Supremacy of the Public Premises Act Over State Rent Control Laws Irrespective of Tenancy Commencement, and a Strong Reassertion of Stare Decisis – Commentary on Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. v. Vita, 2025 INSC 1419

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Life Insurance Corporation of India & Anr. v. Vita, 2025 INSC 1419, decided on 11 December 2025 by a three‑Judge Bench (N.V. Anjaria, J.; Vikram Nath, J.; Sandeep Mehta, J.), is a significant restatement and clarification of two foundational aspects of Indian public and procedural law:

• The overriding reach of the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act, 1971”) vis‑à‑vis State Rent Control legislation, irrespective of when the tenancy commenced; and
• The binding force of precedents, especially that a Bench of lesser strength cannot “clarify” or depart from a larger Bench’s ratio, under the doctrine of stare decisis.

The case arose from a reference by a two‑Judge Bench in view of an apparent conflict between:

• the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 4 SCC 406; and
• the two‑Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. & its Estate Officer, (2014) 4 SCC 657.

At stake was whether tenants/licensees inducted into premises before those premises became “public premises” (e.g., before nationalisation of a bank, or before acquisition by LIC/PSUs), could still invoke State Rent Act protection, or whether once the premises became “public premises” and the tenancy was determined, only the PP Act, 1971 applied.

The lead matter was Civil Appeal No. 2638 of 2023, arising from a Bombay High Court judgment that had relied on Suhas H. Pophale to hold that LIC’s tenant, inducted in 1957, remained protected by Maharashtra rent legislation and could not be evicted through PP Act proceedings.

The Supreme Court has now:

• Reaffirmed the Constitution Bench in Ashoka Marketing and the three‑Judge Bench in M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. LIC, (1980) 4 SCC 435;
• Declared that Suhas H. Pophale does not state the correct law and stands overruled to the extent of its contrary propositions; and
• Re‑articulated, in a structured way, the legal position on the applicability of the PP Act to all public premises and the discipline required in following precedents.

2. Summary of the Judgment

2.1 Core issue

The referred question was whether the PP Act, 1971:

• prevails over State Rent Control Acts (e.g., Bombay Rent Act, Maharashtra Rent Control Act, Delhi Rent Control Act) in respect of tenancies created before the PP Act came into force or before premises became “public premises”; and
• whether a distinction can be drawn between:
  • tenants in occupation before 16.09.1958 (the deemed commencement date of the PP Act), and
  • tenants inducted thereafter but before the property was acquired/nationalised and became “public premises”.

2.2 Holding on substantive law (Public Premises vs Rent Control)

• Both the PP Act, 1971 and the various Rent Control Acts are special statutes. In the event of conflict, the PP Act prevails for public premises.
• The PP Act overrides State Rent Control Acts to the extent that both apply to the same premises, and a person in “unauthorised occupation” of “public premises” (as defined in Sections 2(g) and 2(e)) cannot invoke the protection of Rent Control legislation.
• The PP Act applies to tenancies:
  • created before its coming into force; and
  • created after its coming into force;
  once the premises fall within Section 2(e) as “public premises” and the occupation becomes unauthorised (e.g., after termination under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882).
• No valid distinction can be drawn between:
  • tenants inducted before 16.09.1958/1971, and
  • tenants inducted after that date;
  for purposes of applying the PP Act’s eviction scheme.

2.3 Holding on stare decisis and bench discipline

• The ratio of Ashoka Marketing (Constitution Bench) and Jain Ink (three‑Judge Bench) is binding on smaller Benches.
• Suhas H. Pophale, a two‑Judge Bench decision, consciously departed from those larger Bench decisions, purportedly in the guise of “clarifying” them. This amounted to a serious breach of the doctrine of stare decisis and of judicial discipline.
• A Bench of smaller strength:
  • cannot reinterpret or limit a larger Bench’s ratio on the ground that a point was not argued there; and
  • must either follow the larger Bench or refer the matter to an even larger Bench if it disagrees.
• Accordingly, the propositions set out in paras 59–60 of Suhas H. Pophale, creating protected categories of pre‑1958 or pre‑public‑status tenants, are expressly held to be bad in law and stand overruled (para 13(xi)).

