Substance Over Labels: Mandatory Charity Commissioner Consent for Suits Against (Ex)‑Trustees under Sections 50–51 of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act

I. Introduction

The decision of the Bombay High Court (Original Side) in Niket Mehta v. Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust, through Charu Mehta & Ors., Oral Judgment dated 3 December 2025 (IA No. 3243 of 2025 in Suit No. 23 of 2025, Neutral Citation 2025:BHC‑OS:23200), deals with a recurring and practically important question under the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act, 1950 (“MPT Act”):

Can a public charitable trust avoid the mandatory requirement of prior consent of the Charity Commissioner under Sections 50 and 51 of the MPT Act by characterising a trustee (or ex‑trustee) as a “trespasser” and filing an ordinary civil suit for recovery of compensation?

Justice Milind N. Jadhav answers this in the negative. On a close reading of the plaint and its annexures, the Court holds that the defendant, Niket Mehta, was consistently treated by the plaintiffs themselves as a “trustee/permanent trustee/erstwhile trustee” of Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust (“the Trust”) during the period of alleged unauthorised occupation of trust property. Consequently:

the suit is one “of the nature specified” in Section 50,
prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner under Section 51 was mandatory, and
in the absence of such consent, the plaint is barred by law and liable to rejection under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”).

The judgment re‑emphasises a “substance over labels” approach: what matters is how the plaintiff’s own pleadings and documents characterise the defendant and the dispute, not the legal label or drafting device (such as calling him a “trespasser”) adopted later to escape the rigours of Sections 50 and 51.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

1. The parties and the trust

Plaintiff No. 1: Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust, an admittedly registered public trust governed by the MPT Act, which runs the well‑known Lilavati Hospital and Research Centre in Mumbai.
Plaintiff Nos. 2–4: The present trustees of Plaintiff No. 1, recognised as such after proceedings before the Assistant Charity Commissioner (ACC).
Defendant / Applicant: Mr. Niket Mehta, who, on the plaintiffs’ own showing in various documents, acted as a “permanent trustee” and member of the Board of Trustees of the Trust from around 2001 until at least 2015; the ACC later held his appointment to be illegal in an order dated 14 December 2023.

2. The “suit properties” and alleged unauthorised occupation

The dispute concerns two immovable properties within the hospital building, admittedly belonging to the Trust:

Residential flat: Flat No. 7, 12th floor, admeasuring ~2849.66 sq. ft., used by the defendant as his residence;
Office premises: An office admeasuring ~360 sq. ft. on the 3rd floor (A Wing) of the hospital building.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendant:

occupied the residential flat from January 2007 to April 2015 (elsewhere the plaint suggests up to 2018); and
used the 3rd floor office from January 2007 to January 2009,

without lawful authority, causing loss to the Trust which should have otherwise earned market rent from these properties.

3. Earlier proceedings: Change Report and Supreme Court orders

Two strands of prior proceedings are relevant:

Change report proceedings before the ACC (Order dated 14.12.2023)
The ACC, in adjudicating change reports regarding the composition of the Board, held that the defendant and others were “illegally appointed trustees” and rejected their change report, thereby dislodging them from the management of the Trust. Relying heavily on this, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant was never a validly appointed trustee and therefore his occupation of the suit properties was that of a trespasser.
Supreme Court orders in SLP (C) No. 3772 of 2014
In earlier litigation, the defendant’s occupation of the 12th floor flat had reached the Supreme Court. By order dated 11 May 2015, the Supreme Court recorded that the defendant agreed to pay market rate and maintenance charges for retaining possession. A further order dated 21 January 2016 required him either to:
- vacate the premises after clearing arrears and hand over possession, or
- continue in occupation on payment of monthly compensation at a rate to be determined by an Interim Board.
The plaintiffs asserted that the defendant’s occupation was thus judicially held to be illegal/unauthorised and that he had undertaken to pay compensation.

