Supply of Judgment Copies Held Directory: Limitation Period in Commercial Appeals Begins on Pronouncement – Commentary on Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (2025 INSC 533)

1. Introduction

The Supreme Court’s decision in Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v. M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (2025 INSC 533) clarifies a recurring controversy under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (CCA) and its Schedule-based amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The appellants, state-owned Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. (JUUNL) and its affiliate, sought condonation of a 301-day delay in filing a commercial appeal against a decree in favour of Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) for approximately ₹26.59 crores.

Two pivotal questions arose:

1. Whether the amended Order XX Rule 1 CPC – which obliges commercial courts to “pronounce judgment and issue copies to all parties” – is mandatory (thus postponing limitation until copies are served) or merely directory.
2. Whether, in the factual matrix, sufficient cause existed to condone the 301-day delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court of Jharkhand, holding that limitation begins on the date of pronouncement; the obligation to furnish copies is directory; and large, sophisticated litigants cannot remain passive awaiting service of a free copy.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• The Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, refusing to condone a 301-day delay.
• Order XX Rule 1 CPC (as amended for commercial courts) is directory; limitation is triggered by pronouncement, not by receipt of a free copy.
• Housing Board, Haryana (1995) and Sagufa Ahmed (2021) do not advance a contrary principle because in those cases parties had shown diligence in attempting to secure copies.
• Applying the ruling in Govt. of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers (2021), condonation beyond the outer limit of 120 days (60 + 60) in commercial matters can be granted only by exception; negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides are fatal.
• State instrumentalities are not entitled to a different, more lenient standard.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

1. Housing Board, Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association (1995) 5 SCC 672
   • Held: Where rules expressly require communication of an order, limitation starts upon such communication.
   • Distinction: That case involved individual consumer litigants and clear evidence of efforts to obtain a copy; here, JUUNL made no efforts for eight months.
2. Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Polywood (P) Ltd. (2021) 2 SCC 317
   • Section 421(3) Companies Act: Limitation starts when copy of NCLT order is made available.
   • Distinction: Appellants in Sagufa applied for certified copies promptly – diligence absent in present case.
3. Govt. of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors (P) Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 460
   • Ratio: In commercial/ arbitration appeals, delay beyond statutory period plus 60 days is to be condoned sparingly.
   • Directly applied to hold that 301-day delay (way beyond 120-day outer limit) cannot be condoned.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning weaves together three strands:

1. Statutory Purpose of the CCA: By design, the CCA super-imposes truncated, non-derogable timelines to ensure swift resolution of high-value commercial disputes. Reading Order XX Rule 1 as mandatory would frustrate the very fundamental canons of limitation and the legislative intent for expedition.
2. Directory vs. Mandatory Interpretation:
   • The textual imperative “shall” is not conclusive; contextual factors (object, purpose, consequences of non-compliance) may convert it into a directory duty.
   • If mandatory, litigants could indefinitely suspend limitation by remaining idle until the Registry sues out copies—an untenable outcome.
   • Hence, the rule is directory; litigants must proactively seek copies within a reasonable period.
3. Application of Section 5 Limitation Act:
   • The Court reaffirmed that “sufficient cause” is a restricted safety-valve in the commercial law setting.
   • JUUNL’s failure to even make inquiries for eight months demonstrated gross negligence.
   • Consequently, the delay was not a fit “exceptional” case envisaged in Borse Brothers.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

• Limitation Clarity: Resolves prevalent ambiguity among commercial practitioners on whether the limitation clock is linked to service of a free copy. Courts are now bound to treat pronouncement as the trigger event.
• Heightened Duty of Diligence: Parties – especially government and public sector undertakings – must institute robust internal mechanisms to track judgments and apply for certified copies immediately.
• Reduced Forum Shopping: The verdict curtails tactics of prolonging disputes via strategic inaction, aligning with global standards of commercial dispute efficiency.
• Procedural Harmonisation: Harmonises CCA timelines with the Supreme Court’s approach under the Arbitration Act (Section 37) and Companies Act (Section 421) where “outer-limit plus condonation” regimes are already policed stringently.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Directory vs. Mandatory Provisions

A mandatory provision must be strictly followed; non-compliance invalidates the proceeding. A directory provision signifies legislative intent but non-compliance does not nullify the action, though sanctions may follow.

Order XX Rule 1 CPC (Commercial Courts)

Requires commercial courts to (a) pronounce judgment within 90 days of closing arguments, and (b) “issue” copies to parties. The Supreme Court now says part (b) is directory.

Section 13(1-A) CCA

Provides 60 days to appeal against a judgment of a Commercial Court (District Judge level) or Commercial Division (High Court). Section 5 Limitation Act may allow a further 60-day condonation in rare cases.

Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963

Permits courts to admit an appeal after expiry of limitation if “sufficient cause” for delay is shown. In commercial matters, the threshold is deliberately narrow to foster timely adjudication.

Borse Brothers Ratio

Supreme Court precedent declaring that delays beyond statutorily prescribed plus a short condonable window (60 or 90 days depending on statute) are to be condoned only by exception, not as a matter of course.

5. Conclusion

Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. BHEL firmly establishes that, for commercial disputes, the limitation period to file an appeal is triggered by pronouncement of judgment, not by receipt of a free copy. The obligation under amended Order XX Rule 1 CPC to supply copies is directory; litigants must act with diligence and obtain certified copies on their own initiative. Delays surpassing the cumulative ceiling of 120 days (60 days plus a discretionary 60) will be condoned only in truly exceptional, bona fide situations.

This ruling realigns procedural practice with the core legislative purpose of the Commercial Courts Act – speedy, efficient, and predictable resolution of high-stakes commercial disputes – and serves as a cautionary tale for institutional litigants who rely on bureaucratic inertia rather than active case management.