2.4 Outcome in the lead case

In the lead appeal, the Bombay High Court had quashed the Estate Officer’s eviction order against Vita Pvt. Ltd. on the strength of Suhas H. Pophale, holding that tenancy created in 1957 was protected by Maharashtra rent legislation. By restoring the overriding application of the PP Act, 1971 in line with Ashoka Marketing, the Supreme Court effectively validated the use of PP Act eviction proceedings even for such pre‑Act tenancies.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Statutory framework: the Public Premises Act, 1971

3.1.1 “Public premises” – Section 2(e)

Section 2(e) broadly defines “public premises” to include:

• Premises belonging to, or taken on lease/requisitioned by, the Central Government;
• Premises belonging to, or taken on lease by, various public corporations and entities, including:
  • Government companies (51% or more government shareholding);
  • Statutory corporations like LIC, nationalised banks, major port trusts, etc.;
  • Specified universities, IITs, development authorities, certain municipal bodies, and other notified entities.

LIC is explicitly covered under Section 2(e)(2)(ii), as a corporation established by Central legislation and owned/controlled by the Central Government.

3.1.2 “Unauthorised occupation” – Section 2(g)

Section 2(g) defines “unauthorised occupation” as:

The Court (relying on Jain Ink) underscores that:

• This definition is inclusive and has two limbs:
  • occupation without authority (from inception); and
  • continuance in occupation after authority has expired or been determined.
• The focus is on occupation of public premises, not on when the person initially entered possession.
• Once the premises become “public premises” and the person’s authority is determined (e.g., tenancy terminated), his continued occupation becomes “unauthorised” and falls within the PP Act.

3.1.3 Eviction procedure – Sections 4 and 5

Sections 4 and 5 establish a summary, quasi‑judicial mechanism:

• Section 4: Estate Officer issues a show‑cause notice to the alleged unauthorised occupant, specifying grounds and calling for objections and evidence, and affords a hearing.
• Section 5: If satisfied that occupation is unauthorised, the Estate Officer passes a reasoned order of eviction, giving up to 15 days to vacate, and may use necessary force to take possession if the order is not complied with.

The Court reiterates the well‑established position (confirmed by the Constitution Bench in Kaiser‑i‑Hind Pvt. Ltd. v. NTC (Maharashtra North) Ltd., (2002) 8 SCC 182) that the PP Act’s summary procedure is constitutionally valid, justified by the public interest in speedy recovery of public premises.

3.2 The representative facts: LIC v. Vita

LIC, a statutory corporation wholly owned by the Central Government, owned Flat No. G‑B, Jeevan Jyot Building, Mumbai. The material facts:

• Tenancy in favour of Vita Pvt. Ltd. (respondent no. 1) created around April 1957.
• The PP Act, 1971 came into force on 23.08.1971, but Section 1(3) deems it to have come into force from 16.09.1958 (except certain penal and repeal/validation sections).
• In 2008–2009, LIC found the premises locked and occupied by respondent no. 2 (alleged trespasser); LIC issued notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act on 24.03.2009 terminating the tenancy and then initiated proceedings before the Estate Officer under Sections 5 and 7 of the PP Act.
• Estate Officer ordered eviction (27.03.2012); appeal to the City Civil Court failed (29.01.2013).
• The Bombay High Court, relying squarely on Suhas H. Pophale, held that:
  • tenancy pre‑dated 16.09.1958; and
  • thus, the tenancy remained under State rent legislation, and PP Act could not retrospectively deprive the tenant of rent‑control protection.

The Supreme Court’s present judgment effectively holds that the High Court’s approach was erroneous because it was controlled by Suhas H. Pophale, which itself contradicts binding larger Bench decisions.