4. The present suit

On 19 December 2024, the plaintiffs filed Suit No. 23 of 2025 in the Bombay High Court on its Original Side seeking:

recovery of Rs. 17,20,88,896/- as compensation (with interest) for the defendant’s use and occupation of the suit properties during the contentious period; and
no administrative or structural relief relating to the trust (no prayer for removal of trustee, framing of scheme, etc.).

The plaint repeatedly describes the defendant as:

an “erstwhile illegal trustee” (para 2);
who, “during his tenure, taking undue advantage of his position”, unlawfully occupied the properties (para 10);
whose actions are in “teeth of Section 51 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882” (para 15); and
yet also declares that there was “no legal or jural relationship” and calls him a “trespasser” (para 51).

5. The interim application under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC

The defendant moved Interim Application No. 3243 of 2025 seeking rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC on the ground that:

the suit was barred under the MPT Act, particularly Sections 50, 51 and 80, since:
- the cause of action was squarely within Section 50 (suit by or against public trusts/trustees), and
- prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner under Section 51 had not been obtained;
the Charity Commissioner, being a necessary party under Section 51(3), was not impleaded; and
the suit was vexatious and time‑barred (though limitation was not ultimately pressed).

The plaintiffs opposed, contending that:

the defendant was a trespasser/unauthorised occupant, not a trustee in the eye of law during the relevant period, given the ACC’s finding of an “illegal trusteeship”;
a suit by a public trust against a trespasser, licensee or tenant does not attract Sections 50 and 51; and
the relief sought was purely compensatory for a civil wrong, not a representative/administrative action concerning trust management.

They relied on a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in Shri Hari Ashram (through its Trustee) v. Vijay Jayantilal Patel & Anr. (IA No. 4436 of 2025 in Suit No. 13 of 2025, decided on 03.10.2025), to argue that no Charity Commissioner consent is required for suits against persons holding trust property adversely (such as trespassers).

III. Summary of the Judgment

1. Issues before the Court

Although the Court does not formally frame issues, the core questions it addresses are:

On a reading of the plaint and its annexures alone, what is the true legal character of the defendant’s occupation of the suit properties during the relevant period — as a trustee/ex‑trustee of the Trust, or as a trespasser/unauthorised occupant?
Does the present suit fall within the ambit of Section 50 of the MPT Act?
If yes, is prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner under Section 51 mandatory? And is the suit barred by law for want of such consent, thereby attracting Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC?

2. Findings

The Court’s principal findings can be summarised as follows:

Plaint itself shows defendant was sued in his capacity as (erstwhile) trustee
A holistic reading of the plaint (particularly paras 2, 4, 6, 10, 15 and 51) and key annexures (Exhibits D, L‑1, I, the legal opinion, and S) makes it “prima facie evident” that:
- the Trust consistently treated the defendant as a “trustee/permanent trustee/erstwhile trustee” at all relevant times, and
- the very cause of action — recovery of compensation — is pleaded on the premise that he abused his position as trustee to derive personal benefit from trust property.
The suit falls squarely within Section 50 MPT Act
Given how the plaintiffs themselves characterise the defendant and the nature of relief sought, the suit is one:
- alleging “breach of a public trust, negligence, misapplication or misconduct on the part of a trustee” [Section 50(i)], and
- seeking directions “to recover the possession of, or to follow, property belonging to a public trust or the proceeds thereof, or for an account of such property or proceeds, from a trustee or ex‑trustee” [Section 50(ii)].
The reliefs prayed (recovery of compensation with interest for loss caused to the Trust by the defendant’s use of its properties) are “most specifically” covered by clauses (a), (f) and (q) of Section 50.
Defendant cannot be treated as “person holding adversely / trespasser” within the exclusion in Section 50(ii)
The Court rejects the plaintiffs’ submission that, since the ACC later termed the defendant an “illegal trustee” and some paragraphs call him a “trespasser”, he should be seen under the tail end of Section 50(ii) — which excludes “a person holding adversely to the public trust, trespasser, licensee or tenant”.

