay content into evidence. It is a vital reminder that criminal convictions must rest upon reliable, tested, and lawfully admissible proof rather than assumptions or mere suspicion.