3.3 Precedents and their influence

3.3.1 M/s Jain Ink Manufacturing Co. v. LIC, (1980) 4 SCC 435 (three‑Judge Bench)

Facts:

• The original owner had inducted the tenant; later, LIC purchased the premises.
• LIC terminated the tenancy under Section 106 TPA and initiated PP Act proceedings.
• The tenant argued that he could not be treated as an “unauthorised occupant” because he was inducted long before LIC acquired the property.

Key holdings (as summarised and adopted in the present case):

• Section 2(g) PP Act is about occupation of public premises, not initial entry. “Possession” or “entry into possession” are not controlling expressions; continuous “occupation” is.
• If the person is in occupation of the premises when they have become “public premises” and his lease has been determined, he is an “unauthorised occupant” within Section 2(g) and can be evicted under the PP Act.
• Giving retrospective effect to the PP Act from 16.09.1958 by legal fiction does not alter the fact that it is a later statute than the Delhi Rent Control Act; hence, lex posterior applies.
• Even though both PP Act and Rent Act contain non‑obstante clauses, their conflict must be resolved by reference to object and purpose: public premises eviction is governed by the PP Act.

The present Bench treats Jain Ink as a crucial authority already settling that a tenant inducted before the landlord became a public corporation can nonetheless be an “unauthorised occupant” once his tenancy is terminated by the public entity.

3.3.2 Ashoka Marketing Ltd. v. Punjab National Bank, (1990) 4 SCC 406 (Constitution Bench)

This is the central precedent. The facts covered two typical scenarios:

1. Tenants inducted by a private banking company (Punjab National Bank Ltd.) pre‑nationalisation; after the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, their tenancies continued under the nationalised bank (PNB). The bank terminated the tenancy and opted for PP Act eviction.
2. Tenant inducted by a private insurance company in 1948; life insurance business was later nationalised under the LIC Act, 1956. LIC terminated the tenancy and invoked the PP Act.

The question framed was essentially the same as in the present reference:

Key doctrinal moves in Ashoka Marketing (all expressly reaffirmed here):

• Both the PP Act and Rent Acts are special laws:
  • Rent Acts are special vis‑à‑vis the general landlord‑tenant law under the Transfer of Property Act, providing standard rent, special grounds of eviction, special forums and procedures.
  • PP Act is special vis‑à‑vis the general civil procedure, creating a special, speedy mechanism for eviction of unauthorised occupants of public premises.
• Because both are special, the ordinary rule generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law does not override a special law) does not answer which one prevails in their common field. The Court therefore applies:
  • leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (later laws abrogate earlier contrary laws); and
  • a purposive approach focusing on the object and policy of each statute.
• Result:
  • For premises belonging to the entities listed in Section 2(e) PP Act, the PP Act’s objective – speedy clearance of public premises – is given primacy over rent‑control protection.
  • To that extent, the PP Act overrides the Delhi Rent Control Act (and, by parity, other Rent Acts) where both could apply.
  • A person in unauthorised occupation of public premises cannot invoke Rent Act protection (para 70 in Ashoka Marketing).

The present Bench painstakingly applies this logic and holds that Suhas H. Pophale was incorrect to carve out any category of tenants as inherently excluded from the reach of the PP Act merely by virtue of entering the premises before a certain date.

3.3.3 Suhas H. Pophale v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2014) 4 SCC 657 (two‑Judge Bench)

Suhas H. Pophale involved:

• A private insurance company (Indian Mercantile Insurance Co.) subsequently merging with Oriental Insurance (a government company);
• A leave and licence arrangement of 20.12.1972, with the licensee claiming protection as a deemed tenant under Section 15A of the Bombay Rent Act with effect from 01.02.1973, before Oriental Insurance acquired title on 01.01.1974;
• Subsequent use of PP Act proceedings by Oriental Insurance to evict the occupant.