The Court holds that:
“Once Plaintiffs have described the Defendant as a Trustee / permanent Trustee in the Suit plaint itself as also on the basis of the supporting documents… there can be no manner of doubt that the Suit… is on behalf of Plaintiff No.1‑Trust for recovery of compensation from Defendant in his capacity as the erstwhile Trustee…”
Therefore, he is not a mere adverse possessor or outsider; he is a trustee whose misfeasance triggers Section 50.
Consent under Section 51 and joinder of Charity Commissioner are mandatory
For any suit “of the nature specified in Section 50”, persons having an interest must first:
- apply in writing to the Charity Commissioner for consent under Section 51(1); and
- implead the Charity Commissioner as a necessary party under Section 51(3).
The plaintiffs had done neither. This constitutes non‑compliance with Sections 50–51 and renders the suit not maintainable.
Suit is barred by law; plaint rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d)
Since, on the face of the plaint and documents, the suit is of a kind that must be brought through the special procedure of Section 50 and 51, filing an ordinary civil suit without consent is barred by the MPT Act. This squarely attracts Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC (“where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law”).

The Court therefore:
- allows IA No. 3243 of 2025, and
- rejects the plaint in Suit No. 23 of 2025.
The other interim application (IA No. 4005 of 2025) is disposed of as a consequence.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

1. The procedural lens: Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC

Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC enables a court to reject a plaint if, from the plaint itself, the suit appears to be barred by any law. The settled principles (as reiterated in several Supreme Court decisions) are:

Only plaint and its annexures are relevant: The Court must look solely at the averments in the plaint and documents filed with it. Defences, denials or contrary facts alleged in written statement or arguments are irrelevant at this stage.
Plaint is assumed to be true for this limited purpose: The Court proceeds on the footing that the facts pleaded by the plaintiff are true, and then asks whether, even if true, the suit is barred by any statute.
Bar must be apparent from plaint itself: The bar must be evident from the plaint’s own statements; complex factual inquiries are outside the scope of this inquiry.

Justice Jadhav faithfully applies this test. He meticulously extracts and analyses key paragraphs of the plaint (paras 2, 4, 6, 10, 15, 51) and the plaintiffs’ own annexures, and from these concludes that the suit is of the Section 50 variety. On this foundation, the bar under Sections 50–51 is treated as operating squarely within Order VII Rule 11(d).

2. The statutory scheme: Sections 50, 51 and 80 of the MPT Act

2.1 Section 50 – “Suit by or against or relating to public trusts or trustees or others”

Section 50 is a special provision creating a statutory framework for representative suits concerning public trusts. It largely parallels Section 92 CPC (charitable/religious trusts) but is specific to Maharashtra and wider in scope.

In simplified terms, Section 50 provides that in four broad classes of cases:

alleged breach of a public trust, negligence, misapplication or misconduct by trustees;
need to recover possession of, or trace, trust property or its proceeds from a trustee, ex‑trustee, alienee or other person (but excluding persons holding adversely, trespassers, licensees, or tenants);
necessity of court directions for administration of a public trust; or
declarations/injunctions in favour of or against a trust, trustee or beneficiary,

a suit for specified reliefs (clauses (a)–(q)) may be filed only as a Section 50 suit — that is:

by the Charity Commissioner, or
by “persons having an interest” in the trust, but only after obtaining the Charity Commissioner’s written consent under Section 51.

The reliefs expressly include, inter alia:

Section 50(a): Order for recovery of possession of trust property or its proceeds;
Section 50(e): Directions for taking accounts and making inquiries;
Section 50(f): Order directing trustees or others to pay to the trust the loss caused by breach of trust, negligence, misapplication, misconduct or wilful default;
Section 50(p): Declaration/denial of rights in favour of or against a public trust or trustee or beneficiary, and injunctions; and
Section 50(q): A residuary clause — “any other relief” which is a condition precedent or consequential to the above, or necessary in the interest of the trust.

Most crucially for this case, Section 50(ii) contains a deliberate exclusion: when the property is sought to be recovered from “a person holding adversely to the public trust, trespasser, licensee or tenant”, such cases fall outside Section 50 — and therefore outside the mandatory consent regime of Section 51.

2.2 Section 51 – Consent of Charity Commissioner

Section 51 operationalises Section 50 by providing:

Persons having interest who wish to “file a suit of the nature specified in Section 50” must first apply in writing to the Charity Commissioner for consent.
The Charity Commissioner, after hearing parties and making necessary inquiries, may grant or refuse consent within six months, based on the existence of a prima facie case.
If consent is refused, an appeal lies to the Court, but otherwise the order is final.
In every suit filed by such persons under Section 50, the Charity Commissioner is a necessary party [Section 51(3)].

Sections 50 and 51 together create a special statutory gatekeeping mechanism for trust‑related litigation, ensuring:

screening of frivolous or malicious suits by internal stakeholders, and
institutional oversight and participation of the Charity Commissioner in sensitive trust disputes.

2.3 Section 80 – Bar of jurisdiction

Although not analysed in depth in the judgment, Section 80 MPT Act is relevant contextually. It broadly bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of matters that are required by the Act to be decided by authorities such as the Charity Commissioner, ACC, etc., except as expressly provided (e.g., Section 50 suits).

Read together, Sections 50, 51 and 80 create a bifurcated regime:

Internal/administrative issues are largely reserved for charitable authorities (with limited civil court supervision);
Representative suits of the kind described in Section 50 must follow the special procedure (consent + joinder) before being brought in civil courts;
Ordinary civil suits (e.g., against trespassers, tenants, licensees, or on independent contracts) can be brought without invoking Section 50.

The key, therefore, is to identify on which side of this line a particular suit falls — and that is precisely what this judgment does.

3. Characterisation of the defendant: trustee vs trespasser

The pivot of the case is whether, on the plaintiffs’ own pleadings and documents, the defendant’s occupation is that of:

a trustee/ex‑trustee who misused trust property (engaging Section 50), or
a mere trespasser/person holding adversely to the trust (falling within the exclusion in Section 50(ii)).

3.1 Key pleadings relied on by the Court

Justice Jadhav carefully extracts and analyses several paragraphs of the plaint:

Paragraph 2: The defendant is described as “an erstwhile illegal trustee of the said Trust” whose change report has been rejected, “thereby, removing the Defendant from the Trust”.
Paragraph 4: The suit is to seek recovery of compensation as “the Defendant caused unprecedented losses to the Trust to him illegally occupying the said Trust’s Property during his tenure as an erstwhile illegal trustee.”
Paragraph 6: Recital of the “criminal conspiracy” by which the defendant and others came to be “illegally appointed as Trustees” and kept on reappointing themselves through change reports.
Paragraph 10: Plaintiffs state that “the Defendant during his tenure, taking undue advantage of his position was unlawfully occupying” the 12th floor flat and 3rd floor office.
Paragraph 15: It is admitted that “the Defendant was admittedly in possession and occupation” of the 12th floor property “from 2007 to 2018” and that his act of occupying it for personal use is “in teeth of Section 51 of the Indian Trusts Act, 1882… [a] trustee may not use or deal with the trust‑property for his own profit…”.
Paragraph 51 (mislabeled as 50 in the extract): After asserting there was no legal or jural relationship (landlord–tenant/licensor–licensee), the defendant is then called “always a trespasser upon the said premises”.

The Court notes that while para 51 uses the expression “trespasser”, the thrust of the plaint — especially paras 2, 4, 6, 10 and 15 — is that the defendant:

was a trustee (albeit allegedly illegally appointed),
abused his position as trustee, and
committed a breach of fiduciary duty by using trust property for personal benefit.