The two‑Judge Bench in Suhas H. Pophale held, essentially, that:

• The PP Act, 1971 is to be read as having only a prospective operation from 16.09.1958 (“date 1”) or from the later date on which the premises became “public premises” (“date 2”), as the case may be.
• Persons who entered into occupation prior to “date 1” or “date 2” had acquired “vested rights” under the Bombay Rent Act and continued to be governed exclusively by the State Rent law; the PP Act could not be used to dislodge such rights.
• Thus, it purported to create two broad categories:
  • Category 1: Occupants prior to 16.09.1958 (or prior to date of premises becoming “public premises”) – outside PP Act; protected by Rent Acts.
  • Category 2: Occupants who came in thereafter – subject to the PP Act.

The present Bench identifies multiple problems with this approach:

• It dissects Section 2(g)’s definition of “unauthorised occupation” in a manner inconsistent with Jain Ink and the textual emphasis on “occupation” of “public premises”.
• It directly contradicts the ratio of Ashoka Marketing even though the Constitution Bench had explicitly dealt with tenancies that pre‑dated nationalisation and the PP Act itself.
• It purports to “clarify” Ashoka Marketing by stating that certain temporal aspects were not argued before the Constitution Bench, and hence that judgment was not binding on that point – an approach the present Court rejects as contrary to stare decisis.

3.3.4 Precedents on stare decisis and bench strength

The Court anchors its criticism of Suhas H. Pophale in established precedent on the hierarchy of Bench strength:

(a) Mattulal v. Radhe Lal, (1974) 2 SCC 365

In Mattulal, there was an irreconcilable conflict between two earlier Supreme Court decisions of different Bench strengths. The Court held that:

This is cited here (para 11) to emphasise that when two decisions conflict, the one by the larger Bench prevails, irrespective of which one is earlier or later in time.

(b) General Manager, Telecom v. A. Srinivasa Rao, (1997) 8 SCC 767

This case concerned the definition of “industry” under the Industrial Disputes Act. A two‑Judge Bench in Sub‑Divisional Inspector of Post v. Theyyam Joseph, (1996) 8 SCC 489 had ignored the earlier seven‑Judge Bench in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213.

In GM, Telecom, the Supreme Court held:

The present judgment adopts this reasoning (paras 11.2–11.4) to hold that Suhas H. Pophale, being a smaller Bench, could not disregard or limit Ashoka Marketing and Jain Ink, and thus its contrary propositions “cannot and do not hold the field.”

3.4 The Court’s legal reasoning in the present case

3.4.1 Rejection of the temporal categorisation in Suhas H. Pophale

The Court identifies, and explicitly overrules, the specific propositions in Suhas H. Pophale which:

• make the applicability of the PP Act dependent on whether occupation began prior to 16.09.1958 or prior to the date on which the premises became public premises; and
• assert that such “prior tenants” are permanently outside the PP Act and continue to be governed exclusively by the State Rent Acts.

These are summarised in the present judgment (para 7) and then held to be:

3.4.2 Occupation vs entry: continuity as the key

Building on Jain Ink, the Court reiterates that:

• “Occupation” is a continuing state commencing at entry and enduring until the occupant leaves.
• Once premises become “public premises”, any continued occupation after the authority is terminated (e.g., through a Section 106 TPA notice) is “unauthorised occupation”, irrespective of how or when the person originally entered.
• What is “germane for the purpose of interpretation of Section 2(g)” is whether the person was in occupation of public premises when the PP Act was in force, not whether the entry occurred before or after a particular cutoff date.

This directly contradicts the cut‑off‑date‑based protection devised in Suhas H. Pophale.

3.4.3 Reconciling and prioritising special statutes

The Court restates the well‑settled interpretive framework from Ashoka Marketing:

• Where two special statutes – the PP Act and a Rent Act – overlap, neither can be labelled purely “general”.
• In such a situation, the Court must look to:
  • the purpose and policy of each statute; and
  • the clear legislative intendment expressed in the relevant provisions.
• Given Parliament’s evident policy to ensure speedy eviction of unauthorised occupants from public premises, and the explicit coverage of corporations like LIC, nationalised banks, etc. in Section 2(e), there is a deliberate legislative scheme to remove such premises from the ordinary Rent Act framework.