3.2 Plaintiffs’ own documents (annexures) reinforcing trustee status

Equally important is the Court’s reliance on the plaintiffs’ annexures to the plaint:

Exhibit D (Letter dated 30.03.2009): A letter from the Trust to the defendant, addressing him explicitly as “permanent Trustee”. While calling upon him to vacate the premises, it nonetheless recognises him as a trustee.
Exhibit L‑1 (Letter dated 15.09.2017): Issued by the Trust to nine individuals listed as “Trustees”. The defendant appears as Trustee No. 5. This letter follows the Supreme Court’s order on occupation and calls upon him to vacate.
Annexure I (Letter dated 15.09.2017): From the Principal Advisor to the Board of Trustees to the defendant, describing him as “Member of the Board of Trustees” and admonishing him as a “respectable Trustee” who risks contempt of the Supreme Court if he violates its directives.
Synopsis of a Contempt Petition: In the recitals, the defendant is again referred to as a trustee.
Exhibit S (Letter dated 20.01.2009): On behalf of the Trust, this letter:
- expressly addresses the defendant as “permanent Trustee”; and
- states that “though you have been discharging your obligations as a Trustee of the Trust generally and as authorised by the Board of Trustees, as a Trustee of a Public Charitable Trust, you could not have and cannot occupy and continue occupation of a part of the 12th floor…”

This last letter is particularly telling: it acknowledges that the defendant was:

acting as a trustee,
discharging trustee obligations generally, and
authorised by the Board,

but alleges breach of duty in using trust property for private residence. This fits squarely within the classic paradigm of trustee misfeasance/breach of trust — precisely the scenario Section 50(i) and (f) are designed to address.

3.3 The Court’s conclusion on characterisation

On this material, the Court concludes:

“In the context of the above contents of the Suit plaint which are prima facie clear and unambiguous and the Exhibits referred to hereinabove, it is prima facie evident that Defendant has been described and considered as a Trustee / permanent Trustee of Plaintiff No.1‑Trust for invoking action against him for recovery of compensation for his occupation of the suit properties… During the contentious period for which recovery of compensation is sought is admittedly on the basis of Plaintiffs’ case as he being a Trustee… and he having misused his position as a Trustee.”

Thus, the defendant cannot be retrospectively re‑labelled as a rank trespasser to circumvent the statutory scheme. The attempt to rely on the ACC’s 2023 order (that he was an “illegally appointed trustee”) does not alter the legal character of his status during the years when the Trust itself treated and dealt with him as trustee.

4. Why the suit falls under Section 50

Having settled the defendant’s character, the Court turns to the nature of the suit. It finds that:

The gravamen of the plaintiffs’ complaint is breach of fiduciary duty: that the defendant, as trustee, misused trust property for personal residence and office, thereby causing financial loss to the Trust.
The relief claimed — compensation for such use and occupation, with interest — is in substance:
- an order directing a trustee/ex‑trustee to pay to the trust the loss caused by breach of trust, negligence or misapplication (Section 50(f));
- recovery of the “proceeds” of trust property from a trustee/ex‑trustee (Section 50(ii) read with 50(a)); and
- a consequential or incidental relief “necessary in the interest of the trust” (Section 50(q)).

Thus, even though the plaintiffs do not seek removal of trustees, framing of scheme, or other classic “administrative” Section 50 reliefs, the claim for compensation itself is sufficient to bring the matter within Section 50, particularly clause (f). The Court makes it clear that Section 50 is not confined to purely structural remedies; monetary reliefs against trustees for misfeasance are squarely included.

5. Rejection of the “trespasser” escape route

The plaintiffs attempted to rely on the explicit exclusion in Section 50(ii) (for persons holding adversely/trespassers) and on the decision in Shri Hari Ashram, to argue that:

Whenever a person holds trust property illegally or adversely, the suit can be treated as one against a trespasser, and
no consent under Section 51 is then required.

Justice Jadhav rejects this in the present context for two reasons:

Substance of pleadings prevails over labels
The Court emphasises that the entire plaint and annexures must be read “holistically”. Isolated use of the word “trespasser” in para 51 cannot override the consistent and unequivocal treatment of the defendant as a trustee/permanent trustee/erstwhile trustee elsewhere.
Section 50(ii) exclusion is for outsiders, not defaulting trustees
The exclusion in Section 50(ii) is limited to persons who hold trust property adversely to the trust ab initio — such as strangers, rank trespassers, tenants or licensees — against whom an ordinary civil suit may be filed.

It does not apply where:
- the person is a trustee or ex‑trustee,
- the complaint is about misuse of fiduciary position, and
- the cause of action is framed in terms of breach of trust/negligence/misconduct.

In short, the Court draws a clear doctrinal line: misconduct by a trustee remains trustee misconduct, even if the conduct is illegal or unauthorised; such wrongdoing does not convert him into a trespasser for the purposes of avoiding Section 50.

6. Necessity of Charity Commissioner’s consent and joinder

Once the suit is found to be of the “nature specified in Section 50”, Section 51’s machinery is automatically triggered:

The plaintiffs, being persons having interest, were required to apply in writing to the Charity Commissioner for consent before instituting the suit.
Only upon consent (or successful appeal against refusal) could the suit be filed in the civil court.
The Charity Commissioner, in any such suit, must be joined as a necessary party [Section 51(3)].

The plaintiffs had admittedly not obtained such consent, nor had they impleaded the Charity Commissioner. Therefore, there was a dual violation:

non‑compliance with the statutory precondition to maintainability (consent), and
non‑joinder of a mandatory party in a Section 50 suit.

The Court treats this not merely as a curable procedural defect but as an instance where:

“there is non‑compliance of the provisions of Section 50 read with Section 51 of MPT Act by Plaintiffs.”

This non‑compliance, visible from the face of the plaint, leads to rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) as a suit “barred by law”.

V. Precedents and Authorities Cited or Engaged

1. Shri Hari Ashram (through its Trustee) v. Vijay Jayantilal Patel & Anr.

Counsel for the plaintiffs relied on the Bombay High Court decision (Coram: Sandeep V. Marne, J.) in Shri Hari Ashram (through its Trustee) v. Vijay Jayantilal Patel & Anr., IA No. 4436 of 2025 in Suit No. 13 of 2025, decided on 3 October 2025.

Although the present judgment does not discuss Shri Hari Ashram in detail, the principle invoked was:

Suits by or on behalf of a public trust against persons holding property adversely — trespassers, tenants, licensees — do not fall within Section 50, and hence do not require Charity Commissioner’s consent under Section 51.

Justice Jadhav does not question this proposition. Instead, he distinguishes the present case on facts, by holding that the defendant is not a trespasser in that sense but a trustee/ex‑trustee. In effect, the judgment refines the application of Shri Hari Ashram by:

reaffirming its applicability for genuine trespasser/tenant/licensee cases; but
clarifying that its shield cannot be used where, on the plaintiffs’ own showing, the wrongdoer is a trustee whose breach of fiduciary obligations is in issue.

2. Supreme Court orders in SLP (C) No. 3772 of 2014

The plaintiffs also relied on Supreme Court orders dated 11.05.2015 and 21.01.2016 in SLP (C) No. 3772 of 2014, where:

the defendant’s occupation of the 12th floor flat was held to be unauthorised, and
he agreed to pay market rent and maintenance, and ultimately vacate.

The High Court mentions these orders but does not treat them as determinative of the present procedural question under Sections 50 and 51. They go to:

the merits of the defendant’s liability for compensation, and
the character of his occupation as unauthorised,

but they do not answer the distinct question: What is the proper statutory route for the Trust to recover that compensation now? It is that latter question which Section 50–51 answers and which the Court resolves against the plaintiffs.