Accordingly, the Court reiterates that:

3.4.4 Stare decisis and improper “clarification”

A notable and important part of the judgment is its robust reaffirmation of judicial discipline:

• The Court remarks that Suhas H. Pophale “overlooked, ignored and disregarded” the ratio of Ashoka Marketing and Jain Ink, amounting to “judicial indiscipline, if not judicial impropriety” (para 9).
• It rejects the reasoning in Suhas H. Pophale that the Constitution Bench had not considered certain “retrospectivity” arguments and that therefore a later two‑Judge Bench could clarify the larger Bench judgment on that issue.
• The Court stresses that:
  • Binding force of a precedent is determined by Bench strength, not by the set of arguments actually advanced;
  • A smaller Bench cannot change the operative ratio of a larger Bench “in guise of explaining the decision of the larger Bench” (para 12(d)); and
  • If a smaller Bench considers a larger Bench decision incorrect or incomplete, the proper course is to refer the matter to a larger Bench, not to rewrite the law.

3.5 Impact of the judgment

3.5.1 For public sector landlords (LIC, PSUs, nationalised banks, statutory bodies)

• Clarity: Public entities now have unequivocal confirmation that all occupancies in “public premises” are governed by the PP Act’s eviction regime once the occupant becomes unauthorised.
• Simplification: They are not required to classify tenants into pre‑1958, pre‑nationalisation, or post‑nationalisation categories for purposes of deciding whether PP Act proceedings are available.
• Procedural advantage: They can confidently invoke the Estate Officer’s jurisdiction under the PP Act rather than being forced into slower and more protective Rent Act forums like Small Causes Courts or Rent Controllers.
• Litigation strategy: The overruling of Suhas H. Pophale will affect a large body of pending and future litigation where tenants had relied on that case to resist PP Act proceedings.

3.5.2 For tenants and occupants of public premises

• Loss of “historic” protection: Tenants inducted by private landlords before nationalisation or government acquisition can no longer argue that their tenancies are permanently insulated by Rent Acts from PP Act eviction.
• Reduced procedural protection: Once premises are “public premises” and the tenancy is validly terminated, tenants face:
  • a summary, time‑bound proceeding before an Estate Officer; and
  • limited appellate and judicial review avenues, compared to the extensive protections under State Rent Acts.
• Strategic shift: Tenant defences will need to focus on:
  • whether the premises in fact fall within Section 2(e) PP Act;
  • whether the tenancy was validly determined (e.g., adequacy of Section 106 TPA notice); and
  • procedural fairness in PP Act proceedings;
  rather than on exclusion from the PP Act based on the date of original induction.

3.5.3 For courts and judicial hierarchy

• Precedent discipline: The judgment sends a strong institutional message that:
  • High Courts and coordinate Benches of the Supreme Court must follow larger Bench decisions; and
  • apparent dissatisfaction with a larger Bench’s reasoning cannot justify departure.
• Future references: Where conflicts like Suhas H. Pophale vs Ashoka Marketing arise, the correct course is:
  • to recognise the conflict; and
  • to seek reference to a larger Bench rather than “distinguishing” in a way that nullifies the larger Bench’s operative ratio.
• Stability of law: By reaffirming the primacy of the Constitution Bench ruling, the Court restores consistency that had been disturbed for over a decade.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Public Premises Act vs Rent Control Acts: what is the core difference?

• Rent Control Acts:
  • Apply broadly to landlord‑tenant relationships in a State/UT;
  • Protect tenants from eviction except on specified grounds;
  • Regulate rent (standard rent), deposits, repairs, etc.;
  • Provide special forums (Rent Controllers, Small Causes Courts) and detailed procedures.
• Public Premises Act, 1971:
  • Targets premises owned/controlled by Government or specified public corporations;
  • Focuses narrowly on eviction of “unauthorised occupants” and recovery of arrears/damages;
  • Provides a summary, time‑efficient procedure before an Estate Officer;
  • Embodies a public policy imperative: effective management and utilisation of public property.