3. Wider jurisprudence (contextual, not expressly cited)

Although not expressly cited, the judgment is consistent with established principles laid down in Supreme Court jurisprudence:

On Order VII Rule 11 CPC: That the plaint alone must be looked at to ascertain if a suit is barred by law, and that clever drafting cannot confer jurisdiction where a statute clearly bars the suit.
On special statutory procedures: That when a special law (like the MPT Act) prescribes a particular procedure for certain categories of cases (Section 50 suits), parties cannot bypass that scheme and resort directly to ordinary civil remedies.

The present judgment concretely applies these principles to the MPT Act context, particularly Sections 50–51 and the “trustee vs trespasser” distinction.

VI. Impact and Implications

1. For public trusts in Maharashtra

The judgment has significant practical consequences for public charitable trusts, especially in Maharashtra where many large hospitals, educational institutions and religious bodies are governed by the MPT Act:

Compensation/damages claims against trustees must ordinarily proceed under Section 50:
- Any suit alleging that trustees (or ex‑trustees) misused trust property, misapplied funds, or caused loss by negligence/misconduct, and seeking monetary recovery, will typically be a Section 50 suit.
- Such suits cannot be filed as ordinary civil actions without Charity Commissioner consent.
Attempted re‑labelling will be scrutinised:
- Trusts cannot circumvent Section 50 simply by describing misbehaving trustees as “trespassers” in the plaint.
- Civil courts will examine the totality of pleadings and contemporaneous documents to determine the true character of the dispute.
Charity Commissioner’s gatekeeping role is reinforced:
- Stakeholders must first approach the Charity Commissioner, who will filter out frivolous matters and ensure that litigation is in the trust’s best interest.
- The Commissioner’s mandatory presence as a party in Section 50 suits ensures institutional oversight.

2. For new boards proceeding against erstwhile managements

Cases like this are common: a new board of trustees replaces an old one after charity proceedings, and then uncovers alleged misappropriation or misuse (e.g., “Rs. 1700–1800 crores” as alleged here). This judgment sends a clear signal:

First stop is the Charity Commissioner:
- Before suing former trustees for compensation, misfeasance, or recovery of property, new boards must channel their grievances through the Section 50–51 route.
Risk of plaint rejection if Section 50–51 bypassed:
- If they file a civil suit directly, the plaint is vulnerable to being rejected at the threshold under Order VII Rule 11(d), as here.

This also interacts with limitation: where substantial time has already elapsed, if an ordinary suit is rejected for want of consent, plaintiffs may face limitation challenges in refiling a proper Section 50 suit later. Strategically, therefore, compliance with Section 50–51 at the first instance is critical.

3. Clarifying the “trustee vs trespasser” boundary

The judgment clarifies and sharpens the boundaries between:

True outsiders: Persons who never had trustee status and hold trust property adversely — pure trespassers, tenants, licensees, encroachers. Suits against them can be ordinary civil actions; Section 50–51 need not be invoked.
Insider wrongdoers: Trustees or ex‑trustees who, while in office or acting as such, misuse trust property or breach their fiduciary duties. Claims against them for compensatory recovery must be brought via Section 50.

This clarification is doctrinally sound: a trustee who breaches trust does not thereby cease to be a trustee for the purpose of legal accountability; rather, it is precisely because of his fiduciary status that special remedies (including Section 50 suits) are made available.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What is a “public trust” and who is a “trustee” under the MPT Act?

A public trust under the MPT Act is typically a trust for charitable or religious purposes benefitting the public at large, such as hospitals like Lilavati Hospital, educational institutions, temples, etc.

A trustee is a person in whom the trust property is vested and who is responsible for managing it according to the trust’s objects. Under the MPT Act, even a person who acts as a trustee and is treated as such in practice is generally considered a trustee for legal purposes, even if his appointment is later questioned (a “de facto” trustee).

2. What is a “Change Report”?

Under the MPT Act, whenever there is a change in trustees, property, or other material aspects of a registered public trust, a change report must be filed before the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The ACC inquires into the report and decides whether to record the change in the trust’s public records.