The Court’s consistent stance is that where both could apply, PP Act’s public‑law objective prevails over Rent Acts’ tenant‑protective design.

4.2 “Public premises” in plain terms

Simply put, “public premises” include:

• Government offices and buildings;
• Flats, shops, lands owned/leased by:
  • LIC, nationalised banks, public sector undertakings (PSUs);
  • statutory corporations (like major port trusts);
  • certain universities and institutions created by Parliament.

If your landlord is a public corporation mentioned in Section 2(e) PP Act, the premises are very likely “public premises”.

4.3 “Unauthorised occupation” in practical terms

A person is in unauthorised occupation if:

• He was never validly authorised to occupy; or
• He was authorised (e.g., as tenant or licensee), but:
  • the authorisation has expired (term ended); or
  • the landlord has terminated the tenancy (e.g., by a Section 106 TPA notice); and
  • he still continues to occupy.

It is the continuing occupation without current authority that triggers PP Act proceedings, not the historical fact that he originally entered lawfully.

4.4 Lex posterior and generalia specialibus

• Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant: a later law overrides an earlier law if they are inconsistent.
• Generalia specialibus non derogant: a general law does not override a special law. But this assumes one is clearly “general” and the other “special”.

Here, both PP Act and Rent Acts are “special” in different respects. Hence, the Court goes beyond these maxims and looks to:

• relative chronology (PP Act is later than many Rent Acts); and
• the specific policy choice: Parliament consciously intended to create a special, fast‑track eviction mechanism for public premises, and to exempt them from ordinary rent‑control constraints.

4.5 Stare decisis and Bench strength, in simple terms

In the Supreme Court:

• A decision of a Constitution Bench (5 or more Judges) binds all smaller Benches.
• A decision of a three‑Judge Bench binds two‑Judge Benches.
• If a smaller Bench thinks a larger Bench is wrong:
  • it cannot ignore, overrule or “clarify away” the larger Bench ruling; instead,
  • it must refer the matter to a Bench of equal or larger strength.

This ensures consistency, predictability, and institutional respect for the Court’s own hierarchy. The present judgment underscores that Suhas H. Pophale did not follow this discipline and is therefore not good law.

5. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and Broader Significance

5.1 Substantive law on public premises and rent control

The judgment firmly settles – and re‑settles – that:

• Once premises fall within Section 2(e) PP Act as “public premises”, and the occupant is in “unauthorised occupation” (e.g., after valid termination of tenancy), eviction must proceed under the PP Act, 1971.
• This is true irrespective of whether the tenancy began:
  • before 16.09.1958 (the deemed commencement date);
  • before 23.08.1971 (when the Act was enacted);
  • before nationalisation or government acquisition; or
  • after any of these events.
• State Rent Control Acts cannot be invoked to oust the Estate Officer’s jurisdiction or to shield an unauthorised occupant of public premises from summary eviction.

5.2 Precedent and institutional discipline

Equally important is the Court’s insistence on:

• the binding force of larger Bench decisions like Ashoka Marketing and Jain Ink;
• the impropriety of a smaller Bench recasting the law under the guise of “clarification”; and
• the reaffirmation that when conflicts arise, courts must choose the ruling of the larger Bench as controlling, irrespective of which decision is chronologically later.

By expressly disapproving and overruling the contrary propositions in Suhas H. Pophale, the Supreme Court restores coherence to this area of law and underlines a vital constitutional value: that the Supreme Court speaks with a unified, hierarchically ordered voice, and that judicial discipline is not optional.

In sum, LIC v. Vita is not merely a landlord‑tenant decision. It is a robust reaffirmation of:

• the primacy of public interest in the management of public property; and
• the discipline of precedent without which a multi‑Bench apex court cannot function as a stable arbiter of legal norms.