In this case, the ACC’s order dated 14.12.2023 rejected the change report that recognised the defendant and others as trustees, branding their appointments as “illegal”. This is important for governance, but it did not retrospectively erase the fact that for many years the Trust treated and accepted the defendant as a trustee.

3. What does “barred by law” under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC mean?

A suit is “barred by law” if a statutory provision expressly or impliedly prohibits the court from entertaining it in the form in which it is filed. Examples include:

a limitation provision clearly showing that a suit is out of time;
a statutory bar saying certain disputes must be decided by a special tribunal; or
a special law requiring prior sanction/consent before filing a suit.

Here, the “bar” arises because:

Section 50 read with Section 51 mandates a specific procedure (including prior consent) for suits of a particular type against trustees; and
the plaintiffs skipped this mandatory step and filed an ordinary suit.

4. Why is Charity Commissioner’s consent so important?

The requirement of prior written consent under Section 51 serves several purposes:

Prevents internal factionalism or vendettas within a trust from spilling into vexatious litigation;
Ensures that any suit brought in the name of, or on behalf of, the trust is in the genuine interest of the trust and its beneficiaries;
Allows the Charity Commissioner, as a specialised regulator, to oversee and participate in significant disputes involving trust property and trustees’ conduct.

It is therefore not a mere formality; it is a substantive gatekeeping measure.

5. “Misfeasance by trustee” vs “trespass by outsider”

A key conceptual distinction is:

Misfeasance by trustee: A trustee misuses his access to trust property in breach of his duty (e.g., living in trust property rent‑free, diverting trust funds). This is a breach of trust or misapplication within Section 50(i), and recovery claims against him fall under Section 50(f).
Trespass/encroachment by outsider: A person with no fiduciary role wrongfully occupies or encroaches on trust property. Suits against such persons (trespassers, tenants, licensees, encroachers) need not go through Section 50–51.

The present judgment ensures this distinction is maintained and that trustees cannot be conveniently re‑cast as “trespassers” to bypass the special regime.

VIII. Conclusion: Key Takeaways

This judgment establishes and clarifies several important propositions in the law of public trusts in Maharashtra:

Substance over drafting labels
Courts will look beyond labels like “trespasser” in the plaint and examine the substance of the pleadings and annexures. If the plaintiff’s own case shows that the defendant acted as a trustee (or ex‑trustee) and that the grievance is about misuse of trust property in that capacity, Section 50 applies.
Suits against trustees/ex‑trustees for misfeasance must follow Section 50–51
Claims for compensation, damages, or recovery of proceeds of trust property from trustees or ex‑trustees — arising from alleged breach of trust, negligence, misapplication or misconduct — are “suits of the nature specified in Section 50”. They require:
- prior written consent of the Charity Commissioner (Section 51(1)); and
- joinder of the Charity Commissioner as a necessary party (Section 51(3)).
Section 50(ii) exclusion for trespassers is narrow
The exclusion for “persons holding adversely… trespassers, licensees, tenants” is confined to genuine outsiders, not to trustees who abuse their position. Misconduct by a trustee does not convert him into a trespasser for purposes of escaping Section 50.
Non‑compliance renders suit barred and plaint liable to rejection
Where a suit is, on a fair reading, of the Section 50 type, filing an ordinary civil suit without Charity Commissioner consent constitutes a bar under the MPT Act. Such a suit can be nipped in the bud under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC, as happened here.
Practical guidance for trusts
Trustees, beneficiaries and regulatory authorities should treat this decision as a clear reminder that:
- serious internal grievances against trustees must be pursued via the special statutory route; and
- careful, accurate pleadings — consistent with past correspondence and conduct — are vital. Attempts at creative re‑characterisation may fail and result in outright rejection of the suit.

In the broader legal context, Niket Mehta v. Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust strengthens the integrity of the MPT Act’s specialised regime by preventing its circumvention through artful drafting. It underscores the central regulatory role of the Charity Commissioner and reinforces that trustees, especially of major public institutions, remain accountable through the structured procedures that the Legislature has put in place.